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ANNEX

(Books about)

A

REPLY

TO

THE CALUMNIES

OF

THE EDINBURGH REVIEW

AGAINST

OXFORD.

CONTAINING

AN ACCOUNT OF STUDIES

PURSUED IN THAT UNIVERSITY.

Copleston

Χαλεπὸν τὸ μετρίως εἰπεῖν, ἐν ᾧ μάλις καὶ ἡ δόκησις τῆς ἀληθείας βεβαιοῦται.

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IT will detract very much from the authority of theſe pages, but to prevent all poſſible miſrepreſentation it is right, to ſtate, that a ſingle individual is reſponſible for every fact, opinion, ſentiment, and criticiſm, advanced in them. The undertaking was ſuggeſted by his own feelings, without communication or advice, and finiſhed entirely by his own hand. Many things perhaps are contained in it, which would not be ſanctioned by the general voice of this place. For the correctneſs of the ſtatements, however, the Author has no fears: and for this he will not refuſe to account in perſon, if it ſhould ever be called in queſtion by any reſpectable name. In the mean time he will defend himſelf againſt the variety of judgments that will probably be paſſed on his work, by a ſentiment which is explanatory

tory of the motto he has aſſumed, and which the wiſeſt hiſtorian has placed in the mouth of the greateſt ſtateſman of Greece.

Ὁ τε γὰρ ξυνειδὼς καὶ εὖνους ἀκριβὴς τάχ' ἄν τι ἐνδεέστερος πρὸς ἃ βέλεταί τε καὶ ἐπίσταται νομίσειε δηλοῦσθαι· ὅ τε ἄπειρος, ἔστιν ἃ καὶ πλεονάζεσθαι, διὰ φθόνον, ἔστι ὑπὲρ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν ἀκούοι. Thuc. ii. 35.

INTRODUCTION.

IN a late endeavour which I made to hold up to general contempt a work profeſſedly deſigned for the Students of this Univerſity, a work teeming with faults, and preſenting a view of its ſubject totally miſtaken and confuſed, my only ſcruple then was, and my only ſource of regret now is, leſt it ſhould lead any to imagine that criticiſm of that ſort is a thing which I admire for its own ſake, or would myſelf willingly engage in. If no ſhare of the diſgrace, which ſuch a publication muſt incur, had belonged to us, if no practical evil were likely to ariſe from it, evil of a kind which it is our eſpecial duty to cure and to ſuppreſs, the work, however deceitful its name and its compoſition, might perhaps have been allowed to paſs along unnoticed. But what might be conceded to the common practitioners in this faculty of authorſhip, cannot be claimed by him who boaſts of his offices and employments in a ſeat of learning, in order to give weight and currency to his opinions—by him who had already ſpurned the rod which *gently* corrected him, and had

given full proof, that none but the moſt rigorous and unrelenting diſcipline could have any avail. In ſuch a caſe, it was well known, that no tender feelings would be haraſſed and tormented: and the ordinary ſmart, which literary diſgrace brings with it, cannot by any manly reaſoner be oppoſed to the exerciſe of an important public duty. When the author, not content with weaving his tiſſue of cobweb errors in obſcurity, preſumes to hang them on one of the proudeſt columns of our national temple, who is the fickly *ſentimentaliſt* that would ſtay the arm of criticiſm, or feel a pang at ſeeing the whole unſightly cluſter ſwept away*? Swept away, I truſt, they now are, and added to that heap of uſeleſs rubbiſh which is for ever accumulating from the offal of the preſs: and I ſhall be well content if the criticiſm itſelf, as well as the folly which provoked it, be doomed to the ſame end. If there be any bits of finer temperament and harder ſubſtance found in it, they may be ſorted

* It is ſaid that the author laughs at this criticiſm, as feeble and inefficient. If it fails of effecting its purpoſe, he may be ſure another attempt of the ſame kind will be made. Of the province of taſte, wit, fancy, and female education, I leave him in undiſturbed poſſeſſion. But if he again comes forward in the capacity of inſtructor to the Students of this Univerſity, or commits the credit of the Univerſity in any way upon his works, the ſolidity of his pretenſions will be examined with the ſame freedom as heretofore.

from

from the maſs, and worked up hereafter into ſome goodlier and more enduring form: but the reſt, if it have done the ſervice for which it was intended, may go with my free pleaſure, where the haſty effuſions of the hour naturally go, and be forgotten.

If, however, I ſhall have acquired the character of one who looks with a keen and malicious eye into the doings of his neighbour, or who is rather prone to diſcover what is amiſs, than to praiſe and to be thankful for what is truly valuable, I ſhall have made a greater ſacrifice than my wiſh or meaning was, to what I eſteemed a public ſervice. On this ſubject my opinions and my feelings will have been utterly miſtaken. The diſguſt indeed, which I have felt at witneſſing the miſapplication of literary torture, far exceeds the ſatisfaction I have ever derived from the moſt juſt and ſalutary employment of it. And the preſent age has ſurely furniſhed abundant proof, how a cruel and unjuſt judge may defeat the purpoſe for which he was inveſted with his brief authority; and make us heſitate whether it be not better to live without laws and without magiſtrates, than to ſuffer the prejudices and paſſions of an individual to acquire an almoſt reſiſtleſs ſway, from the ſanction of a regular and apparently conſtitutional tribunal.

The tribunal of which I ſpeak every one will

underſtand. It is one of the ableſt of our literary journals; and, with the power of doing much good, ſeems to delight (ſhall I ſay it?) in doing evil. It glories in abuſing the privilege which public admiration at one time, and public fear ſince, has conferred upon it. But it is time to raiſe the voice of injured freedom and inſulted honour. It is time to convince the world, that bitter invective and loud reproach do not always flow from the abhorrence of what is wrong, but often from the diſlike only of what is different, or the envy of what is proſperous. If we had formerly to complain of mean and mercenary judges, we may perhaps have gained little by changing them for thoſe that are capricious, prejudiced, or vindictive. The indulgence of malignant paſſion, if not ſo contemptible as the love of gain, is certainly more odious—and the ſtain of ſelfiſhneſs is as deeply ingrained in him, who, for the ſake of ſerving his own partial intereſts and contracted relations in the community, undermines the reputation of his neighbour, or who laughs in ſecret at the miſchief which his dark ſlander propagates, as in him who hoards the wages of his ſervility, and broods in ſilence at home over his ill-gotten treaſures.

The vice indeed which firſt ſprouted forth from this green oligarchy, and whoſe rank growth firſt required pruning and correction, was one which

which is the natural offspring of unreſiſted power. After having inſtalled themſelves with a little harmleſs pageantry, in a court degraded by the corruption of its former magiſtrates, and having diſplayed to the gaping multitude, with ſome decent ceremony, though with ſome vanity, their new robes of office, they ſoon began to make them feel the full rigour of their juriſdiction. It was a rigour however which fell indiſcriminately on flagrant and on venial offences, on young and timid culprits, as well as on the moſt practiſed and incorrigible offenders: till at length the exerciſe of ſeverity ſeemed to have blunted, and in ſome inſtances brutalized, the feelings of the judges. They reſpected not the ſmothered but yet unextinguiſhed ſpark of virtue which ſhame indicates; and, for one act of temerity or indiſcretion, dealt out the full meaſure of puniſhment without mercy: thus leaving to the generous mind, once ſtung by the conciouſneſs of diſgrace, no hope of retrieving its honour, and confirming the habitual delinquent in his bad courſes, by making no difference between him and leſſer criminals. The puniſhments themſelves were accompanied by new and exquiſite tortures, deſerved indeed in ſome caſes, but frequently employed only becauſe the ſubject was likely to feel more tenderly, not becauſe his crime was greater, or his audacity more offenſive. And over too many of ſpotleſs

life

life and character, they wielded, in wanton defiance of all our feelings, the ſceptre of tyranny, inſtead of the ſword of juſtice.

But what are the fruits of this harſh diſcipline, even ſuppoſing it to be impartial? Among the moſt induſtrious huſbandmen in that vineyard are thoſe, who are not impelled by want or the lure of high wages, but who *love their work*, and who think they cannot better or more honeſtly employ the time which God has given them, than in this taſk. Theſe men, if treated with plain and homely fare, are well ſatisfied; but they turn with diſguſt and ſhrink back with fear from a ſervice which expoſes them to the headſtrong and boiſterous humours of ſome inſolent taſkmaſter: and, rather than endure his railings and impertinence, they will eat their bread in private, and ſhun all communion, except with their neareſt neighbours.

Why then ſhould we permit a few forward and loud talkers to confound and ſilence ſuch men as theſe? men, who though not fitted to guide the converſation in the great ſociety of the world, are yet well qualified to ſuſtain their part in it, to enliven, to diverſify, and occaſionally to enrich it? Why ſhould we ſcare from the face of day that uſeful and laborious mediocrity, which is not ambitious of fame, although it may be tender of its reputation; which intrudes not into our uppermoſt ſeats, but demands only a civil and not unfriendly

unfriendly reception? This ſurely is neither conſiſtent with juſtice, nor humanity, nor ſound policy. It is dangerous to check the current of free commerce. By ſo doing we either in time divert it wholly from ourſelves, or idly pond back the wealth which ought to circulate through a thouſand ducts and channels, for the public good.

Literature, as well as Science, if it does not go forward, is apt to periſh where it ſtands, or even to loſe ground rapidly. But let us not imagine that he who ſits aloft guiding her car, or that the fiery ſteeds which bear it along, are alone entitled to our admiration. How many unſeen hands are at this moment employed in ſhaping the various and complicated parts of that divine machinery! How many in drawing together the fit materials for its ſtructure, ſcattered as they are over the whole ſurface of the univerſe! How many in exploring diſtant regions, for thoſe gems and brilliant dyes, which glitter in the ſunſhine of peace, and captivate for a time our roving fancy! How many faithful and diligent pioneers are now clearing thickets, fencing out precipices, and removing the obſtructions with which time and neglect and prejudice and ignorance have contributed to impede our progreſs! How many ſkilful engineers are planning new lines of direction for our road, ſmoothing aſcents, cutting off angles and uſeleſs windings, uniting the yawning

ſides

ſides of valleys, round which we formerly toiled in tedious circuit, and providing acroſs the hitherto untrodden gulph a firm and ſafe paſſage! How many of livelier imagination, and more buoyant ſpirits, are adorning the road-ſide with flowers, dreſſing out the country, right and left, in all the fair varieties of nature, opening the landſcape to our view, and giving us at intervals a proſpect of thoſe happy fabled regions, light up by the gleams of hope and of memory, which pleaſe even at a diſtance, and charm away the tedium of human life!

We are all engaged in one ſervice, although our powers may be unequal, and our departments various. And whoever heartily and honeſtly lends himſelf to any of theſe duties, deſerves not our contempt and deriſion, but our favour and encouragement. Let him even fail of ſatisfying the expectation he has raiſed, ſtill if his labours have not been wholly barren, the moſt moderate ſervices may be allowed to ſave him from the keen edge of ſcorn and ridicule and ſtrong invective. Dulneſs muſt indeed be made to underſtand its proper level; arrogance muſt be humbled, forward ignorance abaſhed, error reprimanded, and prejudice condemned. But that powerful enginery ſhould be reſerved for offences of deeper guilt and more ſerious miſchief, for the grovelling reptiles of quackery and obſcenity, for the foul deformed monſters of malice

malice, ſedition, and impiety. Againſt theſe let the indignant Spirit of criticiſm bare his red right arm, and hurl his thunders; againſt theſe let him ſend forth the fierce miniſters of his vengeance, with their viper hair and ſounding laſh.

And to the immortal honour of the Editor of that Journal be it ſpoken, he *has* employed *his own* unrivalled talents, if rumour ſays true, moſt frequently in that ſervice[b]. And by theſe manly efforts in the cauſe of virtue, he has raiſed to himſelf a monument, that will outlive the memory of thoſe occaſions which awakened them, and will continue to command our admiration long after the clamours of his enemies have been huſhed, and even the well-grounded complaints of injured men have been forgotten. The boundleſs extent, however, of his wealth appears to me to have betrayed him into ſome waſteful and ſome injurious expenditure. There is a reſpect due to Genius even in its failings. When the predominant character is bright and pure, while blemiſhes here and there tarniſh its luſtre, I do not ſay theſe

[b] It is commonly reported that, among many other maſterly Eſſays, the following have proceeded from his pen. On Ritſon's Abſtinence from Animal Food, No. 3. Moore's Poems, No. 16. Willan on Vaccination, No. 17. Cobbett's Political Regiſter, No. 20.

blemiſhes ſhould be palliated or unnoticed, but the tone of animadverſion ought certainly to be lowered. Who is not offended at ſeeing THE FIRST POET OF THE AGE chaſtiſed, even when he errs, like a truant Schoolboy?

This ſeverity, however, although a prominent vice in the conduct of that Review, is not the grievance which has called forth the preſent complaint. A remedy, indeed, for that evil in ſome meaſure adequate, may be found in the juſtice and candour of other critics, who poſſeſs the confidence of the public. But when the examination of works in almoſt every branch of ſcience and literature is made the vehicle for covert inſinuation and open railing againſt the Engliſh Univerſities, and eſpecially againſt Oxford; when ſarcaſtic ſneers and alluſions in one number are followed up by keen reproaches and bold accuſations in the next; when the public are taught with unwearied and malicious induſtry to look upon us either as gloomy bigots, or lazy monks, or ignorant pretenders to learning and ſcience; although the falſehood and malevolence of ſuch charges may be viſible to many, yet it muſt happen that ſuch continual droppings will in time make an impreſſion on the public mind, and, if not ſeaſonably counteracted, will probably alienate that reſpect and confidence which we have heretofore en-

enjoyed, and which it is the nation's intereſt, as well as our own, that we ſhould never loſe.

With perſons accuſtomed to the preſs ſuch attacks loſe much of their force, or rather are altogether harmleſs. The malevolence is ſo evident, that they poſſeſs no weight or authority in themſelves: and when the grounds upon which they reſt are examined, it is uſually found that they ariſe not from any poſitive miſdemeanors, which are alledged againſt us, and which admit of diſtinct evidence and diſcuſſion; but that they are looſe charges tacked on to ſome indictment, preferred againſt an individual perhaps, with whom we are quite unconnected, and glancing obliquely only at the Univerſity. It is not that we joſtle them, or ſtop up the way; but they ſtep aſide, and leave their own buſineſs on purpoſe to inſult and pick a quarrel with us. Nothing can more clearly mark a ſettled purpoſe and deſign than this practice. Hardly a book is noticed, (for I will not call their ordinary method *reviewing*,) which does not furniſh an opportunity for this ſort of calumny. And latterly the rankling humour has burſt out in ſuch exorbitant quantity, and with ſuch a malignant aſpect, as to call for immediate and ſtrong remedy.

Of the Editor himſelf I do not think ſo meanly as to impute the wilful falſehoods and miſrepreſentations, with which his journal abounds, to his own

choice. Moſt probably he thinks the charges well-founded. For I believe many of them proceed from the vile ſerpent-brood which have been hatched in our own boſom—that hireling tribe of turncoats, who, diſappointed of honours or rewards here adequate to their own fancied merits, have carried over to the enemy, as the moſt acceptable paſſport, ſome local information, and have courted the favour of their new employers, by mean detraction and extravagant abuſe of their former friends. If any ſuch there be, they will feel the juſtice of this rebuke without any more particular deſignation of their perſons; and I wiſh them no ſeverer puniſhment than that infamy, which, when their work is done, is the common lot of traitors with all parties.

In the mean time, one cannot forbear to reprobate the low ſpirit of jealouſy, with which the Review has been long conducted; and which muſt have been well known to exiſt before thoſe ſervile devotees preſented their rank offerings. Long before theſe loathſome maſſes were introduced, a ſprinkling of the ſame ill-flavoured ſubſtance had been a regular ingredient; and the palate of the public, thus gradually vitiated, was thought perhaps now duly prepared for that groſs meal, which has ſickened or poiſoned all whoſe natural taſte was not previouſly corrupted. My preſent purpoſe, however, is not to notice particularly

larly theſe petty cavils, but to haſten to the conſideration of more ſolid and direct charges, having firſt diſpoſed of one, which, as it proceeds from a writer of profound ſcience and great ability, is the more deſerving of our attention.

CHAP. I.

Of the Study of Ariſtotle, and neglect of the Mathematics.

IN the 22d Number of the Edinburgh Review is a maſterly analyſis of La Place's Traité de Méchanique Céleſte; which no one, I will venture to ſay, has read without feeling reſpect and admiration for the writer of the article, and gratitude for the diſtinctneſs with which he has brought home to his mind reaſonings of the moſt abſtract nature, upon the grandeſt and moſt ſublime of all ſubjects. It is impoſſible to praiſe it too highly. But, in proportion to the homage we feel diſpoſed to pay to uncommon talents, is our vexation at finding a powerful and enlightened mind, equally with the reſt of his brethren, debaſed by a mean and unmanly prejudice. To no other cauſe can I attribute the following paſſage, which is preceded by reflections on the inferiority of the later Mathematicians of this country to thoſe of the Continent.

" We believe, however, that it is chiefly in " the public inſtitutions of England, that we are " to ſeek for the cauſe of the deficiency here re-

" ferred

"ferred to, and particularly in the two great "centres, from which knowledge is ſuppoſed to "radiate over all the reſt of the iſland. In one of "theſe, *where the dictates of Ariſtotle are ſtill* "*liſtened to as infallible decrees, and where the* "*infancy of ſcience is miſtaken for its maturity,* "the mathematical ſciences have never flouriſh-"ed; and the ſcholar has *no means of advanc-*"*ing beyond the mere elements of Geometry*[a]."

The far-ſpread fame of Cambridge for Mathematical ſtudies fixes this deſcription to Oxford: and if the charge were true in the only ſenſe in which the words can be underſtood, there is no ridicule or invective ſo keen, which that Univerſity would not deſerve. The only parts of Ariſtotle's writings, which can interfere with the Student's progreſs in natural philoſophy, are his Phyſics; the doctrines of which, it is well known, were formerly made the baſis of inſtruction in that department of ſcience through all the Univerſities of Europe. Early in the 17th century they received their rudeſt ſhock from the writings of Bacon. Before the end of that century, the new method had ſucceeded in diſlodging the Ariſtotelian philoſophy from its ſtrong holds; and, as uſually happens in revolutions of that magnitude, after a ſhort interval of confuſion among contending fac-

[a] Page 283.

tions,

tions, of which the Carteſian was for a time predominant, the old dynaſty was by univerſal conſent ſuperſeded, and the Newtonian quietly eſtabliſhed on the throne. Under this comprehenſive title I include, for the ſake of convenience, the whole modern ſyſtem of Natural Philoſophy, which derives its origin from the works of Bacon.

Oxford, although the place where this new fledged philoſophy tried her earlieſt[c] flights, and firſt plumed her feathers, was, I believe, one of the laſt fortreſſes, of which ſhe took a formal poſſeſſion. For the Ariſtotelian Phyſics were interwoven with the whole courſe of our ſtudies and exerciſes; and it was not eaſy to reconcile the abandonment of them with the language of the Statutes, which public officers were bound to inforce. And thus, as in courts of Judicature, and other bodies of ancient ſtanding, many forms and practices continued to ſubſiſt, which had loſt their original force and meaning. Even after the new doctrines were received and taught, formal exerciſes continued to be performed according to the ancient regimen. How long this anomalous ſtate of things laſted, I cannot exactly ſay; but it may ſafely be aſſerted, that, *for more than a century*, the Phyſics of Ariſtotle have been ſet aſide,

[c] See the Hiſtory of the Royal Society, which began at Oxford.

and,

and, except for the ſake of ſatisfying liberal curioſity, and of tracing the progreſs of ſcience, they are never even conſulted.

What then muſt we think of the author of this calumny? Did he know that he was advancing a falſehood? This I will by no means affirm; and I am unwilling to ſuſpect it. But he has at leaſt ſhewn more eagerneſs to indulge a prejudice common, I am afraid, among his countrymen, than to acquaint himſelf with the truth of the caſe, as in juſtice he ought to have done, before he became a gratuitous accuſer. The motive which dictated this accuſation is too obvious to be miſtaken. The ſordid inner coating appears too plainly through the ſpecious garb of candour and zeal for ſcience, which is thrown about it: and when that is once diſcovered, no credit, it is hoped, will be given to opinions and inſinuations, which reſt more on the *authority* of the writer than the evidence of facts. On this account I think it needleſs to ſay much here upon the impudent, unſupported declaration, that, in Oxford, "the infancy of Science is miſtaken for its "maturity." If it relate merely to the charge of teaching the Phyſics of the Peripatetic School, in preference to modern ſyſtems, it has been refuted already. If it regard the reſt of our ſtudies, it can at preſent only receive a flat contradiction; and, as I may be thought an intereſted party, my opi-

nions will carry but little weight. I truſt, however, ſoon to convince the reader, by a plain unadorned expoſition of the courſe of ſtudies here purſued, that no calumny was ever more unfounded. And although I cannot claim any deference to my opinions unſupported by proof, yet I may ſurely expect, that the opinions of him will be diſregarded, who is proved to be groſsly ignorant of the circumſtances about which he is ſpeaking.

The latter part indeed of the accuſation is expreſſed in a more diſtinct and tangible form, relating to a a matter of fact.

"The Scholar has no means of advancing beyond "the mere elements of Geometry."

What are the mere elements of Geometry? Are Plane and Spherical Trigonometry, are the properties of Conic Sections, of Conchoids, Cycloids, the Quadratrix, Spirals, &c. &c. the mere elements of Geometry? Is the method of Fluxions included under the ſame appellation? On all theſe ſubjects, lectures both public and private are given. Natural Philoſophy in all its branches, and Aſtronomy, are taught, perhaps by one of thoſe *two perſons* whom the Reviewer[d] modeſtly allows to

[d] See Edinburgh Review, Number 22, p. 81. He complains, that even in the Cambridge method the ſpirit of diſcovery, the δυναμις ευρηγτικη, as he calls it, is not awakened. A *genuine* Edinburgh Reviewer ought to be careful how he meddles

Oxford, as equally capable with himſelf of underſtanding La Place. And that the Scholar *has* the means of advancing to Newton's Principia, is tolerably proved by the public examination of Candidates for the Degree of B. A. twice every year, in that work.

Here again I beg the writer will not think I am impeaching his veracity. In all probability he thought he was ſpeaking truth. But his aſſertion is groſsly falſe. There is ſome difference perhaps between aſſerting what one knows to be falſe, and aſſerting as a thing known what one really knows not: I willingly leave the Reviewer this loop-hole for his conſcience and his character; only aſſuring him, that, notwithſtanding our ſcholaſtic jargon, ſuch ſubtleties have been long ago exploded at Oxford from our doctrine, and few things would be more deſpiſed and condemned amongſt us in our practice.

Throughout this examination I have taken it for granted, that the Phyſics of Ariſtotle were the *infallible decrees* intended by the Reviewer.

dles with Greek. If he quotes two words, one of them in all likelihood is wrong. I ſay a *genuine* Edinburgh Reviewer, becauſe the Greek criticiſms in that Journal, ſome of which are learned and ingenious, have, I believe, been *all* furniſhed from Engliſh Univerſities. In *many inſtances* I know they have. Such phraſes as δυναμις ευρητικη, and *tribrach periods*, for ſentences of three members, [vid. Number 18, p. 398.] betray their Northern origin.

Both the ſubject on which he is writing, and the whole tenor of his argument, require that interpretation. It was not neceſſary therefore in this part to defend the ſtudy of other treatiſes by the ſame Philoſopher, which have no connexion with theſe purſuits. Some account will be given of theſe under the head of Studies purſued in this Univerſity. Let me be permitted however to ſay a few words in this place of the venerable Sage, whoſe revilers have perhaps exceeded in ignorance the bigotry and folly of his moſt devoted admirers.

It has been a current charge againſt Ariſtotle, that he meditated the ſame thraldom over the minds of men, which his pupil Alexander endeavoured to effect over their bodies and fortunes. A charge which, from its flippancy, one might ſuſpect to be of French growth, but which had its origin with no leſs a name than Bacon. Now if ever a writer laboured more than another, in an age of ſophiſtry and dogmatiſm, to eſtabliſh the empire of Common Senſe and Reaſon, it was Ariſtotle. He was thoroughly verſed in all the doctrines of the Schools of Greece. He ſubſcribed implicitly to none. He even incurred the obloquy of deſerting and undermining his maſter Plato, becauſe he rejected the viſionary ſpeculations of that philoſopher, however faſcinating to the fancy, as deluſive and irreconcileable with reaſon,

reaſon. He is moſt generally known as the author of the Syllogiſtic form of Reaſoning, in which his aim has been commonly miſunderſtood, and miſrepreſented even by thoſe who ſhould have pointed out and corrected the vulgar error. This is one of the leaſt of his works: but it is a noble ſpecimen of that inflexible unwearied perſeverance, which the love of truth only, mixed perhaps with the honeſt love of fame, is able to ſuſtain. His chief characteriſtic is a reſolute endeavour to get to the bottom of his ſubject, whatever it may be. In this reſolution his firmneſs and intrepidity are beyond example. It reſembles that unextinguiſhable ardour, that inſatiable deſire, of finiſhing their enterprize, attributed to the heroes of romance. He never reſts ſatisfied with partial glimpſes and imperfect demonſtration, where the ſubject ſeems capable of cloſer handling. And however thorny and deſert the tracts through which he purſues his prey, however far he may be led from the cultivated and elegant walks of life, the fear of loſing admiration, or of diſheartening his companions, never bends him from his purpoſe.

Theſe virtues, conſpicuous as they are in all his writings, are moſt obſervable in what is now called the Organon; becauſe, from the dry and repulſive nature of the ſubject, it poſſeſſes hardly any other attraction. Much of this work is at preſent

ſent uſeleſs, as being applicable merely to the Greek language, and to errors and practices now ſeldom obſervable. Much of it has been judiciouſly compreſſed and *re-caſt*, with increaſed perſpicuity and no loſs of matter: and ſome of the modern compendiums, more eſpecially that of Aldrich, contain the ſubſtance of the original, relieved of its tedious explanations and ſubtleties, and totally free from the barbarous jargon with which the later Schoolmen had overloaded and corrupted it. It is in this reformed ſhape that his ſyſtem is now ſtudied in the Univerſity. And beſides the incidental benefit derived from the rigorous accuracy, with which every argument is analyſed, much good is ſuppoſed to ariſe from enabling a young Student to ſtate his reaſoning, *whenever it may be neceſſary*, in its moſt bare and elementary form, and to examine any ſuſpected reaſoning of another by the ſame rule.

Theſe were the leading objects, which the Author of the Organon himſelf had in view when he unfolded the ſyſtem. He has been abſurdly ſuppoſed to have forged this weapon for the purpoſe of endleſs wrangling. Nothing is more oppoſite to the truth. Its principal uſe and advantage is to *cut ſhort* wrangling, by marking out preciſely the real object of diſpute, and by confining the diſputant to correct reaſoning. Before the method of the Syllogiſm was invented, an ingenious

Sophiſt

Sophiſt could ſet at defiance the ſoundeſt and the moſt acute reaſoner: but the laws of the Syllogiſm, if well enforced, cannot by any art be long evaded, and if the contending parties be of equal power, (which is the only way of trying the utility of any method,) *truth muſt prevail.* The practice of wrangling [ἐριστικὴ, as it was anciently called,] or ſupporting an argument for the ſake of victory, is adopted merely as an exerciſe to try the powers and dexterity of the diſputant, to give him the free uſe of his limbs, and the command of his weapons: juſt like the practice of a fencing ſchool[e], or the drill of a light-horſeman. And as this was one of the favourite exerciſes in the leiſurely ſchools of Athens, it is no wonder that its author ſhould have pointed out the aſſiſtance, which might be derived to it from his own ſyſtem. But never, no never, does he by his advice, his ſentiments, or his example, encourage that perverſion of the nobleſt faculty of man, in ſerious diſcuſſion: on the contrary, he always ſpeaks of it with contempt; and he has done what he could,

[e] It is related as a ſhrewd ſaying of a Nobleman, who, upon being ſhewn the College of the Sorbonne at Paris, and being told that regular diſputations had been held in their hall for ſix centuries, aſked, what they had *ſettled* in all that time. To me the wit appears no better, than if a man ſhould aſk in a fencing-ſchool, how many quarrels had been ended, or how many men ſlain there.

by

by expoſing all the trick and myſtery of falſe reaſoning, to ſuppreſs and defeat the impoſture. In all his writings he ſpurns the uſe of ſuch artifice: he never evades the difficulties of his ſubject: he never ſeeks to diſguiſe or gloſs over the imperfections of his reaſonings; maintaining, that it is better to get near to truth, even if we cannot reach her, than always to ſtand contentedly at a diſtance.

Some allowance will, I hope, be made for the length of theſe remarks. It ariſes from a conviction, that the world are greatly miſled, on this ſubject, by writers of high authority, and from an earneſt deſire to vindicate an illuſtrious name from the unjuſt aſperſions, with which ignorance and frivolity delight to inſult it.

Even the candid and ſagacious Locke is not proof againſt the blind propenſity mankind feel to mark their diſguſt of the abuſe of a thing by denying its uſe. How elſe can we account for his continual reflections on the folly and uſeleſſneſs of Logic, when in his Thoughts on Education he recommends that his friend's ſon ſhould be made to read Chillingworth? Read Chillingworth! Not a page of Chillingworth is intelligible without Logic. All the diſtinctions of Logic, the maxims, the rules, the technical names and phraſes, are employed in the courſe of his controverſy, not only without ſcruple, but in a way which

which would now be called pedantry and oſtentation. The ſame advice is repeated by Dr. Reid, in his Analyſis of the Organon, inſerted in Lord Kaimes's Sketches of the Hiſtory of Man, joined with many juſt reflections on the utility of Logic; and yet he manifeſtly under-rates the ſyſtem of Ariſtotle; and one may collect from ſome of his remarks, that he has no value for it whatever, and thinks the ſtudy of it a waſte of time.

In reading through that Analyſis, I confeſs I have been ſtruck with the inconſiſtency of Dr. Reid, as well as with the erroneous poſitions and interpretations he now and then advances. It is difficult to reconcile the tone of levity and diſreſpect ſometimes aſſumed, with the acknowledged acuteneſs, accuracy, and ingenuity, of the ſyſtem he is examining. That Ariſtotle has purpoſely darkened his demonſtrations, by uſing A, B, C, inſtead of words, is ſo futile a charge, that one wonders how it ever appeared there[f]. The contempt expreſſed for the *Dictum de Omni et Nullo*, and the remark at the end of Sect. 5. on the frivolity of the whole ſyſtem which is reſolvable into this principle, argue either an inadequate view, or a forgetfulneſs, of its true nature and deſign[g]. The ſame thing may be ſaid of the

[f] Chap. iii. ſect. 3.

[g] It is the very beauty of ſcience, to reſolve the moſt intricate theorems into ſome ſimple elementary truth; and that

 which

enquiry how far the Syllogiſm is an engine of Science. As an engine of Science it is not, and never was, propoſed.

Lord Kaimes's own remark[h], that "Ariſtotle "himſelf never attempts to apply his ſyllogiſtic "mode of reaſoning to any ſubject handled by "him"—that "on Ethics, on Rhetoric, and on "Poetry, he argues like a rational being, without "once putting in practice any of his own rules," is, like many other remarks of the ſame writer, flippant and falſe: the treatiſes he mentions are the moſt copious ſource of examples in every part of Logic, and the reſolution of argumentative paſſages in thoſe works, into their ſyllogiſtic elements, is a common and eaſy exerciſe for young ſtudents.

It is unfortunate for the fame of Ariſtotle, that he ſhould be known chiefly as the Author of the Logical Treatiſes. The Treatiſe on Rhetoric is a magazine of intellectual riches. Under an arrangement the moſt accurate perhaps and the moſt luminous ever marked out, the diverſified elements of thought, of feeling, and of taſte, are preſented in due order to the reader's mind. Nothing is arbitrary, nothing gratuitous. Long ex-

which provokes Dr. Reid's contemptuous exclamation is really the great and well-grounded boaſt of Logic.

[h] Page 166. 4to. edit.

perience

perience with mankind, attentive obſervation of human nature in public and in private life, the political hiſtory of paſt times, and the occurrences of his own age, furniſhed him with the materials of this great work. In the courſe of the enquiry, nothing is left untouched, on which Rhetoric, in all its branches, has any bearing. His principles are the reſult of extenſive original induction. He ſought them, if ever man did ſeek them, in the living pattern of the human heart. All the receſſes and windings of that hidden region he has explored; all its caprices and affections, whatever tends to excite, to ruffle, to amuſe, to gratify, or to offend it, have been carefully examined. The reaſon of theſe phænomena is demonſtrated, the method of creating them is explained. The third Book contains a body of rules for good writing, traced to thoſe natural principles, out of which they all grow, and illuſtrated by examples, which his own intimate acquaintance with the beſt poets and orators of Greece readily ſupplied. The whole is a text-book of human feeling; a ſtore-houſe of taſte; an exemplar of condenſed and accurate, but uniformly clear and candid, reaſoning.

It would lead me too far, if I were to do juſtice to my own feelings on this ſubject. Theſe works will perhaps be mentioned again, when I come to treat particularly of our plan of Study. In the

mean time let it be obſerved, that the writings of this great Philoſopher on Logic, Rhetoric, Poetry, Ethics, and Politics, were not merely diſſertations and eſſays, ſuch as procure fame to the writers, if they contain but ſome valuable hints and opinions diffuſely argued: they are not merely critical *diatribes* and ingenious detached arguments, improvements upon former theories. But they are, what is the higheſt and moſt laborious effort of human intellect, entire *ſyſtems* moulded into a full and perfect ſhape; they are buildings planned and raiſed from their foundation by the ſame hand, and carefully finiſhed in all their parts. Nothing ſeems to have been too vaſt for his comprehenſive mind; nothing too minute or intricate for his ſagacity.

He is accuſed indeed of ſevere judgment of thoſe who went before him, of a dictatorial ſpirit, of jealouſy againſt his contemporaries, of pride and arrogance. As theſe charges are unſupported by proof, it is enough to ſay that I have met with no proof of them in his writings. And they may in general be refuted by that ſentiment of his own, that noble characteriſtic, which often raiſes the clamours of little minds, an uniform zeal in the cauſe of truth—a ſettled devotion, which ſuffers no other paſſion to interfere with it. A ſentiment, which I cannot but recommend to the attention of this Reviewer,

viewer, if ever he ſhould feel himſelf wavering between his prejudice and his conſcience.

Ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν φίλοιν, ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

Let me diſmiſs this ſection then with a tranſlation of that honeſt and manly concluſion to his Organon, in which he aſſerts his claim to originality, with fearleſſneſs indeed and freedom, but without arrogance. The ſubſtance of the paſſage has been well given by Dr. Reid[1], although he has miſtaken the meaning of the text in two or three places, eſpecially in the laſt ſentence. I ſhall follow his method in rendering it, correcting him only where he is evidently wrong.

"Of thoſe things which may be called inven-
"tions, ſome have been begun only in a former
"age, and have grown up to perfection by means
"of ſucceſſive improvements; ſome are the work
"of the firſt inventer, but remain in a rude ſtate
"till enlarged and improved by other hands.
"The chief merit however is due to the be-
"ginner. For the beginning, though ſmall, is
"the moſt difficult; to add to it by degrees, and
"complete it, is comparatively eaſy.

"Now with regard to the Dialectic art, there
"was not ſomething done, and ſomething re-
"maining to be done: there was abſolutely no-
"thing done. For thoſe who profeſſed the art of

[1] Page 227, Lord Kaimes.

"diſ-

" diſputation reſembled the Rhetoricians of Gor-
" gias's ſchool. As theſe compoſed orations, ſo
" the other framed arguments, which might ſuit,
" as they imagined, moſt occaſions. Theſe their
" ſcholars ſoon learned. But they were in this
" manner only furniſhed with the materials pro-
" duced by the art: the art itſelf they did not
" learn. It was juſt as if a man, profeſſing to teach
" you how to protect the feet from injury, ſhould
" bring you ſhoes of all ſorts and ſizes. He does
" perhaps by ſo doing anſwer your preſent pur-
" poſe; but he does not, as he profeſſes to do,
" teach you the art of providing for yourſelf.

" Upon Rhetoric indeed much has been al-
" ready written; but on the art of reaſoning, no-
" thing: the whole of what I have compoſed on
" that ſubject is from myſelf; and it has coſt me
" much pains. And ſhould you find upon ex-
" amination that my ſyſtem, though deriving no
" benefit from former labours, is yet not unwor-
" thy of compariſon with others, which have by
" ſlow degrees been brought to perfection, I have
" only to expreſs my hope, that you will forgive
" what may be left undone[k], and that what
" has been done will meet with a favourable ac-
" ceptance."

[k] It ſhould be obſerved, that the Hypothetical Syllogiſm, of which he promiſes, in the firſt book of the Firſt Analytics, to treat more fully afterwards, is altogether omitted.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Examination of a Criticiſm, in the 28th Number of the Edinburgh Review, on Falconer's Edition of Strabo.

BEFORE I proceed to examine the juſtice of the Reviewer's criticiſms, and the truth of his aſſertions, it may be as well to correct what was perhaps only a miſtaken opinion, concerning the reſponſibility of the Univerſity for works printed with the approbation and aſſiſtance of the Delegates of the Preſs.

The Clarendon Preſs has been liberally endowed, and the management of its concerns is entruſted by the Univerſity to a board of Eleven Members, called Delegates of the Preſs, who derive no emolument from their office. They have the entire diſpoſal of its funds: they direct what books ſhall be printed; and to what extent the Authors or the Editors ſhall be favoured with their aid. A conſtant and regular ſupply iſſues from this preſs of Bibles, Common Prayer Books, and reprinted editions of the moſt uſeful works. Perſons who project improved editions often ſubmit their propoſals to the Board, which are always attentively

attentively conſidered, and encouraged in proportion to the opinion entertained of the competency of the perſon, and the general merits of his plan. If the plan be adopted, the money for carrying it on is ſupplied, and the whole riſk is thrown upon the public fund. It is alſo common for undertakings of this kind to originate with the Delegates themſelves; and in that caſe individuals are ſought out, who are thought well qualified for conducting them, and who have given, either in public or private, ſome proof of their fitneſs.

In none of theſe proceedings do the Delegates take on them that kind of reſponſibility which belongs to the Editor of a work, except as far as the printing is concerned. For the general plan, and the general competency of the perſon employed, they *are* reſponſible, but not for the detail of the execution. Miſtakes both in matter and in language may be made, for which an Editor may be blamed: but the diſgrace attached to theſe miſtakes cannot in any fairneſs be imputed to the Delegates; eſpecially if the work contain valuable materials procured by their means, and openly communicated to the world.

With theſe general remarks premiſed, let us proceed to examine the charge brought againſt the Univerſity by this Reviewer. The introductory reflections I leave untouched: they are intended only to heighten the effect of what follows: and

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if I can ſhew that what follows is *falſe*, *unjuſt*, and *ignorant*, the efficacy of this rhetorical flouriſh will not be great.

The writer clearly does not pretend to be a Logician; or to underſtand when two propoſitions are oppoſed to each other. For inſtance, he ſays, " the moſt confident hopes are excited, that " *every new impreſſion* of a claſſic volume from " the Clarendon Preſs will exhibit it with every " *remaining obſcurity or ambiguity* explained." But this hope, he adds, is conſtantly diſappointed: and why? " becauſe, although this learned body " have occaſionally availed themſelves of the ſa- " gacity and erudition of Ruhnken, Wyttenbach, " Heyné, and other *foreign* profeſſors, they have, " of late, added nothing of their own." Where inſult and abuſe are uppermoſt in a writer's mind, it is no wonder that he forgets his reaſon. The abſurdity of ſaying that editions iſſuing from the Oxford Preſs are inferior to expectation, *becauſe* they incorporate the labours of foreign critics of the firſt eminence, inſtead of Britiſh, is too groſs to require a comment.

The reader is next reminded of an " unhappy " attempt at an improved edition of Apollonius " Rhodius," by which the critic ſuppoſes " the " *Graduates* of Oxford were ſatisfied that *degrees* " neither implied nor *conferred ſcience*, but that " a man might become a *Maſter of Arts* without

" poſſeſſing any knowledge or ſkill whatſoever in " that particular art which he profeſſed, and " which he was choſen and appointed to practiſe " for the benefit of the community."

If the edition be a bad one, where is the need of exaggeration? At any rate it has no buſineſs here. I do not call it a good edition: but it is a uſeful one; and, notwithſtanding the wrong readings which it has, I will undertake to match the latinity of the Editor againſt that of this Critic, if ever he ſhall favour the world with a ſimilar attempt.

The quotation above is ſomewhat abridged. The following I give entire.

" Certain it is, that no ſuch attempt has been made " ſince, except in the ſingle and minute, but very " ſucceſsful inſtance of Ariſtotle's Poetics; which was " produced by an *auxiliary volunteer*, reſiding in the " metropolis, *engaged in buſineſs*, and never ſecluded " from the avocations of ſociety. *By not enjoying the* " *leiſure*, perhaps, he never contracted the indolence " or apathy of a Monk; but preſerved the activity, " even by the diſtraction of his faculties. His name " ſtands in the title-page plain Thomas Tyrwhitt— " without any decorative adjunct or title of degree,— " though it would have done honour to the proudeſt " which the moſt exalted feat of learning could be- " ſtow."

Leſt it ſhould be imagined that there is any truth

truth in what the Reviewer intimates, that Tyrwhitt *took no degree at Oxford,* and *was not even a member of the Univerſity,* I will add a very brief ſummary of facts and dates concerning that illuſtrious critic.

He was born in 1730; came from Eton to Queen's College, Oxford, 1747; took the Degree of B. A. in 1750; was elected Fellow of Merton in 1755; took the Degree of M. A. in 1756; and remained Fellow of that College ſeven years; i. e. till 1762; when he was made Clerk of the Houſe of Commons, and reſigned his Fellowſhip. *He quitted all public employment in* 1768; from which time till his death in 1786, he occupied himſelf chiefly in critical and other literary ſtudies, to which the greater part of his former life had been devoted. His Poetics is a poſthumous publication from unfiniſhed notes, and the title page of courſe arranged by another hand.

The next preliminary charge relates to the edition commonly called the Grenville Homer.

" The editors, he ſays, have *religiouſly retained all* " *the errors of Clarke's edition,* even thoſe intro- " duced on the authority of mere conjecture, and in " inſtances where the true reading had been twice be- " fore publiſhed on the authority of the Venetian Ma- " nuſcript. One of theſe *ſo appalled us,* in the 20th " line of the firſt Iliad, as to deter us from all further

 " critical

" critical examination: for, when a groſs violation of " idiom in the uſe of the moods and voices, *introduced* " *arbitrarily* to ſupply a defect in the metre, neither " excited ſuſpicion, nor ſuggeſted inquiry, no one who " values his time can think it worth while to go far- " ther[1].

To this I anſwer, that the Editors *have not religiouſly retained all the errors of Clarke's edition*—that although Clarke's text was the baſis, many readings were corrected during its progreſs through the preſs, on the authority of MSS. collations in the editions of Erneſti and Villoiſon, and of a MS. in New College Library. Of theſe new readings there are *twenty-five* in the two firſt books of the Iliad, and *near three hundred* in the whole Poem. In the Odyſſey there are *above one hundred and fifty*; and the collations of the Harleian MS. by Porſon, ſome of which are incorporated with the text, are given entire at the end of the volume.

Now, with regard to the 20th line of the firſt Iliad, which ſo appalled the Reviewer, it may be proper firſt to ſtate, that the *plan* of the edition was ſimply to give the text. No critical remarks or diſcuſſions were to be introduced. No reading therefore was to be received which required diſcuſſion to ſupport it.

[1] Page 431.

The

The 20th line in Clarke runs thus,

Παῖδα δέ μοι λύσαιτε φίλην, τὰ δ' ἄποινα δέχεσθε.

In the editions of Wolfius[m] and Heyné it is,

Παῖδα δ' ἐμοὶ λῦσαί τε φίλην, τὰ δ' ἄποινα δέχεσθαι.

Clarke has a note of ſome length, giving reaſons for rejecting λύσατε, which had been a common reading, and λύσασθε, which Barnes had adopted, and ending with a conjecture that λύσοιτε is the true reading: but as λύσαιτε *had the authority of the Vatican and Florentine MSS.* he prefers it. δ' ἐμοὶ he himſelf prefers to δέ μοι, as being more emphatic, but he does not alter the text. He objects to the reading,

Παῖδα δέ μοι ΛΥΣΑΙ τε φίλην, τὰ δ' ἄποινα ΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ,

as not agreeing in conſtruction with what follows, Ἀζόμενοι. To this objection Erneſti has ſince replied, by pointing out ſimilar caſes of conſtruction; but he expreſſes no diſapprobation of λύσαιτε, and no preference of the other. The reading is alſo confirmed by the Venice and other MSS. which have δέχεσθαι, although with λύσαιτε inſtead of λῦσαί τε. Bentley conjectured λύσαντε, which would certainly accord with the ſenſe and conſtruction; but it is not neceſſary to have recourſe to that remedy.

[m] Wolfius indeed reads, without aſſigning his authority, τὰ τ' ἄποινα δέχεσθαι.

After

After this view of the caſe, I will leave it to the reader to determine whether he ever met with a more deſpicable inſtance of conceited pedantry, than the exclamation of the Reviewer, that he *was appalled* at this reading, and could go no farther; a reading which Clarke preferred to that ſince adopted by Heyné and others: and whether an edition which took Clarke's text as a baſis could have made the propoſed alteration, againſt Clarke's deliberate judgment, without aſſigning a reaſon; to do which was not compatible with the plan laid down. Thus too there are, beſides that already noticed, two other poſitive untruths in this ſingle ſentence of the Review. For λύσαιτε *is not* a reading introduced arbitrarily: and λῦσαί τε *has not* the authority of the Venetian MS. which, as publiſhed by Villoiſon, reads λυσαιτε.

All this however is by way of prelude to the main attack. He goes on to ſay, with admirable conſiſtency, that having obſerved this degeneracy and ignorance in Oxford Editions, he now "*confidently expected*" a moſt complete edition of Strabo: and adds,

"We therefore learned, with much ſatisfaction, that "no pains nor expenſe had been ſpared in obtaining "collations of manuſcripts from the libraries on the "Continent, as well as from thoſe at home: *but* that "the materials would be *worthy of the artiſts*, and the "ſolidity

" ſolidity of the *ſubſtructions* correſpond with the " weight and extent of the edifice [n]."

In the ſame page, after alledging that the ſtudent has a right to claim the Editor's judgment of preference among the various readings, he proceeds;

" This claim becomes ſtronger when the *office of* " *editor is undertaken by a learned body*, whoſe buſi- " neſs is public inſtruction, or *is delegated by them to* " *ſuch of their members* as are deemed moſt competent " to expreſs the judgment, and exerciſe the authority " of the whole . . . . . from ſuch a *ſynod of critics*, " the republic of letters have a right to expect a *work*— " not merely the raw materials of one, &c."

To this the beſt anſwer will be a reference to the ſtatement already given reſpecting the Delegates of the Preſs. The paſſage admits of no other, and deſerves no other, at leaſt no other of a literary kind. The clauſe, " is *dele-* " *gated by them to ſuch of their members &c.*" will be conſidered immediately.

For the ſake of convenience, then, it may be better firſt to diſpatch ſome aſſertions of an extraordinary kind, although they do not lie in exact order, and then to examine more at large the philological criticiſms. Theſe aſſertions, as they are not commonly met with in good ſociety, it is difficult to deſcribe by any proper title. In-

[n] Page 432.

deed,

deed, ſo numerous are they, that I am perſuaded, if the writer had only reſided a fortnight among the Houyhnhnms, he would have compelled that nation to enrich their language. The firſt of them is, when criticiſing a note of the Editor's, he calls it,

"A paſſage from the Univerſity preſs, and the pen "of a *diſtinguiſhed Graduate, ſelected from the whole* "*body, at an advanced period of life*, to conduct the "greateſt work that it had undertaken for more than "a century preceding[o]." *Splendidè mendax*[p]!

The *truth* is, the Editor *never was a Graduate*; he *was not a member of the Univerſity*, when he undertook this work: *he was not then at an advanced period of life:* he reſided here a little more than a twelvemonth during the progreſs of it, chiefly that he might enjoy the ſociety of literary men, and the uſe of the libraries: he was *not* "*ſe-* "*lected therefore from the whole body*," nor indeed was *he ſelected* by the Univerſity at all. All this, however, the Reviewer aſſerts, that he may have an opportunity of calling the Latin, Oxonian Latin; a phraſe which he repeats with a degree of aſſurance, not undeſerving of a coarſer epithet.

[o] Page 437.

[p] *Splendidè*, of the firſt magnitude. If the reader is not familiar with Horace, he will find a learned commentary on this expreſſion, in Congreve; Love for Love, Act II. Sc. 5.

Pindar

Pindar gave good advice to a Prince, which may not be unſuitable to a Reviewer.

ΑΨΕΤΔΕΙ δὲ πρὸς ἄκμονι ΧΑΛ-
ΚΕΤΕ γλῶσσαν.
Εἴ τι καὶ φλαῦρον παραιθύσ-
σει, μέγα τοι φέρεται
Πὰρ σέθεν· πολλῶν ταμίας
Ἐσσί.

Χάλκευε brings up a familiar image, by which a certain moral quality is ſometimes indicated, not of the moſt amiable kind. If the Reviewer meant to comply with this precept when he wrote, he ſhould have taken care to follow it throughout: but he has been as unhappy in the choice of an anvil, as any gentleman of his profeſſion ever was. Let us now examine ſome more work from the ſame forge.

" We have nevertheleſs *peruſed the whole attentively*, " and can again aſſert, that the printers have done their " duty in rendering very accurately that which was " put before them. The accuracy is, however, that of " the Chineſe tailor, who, in making a new coat from " an old one, copied all the darns, patches and blemiſhes, " which he found in the pattern. In the ſame manner " here, *every error of the preſs*, and uſual inaccuracy of " ſpelling that had crept into the Amſterdam text, *is* " *religiouſly retained*[q]."

Again:

[q] Page 440.

"The text, which has been ſo ſervilely copied, is "merely a repetition of Caſaubon's; who does not "appear to have ſuperintended the printing, or to have "corrected it at all himſelf; whence errors have ac- "cumulated on errors: *which are all carefully embalm- "ed and preſerved in the ſplendid edition before us.*" Ibid.

The beſt anſwer that can be given to theſe charges has already appeared in the Gentleman's Magazine for September 1809. A long liſt of readings in the Oxford edition, together with thoſe of the Amſterdam edition of which they are corrections, is there inſerted. It is needleſs to repeat the particulars here: but I cannot do better than copy the remarks with which the writer of that article follows up his liſt.

"You have here, Mr. Editor, more than *Fifty Cor- "rections* of the Amſterdam edition, within the compaſs "of *fewer than one hundred ſucceſſive pages* of the Ox- "ford edition. This liſt does not include any which "are merely accentual; and it is confined to the text, "though the verſion and notes would have ſupplied a "ſtill larger number. I have alſo examined more than "300 of the ſubſequent pages, and they bear the ſame "teſtimony to the *attentive peruſal* of which the Re- "viewer boaſts, and afford the ſame ground for an "unqualified reliance on his candour, and his ſcrupulous "love of truth [r]."

[r] Gent. Mag. Sept. 1809, page 351.

Equally

Equally undeſerving of reſpect with his aſſertions are the doctrines and opinions of this unhappy critic. In the firſt diſplay indeed of theſe, may be obſerved the ſame diſingenuous ſpirit as in the former part. He treats the Preface and the Notes, as if they proceeded from the ſame pen; whereas the writer of the Preface informs him in the firſt paragraph, that the Editor was his Uncle, and that (he having been dead many years) regard for his memory was one motive which impelled him to this undertaking. The Preface goes on to ſay, that the Editor never deſigned a reviſal of the Text of Strabo; and that *he was ſupplied with the new Collations, procured at great expence, by the liberality of the Univerſity of Oxford.* This Preface is dated *Bathoniæ*, which being prefixed too to a Book on Geography, one would hardly have expected to ſee interpreted as it is by this Gentleman, "written "in the Univerſity of Oxford[8]."

Aſſuming that this ſtain belongs to it, he proceeds to handle it very roughly; but, not content with noticing errors, he ventures upon ſome critical diſſertation. The paſſage of the Preface on which he remarks is this.

Cæterum agam uti potero, et, ſi nihil aliud afferam, ſaltem ea recenſebo, quæ rationem operis te edoceant,

[8] Page 433, l. 22.

quibus ſubſidiis inſtructa eſt hæc Strabonis editio, vel quæ aliqua ex parte incrementa eam ſumpſiſſe contigerit.

The phraſe, "*edoceant quibus inſtructa eſt,*" he ſays, would not be admitted in any place, "where ignorance is not privileged by degrees "of ſcience;" and that to make it Latin we muſt either write *ſubſidia quibus* or *eſt*, inſtead of *ſit*.

I do not defend the phraſe; but the fault is common: and this critic has not pointed out what principle it violates: he only ſays generally, that although the proper and diſcriminative uſe of the Indicative and Subjunctive moods be often a point of extreme nicety, yet in this caſe the error is groſs and obvious—a remark, which is of no benefit to the reader. Indeed, he calls it, when referring to the ſame paſſage[t], the uſe of the Indicative *with the relative pronoun*, ſubordinate to another verb. Before many pages are read, it will probably be made evident, that this remark proceeded from entire ignorance of the true nature of *quibus:* and the point is one of ſuch frequent occurrence in Latin, that I hope to be excuſed for treating it at ſome length.

The difficulty then of determining the proper mood in ſuch caſes ariſes chiefly from the ambiguity of the Latin oblique caſes *cujus, cui, quem,*

[t] Page 436, l. 16.

&c.

&c. in the ſingular number, and all the caſes *qui, quibus, quæ*, &c. in the plural: and this ambiguity is cauſed, by their belonging to different nominatives, Quis and Qui. Theſe words are derived, as Perizonius has well ſhewn[u], from the different Greek roots, Τίς and Κός, and in the old Latin preſerved a diſtinction in their oblique caſes, till in proceſs of time the Relative *Qui* in moſt of thoſe caſes became ſubſtituted for the interrogative τίς[x]. In ſome inſtances, indeed, the caſes peculiar to *Quis* were incorporated with the declenſion of *Qui*: as *Quem, Quid, Quî* and *Quibus*, for which the original caſes of *Qui* were *Quum, Quod, Quo*, and *Queis*. *Cujus* and *Cui* were common perhaps to both from the firſt: ſtill the main fact is clear, that the diſtinction in every caſe but the Nominative was loſt, and ſometimes even there, as Plaut. Curcul. I. 2. 51.

Now it is a common rule, that where the ſubject of a ſentence is known and definite[y], the *indicative* mood is to be uſed: where it is un-

[u] Not. ad Sanct. lib. iii. c. 14.

[x] Ceterum in obliquis caſibus, etiam ad interrogationem, adhibuerunt illa, quæ ab Relativo *Qui* deſcendunt. Nam in obliquis hic rurſus in unam voculam confuderunt Latini ſimul *relationis* et *interrogationis* vim. Not. ad Sanct. iii. 14.

[y] Unleſs the ſentence be conditional or dependent, or imply ſome contingency; of which caſes we ſhall ſoon ſpeak more particularly.

known

known and indefinite, the *ſubjunctive*. This, however, does not hold with *pure Interrogatives*: in them the ſame mood is uſed as in the caſe of aſſertion; and the reaſon perhaps is, that the tone of voice, the direct application to another perſon, ſufficiently proves that we are not aſſerting any thing. But wherever any doubt or indefinite deſcription is intended, which character is denoted by *the pronouns and nouns called indefinite*, the ſubjunctive is employed. This Indefinite, however, if attentively conſidered, will be found to correſpond very cloſely with the Interrogative. It is in fact the ſame word. Τις in Greek, and *Quis* in Latin, have both ſenſes. And the reaſon is manifeſt: for there is the ſame ſtate of mind, the *ſame uncertainty* in each caſe.

Quid *exiſtimas* de hac quæſtione?

indicates the ſame ſtate of mind as,

Quid *exiſtimet* de hac quæſtione, incertum eſt.

And in all caſes where a queſtion is aſked by *Quis*, the ſame thing might be expreſſed with *Quis* and the *ſubjunctive mood*, in the form of a propoſition about which we are doubting. The ſame holds of *Cur*, which in the interrogative form requires an Indicative; in the form of a ſentence denoting uncertainty, a Subjunctive. And thus the Reviewer's objection to the ſentence in note pag. 48, is valid: "*Cur omiſit* Strabo expe-

"ditionem

" ditionem maritimam regnante Necho factam, " neſcio." If it were a *queſtion*, ending at *factam*, *omiſit* would be right: but being an aſſertion with *neſcio*, it required *omiſerit*; juſt as in the example above given, where *Quid exiſtimas* is reſolved into *Quid exiſtimet, incertum eſt.* But though he is right in his objection, he is plainly ignorant of every principle on which it reſts: as will further appear preſently.

It is then by confounding the Indefinite with the Relative, that miſtakes are continually made in the uſe of moods. The Relative, as a Relative, requires no particular mood after it. It refers to ſome antecedent; and if that antecedent be certain and definite, or if it introduce a fact or independent aſſertion, it will naturally have the Indicative mood: Thus,

Nihil faciam inſolenter, neque te tali vel ſcientia vel natura præditum hortabor, ut ad eas te referas artes, *quibus* a primis temporibus ætatis ſtudium tuum *dediſti*; tantum dicam, quod te ſpero approbaturum, me, poſteaquam illi arti, *cui ſtudueram*, nihil eſſe loci, neque in curia, neque in foro viderem, omnem meam curam atque operam ad Philoſophiam contuliſſe [z].

Ex quo ego veni ad ea, *quæ fueramus* ego et tu inter nos de ſorore in Tuſculano locuti [a].

[z] Cic. Ep. Fam. iv. 3.

[a] Ep. ad Att. v. 1.

Hortemur

Hortemur liberos noſtros, cæteroſque *quorum* gloria nobis et dignitas chara *eſt*, ut animo rei magnitudinem complectantur, neque iis aut præceptis, aut magiſtris, aut exercitationibus, *quibus utuntur* omnes, ſed aliis quibuſdam, ſe id, *quod expetunt*, conſequi poſſe confidant[b].

When the Antecedent is leſs certain and definite, or when the aſſertion is vague and diffident, the indicative is not uſed.

Hic *quæ agantur*, quæque *acta ſint*, ea te et literis multorum et nuntiis cognoſcere arbitror: quæ autem *poſita ſunt* in conjectura, *quæque* mihi *videntur* fore, ea Puto tibi a me ſcribi oportere[c].

Here, although the latter things are called *conjectural* and *probable*, yet the aſſertion that they are ſo is *abſolute*; which aſſertion the writer intending to convey, naturally uſes the Indicative mood.

The moſt frequent caſes of error however are where, as in the paſſage quoted from the Preface, the Relative is ſuppoſed to be uſed, although it is in fact the Indefinite, and an Indicative is made to follow it. In Greek the writer is not liable to this error, becauſe the relative and indefinite are expreſſed by different words; and perhaps the beſt *practical* rule for a ſtudent acquainted

[b] De Orat. i. §. 19. See alſo other examples, ibid. §. 23. 49. 53.

[c] Ep. Fam. i. 5.

with

with both languages, is to conſider what word would be employed in Greek. If τὶς, ποῖος, οἷος, ὅϛις, ὅσπερ, would have preſented themſelves, inſtead of the pure relative ὃς, moſt probably he will decide at once for the Subjunctive. In the Preface, ποίοις perhaps, rather than τισὶ, would have been uſed where *quibus* ſtands; certainly not οἷς. Thus:

Cujus mihi videbar et fidelitatem erga te perſpexiſſe, et nôſſe locum *quem* apud tè is teneret [d].

Ὕστερα would have been uſed in Greek (not ἤν) *after*, or perhaps τινὰ, or οἷαν, *before* τάξιν.

The full doctrine is of ſuch extent, that I muſt be cautious how I venture upon it here [e].

[d] Cic. Ep. Fam. iii. 6.

[e] There is indeed no queſtion in grammar more ſubtle and intricate than the doctrine of the Subjunctive Mood. It would require a much longer diſcuſſion than theſe pages will admit to ſift it thoroughly: but as it is a kind of *moot point* among grammarians, a few hints from one who has often conſidered the ſubject may not be unacceptable. I am far from propoſing this as a complete theory, or as one which is very ſatisfactory even to myſelf: and I am aware that the principles do not reſt upon a ſufficiently broad baſis of Induction.

To me then it has appeared, that the uſe of the Subjunctive Mood may be referred to *three general heads*, which I cannot preciſely deſcribe without the aid of Logical terms.

1ſt. *When the* SUBJECT *of the ſentence is uncertain, vague, or indefinite.*

2dly. *When the* PREDICATE *is of that kind.*

3dly. *When the* PREDICATION *or Sentence itſelf is not direct, but dependent upon ſomething elſe.*

There are numerous principles of a ſubordinate kind, with exceptions to all of them, and many

Of the firſt kind, are all thoſe ſentences where the verb is connected with *Quis*, or any of its caſes, which are more numerous than are commonly imagined; or where the *relative* is reſolvable into *Quinam*, *Qualis*, *Quicunque*; or where, after the relative *Qui*, we can ſuppoſe a parenthesis of this ſort, "*whoſoever he may be.*" E. g.

Quæ de me populi *ſit* opinio, neſcio. Clar. Orat. c. 51.

Neque is ſum *qui diſputem.*

Erant tamen, *quibus videretur.* Clar. Orat. 58.

Qui ita *dicat*, ut a multis probaretur. Ib. 50.

Atque ego præclare intelligo, me in eorum commemoratione verſari, *qui* nec *habiti ſint* oratores, nec *fuerint.* Ib. 49.

In the firſt of theſe, *Quæ* comes from the Indefinite *Quis.* In all the others, *Qui* means a *ſort*, a *claſs*, a *deſcription* of people. In the ſame chapter from which the laſt example is taken, when the writer ſpeaks of *definite perſons*, he uſes the *Indicative Mood.*

De iis autem, *quos* ipſi *vidimus*, neminem fere prætermittimus eorum, *quos* aliquando dicentes *vidimus.* Clar. Orat. 49.

Of the ſecond kind are thoſe ſentences in which *the Predicate is meant to be taken with ſome latitude:* not in its ſtricteſt and moſt definite ſenſe; and when no ſtreſs is laid upon that part of the propoſition; as,

Omnium, *quos* quidem ego *audiverim.* Clar. Orat. 55.

Epiſtolæ . . . . . tum videlicet datæ, cum ego me non belle *haberem.* Cic. Att. 5. 11.

In Cumano cum *eſſem*, venit ad me, quod mihi pergratum fuit, Hortenſius. Cic. Att. 5. 2.

When I was not quite well; *During my ſtay in the neighbourhood of Cumæ.* Where obſerve, "*quod* mihi pergratum *fuit*," has the Indicative.

Nos Tarenti quos cum Pompeio dialogos de Republica *habuerimus*, ad te perſcribemus. Cic. Att. 5. 5.

But

mixed caſes. But the ſingle principle juſt laid down will be found to ſimplify the matter greatly, which

But when ſomething more diſtinct is intended by the Predicate, the Indicative Mood is preferred.

Ex quo ego veni ad ea, *quæ fueramus* ego et tu inter nos locuti. Cic. Att. 5. 1.

Me poſteaquam illi arti, *cui ſtudueram*, nihil eſſe loci . . . viderem. Ep. Fam. 4. 3.

Quatenus de religione *dicebat*, *cuique* rei jam obſiſti non *poterat*, Bibulo aſſenſum eſt. Ep. Fam. 1. 2.

Illud *quod eſt*, *qualecumque eſt*, probat. Clar. Orat. 52.

Omnes cauſæ maximæ *quæcumque erant*. Ib. 63.

A remarkable inſtance of this diſtinction of Moods founded in the nature of the Predicate occurs in the ſame paſſage of Livy;

Senatorum omnium, *quique* magiſtratus Capuæ, Atellæ, Cataliæ *geſſiſſent*, bona venire Capuæ juſſerunt: libera corpora *quæ* venundari *placuerat*, Romam mitti, et Romæ venire. Liv. 26. 34. See alſo a paſſage from Cic. Ep. Fam. 1. 5. quoted above in page 48.

It is not always eaſy to diſtinguiſh accurately this caſe from *the third*; that is, where *the whole ſentence* is dependent upon ſome word or ſentence going before, to which therefore it is ſaid to be *ſubjoined*. Nothing however is more frequent than a ſentence with the ſubjunctive mood, in which both the Subject and the Predicate are perfectly defined, becauſe there is a dependency of the whole *predication* on ſomething elſe.

Cui quidem ego, *me cum rogaret*, ut adeſſem in Senatu, eadem omnia . . . . oſtendi me eſſe dicturum. Ep. Fam. 4. 1.

Cum means, "*upon* his aſking me," not ſimply *when*, or "*at the time when*, he aſked me." If the point of time merely is to be noted, the Indicative will ſerve; as

Cum de tuis rebus geſtis *agebatur*, inſerviebam honori tuo. Ep. Fam. 3. 13.

it is hoped may be admitted as ſome excuſe for this long digreſſion. It is however in ſuch points as theſe,

If the preceding clauſe be in the potential mood, all the ſubordinate clauſes, *although merely deſcriptive*, (unleſs intended to introduce ſome independent fact,) muſt be in the Subjunctive: and this is what is commonly meant by conſecutive moods. Thus,

Juſſerunt . . . . *ne* quis eorum, *qui Capuæ fuiſſent, dum portæ clauſæ eſſent*, in urbe . . . . . *maneret*. Liv. 26. 34.

Ne, which governs the principal clauſe, extends its power to all the ſubordinate ones. So, *Ut* ſaltatio quædam *naſceretur, cui ſaltationi Titius nomen eſſet*. Clar. Orat. 62.

But if the preceding clauſe be in the indicative, the ſubordinate deſcriptive clauſe is alſo indicative.

M. Atilius Regulus, *cujus*, ex iis *qui ad Capuam fuerant*, maxima auctoritas *erat* in conſilio, *inquit*, &c. Liv. 26. 33.

In the ſpeeches of Livy indeed, or of any Latin hiſtorian, may be ſeen a very ſtriking illuſtration of the nature of this mood. When the ſpeeches are given in the third perſon, every ſentence proceeds in the Subjunctive mood; becauſe the tenſes depend on *dixit*, or ſome ſuch word preceding. Let any one turn a ſpeech of this kind into the firſt perſon, and he will change all the Subjunctive tenſes into Indicatives; with the exception of thoſe which, according to the firſt and ſecond principle, would ſtill be ſubjunctive.

The ſame holds of meſſages, inſtructions, decrees, &c.

Supplicatio omnibus deis, *quorum* pulvinaria Romæ *eſſent*, *indicta eſt*. Liv. 24. 10.

If he had been ſimply relating a *fact*, he would have ſaid *erant*; but he is giving the ſubſtance of a decree. And this brings us very near to that character of the Subjunctive, in which it is ſaid to reſemble the future tenſe.

Nuntium miſit, qui diceret.

Ἔπεμψεν ἄγγελον λέξοντα.

Perizonius indeed reaſons againſt this doctrine, and ſays all the

that criticiſm ought to be diffuſe; and the ſtudy of them is worth much time and labour: for they

the *futurity* implied in ſuch ſentences reſides in ſome words underſtood. *Mitto qui dicat*, he would reſolve into *Mitto aliquem qui erit ut dicat*. But I do not know how he would reſolve the ſentence above in this manner, *Miſit qui diceret*. And the Latin phraſe correſponds ſo continually with the Greek future participle, that it bears ſtrong teſtimony to the ſoundneſs of Sanctius's doctrine, that all the tenſes of the Subjunctive Mood [a Grammatical term which he rejects] are but diſguiſed futures. After *ſi* moſt of them evidently have that force.

It muſt however be obſerved, that the force of *qui* in ſuch caſes is often called *cauſal*; and when this force is perceived, every one would expect the Subjunctive to follow it.

Antonium . . . . miſi ad te, *cui* [i. e. ut ei] ſi tibi videretur, cohortes *traderes*. Cic. Ep. Fam. 3. 6.

In Siciliam duo Prætores profecti: P. Cornelius ad exercitum; Otacilius, *qui* maritimæ oræ *præeſſet*. Liv. 24. 12.

In Greek this uſe of the relative is not ſo frequent; becauſe, beſides the future participles, there are a great variety of cauſal particles in that language, ὅπως, ἵνα, ὥστε, ὅτι, as well as the pronoun οἵτινες, all of whoſe places are occaſionally ſupplied in Latin by the inflexions of *qui*.

It would be well therefore, if, when doubting what mood ſhould follow *qui*, we were to conſider whether *qui* be ſimply *relative* or not: for if it be reſolved into any thing more than a mere link uniting the clauſe it governs to ſome antecedent—if it denote *the manner* in which the clauſe ſtands related to that antecedent—if it declare that it ſprings from it, is cauſed by it, or is dependent upon it in any way, the Subjunctive, and not the Indicative, ought to follow.

Mr. Harris ſuppoſes the Latin relative to be merely *qua is*: but it frequently has the force of *quia is, quum is, ut is*; in all which caſes it contains an element that calls for the Subjunctive Mood.

Such

are the very joints and ligatures of the language; and to have the right uſe and play of theſe, im-

Such are the remarks which an obſervation, deſultory perhaps, but not ſuperficial, of the beſt Latin writers, has led me to make. They are offered with much diffidence, on a ſubject, where each man almoſt has a right to offer what occurs to himſelf. For the queſtion has never been purſued through all its windings. There is, I doubt not, a clue to this, as to every other mazy dance of human thought, which we trace in the texture of language. When once unravelled, it appears ſimple enough: and the more ſimple it is, the greater is the merit of the diſcovery. And yet in ſuch matters the world are apt to ſhew ingratitude and contempt, when they ought moſt to admire, and to be thankful. Of which injuſtice we have the ſtrongeſt proof in that immortal Stagyrite, who has by a moſt laborious analyſis reſolved all the methods of argumentation into one ſimple principle, only to draw forth this reflection from a modern Philoſopher upon his labours:

O curas hominum! O quantum eſt in rebus inane!

Such injuſtice will not, I truſt, deter a philoſophical critic from attempting to ſolve the intricate phænomena of language which ſtill remain unexplained. To perform the taſk well requires, not only extenſive erudition, a ſtrong memory, an acute and penetrating mind, but an acquaintance alſo, either ſelf-taught or methodically acquired, with that true Logic which enables us to ſort, to diſcriminate, and to abſtract ideas, to know them again under all the changes of dreſs and poſture, and to keep a ſteady eye upon them, as they mingle with the confuſed and ſhifting crowd. This combination of qualities is indeed rare: but there have been men ſo variouſly gifted, though few; and ſome perhaps there ſtill are: One I know there is, who could not render a more acceptable ſervice to the lovers of ancient learning, than by guiding their footſteps through this perplexing labyrinth.

parts

parts more of a native air and grace, is really a more deſirable accompliſhment, than an extenſive acquaintance with the vocabulary, or a knowledge of ſingular and rare ſenſes, in which certain words are uſed.

The critic, whoſe cavils I am examining, ſeems poſſeſſed of no principle to guide him. The examples he gives of an indicative with *quis*, or *quibus*, are wrongly explained. V. g.

> " Dic quibus in terris inſcripti nomina regum
> " *Naſcuntur* flores."

Here if the line be underſtood as a queſtion, the indicative will do; and ſo perhaps it was underſtood by thoſe copyiſts who kept the reading. But the Subjunctive *naſcantur*, with *quibus*, as an Indefinite, is preferable, which in Greek would have been τισὶ, not αἷς. In the next example,

> " Neſcio quis teneros oculus mihi faſcinat agnos,"

Neſcio quis is ſimply parenthetical. " Some one, " I know not who." And again,

> " Neſcio quid majus naſcitur Iliade."

" Some poem (I know not exactly what) is coming " forth, which will ſurpaſs the Iliad." Every one knows that this was a compliment paid by Propertius to Virgil, when he was writing the Æneid. But from the reſolution of the line given in the Review, one is led to ſuſpect that the

the writer underſtood it as ſaid in honour of Homer. He ſays, *Neſcio quid (ſit quod) naſcitur* " *majus Iliade.*" By this mode of reſolving it, the *aſſertion* is loſt, " that *ſomething is really* " coming forth," which is what the Poet meant to expreſs. And ſo with the other example, to ſay as the Reviewer does, " *Neſcio quis* [*ſit qui*] " *teneros oculus mihi faſcinat agnos,*" reduces it to this; that Menalcas *does not know* who has bewitched his lambs: whereas he inſiſts that witchcraft is the cauſe of their leanneſs.

His certe neque amor cauſa eſt; vix oſſibus hærent.
Neſcio quis teneros *oculus mihi faſcinat* agnos.

Some *evil eye*, I know not whoſe, is the cauſe. *That* is the propoſition: *Neſcio quis* is merely an adjunct.

It would but ill expreſs the impatience of Horace in that line,

Certe neſcio quid ſecreto velle loqui te
Aiebas mecum. Serm. I. ix. 67.

to tranſlate it,

" *I certainly do not know* what it was you wiſhed to " ſay to me."

Again, how would the Reviewer explain ſuch paſſages as theſe, where the relative is in an oblique caſe?

Neſcio

Neſcio qua præter ſolitum dulcedine læti
Inter ſe foliis ſtrepitant. Georg. i. 412.

Terraque *neſcio quo* non placet ipſa modo.
Ov. iii. Triſt. iii. 8.

Niſi forte me Paconii *neſcio cujus*, hominis ne Græci quidem, ut Myſii, aut Phrygis potius, querelis moveri putes. Cic. Ep. ad Quint. Frat. i. 6.

Another deciſive objection to his method of reſolving ſuch paſſages is, that he ſuppoſes an ellipſis of the *relative*; which I believe one may venture to affirm is againſt the idiom both of the Greek and Latin languages. In Engliſh it is common. E. g.

The meſſenger you ſent did not arrive.

But neither in Greek or Latin could this be allowed. We might ſay, οὐκ ἀφίκετο ὃν ἐπέμψας, or, *Quem miſiſti non advenit.* We may leave out the Antecedent, eſpecially when it is a demonſtrative pronoun, but never the Relative. In Engliſh we may leave out the Relative, but never the Antecedent[f]. This contraſt is one of the moſt ſtriking peculiarities which runs through the ancient languages, as compared with our own[g].

[f] In poetry indeed it is ſometimes done: but then the deſign is to *elevate* the expreſſion, by introducing ſomething ξενικὸν, ſomething which is out of the common way, and *is therefore not the idiom.*

[g] Mr. Jones, whoſe opinions are always entitled to reſpect,

The phraſe, *eam ſumpſiſſe contigerit*, is perhaps wrong; but it would not be right as the Reviewer mends it, merely by reading *ei* inſtead of *eam*. The fault is in *ſumpſiſſe*, which is ſuperfluous: *ei contigerint* would have been enough. *Contingit* certainly requires a Dative, expreſſed or underſtood; and there is no ſaying why *nobis* might not be underſtood here. It requires a caſe after it, both becauſe *tango* is a tranſitive, and becauſe of the prepoſition *con*. *Accidit* alſo, for the laſt reaſon, requires a caſe after it; and ſo it will be found that the pureſt writers uſe it; although afterwards it took the place of the neutral *cecidit*, which word Plautus, Terence, and Cicero prefer, when the event ſpecified is not related to ſome other event, or to ſome one particularly affected by it.

Of the Latinity of this Preface, let me be per-

does, I ſee, in his Latin Grammar, admit of an ellipſis of the Relative, as in this example;

Urbs antiqua fuit, Tyrii tenuêre coloni:

which he explains by *quam* underſtood, p. 106. Lat. Gram. To me it ſeems better to conſider the latter clauſe as a parentheſis, which is an expedient we muſt at times have recourſe to, or no one rule of ſyntax would be unſhaken. Examples of this kind are extremely rare; and they may, I believe, when they do occur, always be explained moſt ſimply by a parentheſis. I have much to ſay, but this place will not bear it, upon the peculiarity of the Engliſh in omitting the Relative where the Latin and Greek languages omit the Antecedent. It affects *all the cauſal particles.*

mitted

mitted to obſerve, that, although not faultleſs, it is as good as moſt of what is now written in England, and much better than what uſually comes from Germany. If the Reviewer himſelf ever means to challenge the notice of the public in that way, I would adviſe him to be very cautious: the moſt prudent plan will be, not to let his lucubrations paſs beyond the circle of his private friends, or the ſecret orgies of ſome *Dilettanti* ſociety, where they will be praiſed, no doubt, and admired, and embalmed perhaps among the moſt precious of their curioſities.

Before I notice his general ſtrictures on the value of the notes, it may be as well to diſpatch the remainder of his criticiſms upon Oxonian Latin, which, he ſays, differs moſt eſſentially from the old Roman Latin. But in doing this, I muſt be forgiven, if a deſire to clear up notions which are often indiſtinct and confuſed, leads me into ſome lengthened diſſertation. His whole paragraph muſt be copied.

"In this *Roman* Latin, the relative conjunction "QUOD uſually governs an indicative, when it anſwers "to the Engliſh conjunction BECAUSE, unleſs the ſen- "tence be potential or oblique; and a ſubjunctive, "when it ſtands for UT, and anſwers to the Engliſh "THAT. But in Oxonian Latin this is completely

 "reverſed;

" reverſed; and we have repeatedly ſuch ſentences as ' *quod* vires *ſint* exiguæ, ſæpe inſidiis circumvenire ' hoſtem tentant;' pag. 210. and ' ſuſpicor *quod Strabo* ' Byzantii latitudinem a Maſſilienſi *ſumpſit*;' pag. 172. ' alſo, ' hæc relata digna cenſui, *quod* Strabo non ſatis ' clarè de hoc bello *ſcripſerit*;' pag. 1088. and ' *ſcribit* ' *quod cloacæ—ſubiêre tecta*; pag. 336.' [h]

The right uſe of the conjunction QUOD is a knotty point, which has much exerciſed the Grammarians.

In this place it is ſufficient to obſerve, that the conjunction *quod* never ſtands in good writers for *ut*, anſwering to the Engliſh word *that*. It *always* has, more or leſs, the force of *becauſe*[i]. *The ſubſtitution of it for* ut, *and for the accuſative caſe with the infinitive mood, is a barbariſm.*

Since then it always refers to ſome cauſe, if that cauſe be fixed and certain, or if the aſſertion be abſolute, the Indicative mood will be joined with it; if vague and uncertain, or if the aſſertion

[h] Rev. p. 435.

[i] *Ut* alſo is *cauſal*, but it denotes the *final cauſe*, or ſomething which *is to follow*. *Quod, becauſe*, denotes the *efficient cauſe*, or ſomething which *has gone before*. This diſtinction is very neceſſary. It is the key to the right uſe of theſe particles in a thouſand caſes: and the neglect of it may account for many anomalies in the uſe of the Engliſh particles, which have much perplexed Grammarians.

be

be not abſolute, the Subjunctive. In the inſtance quoted from the note, it ought to have been "quod vires *ſunt* exiguæ:" but the Reviewer has not given the reaſon why it ought. The whole paſſage is this: *Parvulæ reſpublicæ ſunt bellicoſæ, et quod vires ſint exiguæ, ſæpe inſidiis circumvenire hoſtes tentant.* Here, becauſe he is ſpeaking only of *parvulæ reſpublicæ*, the fact aſſigned as a cauſe is not doubtful, but certain: "vires *ſunt* "exiguæ." But in the ſame note, when the commentator ſays, "*Artes negliguntur quod inutiles* "*ſint*," *ſint* is right, becauſe the aſſertion is not an abſolute acknowledged truth. So Cicero,

Ad te minus multa doleo, *quod* et mœrore *impedior*, et quid expectem magis *habeo*, quam &c. Att. iii. 10.

Hic tu me accuſas, *quod* me *afflictem*. Att. iii. 12.

Suſpicor quod Strabo . . . ſumpſit, is bad Latin, not for the reaſon aſſigned by the Reviewer, but for one which requires even here a little detail. And if I can at all clear up a matter which has puzzled ſo many acute and learned men, my prolixity will, I am ſure, be forgiven. It involves the old diſputed point between Sanctius, who condemns the phraſes *dico quod, credo quod, ſcio quod*, and his commentator Perizonius, who defends them all. The elder Gronovius eſpouſed the doctrine of Sanctius, and upon that ground altered

altered a line in Plautus, which was almoſt the only palpable authority in their way.

Scio jam filius quod amet meus. Aſin. I. i. 3.

He propoſes to read *quum* or *quam* inſtead of *quod*; and adopts a ſimilar remedy for one paſſage in Livy, where the ſame conſtruction is uſed.

On the ſide of Perizonius are Manutius, Henry Stephens, Voſſius, and Scioppius. Some of theſe parties are very warm in the argument, eſpecially Scioppius, who has betrayed, as people are apt to do, the weakneſs of his cauſe, by diſingenuous attempts to ſupport it. The ſum of their doctrine is this; that *dico quod, credo quod, ſcio quod,* are juſt as good Latin as *miror quod, gaudeo quod, gratulor quod,* &c. and they exclaim, that it is againſt all reaſon to admit the one and reject the other, as Sanctius does.

After a fair ſtatement of the caſe, Geſner, whoſe good ſenſe and candour, as well as his learning, every one muſt admire, points out ſome miſtakes, into which all theſe diſputants had fallen, and gives a perſpicuous diviſion of the ſeveral ſenſes of this particle, which they ſeem to have confounded. What he ſays however of the point more immediately before us is remarkable. He rightly obſerves, if *quod* can be changed into *quia, cum,* or *propterea quod,* it is at our option to expreſs our meaning, either by the Accuſative caſe and the Infinitive mood, or by *quod* and the

the Indicative, or Subjunctive. And he propoſes this as a good practical teſt in all doubtful caſes. Hence, he ſays, after *miror, doleo, queror, indignor, gaudeo, glorior,* and *perhaps* after all verbs denoting *ſimilar* affections of the mind, *quod* may be uſed; but he will not go ſo far as to ſay it may be uſed after verbs denoting *every* affection of the mind; for after *ſpero, confido, vereor,* he thinks it improper; "*ſuch is the* "*tyranny of cuſtom*[k]."

But a little reflection on the reaſon aſſigned for the uſe of *quod* after *miror, doleo,* &c. will teach us that it is not *the tyranny of cuſtom,* but ſound ſenſe and conſiſtent principle, which requires this diſtinction. *Quod* in thoſe caſes, as all Grammarians admit, is *cauſal*; it denotes the *cauſe* of the thing aſſerted: and, as the *cauſe* muſt needs be prior to the effect, it will be proper only in caſes where that priority exiſts. All the affections of *wonder, grief, joy, anger, exultation,* are excited by ſomething which *has* exiſted. *Hope, fear, confidence, ſuſpicion,* relate to ſomething proſpective, ſomething that will perhaps exiſt,

[k] Geſner's own words are, Itaque poſt *miror, doleo, queror, indignor, gaudeo, glorior,* et ſimilia forte affectuum, quæ vocant, verba (de omnibus non auſim confirmare, neque enim dici poſſe puto, *ſpero, confido quod,* neque dici ignoro, *vereor ut* vel *ne: adeo uſus tyrannus eſt*) dubium non eſt, quin *quod* ſequi poſſit: ſequi tamen et poteſt, et ſolet Accuſativus cum Infinitivo. Theſaur. in voc. QUOD.

but

but which we do not *know* will or does exiſt. If this principle had been kept ſteadily in view, it would have ſolved all the caſes about which theſe acute Grammarians are wrangling. It was the gradual loſs of this principle which led to the confuſion in later writers, who at length employ *quod* equally for things *proſpective*, as retroſpective, and for things which are ſtated merely *to be* or to have *happened*, although they are not alledged as the *cauſe* of any thing.

It may indeed happen that *quod* ſhould be joined with *timeo* or *metuo*; but it does not then denote the *object* of the fear, but the *cauſe* which has excited it; an omen perhaps, or ſome ſymptom of a coming evil. I cannot recollect at preſent an example in point. And in ſuch words as *quod* Indexes give us no help. But this would be correct Latin: *Quod rex iraſceretur, metuebat ne quid ſibi mali eveniret. Quod lævum intonuiſſet, ſperavit &c.*

A curious illuſtration of the proper uſe of *quod* occurs when it is joined to the word *adde*. Many paſſages are quoted from good writers, beginning with *adde quod*; but in all theſe caſes, the thing introduced may be conſidered as a *cauſe* or *reaſon* for ſomething before alledged. The author has been *reaſoning*, and the new circumſtance is brought in to *ſupport his argument*. E. g.

Adde

Adde quod, ut cupias conſtans in amore manere
Non potes. Ov. Ep. 17. 199.
Adde quod arcana fieri novus ignis in æde
Dicitur. Faſt. iii. 143.

So again, Faſt iii. 245. and in many other places. The poet is *arguing* a point, or expoſtulating, and giving *reaſons* for the complaint. Of the ſame kind is this paſſage of Cicero:

Videndumque illud eſt, *quod*, ſi opulentum fortunatumque defenderis, in illo uno, aut forte in liberis ejus, *manet* gratia. Cic. Off. ii. 20.

Videndum quod has juſt the ſame force as *adde quod*, and brings in ſome reaſon for what has been before advanced. But in later writers it often ſerves like the Greek ὅτι, in a ſimple narrative, when the accuſative caſe and infinitive mood ought to have been uſed.

Perizonius, who ſpeaks ſharply of the inconſiſtency of Sanctius, ſays, among other things, "nay, he has himſelf uſed this very phraſe, *Adde* "*quod multi Græce ſcripſerunt.*" I doubt whether Sanctius would have been ready with an anſwer; for he certainly has not taken hold of the thing by the right handle. The proper anſwer is that principle which has been juſt laid down. He has been *arguing* a point, and *adde quod* introduces a

new reaſon. The point in queſtion was this: The word *Quod*, it ſeems, occurs frequently in this barbarous ſenſe in the Pandects; the latinity of which is in general very pure. Sanctius anſwers this objection at length: he ſays, that the book has been much interpolated; that the Lawyers, in whoſe hands it has been, are not the pureſt writers: and *Adde quod multi illorum Græce ſcripſerunt*, *whence*, or *from which cauſe*, it was natural that *quod* ſhould be ſubſtituted by them for the Greek ὅτι. To have ſaid, *multos illorum Græce ſcripſiſſe* would not have anſwered his purpoſe ſo well as *quod* does.

A ſingle difficulty ſtill remains; and that is about the word *ſcio*. *Spero quod*, *credo quod*, *dico quod*, *cupio quod*, *volo quod*, are eaſily exploded: but *ſcio quod* ſeems to have ſome authority, and the paſſages which Gronovius alters in order to reconcile them with his doctrine contain this word. The truth perhaps is, that ſuch authorities are genuine[a]: for *ſcio* is ſomething of an inter-

[a] Upon a cloſer examination of this paſſage in Plautus, I have reaſon to believe it genuine. If the reader thinks it worth while to turn to the original, he will find that Demænetus, wiſhing to ſupply his ſon with money for his amours through the medium of a ſlave, Libanus, ſays, for the ſake of encouraging his confidant,

Aut cur miniter tibi,
Propterea quod me non ſcientem feceris?
Aut cur poſtremo filio ſuccenſeam

Patres

mediate kind between the retroſpective and the proſpective claſs. It may partake of the nature of each. The thing muſt *have happened*, in order to be *known* in the ſtrict ſenſe of the word: as in that line of Martial quoted by Sanctius;

Hoc ſcio, quod ſcribat nulla puella. ii. 65.

But it is common to ſay, we *know* many things that *will happen*; and in ſuch caſes *quod* would be undoubtedly wrong. In the example from Martial, Sanctius underſtands *quod* as if it were

Patres ut faciunt cæteri? Lib. Quid iſtuc novi eſt?
Dr. Equidem ſcio jam, filius quod amet meus
Iſthanc meretricem e proxumo Philenium. Aſin. I. i. 33.

The words of Libanus are evidently meant to be ſaid *aſide*. *Equidem ſcio jam*, may be conſidered as parenthetical, referring to *non ſcientem feceris*, and in that caſe *filius quod amet meus*, will relate to *ſuccenſeam*, which is a legitimate conſtruction. I am confident indeed that this is the true conſtruction. *Cur miniter* has *quod non feceris* after it: and *cur ſuccenſeam* would naturally require a ſimilar clauſe ſubjoined explanatory of *ſuccenſeam*, as *non ſcientem feceris* is explanatory of *miniter*. But the courſe of the ſentence is interrupted by *Quid iſtuc novi eſt? Equidem jam ſcio:* and then, as is very common after a parentheſis, the word which preceded it is repeated after it; as here, *filio* is repeated in *filius*.

The line, *Equidem jam ſcio*, &c. is repeated v. 70. where Gronovius juſtly condemns it as ſpurious. The doctrine which I have maintained about *quod* is a further reaſon for condemning it: for in that place *quod amet* muſt depend upon *ſcio:* there is no ſuch word as *ſuccenſeam* going before, with which it can unite.

propter quod, or *cur*. Very likely ſome *équivoque* was intended; in which caſe the uſe of words is apt to be a little ſtrained. And indeed the paſſages are ſo few in which *ſcio quod* is found, compared with the thouſands of occaſions in which that idea occurs, that we may well conſider it offenſive to the genius of the language.

Hence it will be ſeen that *ſuſpicor quod* Strabo . . . *ſumpſit*, is barbarous, not becauſe *quod* is uſed with *ſumpſit*, but becauſe it is uſed with *ſuſpicor*. So *ſcribit*[b] *quod*, is wrong: *quod* . . . *ſubière* is not wrong. *Hæc relatu digna cenſui, quod Strabo non ſatis clare de hoc bello ſcripſerit*, ſi defenſible, becauſe the aſſertion implies ſome diffidence; it is not quite abſolute; ſo in Plautus;

Cur miniter tibi,
Propterea quod me non ſcientem *feceris?*
Aſin. I. i. 34.

and in a hundred other places.

The two firſt examples of the wrong uſe of *ut* are correctly quoted; although in the latter the meaning of *ut* probably is, *as, according as*; in which caſe there is no fault. Of the other I can only ſay, that in the eye of every candid

[b] After *ſcribo* ſhould be the Accuſative caſe and Infinitive mood. Thus Livy, xxiv. 31. *Scriptum erat* recte eum feciſſe . . . quod nulli peperciſſet; not *ſcriptum erat quod recte feciſſet.*

reader

reader it *muſt* be deemed an overſight, and not a mark of ignorance. It is impoſſible that ſuch a miſtake could have been deliberately made. The Reviewer indeed ſays, "this kind of error is "ſyſtematic[c]." He does not however refer to a ſingle example of the kind beſides, although he has evidently peruſed the notes *ſolely* with a view to detect the falſe Latin; and from what I have read of them, I do not believe he could produce another. That the error is *ſyſtematic*, is an aſſertion which will ſhine conſpicuous in that galaxy of falſehood which has nearly dazzled us already. The paſſage p. 220, where *ut* is ſaid to be omitted, he does not underſtand. To place *ut* where he propoſes, would make nonſenſe. The meaning of *videatur* is, *may ſeem*. "*To the eye* "*it may ſeem* at firſt not to riſe: but, in reality, "by degrees it ſwells into the mountains of Mo-"lina," &c[d].

"Of the Oxonian uſe of the indicative with the "*relative* pronoun ſubordinate to another verb we have "already treated in our obſervations on the Preface[e]."

We alſo have treated of this matter pretty largely, and have ſhewn how the Indefinite

[c] Page 436, l. 13.

[d] Paullo infra Caunum ex Idubeda emiſſus Oroſpeda mollibus initio jugis vix aſſurgere videatur; ſenſim tamen ſeſe efferens Molinæ primum montes erigit, &c. p. 220.

[e] Rev. p. 436.

is

is often confounded with the Relative. But we do not often expect to find ſuch a confuſion as the Reviewer is here guilty of. For example; of this fault he gives three ſpecimens, ſelected from the whole body of notes. In the firſt and third, what he calls the Relative is in fact the Indefinite. In the ſecond, "cum ſentirent "quantum optimates a divitiis potuerunt," he calls *quantum* a Relative. In the next example there is ſomething worſe than blundering about a Relative. In order to make room for a pitiful joke, he wilfully perverts the meaning of the paſſage;

'Obſervandum eſt, quo violentior eſt Solis ardor, eo 'citius fieri pluvias.' "*Citius*, ſays he, we preſume "ſtands for *crebrius*; for though 'it rains faſter' be "a common vulgariſm in Engliſh, we do not believe "that it had even that humble ſtation in any idiom of "the Latin, that exiſted prior to the Oxonian."

Who could have believed that in this paſſage *citius* merely means *ſooner?* The rainy ſeaſon ſets in SOONER, the hotter the climate is. Even ſuppoſing the Editor had meant *faſter*, *crebrius*, which the Reviewer recommends, is the laſt word he ſhould have uſed. It conveys an idea totally different, *more frequently: vehementius*, *effuſius*, *gravius*, would have been the proper words for *faſter*[f].

[f] This criticiſm is very ably refuted in the Gent. Mag. for

The next complaint is of the Oxonian uſe of tenſes. Of this fault he produces eight ſpecimens. One of theſe runs thus;

"Neque hoc memoriæ lapſu Strabo ſcripſit; ſed "cum de Cyri rebus geſtis vix aliquid certe conſtat, "eam famam ſequitur, &c."

He ſeems to mean, that the change of tenſe from *ſcripſit* to *conſtat* and *ſequitur*, is utterly barbarous. He therefore brings in a Roman, altering *conſtat* into *conſtaret*, and *ſequitur* into *ſequebatur*. The Roman muſt have been more nice than many of his countrymen to think this neceſſary: ſuch changes of tenſe in the ſame ſentence are not unuſual in the beſt writers.

Primo anteſignani Pœnorum, deinde ſigna perturbata, poſtremo tota impulſa acies; inde haud dubie terga *data, ruuntque* fugientes in caſtra; adeo pavidi trepidique .... ut ne .... quiſquam *reſiterit*, ac prope .... *ediderint*. Liv. xxiv. 16.

for Oct. 1809. by Mr. Falconer, the writer of the Preface. His paſſage from Servius proves that *citius* will bear the meaning of *ſooner*; but the poſitive authority of Horace and Virgil, both of whom uſe it in that ſenſe, is ſtill better. The Poets however are not the beſt guides. Cicero would have ſaid *maturius*.

The whole of Mr. Falconer's letter is well worth reading. I om obliged to touch upon the ſame points, ſome of which I ſhall treat more fully than he has done.

Itaque

Itaque Nolam ad Collegam *mittit* .... opus eſſe, qui *opponatur:* vel ipſe relicto Nolæ præſidio modico *veniret:* vel ſi eum Nola *teneret*, et res *eſſent*, &c. Liv. xxiv. 19.

Conſules, Marcellus retro, Nolam *redit;* Fabius in Samnium .... *proceſſit*. Liv. xxiv. 20.

Ad me *adire* quoſdam memini qui *dicerent*. Cic. Div. iii. 10. 19.

Pronuntiat Gracchus eſſe nihil quod de libertate *ſperarent*, niſi eo die fuſi fugatique hoſtes eſſent. Liv. xxiv. 15.

Quoad primus ille ſermo *haberetur*, *adeſt* in diſputando ſenex. Cic. Att. iv. 16.

Antiochus Magnus, ut tributa Romanis *ſolveret*, nocte templum Elymæi Jovis *aggreſſus eſt*, qua re prodita, concurſu incolarum cum exercitu toto *interficitur*. Juſtin. lib. xxxii. c. 2.

It is needleſs to multiply examples, for theſe are enough to ſhew that a fault of this kind in a modern, eſpecially in one whoſe mind was wholly intent on his matter, and quite regardleſs of his ſtyle, is not very diſgraceful. The alteration of *ſupponeret* into *ſuppoſuerit*, has no reaſon for it, and to my ears makes the ſentence leſs Roman than it was before. Either *ſupponeret* is uſed for *ſupponat*, or *habet* for *haberet*. In Plautus ſuch inaccuracies are very common. If the Reviewer means to ſay that the expreſſion " *cum* " de Cyri rebus vix aliquid certe *conſtat*" is faulty, and

and that it ought to be *conſtet*, he takes more upon himſelf than he has any right to do. The beſt writers have uſed *cum* in this ſenſe with the Indicative mood.

Tibi maximas gratias ago, *cum* tantum meæ literæ *potuerunt*. Cic. Fam. xiii. 24.

Cum medio *exceſſit*, unde hæc ſuſcepta eſt tibi.
Ter. Phorm. V. vii. 77.

Gratulor tibi, *cum* tantum *vales* apud Dolabellam, quantum &c. Cic. Att. 226. b. ap. Nizol. voc. Cum. et Cic. de Orat. 122. b. ibid.

Cum iſthæc res male *evenit* tibi, Gripe, gratulor.
Plaut. Rud. IV. iv. 134.

Tu *cum* eo tempore mecum eſſe non *potuiſti*, quo operam deſideravi tuam, cave feſtines &c.
Cic. Fam. xvi. 12. Facciol.

Quam quidem, *cum* difficillimo reip. tempore ſecuti *ſunt*, eos nunquam oportebit &c. Cic. Phil. xiv. 11.

The Subjunctive is certainly moſt frequent with *cum*, when uſed for *quandoquidem* or *quoniam*; and writers of Latin ſhould be cautioned againſt this practice: but as it has the ſanction of Cicero, however ſparingly, it is to be treated with reſpect. It cannot be a downright barbariſm.

The next critical laſh falls upon the following ſentence.

"Strabo duodecim civitates in Etruria principes "antea dixit: ſed harum tantum octo memoravit, ſcili- "cet Tarquinii, Cære, Volaterra, Arretium, Paruſia, "Volſinii, Falerii, Cluſium. p. 322."

Upon this the Reviewer obſerves, that "although "in *Homeric Greek* there is a figure of ſpeech "ſomewhat like this," yet "it was unknown to "*every period of Latinity*—prior to the Oxonian, "which it has thus ſo happily enriched."

Why in Homeric Greek only? Did he ever read this paſſage in Xenophon? Ἐφ' οἷς γε μὴν ἔργοις κεῖται θάνατος ἡ ζημία, ἱεροσυλίαι, τοιχωρυχίαι, ἀνδραποδίσις, πόλεως προδοσία, ἃ δ' αὐτοὶ οἱ ἀντίδικοι τούτων πρᾶξαί τι κατ' ἐμοῦ φασίν. Apol. Soc. §. 25.

The ſame conſtruction occurs often in Herodotus and Thucydides; and I perceive an inſtance in Strabo, p. 299. l. 25. And as to the facetious remark about Latinity, it may be edifying to quote the following paſſage from the Edinburgh Review, when examining an edition of a *Latin claſſic*.

"There is no form of conſtruction more common, "than this reſuming the Nominative caſe after the "ſentence appears to be proceeding to ſomething elſe. "Nay, there are many inſtances, in which an object is "firſt introduced, in ſome of the oblique caſes, in the "courſe of conſtruction; and then the Nominative is "reſumed, without regard to that conſtruction, for the "purpoſe of ſtating or expounding ſome circumſtance "attending it. Thus in the tenth book of the Æneid we "have

—"rapiens immania pondera baltei,
Impreſſumque nefas"

"all

" all in the accuſative; but the farther deſcription of " the *nefas* is given, without any interval, in the " Nominative.

—una ſub nocte jugali
Cæſa manus juvenum fœda, *thalamique cruenti.*"

Edinb. Rev. No. V. p. 63.

I will not go ſo far with this ingenious critic, as to ſay, " *nothing is more common than this con-* " *ſtruction*;" but I may at leaſt conſign over to him the controverſy with his brother critic, who ſays, " *it is unknown to every period of Latinity.*"

The paſſage however in the note is manifeſtly an overſight: it never could have ariſen from ignorance, and it never could miſlead or embarraſs any reader.

The Reviewer proceeds;

" Upon the ſame principle, the baldneſs and poverty " of the ancient Roman tongue have been embelliſhed " in this new modification of it with the *exquiſite and* RE- " CONDITE *phraſes of ſtretching out a ſentence or opinion* " geographically by the mile, from one gate of a great " city to another,—' Donati tamen *ſententiam* intelligo " eſſe a porta Eſquilina verſus Labicanam'—*and ex-* " *hibiting Faith or Belief* in a tangible or viſible form, " aſcertained *by cubical or ſuperficial meaſure.*—' *Ma-* ' *jor* auctori noſtro ac Juſtino adhibenda *fides* eſt."

This is meant (ſi Dîs placet) for wit and pleaſantry! O! ſi ſic omnia dixiſſet! Little ſhould I dread the miſchievous effects of this northern

libeller. Or if I could believe this to be the tone of ſarcaſm we are likely to hear from that journal in future; inſtead of complaining and refuting, I ſhould ſing in a note of triumph,

Audivere, Lyce, Dî mea vota; Dî
Audivere, Lyce. *Fis anus, et tamen*
Vis formoſa videri:
Ludiſque, et bibis impudens.

There is indeed a tottering and toothleſs decrepitude in this paſſage, which almoſt diſarms criticiſm, and, as it affects to be friſky, provokes only laughter. The egregious fillineſs of miſtaking a *gate* for a *road*, and of tranſlating "*verſus* Labicanam," "*to* the Labican," as if *verſus* denoted the *limit* inſtead of the *direction* of any movement, has been ſo well expoſed by Mr. Falconer[c], that it would be uſeleſs for me to ſay more on that ſubject. "*Major* fides" is objected to, as "exhibiting faith in a tangible or viſible "form, aſcertained by cubical or ſuperficial "meaſure." Cicero is guilty of the ſame error, with the words *ſpes, virtus, indoles, vox, alacritas, admiratio, auctoritas*, all of which he abſurdly joins with the epithet *major*, for want of this learned Reviewer's advice: and as to this very word *fides*, his ignorance of his own language is inexcuſable.

[c] Gent. Magazine, Oct. 1809.

"Si

" Si *honor* is fuit, *majorem* tibi habere non potui: ſi " *fides*, *majorem* pene habui, quam mihi ipſi.

Ep. Fam. v. 20.

In the ſame ſtrain of ſuperannuated tittering he proceeds,

" which [ſc. fidem] this learned body is ſo generous " as to *give gratuitouſly* (for they cannot mean it in the " Roman ſenſe, of either rendering credible or pledging) " to an old Jewiſh hiſtorian, who has been dead ſeventeen " centuries—' *Joſepho fidem damus*,'—and make a faith- " leſs uſurper give to hiſtory, what he never had to give " to any one—' *Auguſtus fidem hiſtoriæ dedit.*"

Rev. p. 437.

The wiſdom of all this is juſt as ſmall as the wit. Does he mean to ſay, that the Roman ſenſe of " *Joſepho fidem damus*," is " *we render Joſephus* " *credible?*" If ſo, he is quite in the dark. *Dare fidem*, after a *thing*, a *circumſtance*, an *argument*, may mean *to add weight and credit* to any ſtatement. Thus,

Nunc quoque dant verbo *plurima ſigna* fidem.

Ov. Faſt. ii. 20.

Commemoratio antiquitatis . . . et auctoritatem orationi affert et fidem. Cic. Orat. 34.

But after *a perſon*, " dare fidem" means to *promiſe*, to *certify*, *to give one's word*. There is a marked diſtinction in its uſe according as it follows *a perſon*, or *a thing*. *Homo dat fidem*, he promiſes: *Homo habet fidem*, he believes: *Res dat*

dat fidem, it adds credit: *Res habet fidem*, it is credible. How abſurd therefore is his remark about Auguſtus! We may ſay of a *faithleſs* man, as well as of an *upright* man, "*dedit* fidem." It is not in *giving* their word, but in *keeping* it, that they differ.

But we have not done with this unlucky *fidem* yet. He goes on to ſay,

"The Engliſh phraſe, indeed, may ſuggeſt another "meaning, and make us Britons ſuſpect, that, in this "new dialect, '*fidem dare*' ſignifies what '*fidem habere*' "did in the old: but no ſuch ſuſpicion will ariſe on "the Continent, *where no ſuch indigenous expreſſion* "*exiſts*." Rev. p. 437.

"O! I had loſt a ſheep, an' he had not "bleated."

Why will a man force us to expoſe his vanity and ignorance? The thing, to be ſure, is in itſelf quite indifferent; but it may ſerve to ſhew what ſtuff this Reviewer is made of, who would fain have us to think he underſtands German.

But let us hear the words of Noltenius.

Sed quæ eſt occaſio, quod *Germani mei* locutione *fidem dare* etiam tunc utuntur, quum utendum eſſet locutione *fidem habere*, aut verbo ſingulo, *credere* vel *accredere*? Hæc nimirum, quod in vernaculâ linguâ habemus locutionem *Glauben geben, beymeſſen, zuſtellen*, putamuſque, quomodo Latinum *dare* noſtro *Geben* alias

alias reſpondet, ita reſpondere eidem et heic poſſe, dicique adeo *fidem dare*. Nolten. Antibarb. Wichmanni, p. 1421.

Few of my readers will be diſpoſed to heſitate between this authority and that of the Reviewer. Many of them alſo may have heard the French phraſe *ajouter foi* not uſed as the Roman *adjungere fidem*, but in the ſenſe of *credere*. From a Spaniſh Dictionary by Gattel, I learn that *Dar fé* means *croire*; from a Caſtilian Dictionary, that *Dar credito, dar fé*, is the ſame as *alicui fidem habere*; and from Baretti's Italian Dictionary, that the Engliſh of *Dare fede* is *to believe*. And yet *no ſuch indigenous phraſe exiſts on the Continent!* Well did Cicero obſerve;

Qui ſemel verecundiæ fines tranſierit, eum bene et naviter oportet eſſe impudentem.

Let it be remembered too, (for indeed it is a thing never to be loſt ſight of,) that theſe miſtakes of the Reviewer are not picked and culled out of two folio volumes; but he is himſelf acting the rigid cenſor, challenging public notice, and of courſe is upon his guard, and does his beſt; and yet he ſcarcely utters a ſentence in Latin without committing ſome palpable blunder againſt the idiom of the language.

Some other little matters of this ſort muſt now be

be diſpatched, and then we ſhall come to the *flos et medulla*, the pink and cream of criticiſm, the DEUS LUNUS.

He is pleaſed to ſay, " there are ſome of theſe " Oxonianiſms ſo profound or ſo refined, that " our northern underſtandings, condenſed as they " are with Mathematics and Metaphyſics, can " ſcarcely comprehend them at all." The reader, I hope, will take notice in future that what is *condenſed* cannot *comprehend* what is *profound*. The Reviewer indeed adviſes the Univerſity of Oxford to ſhake off the " *benumbing influence of Port* " *wine*;" (pag. 441.) whereas his own faculties have been *condenſed* by more ſubtle diet. It is to be hoped he does not always treat his genius as he does his readers; and, on thoſe rare occaſions, the liquor he condemns may at leaſt vie with a certain northern beverage, for which he perhaps imagines the encomium of Horace to be intended.

Tu lene tormentum ingenio admoves
Plerumque duro:

It certainly cannot be a *benumbing* port, which the Poet means by

Narratur et priſci Catonis
Sæpe *mero caluiſſe* virtus.

With all its faults there is ſomething generous about it; and if the old Latin proverb ſays right,

right, it is at leaſt no enemy to *truth*. If he has himſelf hitherto abſtained from its uſe, under the hope of ſubduing prejudice, invigorating his faculties, or quickening his perceptions, never was an experiment attended with a more unfortunate reſult.

The ſcurrility and meanneſs of this abuſe muſt be allowed to ſcreen it from a grave and formal anſwer; neither will any ſuch reply be wanted by thoſe who are accuſtomed to the enjoyment of good ſociety, and who know how eaſily the moſt innocent and the moſt indifferent habits of life may be made the object of vulgar and malignant ſatire. Let us return then to his Latin criticiſms.

"Tigranes poſt reges ſubditos rex regum appellatur." Strabo, p. 772.

Upon this he exclaims,

"Is it poſſible that the writer could mean '*Tigranes, 'poſtquam reges ſupradictos imperio ſubjecerat, rex re-'gum appellatus eſt?*'

Here he ſuppoſes the conſtruction *poſt reges ſubditos* to be wrong: whereas it is much more correct and elegant than his own. E. g.

Paucis annis poſt reges exactos. Clar. Orat. xiv.

And again:

Sexennio poſt Veios captos. Cic. Div. i. 44.

Such modes of conſtruction abound in Livy. *Subditos*, though not the right word, has a ſort of authority even in Ovid. The Reviewer's own word, *ſupradictos*, never ſaw the light till long after the Auguſtan age. *Supradictis*, which occurs two or three times in Quintilian, ought to be divided, as it is in Horace; *Adde ſupra dictis*, Serm. II. vii. 78. In theſe places it always means *the things which have been before ſaid.* As an adjective prefixed to a ſubſtantive, like the ὁ προειρημένος ἀνὴρ of Polybius, it was never employed till a much later age. There is no need of ſaying *appellatus eſt*, becauſe of the paſt time *ſubditos:* nothing is more common than this irregularity in the narrative ſtyle. Indeed *appellatur* is the right tenſe, if a *practice* or *habit* is meant to be expreſſed.

The next paragraph of the Review contains a groſs fabrication. A paſſage from the notes is produced to this effect.

"Platæenſes noſter author affirmat eſſe olim prope "paludem ſitos; remotis tamen incolis ad meliorem "locum a palude diſtantem, urbs nova nomen priſcum "ſervavit, quod nomen non eorum ſitui ab aquis re- "moto proprie competeret." To which, ſays the Reviewer, *the writer adds with ſelf-complacent confidence,* "nihil abſurdi in his, ut mihi videtur, apparet. p. 590." And, to prove that *there is abſurdity,* he proceeds to correct *the Editor's Latin.*

By

By this method of quoting, an Author may be made to ſay any thing. The truth is this. Palmemerius had objected to the etymology of Platæa given by Strabo. He cannot reconcile it with the *inland* ſituation of that city, that its name ſhould be derived from a word ſignifying an *oar*; he ſays, " *Quid abſurdius hoc etymo?*" The object of Falconer's note is to account for this paradox; which having done, he vindicates Strabo from the reproach of Palmerius, alledging " *nihil ab-* " *ſurdi* in his, ut mihi videtur, apparet."

Now for the Latinity, which this Reviewer, forſooth, thinks proper to correct. I hope the reader will have patience to examine it carefully, and he will find that, for one fault he mends, he makes two. The Editor of Strabo he ſomewhere compares to a Chineſe tailor. But there is a homely Engliſh proverb, according to which, it ſeems, he would not rank very high himſelf in the ſcale of handicraft employments. Thus then he would correct the note.

" Platæenſes ad paludem olim habitâſſe, noſter affir- " mat: in locum autem meliorem tranſlatos novæ urbi " nomen priſcum continuâſſe, *ſitui* licet, ab aquis re- " moto, *haud diutius competiſſet.*"

Will he tell us where he ever met with the word *ſitui*, and from what author he borrowed the phraſe *haud diutius? Haud diutius! no longer.*

Is this the critic who has no mercy for bald Latin? and who thinks it not beneath the buſineſs of a ſcholar to hunt for miſtakes in the poſthumous works of one long ſince dead? of one who never aſpired to the credit of a pure writer, and whoſe habit it was to pour forth the various information, with which his mind was ſtored, in the language that firſt preſented itſelf to his pen. Oh miſerable miſuſe of time, even when learning is ſo employed! The concluding part of the Editor's note might have been better expreſſed thus; *Urbem novam priſcum nomen ſervaſſe, quanquam ei, ſitu ab aquis remoto, jam id non competeret.* *Competeret* is right, not *competiſſet:* the idea requires continued time, or the imperfect tenſe, not the preterperfect, much leſs the preterpluperfect. *Conveniret* would be better ſtill.

One ſtep more, and then we are out of the mire. The following he propoſes as a piece of faultleſs Latin, not without his accuſtomed ſneer at Oxonian Latin.

"Nonne vult Pauſanias Melanthum Andropompi fi-
"lium e Nelei progenie *primum* fuiſſe, *qui* in Attica
"ſedem *habuiſſet*; atque ideo *eundem qui* Xanthum
"*occidiſſet*." Rev. p. 488.

In this ſentence there are no leſs than four faults; two of them rank barbariſms—*primum qui*—

qui—eundem qui. The two other faults are, *habuiſſet—occidiſſet.*

Firſt then of *primum qui.* Any reader of Cicero, one would think, muſt have obſerved that he invariably avoids this phraſe, although he has a hundred occaſions for uſing it, if it were Latin. In the treatiſe de Claris Oratoribus, this idea occurs continually; and the phraſe employed is either *primus* alone, or *qui primus,* or the adverb *primo.* E. g.

Cum cætera melius, quam ſuperiores, tum *primus intellexit.* c. viii.

Hic *primus inflexit* orationem, et eam mollem, teneramque reddidit. c. ix.

Sed tum fere Pericles .... *primus* adhibuit doctrinam. c. xi.

Et eum *primum* ob eam ipſam cauſam Maximum eſſe appellatum. c. xiv.

Æſculapius, *qui primus* vulnus obligaviſſe dicitur. Cic. De Nat. 71. a. Nizol. voc. Primus.

Peripatetici *primi* ex omnibus philoſophis docuerunt. Cic. Fin. 110. a. Nizol. voc. Primus.

So Horace:

Illi robur et æs triplex
Circa pectus erat, *qui* fragilem truci
Commiſit pelago ratem
Primus. Od. i. 3.

Such a phraſe as *primus fuit qui habuit,* would have

have grated in the ears of any Roman. The reaſon is manifeſt. *Qui* being a relative refers properly to a *perſon* or *thing*, or a *quality in the abſtract*, not (if one may be allowed to uſe a logical term) to a quality *in concreto*. Now *primus* is an adjective in the ſuperlative degree: but who would think of ſaying, *pulcherrimus qui venit ad Trojam*, for *pulcherrimus eorum qui venerunt?* The Relative might refer to *pulchritudo* in the abſtract, but not to *pulchritudo* implied in *pulcherrimus*. The ſame principle holds in Greek. There we ſay, ὃς πρῶτος, ὃς κάλλιστος, not πρῶτος ὃς, κάλλιστος ὅς.

The other barbariſm is *eundem qui*; which will require a little more diſcuſſion, becauſe it appears to derive more countenance from the practice of good writers, and neither Voſſius nor Turſellinus ſeem aware of the true principle. Is it however credible, that if this mode of ſpeaking were correct, it ſhould not be met with ten times in all the pureſt writers? The idea is ſo common, and enters inadvertently into ſo many ſentences, that we muſt purſue a very different rule of criticiſm, when examining this, from what is uſually adopted when the genuineneſs of a ſingle word is ſuſpected. In the preſent caſe I ſhould not admit three or four inſtances, out of the whole body of Latin authors, to juſtify the uſe of it: but the fact, I believe, is, that in the way here employed

it

it does not occur *once*. Cicero's ordinary way of ſpeaking is, *eum qui, is qui,* when he wiſhes to identify a perſon with ſome fact or ſtory. Vid. Clar. Orat. c. xix. and twice c. xxi. c. xlvii.

A thouſand other paſſages of the ſame ſort might be produced from him and Livy, in which a modern would ſay *the ſame who*. Vid. Liv. xxi. 40.

On looking over the examples in Geſner and Facciolati, I do not find one which ſupports the Reviewer's phraſe. There are none where *qui* is uſed after *idem*, when *idem* means a *perſon*, or *ſubſtance*.

The reaſon for this may be, that *is qui* identifies an individual as well as *idem qui*. If it be *he* at all, it muſt be *the ſame he:* for *ſubſtance* does not admit of *more* and *leſs* [a]. But when *idem qui* is uſed with reference to a *quality*, it denotes the *ſame degree*, and *idem* may generally be converted into *par*.

And not only does *quality* vary in degree in the *ſame thing*, but the *ſame quality* may be in *different things*. And again, one thing may have the *ſame relation* to many others. Hence, both in denoting *quality* and *relation*, *idem qui* is a common mode of ſpeaking.

[a] Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ οὐσία μὴ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον . . . οἷον εἰ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ οὐσία ἀνθρωπος, οὐκ ἔσται μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἄνθρωπος, οὔτε αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ, οὔτε ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ. Ariſtot. Categor. περὶ Οὐσίας. Ἐπιδέχεται δὲ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον τὰ ποιὰ. Ibid. περὶ Ποιότητος.

The

The examples in Voſſius and Turſellinus of *idem qui*, ſo far from oppoſing, really ſupport the principle I am maintaining.

Verres *idem* eſt, *qui* fuit ſemper. Cic. Verr. i. ap. Turſell.

Here *idem* means *character*, not *perſon*. The ſame may be ſaid of theſe:

Eſt *idem qui* ſemper in republica fuit. Cic. Att. ix. 11. Geſn.

Nihil commutantur animo, et *iidem* abeunt, *qui* venerant. Cic. Fin. iv. 3.

Peripateticis veſtris, qui quondam *iidem* erant, *qui* Academici. Cic. Off. iii. 4.

If the phraſe is never uſed, as I believe it never is, of *perſons* but in this figurative way, when by perſon is meant *character* or *quality*, there cannot be a ſtronger proof that it is improper in any other. For it ſhould be obſerved, that *abſolute ſameneſs* or *identity* is then predicated: which *ſameneſs* is the proper antecedent to *qui*.

In the New Teſtament, what is tranſlated *the ſame who*, is ſeldom, if ever, ὁ αὐτὸς ὅς. In Luk. vi. 38. τῷ αὐτῷ means *quality*. In 1 Cor. xii. 6. ὁ αὐτὸς ſignifies ONE; and in other places, *relation*. When a reference is made to ὁ αὐτὸς, it is generally by a word denoting *quality*: as,

TON

TON AYTON ἀγῶνα ἔχοντες OION εἴδετε ἐν ἐμοί. Phil. i. 30. 'Having *the ſame* conflict *which* ye ſaw in me.'

When the *relative* is uſed in Greek, the antecedent is not ὁ αὐτὸς, but ὅτος.

Another fault in the Reviewer's phraſe *eundem qui* is, that the relative is not in the *ſame caſe* with the antecedent, which it ought to be, as, I hope, the following analyſis will prove. The argument requires a little ſteady attention; and it ſeems to me deſerving of it.

When *idem* is in the *nominative* caſe with *qui* following it, mere *identity* is predicated. *Idem eſt qui fecit*, as we have already ſhewn, is barbarous: *idem eſt qui fuit* is Latin. The rules of grammar may indeed require an *accuſative* caſe, but *identity* is the idea that is expreſſed: nothing is predicated of the thing mentioned but that it is *the ſame*. Thus,

Apud bonos *iidem* ſumus *quos* reliquiſti. Cic. Att. i. 13. Turſellin.

Here *quos reliquiſti* means no more than '*qui* '*fuimus* cum nos reliquiſti.' So,

Eoſdem eſſe oratorios numeros, *qui* ſunt poetici. Cic. in Orat. c. lvi.

The variation of *caſe* does not affect the meaning of the propoſition: *identity* is all that is predicated.

But when *idem* in any of its *oblique caſes* is followed by *qui*, the meaning of the paſſage is, not that the thing which *idem* denoted *is the ſame* with any thing elſe, but that it *bears the ſame relation* to two other things. Now the inflexions or *caſes* of nouns are expreſſive of *relation*. The caſe of *idem* denotes the relation it bears to one of the two things, and the caſe of *qui* denotes the relation it bears to the other. Hence the caſe of *idem* and the caſe of *qui* ought to be the ſame, otherwiſe they do not mark the *ſame relation*. And thus, I believe, it will be found, that the beſt writers invariably uſe the words. *Eadem ratione qua, eodem pacto quo, eandem poteſtatem quam, eodem loco quo*, are among the moſt ordinary phraſes. The laſt phraſe is from Livy, xlii. 37. where *loco* means *rank, eſtimation*, which is a *quality* or *abſtract idea:* if it had meant ſimply *place, ipſo* probably, and not *eodem*, would have been the word: as in this paſſage of Cicero;

Caſtra paucos dies habuimus, *ea ipſa, quæ* contra Darium habuerat apud Iſſum Alexander. Ep. Att. v. 20.

There are various ways indeed of expreſſing the *ſame relation*, and ſometimes this happens with *idem qui*. As, "Vovit *in eadem* verba Con-"ſul, *quibus* antea quinquennalia vota ſuſcipi "ſolita erant." Liv. xxxi. 9. Where the change of expreſſion is eaſily accounted for, by the uſe of

of *ſuſcipi* inſtead of repeating the *verb* voveo: but the *relation* is not changed.

A remarkable inſtance of the obſervance of the rule above mentioned juſt occurs to me in Livy, xxvi. 33.

Cæterorum omnium Campanorum *eundem* erga nos animum, *quem* Carthaginienſibus, fuiſſe—not 'qui Car-'thaginienſibus.'

And thus too we may uſe all words denoting *relation*, although they include a *perſon* under them. *Eodem rege quo, eodem duce quo*, &c. But to ſay *eodem duce, qui*, or, as this writer ſays, *eundem eſſe qui occidiſſet*, is againſt the genius of the language, and argues an ignorance of the principle which governs this phraſeology.

But to return from this digreſſion to the Reviewer's Latin. Both the tenſes *habuiſſet* and *occidiſſet* are wrong. *Haberet* might do, as relating to continued time; but *habuerit* is the more uſual form. Inſtead of *occidiſſet*, he ſhould have ſaid *occiderit:* for *occiderit* has nothing ſubordinate to it, or connected with it, whoſe time cannot begin, till the time of *occiderit* is paſt; *which is the proper teſt for the uſe of the preterpluperfect ſubjunctive.*

I will produce an exact parallel, in point of tenſes, from Cicero.

Publium etiam Scipionem Naſicam .... habitum

 eloquentem

eloquentem aiunt, illius qui ſacra acceperit, filium. Clar. Orat. c. xx.

Which this Reviewer might have expreſſed thus,

Publium etiam Scipionem Naſicam fuiſſe aiunt qui eloquens habitus fuiſſet, ejuſque patrem eundem eſſe, qui ſacra accepiſſet.

Such is the advantage of not having one's Latin ſtyle ſpoilt at Oxford. His own ſentence I ſhall beg leave to caſt quite in a new mould.

Nonne vult Pauſanias, primum ex Nelei nepotibus Melanthum in Attica ſedem habuiſſe, ac proinde eum eſſe qui Xanthum occiderit?

When preparing to introduce the DEUS LUNUS, he clothes the Editor's remark in a new Roman dreſs, which he fancies is perfectly *in coſtume*. "Romanis enim Græciſque juxta ignorantibus "quiſnam deorum eſſet iſte Menes, pro alio quam "Luna, *ſub deæ perſona*[a] ab iis culta, *Straboni* "vix haberi *potuerit*." *Straboni* vix *haberi*, is one of thoſe faults which may grace the fourth form at Eton, but ſeldom, I imagine, riſes higher in the ſchool. What *potuerit* has to do here

[a] *Sub deæ perſona*—This is as bald a phraſe as he could have uſed: and I doubt its purity. He might have ſaid, *tanquam Dea, tanquam fœmina, fœminea forma*—any thing better than '*ſub* deæ perſona.' For the ſtrict meaning of the phraſe is, *under the aſſumed appearance, or character, of a Goddeſs.*

I will

I will not attempt to explain. We will however ſuppoſe it to be *potuit*. And what then? "*Is* it "poſſible, he exclaims, that even the preſſmen at "Oxford ſhould be ignorant that there was at "Rome a *Deus Lunus*, as well as a *Dea Luna*?"

This is one of thoſe ſcraps of nauſeous pedantry which bring a reproach upon the ſtudy of ancient learning—exalting an inſignificant trifle into an affair of importance—a ſolitary and obſcure fact, of which every one may well be ignorant, into a *criterion* of ſound erudition. This too I ſhould ſay, if his mythology were correct. But the ignorance is as palpable as the affectation is diſguſting. In order to expoſe it, it is impoſſible to avoid a longer detail than the God and all his worſhippers together are worth. But ſo it is with puny cavils: they generally take more trouble and more time in refuting, than ſtrong objections.

The firſt thing then that ſtrikes us is, the uniform ſilence on the ſubject of this deity in all popular compendiums of Roman antiquities. Cicero, Ovid, Livy, and other writers about that time, from whom we collect incidentally moſt of what we know reſpecting the Roman religion, never mention him. And in fact the earlieſt writer, who ſpeaks of him as connected with that religion, is Tertullian. In his *Apologeticus*, written in the third century, he boldly attacks the pagan ſuperſti-

ſuperſtitions and follies. Having ſpoken of the diſgraceful ſtories which the beſt poets relate of their own deities, he proceeds to notice low and vulgar farces, in which they are expoſed to the deriſion of the populace. "Mœchum Anubim, et maſculum "Lunam, et Dianam flagellatam, et Jovis mortui "teſtamentum recitatum, et tres Hercules fameli-"cos irriſos." c. 15. The epithets to the other deities are *mœchum, flagellatam, mortui, famelicos,* all denoting ſomething abſurd or ludicrous; from whence we muſt in reaſon infer that the epithet *maſculus* was of the ſame kind. If ſo, could it even at that time be a part of the religion of Rome, when Tertullian himſelf produces it as a burleſque of their religion?

There is no arguing from the capricious manner in which the poets and artiſts diverſified the form, the ſex, and the office of their deities. At this rate, we ſhall have a *Female Bacchus*, a *Venus Maſculus*, a *Fortuna Barbata*, and every other prepoſterous abſurdity. Even Jupiter would hardly know himſelf in the Orphic verſe,

Ζεὺς ἄρσην γένετο, Ζεὺς ἄμβροτος ἔπλετο ΝΥΜΦΗ.

And as, according to Spon, there were many who held all the deities to be of both ſexes, ſo the philoſophers held them to be of none. Vid. Spon in Polen. Supplem. vol. iv. p. 678.

A little before the time of Tertullian indeed we are told by Spartianus, that Caracalla, when in the Eaſt,

Eaſt, viſited Carræ in Meſopotamia for the ſake of the God Lunus, *Lunæ Dei gratia.* Vit. Caracall. p. 87. fol. ed. And immediately he tells of a fooliſh ſuperſtition prevalent among the Greeks and Egyptians reſpecting this deity, in a way that ſhews he thought him unknown to the Romans.

The following are the words of Spon upon the ſubject. "Deus iſte Lunus, ſeu Luna, habitu "virili ſæpe in nummis *Græcorum* exprimitur." Polen. Supplem. vol. iv. p. 678. But in all theſe coins he is repreſented with the Phrygian tiara.

The diſguſting ſtory of Elagabalus, who aſſumed that name from the Syrian deity the Sun, and introduced his worſhip into Rome, is well known; but even this ſtory affords no foundation for a *Deus Lunus at Rome.*

As far as it goes, it makes againſt it. The new deity brought in by him, to match with the Syrian Elagabalus, was a female called Οὐρανία, from Carthage, the ſame with the Phœnician Aſtarte or Luna; and, as the fooliſh ſtory goes, it was the *feminine character of this deity* which directed his choice; for he took it into his head that his Syrian God was not pleaſed with the bride he had before given him, Pallas, becauſe of *her warlike character.* All this traſh may be ſeen in Herodian, lib. v. c. 15. Now the votive tablet at Palmyra exhibits the Lunar Deity as *a male*

male in armour; and if any inference is to be drawn from theſe data, it is that *he* never found his way to Rome. The Syrian worſhip even of the Sun was, we know, expelled from Rome, after the death of the monſter who introduced it. And it is worth remarking, that Sperlingius, in one of his letters publiſhed by Polenus, ſays, "all the "Northern and Eaſtern nations worſhipped the "moon as a male—the Greeks and Romans only "(with thoſe nations who wiſhed to imitate "them) eſteemed that deity a female." Polen. Supplem. vol. iv. p. 294.

Now Strabo, as Caſaubon well obſerves[a], when giving this Aſiatic deity a Greek name, inſtead of coining a new word, Σελήνος, prefers Μῆν, which is maſculine, and is properly expreſſive of his character: and, as far as appears, even the *Latin name* LUNUS was not coined till long after Strabo's time.

But ſuch inquiries, inſtead of indicating a claſſical taſte and ardour, are pretty ſure teſts of a depraved appetite, which is incapable of reliſhing wholeſome native flavours, and ſeeks its gratification in every thing that is fetid and diſagreeable to an uncorrupted palate. Never can I believe this writer to have imbibed the generous love of ancient learning. His delight is not to launch

[a] Ad Spartiani Caracall. p. 88. Ed. Par. 1620.

his

his veſſel on the broad current, and ſpread his ſails to the wind; but to dabble in ſome muddy back-water, and fiſh up with ignoble pains a few filthy ſhreds and remnants, which might well have been allowed to periſh where they ſunk, in the dark ſilent pool of oblivion.

"The ſeventeen maps, with which the ſeventeen "books are illuſtrated and adorned, are ſaid, in the "preface, *to have been formed on the beſt authorities*, "and carefully adapted to the geography of Strabo. "We have examined only that of the central ſtates of "Greece; and in that we find neither Erythræ in "Bœotia, nor Ægæ, Hiſtiæa, or Orabiæ in Eubœa— "though they are all deſcribed as cities of importance "in the text of the author—are duly placed in the map "of M. D'Anville—and the three firſt, moreover, diſ- "tinguiſhed as independent ſtates by their coins ſtill "extant." Rev. p. 440.

In this ſingle paragraph there are three falſe propoſitions, one miſrepreſentation, and one blunder. The blunder is Orabiæ for Orobiæ. The miſrepreſentation is, that *Hiſtiæa is not in the map. Oreus*, which in Strabo's time was the name of Iſtiæa, *is in the map*; and it is difficult to conceive that he did not know it, becauſe in D'Anville's map it is called *Oreus, prius Iſtiæa.* As for the three falſe propoſitions[a]: Erythræ in Bœotia *had*

[a] For the two firſt of theſe points I have again to acknowledge

no coinage of its own: *Ægæ* in Eubœa *had none* of its own: and the maps are *not ſaid* in the Preface to have been formed on the beſt authorities. All that is ſaid of them is, that *care was taken to adapt the laſt fourteen to the text of Strabo as cloſely as the three firſt.* The adoption of the name *Oreus* inſtead of *Iſtiæa* is one proof of this.

Having now nearly diſpoſed of the long ſtring of *falſe aſſertions, miſrepreſentations,* and *blunders,* which go to the compoſition of this article, it only remains to ſay a few words concerning the Edition itſelf of Strabo, which has been made the vehicle of ſo much coarſe invective. In the account given of it, the public are as much wronged as we are abuſed: for no view whatever is laid before them of its nature or its merits. Neither can I afford much room for that purpoſe; it being my deſign not to vindicate the book, but to vindicate the Univerſity from falſe aſperſions.

It contains, however, collations of almoſt all the known manuſcripts. It has every thing that was valuable in Caſaubon's edition, beſides having corrected numberleſs typographical errors. The excellence of Tyrwhitt's conjectural emendations

ledge the aſſiſtance of Mr. Falconer's letter, [Gent. Mag. Oct. 1809.] as well as in what relates to Philip King of Macedon.

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is acknowledged by the Reviewer; although he is ſtudious to deprive Oxford of all ſhare of the credit. Even here his evil genius of ignorance haunts him every ſtep he takes. He aſks, why they were not publiſhed in one ſmall ſupplementary volume. The anſwer is, they have been printed in a ſmall volume, as every pretender to exact Greek criticiſm ought to know, twice already: once at London in 1783, which edition is quoted by Schweighæuſer in his notes to Polybius, and once by Harles in 1788, from which the French tranſlators have taken his conjectures, as far as they have gone, and in general adopted them with acknowledgments of their ingenuity.

The Reviewer praiſes theſe emendations highly, and, out of near two hundred, ſelects ſix, as being particularly ingenious, and as *having been confirmed by manuſcripts* collated ſince his death. The firſt and the laſt of theſe ſix *have had no confirmation whatever* from manuſcripts; the firſt is not ſo much *a conjecture*, as an adoption of the ſenſe given in the old Latin tranſlation: the third is only *partially confirmed:* and the ſecond and fourth have no pretenſions to ſuperior ſagacity, as I will leave it to any one converſant in theſe matters to determine. How unaccountable all this! when, in the imperfect reading which I have myſelf given to the notes, I have found

above twelve very ingenious ones positively confirmed, *as many* partially confirmed, and at least *twenty*, far exceeding those selected by him in acuteness and ingenuity, not yet confirmed, but bearing the strongest marks of probability [a].

He goes on to say,

"Almost the whole of the Editor's own notes are "*historical* and *geographical* commentaries; which may "be of use to the reader, in saving him the trouble of "reference."

And yet all this is called *alloy*, p. 449. l. 32. Besides, what is meant by *saving him the trouble of reference?* Many of them, nay, most of them, will *give* him the trouble of reference, if he has an inquisitive turn: for they point out the passages in ancient and modern books, which tend to throw any light upon the text, or which contain matter intimately connected with it. In many of them disputed points of chronology and geo-

[a] It may not be unacceptable to those who take an interest in this department of criticism, if I specify some of these out of a much longer list of each kind. The first number denotes the page, the second the line. 166, 4. 235, 37. 330, 20. 357, 5. 401, 19. 682, 21. 696, 32. 700, 10. 874, 19. 1054, 17. 1179, 22. entirely confirmed. 287, 10. 353, 31. 384, 15. 408, 22. 430, 33. 677, 43. 686, 1. 690, 31. 799, 35. partially confirmed. 166. 34. 290, 20. 308, 22. 354, 29. 378, 25. 425, 6. 459, 6. 493, 14. 602, 8. 732, 7. 733, 10. with a multitude besides, ingenious, although not confirmed.

graphy

graphy are diſcuſſed, and frequently explained by diagrams—incidental elucidations of other authors are given—the ancient and modern names appropriated, often beyond what D'Anville and other geographers have done—the etymology of many traced to Oriental words—a conciſe hiſtory of remarkable towns is given—the productions, natural hiſtory, trade, population &c. are compared with the accounts of the beſt modern travellers—a vaſt variety of curious information is ſcattered through them, of a rambling and miſcellaneous kind, but always connected with the text—and, notwithſtanding the faulty Latin, ſound ſenſe and conſiderable force of reaſoning are always perceptible.

The Reviewer indeed ſays, that,

"In *Hiſtory* and *Geography* the Editor diſplays the "ſame ſort of accuracy as in *Grammar*:" and he ſupports his charge by ONE ſpecimen. "Philip the ſon of "Demetrius, and father of Perſeus, is called *repeatedly* "Philip the Second, though he was the fourth regu-"larly acknowledged King of Macedonia of that "name." Rev. p. 441.

This calumny has been completely refuted by Mr. Falconer. There is but *one* place in which the word *ſecundus* is applied to the ſon of Demetrius: and in that place it poſſibly meant not the *ſecond Philip*, but the *next* perſon who de-

deſtroyed the cities Sciathus and Peparethus, after the war between Philip and the Athenians. I am myſelf inclined to think it a miſtake of the Editor's: nor do I fear that this conceſſion will raiſe any other feeling but that of contempt or indignation againſt the critic, who founds a ſweeping charge of hiſtorical inaccuracy in the whole two folio volumes upon this ſingle miſtake.

Of him then it is time that we now take a long farewell. Degraded as he muſt be in the opinion of every candid and liberal mind, it is impoſſible he can again find vent for his malice through any reſpectable channel. There is a blot in his eſcutcheon, which muſt for ever exclude him from the liſts of honourable combat: and he muſt be ſent, like ſome uncourteous and *recreant* knight, bereft of his habiliments, to atone for his offence by a life of auſtere and ſolitary penance.

Victus abit, longeque ignotis exulat oris,
Multa gemens ignominiam plagaſque—

I cannot proceed with the paſſage, for it is impoſſible that any glory can be gained againſt ſuch a combatant, or any pride felt at ſuch a victory. If indeed he would qualify himſelf for a renewal of the fight, he muſt practiſe *many a hardy adventure in a foreign land*—he muſt, in the language of that Firſt of Critics, ſeek for diſtinction

tion "by harder ſtudy and a humbler mind," and then perhaps, after a due probation, he may be reckoned worthy of engaging in claſſical warfare with an Engliſh Univerſity.

After all the experience we have had of the ſtrength of his prejudices, I ſtill was ſurpriſed that the Editor ſhould permit this article to diſgrace his pages. The *ſcurrility* of the attack muſt ſurely have made him heſitate. Its *unfairneſs*, I fear, was no obſtacle; and its *virulence* the chief recommendation. But I do believe, that if he had been aware of its containing half the *ignorance*, or one tenth part of the *falſehood* which has been pointed out, he would have rejected it with diſdain. In his own writings (if I can truſt to rumour, and to that feature, no unſeemly one, which runs through them all) I diſcover a tone of mind far ſuperior to ſuch baſeneſs—a vigour of intellect indeed, which ſhould make him cautious how he meaſures others by his own ſtandard—and a correctneſs and dignity of moral ſentiment, which I reſpect even in an enemy.

CHAP. III.

CLASSICAL EDUCATION—*Remarks on an Article in the Edinburgh Review, upon Edgeworth's Profeſſional Education.*

MUCH has been ſaid, and well ſaid, on this ſubject: but I have not yet ſeen the queſtion argued exactly on its right grounds. Neither do I propoſe in the preſent treatiſe to ſupply all the deficiencies which I ſpeak of in its advocates, but rather to point out two or three leading principles, which have not been made ſufficiently prominent in theſe diſcuſſions, if they have been noticed at all.

Some, who diſpute the utility of Claſſical learning, have joined iſſue on this ground: What remuneration does a boy receive for the time and money expended in this purſuit? For what employment does it fit him? or how does it enable him to improve his fortunes?

To this I anſwer, that the object of Claſſical education is not to fit him for any *ſpecific* employment, or to increaſe his fortune. Such, I admit, is the object of moſt parents when educating their

their children; but it is an object not only different from that of true philoſophy or enlightened policy, but even frequently at variance with it. The peculiar intereſt of the individual is not always the ſame, is ſeldom preciſely the ſame, with the intereſt of the public. And he who ſerves the one moſt faithfully, always forgets, and often injures, the other. The true principles of educating a gentleman cannot be better ſketched than they are by Locke, although his language already ſounds rather quaintly.

"The great work of a Governor is to faſhion "the carriage and form the mind; to ſettle in "his pupil good habits, and the principles of "virtue and wiſdom; to give him, by little and "little, a view of mankind; and work him into a "love and imitation of what is excellent and "praiſe-worthy; and, in the proſecution of it, "to give him vigour, activity, and induſtry. The "ſtudies which he ſets him upon are but, as it "were, the exerciſe of his faculties, and employ-"ment of his time, to keep him from ſauntering "and idleneſs, to teach him application, and ac-"cuſtom him to take pains, and to give him "ſome little taſte of what his own induſtry muſt "perfect. For who expects that, under a tutor, "a young gentleman ſhould be an accompliſhed "critic, orator, or logician; go to the bottom of

" metaphyſics, natural philoſophy, or mathema-
" tics; or be a maſter in hiſtory or chronology?
" Though ſomething of each of theſe is to be
" taught him: but it is only to open the door,
" that he may look in, and, as it were, begin an
" acquaintance, but not to dwell there." Vol. iii. p. 39.

It is remarkable, however, that Locke, like moſt other writers on education, occaſionally confounds two things which ought to be kept perfectly diſtinct, viz. that mode of education which would be moſt beneficial, as a ſyſtem, to ſociety at large, with that which would contribute moſt to the advantage and proſperity of an individual. Theſe things are often at variance with each other. The former is that alone which deſerves the attention of a philoſopher; the latter is narrow, ſelfiſh, and mercenary. It is this laſt indeed, on which the world are moſt eager to inform themſelves: but the perſons who inſtruct them, however they may deſerve the thanks and eſteem of thoſe whom they benefit, do no ſervice to mankind. There are but ſo many good places in the theatre of life; and he who puts us in the way of procuring one of them, does to *us* indeed a great favour, but none to the whole aſſembly.

It is again ſometimes aſked, with an air of triumph, what is the *utility* of theſe ſtudies? and

utility

utility is vauntingly pronounced to be the ſole ſtandard, by which all ſyſtems of education muſt be tried.

If in our turn we were to aſk what *utility* is, we ſhould, I believe, have many anſwers not quite conſiſtent with each other. And the beſt of them perhaps would only give us other words equally looſe and indefinite; ſuch as *wiſer, better, happier*; none of which can ſerve to untie a knotty queſtion, and all of which lead us into a wider field of doubt and enquiry, than the ſubject which originally produced them. Before I attempt to ſhew what the utility of Claſſical learning is, in my own ſenſe of the word, let it be permitted me to explain what it is not; and to take up the enquiry a little farther back than writers on this ſubject commonly go.

It is an undiſputed maxim in political economy, that the ſeparation of profeſſions, and the diviſion of labour, tend to the perfection of every art—to the wealth of nations—to the general comfort and well-being of the community. This principle of diviſion is in ſome inſtances purſued ſo far, as to excite the wonder of people, to whoſe notice it is for the firſt time pointed out. There is no ſaying to what extent it may not be carried; and the more the powers of each individual are concentrated in one employment, the greater ſkill and quickneſs will he naturally diſ-

play in performing it. But while he thus contributes more effectually to the accumulation of national wealth, he becomes himſelf more and more degraded as a rational being. In proportion as his ſphere of action is narrowed, his mental powers and habits become contracted; and he reſembles a ſubordinate part of ſome powerful machinery, uſeful in its place, but inſignificant and worthleſs out of it.

So ſenſible is the great and enlightened Adam Smith of the force of this objection, that he endeavours to meet it by ſuggeſting, that the means of intellectual improvement multiply rapidly with the increaſing wealth of ſociety; that the facility therefore of acquiring theſe means may increaſe in the ſame ratio with the injurious tendency of that ſyſtem we have been juſt conſidering; and thus counteract or compenſate all its evil. An anſwer, which affords a much ſtronger proof of the candour of the philoſopher, than it is a ſatisfactory defence of his ſyſtem againſt the ſuppoſed objection. The evil of that ſyſtem is certain, and almoſt demonſtrable; the remedy ſuggeſted is doubtful, and even conjectural. It would have been better to alter the ſhape of the whole queſtion, and remove at once the ground-work of the objection, by guarding his theory againſt that extreme in which it takes its riſe.

If indeed national wealth were the ſole object

of

of national inſtitutions, there can be no doubt but that the method demonſtrated by Dr. Smith, being the ſureſt means of attaining that end, would be the great leading principle of political philoſophy. In his own work *it is* the great and ſole end of his enquiry: and no one can blame him for confining himſelf to that ſingle conſideration. His undertaking required no more, and he has performed his part well. But, in truth, national wealth is not the ultimatum of human ſociety; and although we muſt forbear entering on the boundleſs enquiry, *what is the chief good*, yet all reflecting minds will admit that it is not wealth. If it be neceſſary, as it is beyond all queſtion neceſſary, that ſociety ſhould be ſplit into diviſions and ſubdiviſions, in order that its ſeveral duties may be well performed, yet we muſt be careful not to yield up ourſelves wholly and excluſively to the guidance of this ſyſtem: we muſt obſerve what its evils are, and we ſhould modify and reſtrain it, by bringing into action other principles, which may ſerve as a check and counterpoiſe to the main force.

One of the greateſt faults in all moral and political reaſoning is an exceſſive and immoderate application of one principle, to the excluſion of others, with which it ought in reaſon to be combined; and whoſe relative force ſhould always vary with the circumſtances of the caſe.

There

There can be no doubt that every art is improved by confining the profeſſor of it to that ſingle ſtudy. There are emergencies, which call for his *whole mind and faculties* to be abſorbed in it, which require him to forget every other relation of life, however ſacred or natural, except that artificial one in which he is then placed. Times will occur when a Surgeon or a General muſt diſmiſs the common feelings of human nature, and, in order to do his taſk well, muſt look upon himſelf as engaged in working out one problem, and upon all around him as inſtruments ſubſervient merely to the acquiſition of ſome one diſtinct purpoſe, without regard to their bearings on any thing beſides.

But although the Art itſelf is advanced, by this concentration of mind in its ſervice, the individual who is confined to it goes back. The advantage of the community is nearly in an inverſe ratio with his own. Reaſon and common ſenſe require that neither object ſhould be excluſively regarded. And if, as in the caſes above mentioned, an *entire* ſacrifice of the individual is demanded, in all other caſes that ſacrifice can be required only in proportion as they approximate to this extreme. And thus a wide ſpace is left to the diſcretion of the individual, where the claims of the community are either not preſſing, or are wholly ſilent.

Of courſe it will be underſtood, that in this ſtatement I conſider the intellectual enjoyment of the individual merely, when ſpeaking of his *advantage*, and that I do not loſe ſight of that enjoyment, which even the moſt confined exerciſe of the intellect imparts: I conſider it as abridged only in proportion to the contracted ſphere of action in which he is doomed to move.

Indeed, when the emergency is paſt, ſociety itſelf requires ſome other contribution from each individual, beſides the particular duties of his profeſſion. And if no ſuch liberal intercourſe be eſtabliſhed, it is the common failing of human nature, to be engroſſed with petty views and intereſts, to under-rate the importance of all in which we are not concerned, to carry our partial notions into caſes where they are inapplicable, to act, in ſhort, as ſo many unconnected units, diſplacing and repelling one another.

In the cultivation of literature is found that common link, which, among the higher and middling departments of life, unites the jarring ſects and ſubdiviſions in one intereſt, which ſupplies common topics, and kindles common feelings, unmixed with thoſe narrow prejudices with which all profeſſions are more or leſs infected. The knowledge too, which is thus acquired, expands and enlarges the mind, excites its faculties, and calls

calls thoſe limbs and muſcles into freer exerciſe, which, by too conſtant uſe in one direction, not only acquire an illiberal air, but are apt alſo to loſe ſomewhat of their native play and energy. And thus, without directly qualifying a man for any of the employments of life, it enriches and ennobles all. Without teaching him the peculiar buſineſs of any one office or calling, it enables him to act his part in each of them with better grace and more elevated carriage; and, if happily planned and conducted, is a main ingredient in that complete and generous education, which fits a man "to perform juſtly, ſkilfully, and magna-"nimouſly, all the offices, both private and pub-"lic, of peace and war."

Thus far then we have conſidered the utility of thoſe liberal purſuits, which in a refined ſtate of ſociety engage the attention of the higher orders, and which, by common conſent, impart a dignity to the ſeveral profeſſions of life, and to mercantile adventure.

It ſtill remains to prove, that what is called *Claſſical literature* anſwers this purpoſe moſt effectually.

And here, if the queſtion is to be compendiouſly treated, it muſt be allowed me to take for granted many points, which a captious adverſary might diſpute, but which the authority of the

the greateſt names, and the general experience of educated men concur in eſtabliſhing. That the relics of Grecian and Roman literature contain ſome of the choiceſt fruits of human genius; that the poets, the hiſtorians, the orators, and the philoſophers, of Greece eſpecially, have each in their ſeveral lines brought home, and laid at our feet, the richeſt treaſures of invention; that the hiſtory of thoſe early times preſents us with a view of things "nobly done and worthily ſpoken;" that the mind and ſpirit which breathed then, lives ſtill, and will for ever live in the writings which remain to us; that, according as taſte, and genius, and learning, have been valued among men, thoſe precious remains have been held ſtill dearer and more ſacred; are all poſitions which it is better to aſſume as indiſputable, than to embarraſs the preſent argument with any new attempt to prove them.

Neither is it neceſſary to ſay much in order to ſilence the feeble and querulous cry, that all the good which thoſe works contain may be had through the medium of *tranſlation*. To demonſtrate, indeed, how, from the very nature of language, tranſlation cannot adequately perform this office, would require an extended argument. I would rather appeal to the reflection and experience of every man who is acquainted with more than one language, whether he has not

often felt a tranſlated thought, even when beſt executed, to be rather a cold inanimate buſt, than a living counterpart of the original: whether he has not been affected by ſentiments or deſcriptions in one language, in a degree which no power or ſkill can equal in another. Even the rudeſt languages have in ſome words and phraſes, or ſome peculiarity of conſtruction, their characteriſtic advantage; and the more copious and perfect a language is, the more muſt theſe advantages be multiplied. A bare chronicle of facts indeed, or a rigid demonſtration in ſcience, may perhaps be transferred from one to the other without loſs or injury. For where the ideas are few, ſimple, and determinate, they readily find in all languages an adequate expreſſion. But how ſhall the inſpirations of genius and fancy be packed up, lettered, and conſigned over, from hand to hand, in this literary traffic? How ſhall even the ordinary phraſeology of moral reaſoning, of ſentiment, of opinion, preſerve its native colouring, and exact features? How ſhall the language of varied paſſion, of tender feeling, of glowing deſcription, find, in the diſtant region to which it is tranſported, the preciſe meaſure of its value? How, after this change of place and manners, where all is ſo new and ſo different, how ſhall it ſuit itſelf with the commodities adapted to its former wants and habits? Mere ſubſiſtence, it is true,

true, the bread of life may be obtained every where. The great truths of religion, the bare theorems of ſcience, whatever is addreſſed to the underſtanding ſtrictly, may perhaps paſs unimpaired. But all that conſtitutes the grace, the beauty, the charm, the dignity of compoſition, all that tends to awaken the fancy, or to affect the heart, like the finer and more volatile parts of ſubſtances, is loſt during the experiment; or if theſe qualities be partially retained, they are in a manner the invention of the tranſlator; and ſerve rather to tell us, that the original was excellent, than to preſent us with a view of that excellence itſelf.

The writer of an Article in the Edinburgh Review, on "Edgeworth's Profeſſional Education," whoſe petulant ſarcaſms alternately provoke our ſpleen and our laughter, endeavours to convince the world, that, notwithſtanding the advantage of Claſſical learning, the aſcendancy it has acquired in Engliſh Education is prepoſterous, and the mode of teaching it in Engliſh Schools, and Univerſities, utterly abſurd. I confeſs it was the reading of that article, which drew forth the preſent remarks, and I had deſigned a formal diſcuſſion of the falſe opinions and accuſations contained in it. The bulk of this volume, however, ſwelling imperceptibly far beyond my firſt intention, induces me to contract the plan; and the truly meagre and flimſy texture of the article

itſelf is hardly deſerving of any ſolid criticiſm. There is a ſprightlineſs, however, and vivacity, which takes with the world at firſt reading, and raiſes a tranſient admiration, which perhaps was the ſole ambition of the writer: for, upon comparing one page with another, he ſeems wholly regardleſs of the dull virtue of conſiſtency, and, like ſome popular divines, thinks only how he may keep up the requiſite ſmartneſs for his fifteen minutes to amuſe his audience.

He may think it injuſtice to compreſs his airy ſatire; but there is really not time for quoting him always in his own words. I could wiſh the reader of this chapter firſt to give an attentive peruſal to the Reviewer, while I endeavour to exhibit his impeachment in diſtinct charges.

1ſt. That Claſſical learning forms the *ſole* buſineſs of Engliſh Education.

2dly. That hence the taſte and imagination only of the ſtudent are cultivated.

3dly. That the inſtruction of public ſchools and univerſities, even in Claſſical literature, is of a limited and miſtaken kind.

4thly, That in Oxford particularly, every manly exerciſe of the reaſoning powers is diſcouraged.

The firſt charge, beſides being ſpun and twiſted into the materials of every page, is alſo diſtinctly laid before us in the following terms,

"A young

"A young Engliſhman goes to ſchool at ſix or ſeven "years old: and he remains in a courſe of education "till twenty-three or twenty-four years of age. In all "that time, his ſole and excluſive occupation is learning "Latin and Greek." No. 29. p. 45.

From the manner in which the phraſe *learning Latin and Greek* is uſed, one might be led to ſuppoſe that the Grammar and the Lexicon were the ſole companions of the Student; that Latin and Greek were a ſort of *black art*, ſomething wholly unconnected with the ſyſtem of nature and of human affairs; that the languages were learnt for the ſake of the ſound or form of the letters, not for the ſtores of taſte and knowledge which they contain. What elſe is the Reviewer's notion of learning Greek? Can we be ſaid to learn Greek, without making ourſelves acquainted with the authors who wrote in Greek? A modern language may perhaps be learned without much of its literature: but how is it poſſible to ſeparate the ſtudy of an ancient language from the ſtudy of thoſe works in which it has been preſerved? Of all known languages, the Greek perhaps is the moſt copious and extenſive; and no one can pretend to call himſelf a maſter of it, who has not ſtudied the ſeveral claſſes of authors in which its compaſs and variety is diſplayed. The language of Ariſtotle is as different from that of Homer, Sophocles,

Sophocles, or Pindar, as theſe again are from Thucydides, Xenophon, or Demoſthenes. It would be uſeleſs to purſue the topic through all its branches. Thoſe who are acquainted with the ſubject will admit the ſtatement as ſoon as it is made: and thoſe who are not, will hardly, I preſume, apply to the Edinburgh Review for information about the Claſſics.

How idle then, how perfectly ſenſeleſs, all this declamation about Latin and Greek! unleſs the ſtudy of Bacon, of Locke, of Milton, of Addiſon, and all our greateſt moraliſts, hiſtorians, and poets, be rightly called *learning Engliſh*. What is to hinder the ſtudent from deriving all the benefit which the reading of valuable authors is ſuppoſed to impart? or rather, if theſe works are ſtudied, how can he avoid deriving it?

Yet even Mr. Edgeworth, the author of the book which gives occaſion to the Review, (although a writer not of the ſame empty claſs with the Reviewer, but one who to great ingenuity and vivacity adds much good ſenſe, and gives many proofs of a good heart,) even he is weak enough to ſay, "that young men intended for "Clergymen ſhould not go to any Univerſity, "till they are *thoroughly maſters of the learned* "*languages, particularly of Greek.*" p. 95. I am at a loſs to conceive what ſo intelligent a writer could mean by this paſſage. The abſurdity

ſurdity of teaching Greek, without teaching the beſt authors who have written in that language, appears to me ſo ſtriking, that no words can make it more evident; and to ſuppoſe that theſe authors can be *thoroughly ſtudied* before a young man goes to the Univerſity, or even during the whole time he ſtays there, is equally againſt reaſon and common ſenſe.

The firſt charge then of this Reviewer, as far as it implies a ſtudy of language merely, is already anſwered. For a contradiction of the aſſertion itſelf, which I hope will be found ſatisfactory, the reader is referred to the Chapter on The Courſe of Studies purſued at Oxford.

The ſecond charge alſo requires no ſeparate notice. If the Poets alone were ſelected by us out of the great maſs of ancient learning, ſome ground might appear to exiſt for this complaint. But the fact is far otherwiſe: and facts are ſtubborn things.

The third charge is worked up with all the ſmirking pleaſantry and pert playfulneſs peculiar to a certain ſchool, whether conſiſting of Divines, or Lecturers, or Letter-writers, or Reviewers, whoſe main object ſeems to be, to have their laugh out, whatever truth or juſtice or decency or right reaſon may ſay to the contrary. And perhaps the wiſeſt way is to let them have their laugh out. It is a miſerable ambition, and its

ſucceſs

ſucceſs need not be envied; provided the world are diſpoſed to liſten afterwards to plain ſenſe and unvarniſhed truth. The whole ſyſtem is ridiculed, by which the Claſſics are uſually taught. It is not merely inſinuated, but aſſerted, that the knowledge of minute points of Grammar and the mechaniſm of Latin verſe are deemed the higheſt accompliſhments of a Scholar—and that "his ob-"ject is not to reaſon, *to imagine*, and to invent; "but to conjugate, decline, and derive."

"The great ſyſtem of facts with which he is moſt "perfectly acquainted, are the intrigues of the Heathen "Gods: with whom Pan ſlept?—with whom Jupiter?— "whom Apollo raviſhed? Theſe facts the Engliſh youth "get by heart the moment they quit the nurſery; and "are moſt ſeduloufly and induſtriouſly inſtructed in "them till the beſt and moſt active part of life is paſſed "away." Rev. p. 45.

I have copied the very words of this filthy ribaldry, in order that the reader may judge of the pure virtuous indignation which glowed in the breaſt of the ſatiriſt who wrote it. The deſcription is applied to the whole courſe of Engliſh Education, even to the advanced period of twenty-four. Now it is difficult to ſay how ſuch an adverſary is to be treated. To contradict him flatly, might be thought unmannerly; and yet that is the only treatment he properly deſerves, who

who with wanton levity perverts the truth. If the paſſage had occurred in a farce, or burleſque comedy, we ſhould forgive the falſehood for the ſake of the humour; and becauſe the writer himſelf does not expect to be believed. But this we are told by a perſon who affects in other paſſages the grave cenſor and indignant moraliſt, and who with a magiſterial air, forſooth, after his play is over, vouchſafes his ſerious advice on the ſubject of Education. As to the childiſh prattle which follows, about "the Æolic Reduplication," "Sylburgius his method of arranging defectives "in ω and μι," "the reſtoration of a dative caſe, "which Cranzius had paſſed over," which he ſays are the higheſt feats of glory in the eſtimation of a young Engliſhman, the whole is a tiſſue of ignorance and nonſenſe, of which a man of liberal education ſhould be aſhamed.

The entire paſſage is given at the bottom of the page[a]: it is hardly deſerving even of that

[a] "The diſtinguiſhing abſtract term, the epithet of Scholar, "is reſerved for him who writes on the Æolic reduplication, "and is familiar with Sylburgius his method of arranging "defectives in ω and μι. The picture which a young Engliſh-"man, addicted to the purſuit of knowledge, draws—his *beau* "*idéal* of human nature—his top and conſummation of man's "powers—is a knowledge of the Greek language. His object "is not to reaſon, to imagine, or to invent; but to conjugate, "decline, and derive. The *ſituations* of imaginary glory which "he draws for himſelf, are the *detection* of an Anapæſt in the

notice: but it may be as well to clear the ground of theſe light buſh-fighters, before we advance into the heart of the enemy's country, and beat up his cloſe quarters.

Firſt then of "him who writes on the *Æolic* "Reduplication." No man ever wrote on it; for this plain reaſon, that there is no ſuch thing. The *Dorians* are ſaid to have been fond of forming verbs in *μι* out of verbs in *ω*, which proceſs was uſually completed by prefixing the reduplication: as *θέω*, *θήμι*, *τίθημι*; and this mutation of verbs, but not the reduplication conſequent upon it, may be diſtinguiſhed by the name of their Dialect; which dialect is ſometimes confounded with the Æolic; and indeed by Maittaire they are treated as one. But there is no peculiar *Æolic* or *Doric* reduplication [b]. There

"wrong place, or the reſtoration of a dative caſe, which "Cranzius had paſſed over, and the never dying Erneſti failed "to obſerve." Edin. Rev. No. 29. p. 46.

[b] I cannot avoid ſubjoining a note upon this Æolic Reduplication, which may contain ſome matter intereſting to a few of my readers, and which will prove to all of them the ignorance of this Reviewer upon a ſubject, with which he affects to be quite familiar.

So far from practiſing reduplication, it was common with the Æolians as well as the Ionians even *to reject the augment*. "Nam Æoles, ab eo quod eſt *χαίνειν*, non apponunt in-"crementa præteritis, ſed dicunt *χανόν*." Scal. de Canſ. Ling. Lat. c. 52. It is generally ſaid that the Latin language is deſcended from the Æolic Greek. I am inclined to think with Heyné, after Foſter and Burgeſs, [Excurſ. II. ad Il. 19.] that

is an *Ionic* reduplication, by ε inſtead of ι, which was perhaps what the Reviewer meant, if he meant any thing. [Vid. Euſtath. ad Odyſſ. x. p. 1654. 29. et ibid. 32.] There was alſo an *Attic* reduplication, much practiſed by the Poets, as ἐρήρικα from ἐρίζω, and in the preſent tenſe, as ἀλάλημι from ἄλημι; and the Poets were apt to extend the reduplication of the preterperfect to other tenſes. [Vid. Clenard. ed. Sylb. 144. 10. et 103. 43.] Clenardus mentions alſo a *Bœotic* re-

that the diſtinction of dialects did not then ſubſiſt: and that in later times, when learned men were led to inveſtigate theſe matters, they found a greater affinity between the Latin and Æolic than between the Latin and any other dialect, only becauſe the Æolians retained moſt of the ancient language.

It is remarkable, ſays Heyné, that the only documents from whence Grammarians deduce their canons of Æoliſm, are the fragments of Lyric poets, and he ſeems to approve of Maittaire's method, who merges that dialect in the Doric.

There is a paſſage in a ſcarce book, *Hortus Adonidis*, p. 49; from which we learn that *the Sicilians* were fond of forming new verbs out of the preterperfect tenſe, as πεποιήκω from πεποίηκα, κεκλήγω from κέκληγα. Now the Sicilian was a ſubdiviſion of the Doric. It was a *ſpecies* prevailing in the Peloponneſian colonies, which went chiefly weſtward, as the Æolian did in the earlier colonies of Aſia. They have many points *in common*, but that which is *peculiar* to the Sicilian is *oppoſite* to the Æolian.

After all, I believe the origin of the Reviewer's blunder is to be found in page *66.* of the *Wincheſter* Grammar; where *Æoles* occurs in the ſame paragraph with an example of *Bœotic reduplication.*

duplication, p. 103. 20. but no ſuch phraſe occurs as *Æolic* reduplication, except once (and, I am pretty confident, only once) by Sylburgius in his notes on that Greek Grammar, p. 456. where it is probably put by miſtake for *Attic*.

Now 2dly. of the memorable exploits of Sylburgius. Sylburgius never arranged any defectives in ω and μι. He leaves Clenardus's arrangement as it was; and corrects only ſome occaſional blunders, into which he and his commentator Anteſignanus had fallen.

3dly. What the Reviewer could mean by "a "dative caſe, which Cranzius had paſſed over," I cannot even gueſs. Perhaps there is ſome miſtake in the name: for there is no Commentator or Critic ſo called. At leaſt he was not known to Fabricius or Saxius; and the ſmall treatiſe on Grammar which Cranzius the Theologian and Juriſt publiſhed in 1506, is not mentioned by them in the liſt of his works, ſo inſignificant and uſeleſs was it become, after the labours of other ſcholars.

Laſtly, Erneſti is introduced as a champion of verbal criticiſm, when the facetious Reviewer would play off his pleaſantry on the abuſe of that ſpecies of learning. Moſt unfortunate of men! What ill-ſtar could have led him to venture thus on the mention of particulars? *Dolus latet in univerſalibus* is indeed a ſound maxim. If he had

had kept to general buffoonery, he might have concealed his ignorance. But by ſpecifying facts and names he has ſpoilt all, and only expoſed himſelf. Every ſtudent knows that among all the foreign Editors Erneſti ſtands conſpicuous for his *practical* editions—that his notes are few and ſhort—and that he deſpiſed curious philological diſſertations which had no direct tendency to elucidate the author, or to aſſiſt the reader.

Let us now proceed to more important matters.

Upon the ſubject of ſchool exerciſes ſcarcely any thing can be ſaid, which has not been ſaid long ago by writers of great authority. The opinions of *this* writer are of no value. In fact, it may be ſaid of him, as of ſome late publiſhers of Sermons, that he has no opinions. One while he tells us, that the "imagination is too much "cultivated," p. 48; at another, that the ſtudent's great object is not to *imagine*, but to learn the technical rules of grammar. In one page he objects to the ſtudy of ancient Metaphyſics, Morals, and Politics, '*that the Greek alone is ſtudy enough* '*without them*;' and in the next, that '*all the* '*ſolid and maſculine parts of the underſtanding* '*are left wholly without cultivation.*'

It may be curious however to ſee the real opinions of two illuſtrious writers on this point of ſchool compoſitions. Milton rejects the prac-

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tice altogether, and calls it "forcing the empty "wits of children to compoſe themes, verſes, and "orations, which are the acts of ripeſt judgment, "and the final work of a head filled, by long "reading and obſerving, with elegant maxims "and copious inventions. Theſe are not matters, "he continues, to be wrung from poor ſtriplings, "like blood out of the noſe, or the plucking of "untimely fruit[a]." He makes no difference between compoſitions, in Latin and Engliſh, in verſe and proſe: he equally proſcribes them all.

Locke is juſt as adverſe to the practice, and much more diffuſe in his reaſoning againſt it. "By all means, ſays he, obtain, if you can, that "your ſon be not employed in making Latin "themes and declamations, and, leaſt of all, "verſes of any kind[b]." He then proceeds to inveigh againſt all ſuch exerciſes, eſpecially in Latin; and condemns verſes of every kind, chiefly for this reaſon. "If he has no genius to poetry, it is the "moſt unreaſonable thing in the world to tor"ment a child, and waſte his time about that "which can never ſucceed; and if he have a "poetic vein, it is to me the ſtrangeſt thing in "the world, that the father ſhould deſire or "ſuffer it to be cheriſhed or improved;" adding, in ſubſtance, "that it is not likely to promote his

[a] Tractate of Education, vol. i. p. 275. 8vo.
[b] Vol. iii. p. 76. fol. ed.

"fortunes,

"fortunes, but rather to make him poor and "idle."

The ſketch of "a complete and generous edu-"cation," drawn by the firſt of theſe great maſters, is magnificent indeed and impoſing, but has never been thought reducible to practice even by his fondeſt admirers. It is read, and will continue to be read, for its bold and large conceptions, and the majeſtic eloquence of its ſtyle—for that heavenly fancy, and that mighty ſoul which breathes through all his works, and which makes even his prejudices and his errors awful.

For the memory of the other I alſo feel ſincere reverence, although his own opinions would have been entitled to greater reſpect, if he had himſelf treated with more deference the opinions of others who had gone before him, and the practice of ſenſible men of his own time, whoſe judgment was worth more, in proportion as it was confirmed by experience. The light freedom indeed, and the confidence with which this philoſopher attacks all eſtabliſhed notions, is one of the principal blemiſhes in his character. Intrepid and ſagacious he certainly is; but theſe are not the only qualities requiſite in a diſcoverer of truth; eſpecially if the enquiry be of ſuch a nature as to draw after it important practical conſequences. Caution and reſpect for the opinions of others, in all caſes, but more particularly in matters

matters incapable of demonſtration, are virtues not of the loweſt order.

To theſe authorities, as in a matter of judgment and experience, we may ſurely oppoſe that of Cicero and Quintilian. Locke pronounces, that writing does not help towards good ſpeaking, p. 77. Cicero ſays, it is the beſt and moſt efficient preparation for it. De Orat. i. 33. Quintilian recommends it as a main part of the education of an Orator; and deſcribes, with his uſual candour and good ſenſe, his own method in examining the compoſitions of his pupils. Inſt. ii. 4. So much for authority in this matter. The thing itſelf ſtrikes every one at firſt ſight as reaſonable: and the experience of moſt perſons concerned in education bears teſtimony to its uſe. Without ſome exerciſe in compoſition, the ſtudent, who has read even the beſt authors, feels a difficulty and embarraſſment in arranging his thoughts on any given ſubject, in connecting, illuſtrating, and adorning them. Juſt as in the conduct of life, if he has never been accuſtomed to think or act for himſelf, although he may have lived among the pureſt examples, yet when called upon to act or reaſon, he is apt to be diſconcerted, diffident, and confuſed. In fact, the utility, and almoſt neceſſity, of *practice* is ſo received a maxim, that we may fairly demand the ſtrongeſt proof againſt it, before we give way. Milton's reaſon does not

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meet the queſtion. It is not for the value *to us* of what the boy writes, that we impoſe the taſk, but for the benefit of the exerciſe to himſelf.

To write well is, as he juſtly calls it, "the act "of ripeſt judgment;" it is the laſt beſt fruit, the τελευταῖον ἐπιγέννημα of an educated mind: but without previous effort and training, it is idle to expect that theſe manly virtues will ever arrive at maturity. That finiſhed offſpring of genius ſtarts not, like Minerva from the head of Jupiter, perfect at once in ſtature, and clad in complete armour: but is the produce of ſlow birth, and often of a hard delivery; the tender nurſling of many an infant year—the pupil of a ſevere ſchool, formed and chaſtened by a perſevering diſcipline.

The ſame reply may be made to the objection againſt verſes. It is not that we ſeek to ſtock the world with new poems, but to give play in the moſt effectual manner to the *poetic faculty*, which exiſts to a certain degree in all minds, and which, like every other faculty, ought to lie wholly uncultivated in none. At leaſt it is an irreparable injury to young minds, if it be entirely neglected. They may ſtill be uſeful members in the mechaniſm of ſociety, if the powers of reaſoning and calculation only be encouraged: but they loſe that intellectual charm, from which life borrows its loveliеſt graces; they loſe, in a refined

fined age, the means of recommending Virtue herſelf, if taſte and elegance be not found in her train. The reaſoning of Locke on this ſubject does, I confeſs, appear to me ſordid and illiberal. He ſays, indeed, in a phraſe not very intelligible, that we muſt be careful how we "make anything "a boy's buſineſs but downright virtue." p. 76. But the improvement of the faculties which God has implanted in us, is ſurely itſelf a virtue. Our attention may be given in undue meaſure to one, and may violate that juſt harmony, without which nothing is virtuous, nothing lovely. But the faculty itſelf, which he condemns, was one of the kindeſt gifts of heaven. And why then ſhould man be niggardly where Providence has been bountiful? Why ſhould he think ſcorn of that pleaſant land, and undervalue thoſe fair poſſeſſions, which were not thought beneath the care even of the Almighty? In the garden of Eden, we read, was made to grow, not only what was good for food, but every tree alſo that was pleaſant to the ſight: and in that garden man was placed, to keep it, and to dreſs it.

That in ſome ſchools too much ſtreſs is laid upon this accompliſhment, I will not take upon me to deny. Let the exceſs, where it is an exceſs, be blamed and corrected. The reproach of the Reviewer, however, extends equally to the Univerſities:

Univerſities: and here I can undertake to affirm, the charge is falſe. If any thing, the fault lies on the other ſide. Verſes, eſpecially Latin verſes, are looked upon as a boyiſh exerciſe; and although it is the practice not to call for this exerciſe, except from thoſe who are known to excel in it, yet even this limited demand is ſeldom ſatisfied. So prevalent is the conviction, that the higheſt excellence alone can give it dignity; and that other roads to diſtinction are open, in which every degree of merit will command reſpect. Its utility, however, even in the lower department of elegiac verſe, is not generally underſtood. It imparts a habit of compreſſion without obſcurity; a habit of ſelecting the fitteſt materials, and of ſetting them in the niceſt order; and a command of pure, terſe, and poliſhed diction, which cannot long be practiſed without imparting a ſalutary tincture to all other kinds of compoſition. Still, I admit, it is not a principal, but a ſubordinate feature, in every ſound plan of education; and the farther we advance in life, the more urgently do other claims preſs upon us.

It is time however to notice the fourth charge of the Reviewer, the ſubſtance of which is, "that "in Oxford particularly, every manly exerciſe of "the reaſoning powers is diſcouraged."

The beſt anſwer to this will be given in the

account of our ſtudies; and ſomething, I truſt, has been already ſaid in refutation of it, when the falſe eſtimate made of the nature of Claſſical learning was expoſed. The ſtudent undergoes a cloſe examination in the *ſubject matter* of all he reads, and ſome of the works moſt read are no light exerciſe of the underſtanding. Strict Logic, Divinity, and Mathematical theorems, whether pure or mixed, cannot fail to diſcipline the reaſoning powers; and theſe form a part of the ſtudies in every College. There are lectures read in Experimental Philoſophy, in Aſtronomy, in Cheminiſtry, in Mineralogy, and in Botany: how far theſe purſuits *exerciſe* the ſtudent's mind, can only be collected from the general tendency of ſuch ſtudies. They do not enter (except the two firſt, and theſe at the option of the candidate) into the examination for degrees; and as they are taught not by Tutors, but by public Profeſſors, it cannot well be aſcertained what impreſſion they make on each individual.

In reply however to the frivolous impertinence about checking the progreſs of ſcience, and keeping us back to the meaſure of the ancients, let it ſuffice to ſtate, that a rank fallacy runs through the whole argument. The writer confounds the *cultivation of literature* with the *acquiſition of ſcience*. In the former, unleſs our models be defective, which is not attempted to be ſhewn, the

the ſtudy of thoſe models muſt be as beneficial now as ever. In the latter, the ancients are not made our guides. We ſtudy them for the facts, the reaſonings, the deſcriptions, the characters and the ſentiments, for the principles and the examples of pure taſte, which they contain. Theſe muſt ever be what they once were, and their relative importance muſt ever remain the ſame. It is not the dicovery of neutral ſalts, or the decompoſition of alkalis, that can alter the value of ancient literature—that can make eloquence leſs powerful, poetry leſs charming, hiſtorical example leſs forcible, or moral and political reflections leſs inſtructive. Where then is the wiſdom of bringing into compariſon things which have no common points of relation; which are in fact heterogeneous, and incommenſurate with each other? Whatever may be the advancement later ages have made in the knowledge of the properties of bodies, the temper and conſtitution of the human mind cannot have changed; and the writers beſt adapted to make impreſſion there, if we turn not ſtupidly and ſullenly away, will perform their office now as heretofore.

Never let us believe that the improvement of chemical arts, however much it may tend to the augmentation of national riches, can ſuperſede the uſe of that intellectual laboratory, where the ſages of Greece explored the hidden elements of

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which man conſiſts, and faithfully recorded all their diſcoveries. Never let us permit the volumes which incloſe theſe early records, which preſent us with a diſtinct view, not only of the reſults, but of each varied proceſs in all its ſtages; never let us permit them to moulder and periſh as they lie, inſenſible of that kind Providence which preſerved them through their long and dark voyage, and of thoſe heroic efforts which baffled all the fury of ignorance, and enabled them to ride out the ſtorm in ſafety. Some indeed have unhappily foundered in their courſe; but even of theſe, the ſcattered wreck has been waſhed in by the waves, and proves to us, while we gather along the ſhore its glittering fragments, how precious the lading was which has been caſt away.

If, in the ſearch for theſe diſmembered parts, ſomething more than ſober reaſon would dictate has been felt, ſome devotional paſſion, as for "the "torn body of a martyred ſaint," why ſhould we ſcoff at the honeſt toil, and not rather admire and applaud the zeal which ſuſtains it? As the feigned wandering of that Egyptian Queen for her loſt Oſiris, or, as the nobler fable tells, though born in later days[a], of the Virgin Truth, whoſe lovely form, once ſo perfect and glorious to look upon, was by a race of wicked deceivers hewn into a

[a] See Milton's "Speech for the Liberty of unlicenſed Print-"ing," p. 317. 8vo.

thouſand

thouſand pieces, and ſcattered to the four winds; ſo has it been with the body of ancient learning, mangled and diſperſed as it was throughout the world. And it is only by long ſearch and painful diligence, that limb after limb has been found, and reſtored in ſome meaſure to that form of perfect beauty which it once had. The ſervice ſurely is entitled to our thanks and praiſe: and that enthuſiaſm, which magnifies the value even of the minuteſt relic, will meet with reſpect and forgiveneſs among liberal minds. Mockery we know will always be the engine of vulgar malice, to undermine that which overtops itſelf; and envy will affect to deſpiſe what it does not and cannot poſſeſs. But from the more enlightened claſs, eſpecially from thoſe who hold up the torch of criticiſm, and pour its uſeful beams to the remote corners of our iſland, it is not too much to expect that the peaceful and inoffenſive purſuits of learning may be ſhielded from ſcorn and calumny—that they will not at leaſt themſelves wantonly attack them with rude clamour or inſulting ſarcaſm, and leaſt of all *fabricate* abuſes for the ſake of venting their ſpleen, or diſplaying the vain talent of wit and raillery.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Courſe of Studies purſued at Oxford.

NOTHING ſeems leſs underſtood, or more induſtriouſly miſrepreſented, than the courſe of ſtudies, which this Univerſity reformed and ſettled ſome years ago, and which is now purſued even more vigorouſly than at the time of its firſt inſtitution. In the preſent chapter I propoſe to explain very minutely its ſeveral parts; and to throw in occaſionally ſuch remarks as ſeem neceſſary to meet the objections, which are now and then alledged by haſty and ſuperficial obſervers. A plan of ſtudies ſketched on paper is, I am aware, often very fallacious: and nothing is more eaſy than to miſlead the public by a fair and plauſible ſtatement of this kind. I have myſelf ſeen outlines drawn, divided into ſtudies of the firſt year, of the ſecond year, and ſo on, which appeared to comprehend almoſt all one could deſire to learn either in literature or ſcience: but the perſons who execute this plan muſt be more fortunate than common, if the materials on which they operate are capable of bearing it. In a Univerſity

ſity, one fourth part of which changes every year, the new comers differ ſo widely in age, in capacity, in diſpoſition and turn of thought, in previous knowledge and attainments, that it ſeems inconceivable how they can be claſſified in this manner, without a ſacrifice, not of extreme caſes, (for that muſt happen in all comprehenſive plans) but of ſomething worth preſerving and improving in all. The books and the portions of ſcience allotted to the firſt year are ſuch as many, by the moſt diligent ſtudy during four years, can never go beyond; while others come ſo ripe and forward as to be quite fit to begin where the former end. The facility, again, of learning, the rate of advancement varies in ſuch wide proportions, that no fair claſſification can be founded on this baſis. It is idle to think that any ſyſtem of education can equalize the powers of different minds. The nominal rank and precedence of the ſtudent, like rank in all the liberal profeſſions, muſt be determined chiefly, not by his merit, but by his ſtanding: the habits of ſociety, the mixed and entangled intereſts of life require it: but in obtaining this rank, it may be contrived (and it is the great ſecret of liberal education ſo to contrive it) that emulation ſhall be an active, ſteady, and commanding principle. Compulſion in ſuch caſes is ridiculous. It ſcarcely ſucceeds even in a nurſery; and, as we advance in years, is leſs to be

wiſhed for, and is in fact leſs practicable. Conſtant admonition, the conſciouſneſs of an overſeeing eye, the fear of reproof, and the hope of praiſe, are indeed of ſervice, are even neceſſary to overcome the deſultory habits of youth, to check its wanderings, to fix its reſolutions, and keep it to its purpoſe. Theſe however are ſecondary and incidental powers: they ſerve to refit and keep the machinery in order; but the great ſpring, which moves and invigorates the whole, is emulation.

According to the laſt regulations, the Univerſity Honours are obtained in the following manner.

As ſoon as the ſtudent enters on his third year, he is ſubject to a public examination, which admits him, not to the Degree of Batchelor of Arts, but to that intermediate ſtep, which ſtill retains its old title of *Sophiſta Generalis*. The old exerciſe was a logical diſputation in the public Schools on three philoſophical queſtions, which had long dwindled into an inſignificant form, before the preſent exerciſe was ſubſtituted in its room. At this previous examination he is expected to conſtrue accurately ſome one Greek and one Latin book at leaſt: the moſt difficult works are not required or encouraged, as there is no competition

tion between the candidates, and an accurate grammatical acquaintance with the ſtructure of the two languages is the point chiefly inquired into. Xenophon, Homer, Herodotus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Demoſthenes among the Greeks, and Virgil, Horace, Salluſt, Livy, and Cicero, among the Latins, are the moſt uſual books. Beſides this, he is examined in ſome compendium of Logic, (generally Aldrich's,) which is never omitted, and in the elements of Geometry and Algebra, which are not held to be abſolutely indiſpenſable. All this is done in public. Eight candidates may be examined in one day, who are all preſent during the whole time; and there is commonly a numerous attendance of Junior Students. Indeed there muſt of neceſſity be an audience, becauſe every candidate is bound to attend one examination before he is examined himſelf. The number however far exceeds what the Statute requires, and the School is often quite full. The Examiners are four in number, eſpecially appointed by the Univerſity, and ſworn to the faithful performance of their duty.

If the ſtudent fails on this occaſion, it paſſes *ſub ſilentio*. He does not receive his certificate at the cloſe of the day; and he may preſent himſelf again the next term.

After having paſſed this Examination, his ſtudies are directed more ſteadily to the other,

where the honour he acquires will depend entirely on his own exertions. He cannot preſent himſelf till after the third year is completed, and it is common to defer it till the end of the fourth year. He is then examined firſt in the rudiments of Religion: a paſſage in the Greek Teſtament is given him to conſtrue, and he is tried, by queſtions ariſing out of it, whether he has a proper view of the Chriſtian ſcheme, and of the outline of ſacred hiſtory. He is expected to give ſome account of the evidences of Chriſtianity, and to ſhew by his anſwers that he is acquainted with the thirty-nine Articles, and has read attentively ſome commentary upon them. He is examined again in Logic, the object being chiefly to ſee that he has juſt and firm conceptions of its leading principles; and, on this occaſion, ſelections from the Organon are often introduced.

The Examination then proceeds to Rhetoric and Ethics. Upon theſe ſubjects the celebrated treatiſes of Ariſtotle are chiefly uſed: and whoever is maſter of them knows what an exerciſe of the mind it is to acquire a thorough inſight into the argument, and what a ſerious diſcipline the ſtudent muſt have undergone, who has accompliſhed this point. The accurate method obſerved in each treatiſe renders it not a perplexing, but merely an arduous taſk: the preciſion of the language, the cloſe connection of the reaſoning,

reaſoning, the enlarged philoſophical views, and the immenſe ſtore of principles and maxims which they contain, point them out as the beſt calculated perhaps of any ſingle works for bringing into play all the energies of the intellect, and for trying, not merely the diligence of the ſcholar, but the habit of diſcrimination which he has formed, the general accuracy of his thoughts, and the force and vigour of his mind. If it be at all of uſe to divide, to diſtinguiſh, and to define, to ſtudy clear arrangement and order, to diſcern connection, and to comprehend a plan compoſed of many widely-ſeparated parts, hardly any works can be named, ſo well adapted to all theſe purpoſes. To theſe is often added, at the option of the ſtudent, the treatiſe on Politics, which is in fact a continuation and completion of the Ethical Syſtem.

Beſides theſe treatiſes of Ariſtotle, Quintilian as belonging to Rhetoric, and the philoſophical works of Cicero, eſpecially that De Officiis, as belonging to Ethics, are admitted. And theſe laſt, as being of eaſier attainment, are of courſe the choice of many candidates. But neither of them are ſtrictly indiſpenſable.

In examining *viva voce* almoſt two hundred candidates every year, nearly in the ſame departments, much ſkill and care is requiſite, leſt a certain routine of queſtions be introduced, which a ſtudent may learn, and give to them ſome plauſible anſwers,

anſwers, without having drawn his knowledge from the original ſource. Nothing but practice and conſtant vigilance, joined to a familiar acquaintance with the ſeveral books, can effectually guard againſt this abuſe. And hence to a by-ſtander the Examination may often ſeem vague and deſultory, when the deſign only is, to probe the candidate here and there, and aſcertain that his reading has been ſerious, not looſe or ſuperficial, or, as might ſometimes happen, none at all.

At this Examination the ſtudent preſents what number of Claſſical Authors he pleaſes, provided they be not leſs than three, and thoſe of the higher order, including both languages. It is not unuſual for thoſe who aim at the higheſt honours to mention Homer, Pindar, one, two, or three of the Greek Tragedians, and Ariſtophanes. Thucydides is ſeldom omitted. The other hiſtorians, and the orators, are alſo included, according as the ſtudent's line of reading has been. Of Latin Authors, beſides the poets of the Auguſtan age, Livy, Tacitus, Cicero, Juvenal, and Lucretius, are the moſt uſual. In the books that he names, he is expected to be well and accurately verſed. And although great encouragement is given to an enlarged range, yet a haſty and unſcholarlike manner of reading, however extenſive it may be, will not obtain reward, and is in fact much diſcountenanced.

Beſides

Beſides the queſtions propoſed *viva voce*, many others in the different branches of the Examination are put, and anſwered on paper, while other things are going on. And in this manner alſo the candidate's knowledge of Latinity is tried.

The Mathematical Examination is quite a diſtinct buſineſs. It is conducted indeed at the ſame time, but is chiefly done on paper, if the ſtudent has advanced far in thoſe ſtudies; although for every candidate who preſents himſelf in Mathematics there is an oral examination, in which, with a table of diagrams before him, he is called upon, not to give full and long demonſtrations, but, as the Examiner turns over a correſponding table, to anſwer queſtions relating to the properties of figures, and the mode of proving certain theorems. The ſoundneſs of his ſcientific ſtudies is thus made known; and he has problems, which require time and cloſe attention, to ſolve at his leiſure on paper, while the examination paſſes on to others.

It muſt be well known to every one who has had experience in life, that, notwithſtanding this formidable array of books and ſciences, great numbers of candidates muſt be allowed to paſs, whoſe attainments in both are, from various cauſes, very inconſiderable. Still if the ſyſtem be ſo conducted as to encourage exertion, it would be abſurd to reject thoſe of the moſt moderate

derate pretenſions, who have paſſed through their period of reſidence with good conduct, and a tolerably regular attention to the preſcribed ſtudies. Nothing but extreme incapacity, extraordinary want of ſchool education, or groſs idleneſs at the Univerſity, will abſolutely exclude a ſtudent from his degree at the regular time. Of this deſcription ſome few are found every year. But even theſe are not finally rejected; they may appear at the following Examination, and, unleſs the ſame inſufficiency is again obſerved, generally paſs.

Of thoſe who are thought worthy of Honours, there are two claſſes in the branch of Literature, and two in that of Mathematical Sciences; and nothing hinders a candidate from being diſtinguiſhed in each branch: indeed this double Honour is very frequent. The ſecond Claſs of each department is divided into two parts, an upper and a lower; ſo that in fact there are three claſſes of Honours in Literature, and three in Mathematics. The individuals of each claſs are arranged among themſelves, not according to merit, but in alphabetical order. It has uſually happened, that above one third of the whole number of candidates have been placed in the liſt of honour: but of theſe by far the greater part are in the lower diviſion of the ſecond claſs. All theſe names are printed: the names of thoſe who ſimply paſs, and obtain no honour, are not printed.

If

If any candidate is rejected, it paſſes *ſub ſilentio*. His certificate is not delivered to him.

The Examiners are ſworn officers, appointed for two years; they are four in number, and muſt all be preſent, unleſs prevented by ſickneſs or ſome very urgent cauſe. The School is in general much crowded during the Examination-weeks, eſpecially when a candidate, who enjoys any previous reputation, is to appear. In ſuch caſes a ſtrong intereſt is excited among all orders, and great attention is paid.

It will be evident, from the ſtatement here given, that the ſtudents are prepared to paſs this examination, not by ſolemn public lectures, delivered to a numerous claſs from a Profeſſor's chair, but by private ſtudy in their reſpective Colleges. This method of ſtudy is the next thing which requires to be explained; for upon this point alſo the world are greatly, and in ſome inſtances purpoſely, miſinformed.

The mode of inſtruction by College Lectures, which prevails at both the Engliſh Univerſities, is an innovation upon the original plan, which formerly obtained among them, and which is ſtill practiſed in foreign univerſities, and I believe in thoſe of Scotland. Some peculiar advantages there are attending each method, and the beſt method perhaps would be that which ſhould unite both more completely than is the caſe with any

modern univerſity. If, however, they are compared one againſt the other, as means of inſtruction, the preference ſeems ſtrongly due to that of College Lectures.

Under this ſyſtem the pupils of one tutor are eaſily claſſed according to their capacities, and the ſtock of learning and ſcience they bring with them. When formed into theſe ſubdiviſions, the choice of the lecture may be adapted to their peculiar wants, and the lecturer can perceive, individually as he goes along, how his inſtruction is received. The heavineſs of ſolitary reading is relieved by the number which compoſe a claſs: this number varies from three or four to ten or twelve: a ſort of emulation is awakened in the pupil, and a degree of animation in the inſtructor, which cannot take place with a ſingle pupil, and which approaches to the vivacity of a public ſpeaker addreſſing an audience. At the ſame time he can addreſs himſelf to individuals, ſatisfy their ſcruples, correct their errors, and in ſo doing, the ſubject being thoroughly ſifted and handled is ſeen in a variety of lights, and faſtens more durably on the mind of thoſe who are liſteners merely. Indeed, the impreſſion thus made by theorems of ſcience, and by proceſſes of reaſoning on every ſubject, is ſo much more vivid, and the means are at hand of aſcertaining ſo ſatisfactorily how each pupil receives what he hears,

that

that the buſineſs of teaching is made leſs irkſome and fatiguing to both parties; and in a few weeks the tutor is enabled to form a juſter eſtimate of the abilities, and quickneſs, and mental habits, of his pupil, than any other ſyſtem could explain to him in as many years.

In reading the principal Claſſic Authors alſo, which forms a great part of Oxford Education, the advantages of this method are not leſs conſpicuous. A habit of accuracy, the laſt habit which a young man acquires by himſelf, is thus created. A thouſand points are remarked as he goes along, which would have eſcaped a ſolitary ſtudent. Bad ſchool-practices are corrected. Principles of taſte and criticiſm are conveyed in the moſt ſtriking manner, becauſe they ariſe out of the occaſion, and are taught with the example before him. Opinions of men and books, and whatever elſe is connected with the topics as they occur, are eaſily communicated. The ſcheme of literature is gradually unfolded to his mind, according as he is able to bear it, and to profit from it. In fact, there is no work of the claſs here alluded to, which may not ſerve as a text-book; with which information of every ſort may, as the occaſion requires, be interwoven; and the mode of imparting it may be adapted to the individual who is addreſſed. It is thus that the ſtores of one mind may moſt effectually be transfuſed into another,

whether concerning matters of literature, or philoſophy, or religion, or the conduct of life. It is in theſe readings that the full merit of thoſe ancient models is made prominent, and brought home to the feelings and apprehenſion of every one. They ſerve as ſpecimens and exemplars, according to which private ſtudy may be formed and moulded; for in private ſtudy, after all, the great field of literature muſt be traverſed. And hence is eſtabliſhed that intercourſe of mind, which, imperceptibly, gives a tincture even to the moſt thoughtleſs, and marks a laſting ſtamp on others, who are hardly conſcious of the ſucceſſive impulſes, by which the impreſſion is continually worn in.

In the more ambitious diſplay of a public Lecture, there are, beyond a doubt, advantages which private inſtruction cannot have. The effort of the Lecturer is naturally greater, his matter more carefully prepared, his tone and diction more elevated and impreſſive. There are emotions which eloquence can raiſe, and which lead to loftier thoughts and nobler aſpirings than commonly ſpring up in the private intercourſe of men: when the latent flame of genius has been kindled by ſome tranſient ray, ſhot perhaps at random, and aimed leaſt where it took the greateſt effect, but which has ſet all the kindred ſparks that lay there, in ſuch a heat and ſtir, as that no torpid

torpid indolence, or low earthy-rooted cares, ſhall ever again ſmother or keep them down. From this high lineage may ſpring a never-failing race; few indeed, but more illuſtrious becauſe they are few, through whom the royal blood of philoſophy ſhall deſcend in its pureſt channels, but will hardly be brought down to mingle with the baſer alloy of the unſchooled multitude. It is not, it cannot be, the moſt effectual means by which inſtruction is to be conveyed to the minds of the great majority of ſtudents; and to do this, ſurely, is the prime object in any ſyſtem of national education. The ſucceſſion of illuſtrious names brought into notice by the other mode, is apt to caſt a deluſive ſplendour over the prominent maſſes which it illumines, and to withdraw our attention from the thouſand inferior objects which are crowded in the back ground, leſs captivating, it is true, to the imagination, but equally entitled to the care of true philanthropy. I would not undervalue theſe higher doings; but we muſt be cautious how they lead us out of the track of plain and ſober induſtry. A thirſt for diſtinction may interfere with homely duties more really important to mankind. Our huſbandry is truly on a large ſcale; but let us beware how we ſacrifice, after the example of vain oſtentatious breeders, the food of ſome twenty or thirty, for the ſake of making a proud ſhew of one.

Such

Such produce is not the true or certain teſt of ſkilful management. If we ſend out into the world an annual ſupply of men, whoſe minds are imbued with literature according to their ſeveral meaſures of capacity, impreſſed with what we hold to be the ſoundeſt principles of policy and religion, grounded in the elements of ſcience, and taught how they may beſt direct their efforts to farther attainments in that line; if, with this common ſtock, of which they all partake, they be encouraged afterwards to ſtrike off into the ſeveral profeſſions and employments of life, to engage in the public ſervice of the ſtate, or to watch over and manage the leſſer circle of affairs, which the independent gentlemen of this country, and of this country only, conduct in their reſpective neighbourhoods; I think we do a greater and more ſolid good to the nation, than if we ſought to extend over Europe the fame of a few exalted individuals, or to acquire renown by exploring untrodden regions, and by holding up to the world, ever ready to admire what is new, the fruits of our diſcovery.

Let not this be conſtrued into an admiſſion that ſpeculation is diſcouraged. The fact is not ſo. But it is not, and it ought not to be the buſineſs of a body. It is for us to execute an eſtabliſhed ſyſtem; to teach and to recommend what is thoroughly approved. Individuals may

engage

engage in the taſk of diſcovery; and they are better fitted for that taſk, if they be well informed in what is already known. In caſe they ſhould be rewarded for their honourable ſearch, "if truth "ſhall have ſpoken to them before other men," let them in the name of truth not withhold the ſecret; it will be eagerly liſtened to here as elſewhere; and if, after due probation, it be found to be indeed the voice of truth which ſpake it, our ſyſtem will thankfully receive the wholeſome aliment. But to expect that every crude opinion or untried theory ſhall enter as ſoon as it demands admiſſion, and take its place amongſt us, while we riſe up and make room to receive it, is againſt all reaſon and the analogy of things. Let the experiments be tried, and repeatedly tried, in ſome inſignificant ſpot, ſome corner of the farm: but let us not riſk the whole harveſt of the year upon a doubtful project.

There is one province of education indeed, in which we are ſlow in believing that any diſcoveries can be made. The ſcheme of Revelation we think is cloſed, and we expect no new light on earth to break in upon us. The ſacred volume we know has been abuſed, (as what gift of the Almighty has not been abuſed?) for the worſt and wickedeſt ends. It has been hidden from the world, it has been corrupted, miſinterpreted, and perverted, ſo as to become an engine of fraud and error,

error, and blind fanaticiſm. Theſe arts and theſe acts of violence we hold it our eſpecial duty to remedy and to guard againſt; to keep ſtrict watch round that ſacred citadel, to deliver out in due meaſure and ſeaſon the ſtores it contains, to make our countrymen look to it as a tower of ſtrength, and to defend it againſt open and ſecret enemies. It ſtands conſpicuous in all our ſtreets: it catches the eye in every direction, and at every turning: and we ſhould think all our views incomplete without it.

But I have, while purſuing theſe topics as they preſſed upon my attention, left two or three points omitted, which belong to the detail of our proceedings.

Notwithſtanding the high authorities quoted againſt the practice of compoſition, it forms part of the buſineſs of education in each College. Theſe exerciſes however are all in proſe, with the few exceptions before alluded to, and they are alternately Engliſh and Latin. In ſome Colleges a ſelection of the beſt is made every week, and read publicly before the College by the authors. In others they are collected at the end of each term, ſome judgment is pronounced upon them, and thoſe who have written the beſt are thanked and commended.

It is alſo the practice of moſt Colleges (certainly of all the larger Colleges) to examine every

ſtudent

ſtudent at the end of each term in the ſtudies of the term. On this occaſion he preſents written notes and abridgments which he has formed, and gives an account of any other things he has read, connected with the main courſe of his ſtudies.

There have alſo been for about forty years Prize Exerciſes, propoſed by the Chancellor, in Latin Verſe, and Engliſh Proſe; to which our preſent Chancellor has added one, at his own ſuggeſtion, in Latin Proſe. Theſe are open to the whole Univerſity; and the ſucceſsful compoſitions are recited in the Theatre in the moſt public manner at the annual Commemoration. The number of exerciſes uſually given in is fifty or ſixty: and occaſionally a Prize in Engliſh Verſe is added, which has brought forth poems of no common merit.

Such is the outline of the ſtudies of this place: an outline, which I do not ſay is incapable of being improved and enlarged, but which does ſeem to comprehend all the leading objects of liberal education. In particular, it might, without danger of interfering too much with the more efficient ſtudies of private colleges, admit of more frequent public lecturing than is at preſent practiſed. But to ſuppoſe that there is no ſuch lecturing, is a great miſtake. Beſides a courſe, and ſometimes two courſes, in divinity,

I have already mentioned that lectures in this way are read by the ſeveral Profeſſors in Natural Philoſophy, Aſtronomy, Chemiſtry, Mineralogy, Botany, Anatomy, to claſſes drawn from different Colleges, at the option of the individuals, or under the advice of their tutors. Public lectures, which are rather detached diſſertations, are alſo read, one in each term, to the whole Univerſity by the Profeſſor of Poetry, and the Profeſſor of Modern Hiſtory. There is likewiſe a Courſe in Modern Hiſtory often read to a ſelect claſs, in which the doctrines of Political Economy have by the preſent Profeſſor been much introduced and diſcuſſed.

That Political Economy therefore is unknown or diſcountenanced as a ſcience, is equally wrong with many other imputations againſt us. The beſt works in that branch, as well as in the elements of Law and Politics, are in the hands of many ſtudents, with the full approbation of thoſe who regulate their ſtudies; although it is never forgotten that to lay a foundation of liberal literature, ancient and modern, before any particular purſuit abſorbs the mind, is our main buſineſs. Any ſtudent alſo may obtain aſſiſtance from the Profeſſors of Saxon and Oriental learning. But it is ſeldom that claſſes are formed in theſe branches. A few individuals, enough to

to keep up the ſucceſſion unbroken, have always made them their favourite ſtudy. But no account is taken of theſe matters at the Examinations for Degrees.

CHAP. V.

Of PLANS OF EDUCATION *in general, and particularly of Engliſh Education.—Abuſe of the term* UTILITY.—*Remarks on the Study of Political Economy and Moral Philoſophy—Of ſome vulgar errors reſpecting Oxford—Concluſion.*

PLANS of Education can never create great men. It is a weak and miſtaken opinion one now and then meets with in the world; and all the teſtimony of hiſtory and experience will never wholly explode it. Native vigour and perſevering exertion are the rare qualities, which lead to excellence of every kind. Theſe qualities, it is true, may be aided, encouraged, and directed by method. Still it cannot happen that the method beſt adapted for the generality of caſes will exactly ſuit each. The charge of education is a weighty one, and many intereſts are involved in it: it muſt be conducted with a view to the general benefit; and rules not always liked, not always profitable to individuals, muſt be inforced. Some perhaps will be impatient, and overſhoot the

the convoy, in hopes of making a better market. But it is at their own peril; and as the advantage is precarious, ſo is the failure unpitied, and without remedy.

There are again many who ſpeak, there are ſome even who have written upon education, as if in its beſt form it were one continued ſyſtem of reſtraint, of artificial guidance, and over-ruling inſpection. The mind, they tell us, may be moulded like wax; and wax-work truly is all theſe plans will make of it. Such was the old Platonic reverie: ſuch was the Jeſuit ſcheme, the moſt perfect drill-training, perhaps, from the Centinel to the General, that ever was deviſed. Such in a great meaſure is the method of the modern Quakers. Heaven, and the guardian genius of Engliſh liberty, preſerve us from this degrading proceſs. We want not men who are clipped and eſpaliered into any form, which the whim of the gardener may dictate, or the narrow limits of his parterre require. Let our ſaplings take their full ſpread, and ſend forth their vigorous ſhoots in all the boldneſs and variety of nature. Their luxuriance muſt be pruned; their diſtortions rectified; the ruſt and canker and caterpillar of vice carefully kept from them: we muſt dig round them, and water them, and repleniſh the exhauſtion of the ſoil by continual dreſſing. The

ſunbeams

ſunbeams of heaven, and the elements of nature, will do the reſt.

In the firſt ſtages indeed of infancy and boyhood, reſtraint muſt be continually practiſed, and liberty of action abridged. But, in proportion as reaſon is ſtrengthened, freedom ſhould be extended. At ſome of our public ſchools, it is ſaid, this freedom is indulged to a dangerous extent. The charge may be juſt; and if ſo, the evil calls aloud for correction. But when a ſtudent is ſent to the Univerſity, he ought to underſtand that he muſt think, in a great meaſure, and act, for himſelf. He is not to be for ever watched, and checked, and controlled, till he fancies that every thing is right which is not forbidden: as if there were no conſcience within him, and no God above him, to whom he is accountable. Obedience is indeed a virtue even in man; but it is obedience founded in right reaſon, not in fear. Unleſs joined with this principle, virtue itſelf hardly deſerves the name. Unleſs ſome choice be left it, ſome voluntary action to try its ſteadineſs, how ſhall it approve itſelf to be virtue?

On this principle I rejoice to ſee a manly and generous diſcipline eſtabliſhed among us—a diſcipline which enjoins nothing, which prohibits nothing, which puniſhes nothing, but what reaſon and common ſenſe declare deſerving of that treatment.

ment. There are decencies and formalities, indifferent perhaps in their own nature, which all well-ordered communities, eſpecially if numerous, find it expedient to inforce by rules; and which none but a depraved taſte would difreliſh or habitually violate. But in all the great buſineſs of education, the ſtudent feels that what he does is his own doing; the free working of his own will; aſſiſted certainly by counſel, by reproof, and by encouragement; but ſpringing principally from his own ſenſe of what is fitting, virtuous, and honourable.

In the favourite ſtudies of the place, they meet with nothing but what tends to breed and foſter theſe noble ſentiments; to make them feel what they owe to their country in a land of freedom, and what their country expects from them. In the hiſtories of Thucydides and Xenophon they ſee reflected all the great cauſes and motives, which can ever agitate and diſtract their own nation. They read, unmixed with the prejudiced and perverſe clamours of party, the fatal conſequences of miſrule and anarchy, of wild democracy, of unlimited or unjuſt power. In theſe works, more eſpecially in the former, is ſpread out before their eyes a crowded but not a confuſed picture of human affairs, exhibiting all the paſſions, both in their ſecret workings and in their fulleſt energy—all the difficulties and duties of a true patriot—all the virtues, the vices, the intrigues,

intrigues, the reciprocal intereſts, and the diverſified fortunes of free ſtates; and with the fulleſt and minuteſt detail of facts are interwoven ſuch reflections and reaſonings, as muſt for ever fix on that hiſtory the ſeal of political wiſdom, and make it to be, what its author nobly and boldly foretold it would be, a ſtanding monument of inſtruction to all times.

In the latter of theſe writers they will ſee how active patriotiſm and ſkill in affairs may be combined with the cultivation of letters and ſound philoſophy: while in his luminous narrative will occur to them ſuch a lively and juſt account of things, ſuch ſtrong portraits ſtarting, as it were, from the page in their native mien and features, as to carry almoſt all the diſtinctneſs, and more than all the authority, of living examples. And from no ſtudy can an Engliſhman acquire a better inſight into the mechaniſm and temper of civil government: from none can he draw more inſtructive leſſons, both of the danger of turbulent faction, and of corrupt oligarchy: from none can he better learn how to play ſkilfully upon, and how to keep in order, that finely-toned inſtrument, a free people.

To think that any ſtudent can peruſe and underſtand theſe works without catching ſome portion of the generous ſpirit that breathes in them, is to argue an ignorance of the frame and conſtitution

ſtitution of man's nature; and many, we truſt, there are, who, in the lofty language of Milton, "are led by them and drawn in willing obedience, "enflamed with the ſtudy of learning, and the "admiration of virtue; ſtirred up with high hopes "of living to be brave men, and worthy patriots, "dear to God, and famous to all ages."

So live they yet
Unchang'd by time, and hold their empire ſtill
With noble minds: ſtill lingering on the banks
Of Iſis' ſilver ſtream, the Muſe of Greece,
As by Iliſſus once, her awful truths
Unfolds, and draws from many a record proud
The great example, not in vain addreſs'd
To Britain's youth, that teaches how to prize
Their country's worth, and how to guard its weal
With virtue or with arms. Lo! where ſhe points
To Marathon's dread plain, and the rough ſhore
Of ſea-beat Salamis, and bids them mark
How Heaven itſelf will arm, to aid the cauſe
Of virtuous freedom. From the myſtic ſhrines
Of old Eleuſis, and her dark abodes,
Went forth "The Mighty Mother," and in clouds
Hovering aloft o'er Perſia's baffled hoſt
Pour'd wild diſmay, and on the Colian rock
Scatter'd the frequent wreck. Then while the flame
Glows in their youthful breaſts, pauſing awhile
The ſweet inſtructreſs bids them mark again
How Athens roſe to empire; firm, and wiſe,

Reſting her ſway on lovely virtue roſe;
Till wealth and power prevail'd at length to taint
Her ſimple faith, and warp'd her from the line
Of equal rule: and the vile demagogue
Unfix'd the people's mind: and looſening firſt
The fence of law, that held him from his prey,
Chang'd them from what they were, from juſt and mild
To fierce and cruel. Ponder th' eventful tale,
Ye riſing hopes of Britain, for it ſpeaks
With no light warning.

Such was the impreſſion made by theſe ſtudies on one, who had himſelf drank largely at the fountain of modern ſcience as well as of ancient learning; who lately ſhone a bright example among us, as the warm friend to merit of every kind; who never ceaſed to encourage, to direct, and to aſſiſt thoſe around him in every honourable purſuit; and who is now wiſely gone to enjoy the evening of life in repoſe, ſweetened by the remembrance of having ſpent the day in uſeful and ſtrenuous exertion.

It is not without reaſon then that we may think ourſelves injured and inſulted, when the world are told that we confine our inſtruction to the grammatical niceties of a dead language—that we repreſs all attempts at reaſoning upon moral and political queſtions—that, "by our miſerable "jealouſy and littleneſs, an infinite quantity of "talent

" talent is deſtroyed,"—that all the great topics, in which the mind of a public man ſhould be well informed, are not only neglected, but diſcouraged or deſpiſed. The world in general cannot know, what the writer of this calumny moſt probably knew, that the charge is falſe. They will naturally be impreſſed by the daring look and menacing tone with which theſe poſitions are advanced: and, unleſs they read with ſufficient attention to detect the ignorance and inconſiſtency of the writer, they will conclude, that, if not anſwered, they cannot be denied. In ſuch a caſe indeed, where the charge is totally unſupported by proof, and by the authority of any name, a bare denial is in ſtrict juſtice enough. No man can fairly be put on his defence, and expected to clear himſelf from looſe accuſations, without being even confronted with his accuſer. But what could not in ſtrict juſtice be demanded of us, it may ſtill be wiſe and prudent to concede. A decent reſpect for public opinion, which every man and every ſociety of men ought to entertain, makes it impoſſible to hear oneſelf openly and induſtriouſly defamed without ſome uneaſineſs, and without feeling ſome anxiety to give truth its fair chance againſt malice and defamation.

The words of this acrimonious invective I have not thought it always neceſſary to tranſcribe; but the ſubſtance of it will not be found, I truſt,

unfairly ſtated, if compared with the extracts below[a]; which contain ſome of the noxious infuſions in their moſt rectified and concentrated

[a] 'The Engliſh Clergy, in whoſe hands education entirely reſts, bring up the firſt young men of the country, as if they were all to keep grammar ſchools in little country towns; and a nobleman, upon whoſe knowledge and liberality the honour and welfare of his country may depend, is diligently worried, for half his life, with the ſmall pedantry of longs and ſhorts. . . . . A genuine Oxford tutor would ſhudder to hear his young men diſputing upon moral and political truth . . . . He would augur nothing from it, but impiety to God, and treaſon to Kings. And yet, who vilifies both more than the holy poltroon, who carefully averts from them the ſearching eye of reaſon, and who knows no better method of teaching the higheſt duties, than by extirpating the fineſt qualities and habits of the mind? If our religion be a fable, the ſooner it is exploded the better. If our government is bad, it ſhould be amended.' Edin. Rev. No. 29. p. 50.

'When an Univerſity has been doing *uſeleſs things* for a long time, it appears at firſt degrading to them to be uſeful. A ſet of lectures upon political economy would be diſcouraged in Oxford, probably deſpiſed, probably not permitted. . . . The Parr or the Bentley of his day would be ſcandalized in an Univerſity, to be put on a level with the diſcoverer of a neutral ſalt; and yet, *what other meaſure is there of dignity in intellectual labour, but uſefulneſs?* . . . . Nothing would ſo much tend to bring claſſical literature within proper bounds, as a ſteady and invariable *appeal to utility* in our appreciation of all human knowledge. The puffed-up pedant would collapſe into his proper ſize, and the maker of verſes, and the rememberer of words, would ſoon aſſume that ſtation which is the lot of thoſe who go up unbidden to the upper places of the feaſt.' Ibid. p. 51.

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form. There is however one ingredient carefully thrown in, with a view to render the reſt more palatable—a plauſible affectation of zeal for what is termed *Utility*.

Upon this ſubject I have already treated at ſome length in the third Chapter. But the fallacy is of ſuch perpetual recurrence, that I muſt requeſt a little farther attention while the ſolidity of this pretenſion is accurately examined. *Utility*, if it means any thing, means that which is conducive to ſome good end. Thus a thing may be uſeful which is not good in itſelf, provided it lead to what is good. It is the value of the end, which muſt determine the value of the means. And if a queſtion ariſe concerning the comparative utility of two things, it can only be determined by conſidering the nature of the ends to which they reſpectively lead.

Now all thoſe arts and ſtudies which relate to the improvement of manufactures, and to the raiſing or multiplying the means of ſubſiſtence, terminate merely in the bodily wants of man. Our houſes are better furniſhed, our table may be better ſupplied, our travelling more commodious; and all theſe are very deſirable ends. But will any man who aſpires to the name of philoſopher maintain, that theſe are the principal ends of human life—that a rational being is moſt nobly occupied in ſupplying his bodily wants—in miniſtering

niſtering to the caprices of faſhion in dreſs, in building, in equipage, or in diet? There ſurely is ſome object paramount to all theſe, for which his faculties are fitted, and towards which they receive from nature ſome ſecret impulſe and bias; an impulſe which he is enabled to obey, in proportion as the preſſure of thoſe other motives is leſſened, which are inferior in dignity, although prior in neceſſity. To make *neceſſity* the ſtandard of what is praiſeworthy or honourable, is againſt the uniform judgment of mankind. If that poſition were admitted, the loweſt employments of life are unjuſtly depreſſed: for what ſervices are more neceſſary than thoſe which provide us with food and raiment? If the other wants and pleaſures of life could not be conſulted, without a ſacrifice of theſe, no man could heſitate to which to give the preference. It is only on the preſumption that theſe can be ſupplied by ordinary hands, and that there is time and labour enough at the diſpoſal of ſociety for other purpoſes, that we can at all juſtify thoſe leſs neceſſary purſuits, which engage the attention of the higher departments in civilized life. This univerſal teſtimony of mankind, uncalled for and undeſigned, appears to me the ſtrongeſt evidence for the reaſonableneſs of that diſtinction which every where prevails, and which admits only of ſuch variations as local and accidental peculiarities naturally cauſe. The

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main principle is not only obſervable, but is prominent under all theſe variations, and has been ſo in all ages of the world.

Still we are continually reminded, that ſolid and uſeful attainments are preferable to thoſe which are leſs neceſſary, and which adorn rather than ſupport life. I readily grant that they are ſo: but only when brought into *competition* with each other. It is only when we are called upon to *make a choice between two*—when we cannot *have both*. We muſt build our houſe before we furniſh it: but he who ſupplies the library and the pictures may ſurely be allowed to rank above the artificer that raiſed the walls and framed the roof.

Neither can any diſtinction be juſtly made between the caſe of *manual* and *intellectual* labour. They cannot indeed be altogether ſeparated, even in the loweſt occupations. And where the labour is purely intellectual, I do not ſee how its dignity can be meaſured by the tendency it has to ſatisfy the bodily wants of men. It is not, at leaſt, a ſelf-evident propoſition; which this Reviewer preſumes it to be. And if it be true, much more reaſon does there ſeem for meaſuring the mechanical and corporeal employments of life by that ſtandard. But it is *not true*, and never will be *eſtabliſhed* in the opinions of men. It may be brought forward upon occaſion, like many other plauſible

plauſible deceptions, to ſerve a temporary purpoſe, to excite odium againſt one party, or to acquire popular favour for another; and the miſchief may be great for a time, although the deluſion cannot be laſting.

There muſt be ſurely a cultivation of mind, which is itſelf a good: a good of the higheſt order; without any immediate reference to bodily appetites, or wants of any kind. Of this cultivation I ſhould ſay, as of many profeſſions and trades, that it muſt not be allowed to *interfere* with duties of a plainer kind. If they cannot *both* be allowed in the ſame ſociety, that which is leaſt neceſſary muſt give way. But in the preſent caſe, ſuch is not the queſtion. No pretence is ſet up, that an undue proportion is withdrawn from the general population, and employed in theſe ſtudies; but that the *ſtudies themſelves* are frivolous, becauſe they do not immediately tend to what is called *practical* good.

There are, it is true, emergencies of ſo imperious a nature, that they ſeem, while they laſt, to exalt the merit of him who relieves them, above that of every other ſervice. An emergency of this kind is war. But no one ſurely can deſire war on its own account. No ſincere Chriſtian, or friend to mankind, can wiſh the profeſſion of arms to be extended beyond the neceſſity of the caſe. The neceſſity may be lamented, but, after the

the unvarying experience the world has had, it is the weak and viſionary theoriſt only that can expect to ſee it altogether removed. And having this experience before us, any ſyſtem of national education would be *wrong*, which unfitted men for that ſtate of things—any ſyſtem would be *imperfect*, which had not ſome tendency, direct or indirect, to fit them for it. And if Claſſical education be regarded in this light, there is none in which it will be found more faultleſs. A high ſenſe of honour, a diſdain of death in a good cauſe, a paſſionate devotion to the welfare of one's country, a love of enterprize, and a love of glory, are among the firſt ſentiments, which thoſe ſtudies communicate to the mind. And as their efficacy is undoubted in correcting the narrow habits and prejudices to which the ſeparation of the profeſſions gives birth; ſo in the rough ſchool of war is it more eſpecially exemplified, in mitigating the tone of that ſevere inſtructor, and in ſoftening ſome of his harſheſt features.

But I will not return, however attractive the theme, to a conſideration of the merits of the beſt Claſſic writers. The praiſes we beſtow upon them will be regarded by our adverſaries, not as *proofs*, but as *encomiums*; and if what has been ſaid is not ſufficient, there is nothing, I believe, that can be ſaid, to convince a heſitating and candid enquirer, how naturally they tend to inſpire

juſt and elevated thoughts; thoughts not merely adapted to ſolitude and contemplation, but to the intercourſe of ſocial life, and to the diſcharge of its moſt active duties.

Let me be permitted however, before I quit the ſubject, to tranſcribe a paſſage from the ſame Review; written at a time when candour and liberal ſentiment towards Engliſh Univerſities were not unknown to it.

"It is the reſpect which men of rank in England "uſually pay to a Claſſical education, that drew from "our Author the following compliment, in which we "heartily join, in favour of our ſouthern neighbours, "and which is valuable, as coming from a man little "accuſtomed to the complimentary ſtyle."

'We ought to judge in matters of education, rather 'from experience than from mere reaſoning. We ſhould 'enquire what nation has produced the moſt active, 'and the greateſt men; not indeed the greateſt number 'of compilers and of book makers, but of the moſt in-'trepid, the moſt acute, accompliſhed, and magnani-'mous characters? This is very probably the Engliſh 'nation.' Edinburgh Review, Number vi. p. 352. On Lichtenberg's Miſcellaneous Works.

If ſuch be the advantages of a ſyſtem founded in the ſtudy of ancient literature, it cannot be an object of indifference with the nation, to ſee it firmly eſtabliſhed and well endowed. To preſerve and

and uphold with due care this venerable edifice, a large appropriation both of the men and of the property of the country may well be made. Many there certainly ought to be, whoſe peculiar office ſhould lead them to examine diligently all its parts, to bring together ſuch materials as are neceſſary to counteract decay, to maintain its ſolidity, to cleanſe, to improve and embelliſh it. But it is the *free communication of its uſe to the public*, which is their leading purpoſe; and, according as that duty is well or ill performed, the judgment of the public ſhould be pronounced.

That ſome of its apartments might not be arranged more commodiouſly, or furniſhed better, is more than I would preſume to ſay. But on the ſubject of Political Economy, of which we now hear ſo much, I will venture a few obſervations in our defence.

This is, beyond a doubt, of all ſciences relating to human intereſts, that in which the greateſt progreſs has been made in modern times; and much honour is due to thoſe writers who have let in light upon this hitherto obſcure and unfrequented track. But the effect of novelty and diſcovery is to attract for a ſeaſon an undue proportion of public favour. Such appears to me to have been the miſtake with regard to Political Economy: and, in many inſtances, it has been a dangerous, if not a miſchievous miſtake: for

the attainment of this ſcience ſeems almoſt to have ſupplanted all the other branches of knowledge requiſite for a ſtateſman; to have often narrowed his views, and to have made him regard every public meaſure ſimply in the relation it bears to national wealth. But this object, as I have already contended, and ever will contend, againſt the clamorous ſcioliſts of the day, is not the prime buſineſs of true policy. However important and even neceſſary it may be, it is a ſubordinate and not a predominant concern in public affairs—not leſs than the management and improvement of an eſtate in private life is an inferior duty to the education of children, the maintenance of character, and the guidance of a houſe.

Still it cannot be diſputed, that the ſcience has a tendency, if rightly ſtudied, to enlarge the mind, and that it will enable a man to perform many of the relative duties of life, both public and private, more correctly. On this account the introduction of it into the Lectures on Modern Hiſtory has always appeared to me a great improvement; and the ſtill farther extenſion of the ſame enquiry would, I am perſuaded, be much approved.

Its great leading principles however are ſoon acquired: the ordinary reading of the day ſupplies them. And with the majority of ſtudents, the more accurate ſtudy and inveſtigation of its theorems

orems may well be reſerved for thoſe ſituations and occaſions, in which many of them will be placed at ſome future ſeaſon, and which afford ample time for the completion of ſuch enquiries. When combined with practical exertions, and called forth by particular occaſions, theſe ſtudies gain a firmer hold, and are purſued with more eager intereſt. The mind ſhould indeed be early diſciplined and fitted for that work: but the work itſelf may be done when the time comes.

It is a folly to think that every thing which a man is to know muſt be taught him while young; as if he were to ſpring at once from College, and be intruſted with the immediate management of the world: as if life had no intervals for extending knowledge: as if intellectual exerciſe and the act of learning were unbecoming the ſtate of manhood.

With regard to this ſcience in particular, there are many points in it, which make me think it a fitter employment for the mind in an advanced period of life, than when the affections are young and growing, and liable to be cramped and ſtunted by the views of human nature which it continually preſents. There is perhaps ſomething in all theoretical views of ſociety, which tends to harden the feelings, and to repreſent man as a blind part of a blind machine. The frame-work of that great ſtructure muſt, we know, be put together upon ſuch principles. And the more enlarged

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our ſphere of action is, the more correct and luminous ought our notions to be of their relative power and importance. But by far the greater part of thoſe who are educated for active profeſſions have leſs occaſion for contemplating theſe abſtract notions, than for adapting themſelves promptly to the limited relations of life in which they are placed; and in which the remedy of evils cauſed by the friction of the machine and by external accident, requires not that comprehenſive view of its whole conſtruction to be for ever preſent to the mind. It is not then that I would keep theſe truths out of ſight; it is not that I would deny the utility of them in every ſphere and condition: but where a choice is left us among many purſuits, all of which are in their ſeveral degrees beneficial, I would be very cautious how that was ſingled out and made predominant, which is ſo prone to uſurp over the reſt, and the abuſe of which is not a laughable, but a ſerious evil.

Much we are told from day to day of the folly of pedantry. The folly is indeed ridiculous, and it is ſeldom ſpared. But the pedant in chemiſtry, or in phyſics, is at leaſt as diſagreeable an animal as the pedant in claſſical learning; and the pedant in political economy is not diſagreeable only, but dangerous. And if a proſpect were open to a young man of a period of leiſure after his term of college-ſtudy ſhould be expired, it ſeems more adviſable

adviſable to lay the foundation for this ſcience by exerciſing his mind in ſound Logic and in Mathematical reaſoning, upon which any other ſyſtem of cloſe and ſevere reaſoning may ſoon be built, than to run the riſk of ſacrificing that more generous diſcipline, which, if not imparted at an early period of life, is ſeldom acquired afterwards.

Never, while the world laſts, will it be wholly diſabuſed of that ſpecious error, that the more there is crammed into a young man's mind, whether it ſtays there or not, whether it is digeſted or not, ſtill the wiſer he is. And writings ſuch as thoſe which I have been examining, ſmart, witty, and confident, tend to confirm this diſeaſed habit of thinking, and to ſpread the contagion. A half educated father hears that lectures are read in Chemiſtry, Botany, Mineralogy, &c. &c. at one place, and his ſon is learning nothing of this ſort at ſchool. Incapable of judging how mental powers are improved by continual exerciſe, and how the moral character is in a great meaſure formed by the ſtudy of good authors, he fancies that when the grammar of a language is learnt, all farther attention to that language is loſt time—that there is nothing new gained, becauſe there is no new name. If the boy is captivated by the novelty and variety of the ſtudies which are preſented to him, he ſeldom returns with any reliſh to philological purſuits. He may become a ſkilful agriculturiſt, an improver of

of manufactures, an uſeful inſpector of roads, mines, and canals: but all that diſtinguiſhing grace, which a liberal education imparts, he foregoes for ever. It cannot be acquired in a later period of life, if the morning of his days have been occupied with other cares, and the intellectual habits already ſettled in different forms and poſtures. If, as too often happens, theſe matters are received into the ears, but take no poſſeſſion of the mind, there is not only a moral blank, but an intellectual barrenneſs—a poverty of fancy and invention, a dearth of hiſtorical and poetical illuſtration, a want of all thoſe ideas which decorate and enliven truth, which enable us to live over again the times that are paſt, to combine the produce of widely diſtant ages, and to multiply into one another the component parts of each. The experiment is a cruel one. I have ſeen it tried; and have witneſſed the melancholy and irreparable reſult.

On the contrary, if this liberal inſtruction be firſt provided, and if the intellect be duly prepared by correct Logic, and pure Mathematical ſcience, there is no analyſis, which the buſineſs of life may afterwards call upon him to inveſtigate, beyond the reach of a moderate underſtanding. The habit of diſcrimination, the power of ſtating a queſtion diſtinctly, and of arguing with perſpicuity, are of much greater importance than the haſty acquiſition of miſcellaneous knowledge. Not that I would

would be underſtood to exclude the ſtudy of thoſe matters from an Univerſity. They are taught, and eſteemed and encouraged here: but we do not deny that they are the ſubordinate, and not the leading, buſineſs of education: and (what I think ſhould never be forgotten) they are much more eaſily attained by a well diſciplined mind, after he enters into life, than the other ſtudies upon which we lay the greateſt ſtreſs.

If it be ſeriouſly complained of as a defect, that ſcepticiſm either in philoſophy or religion is diſcountenanced, I can only pity the folly of the writer who could advance ſo untenable a poſition. If indeed the object of education be to diſtract the mind of the ſtudent, to make his opinions looſe, wavering, and inconſtant, inſtead of guiding his choice, aſſiſting his judgment, and concentrating his powers, then we muſt admit that we are altogether under a miſtake. If he was ſent here, not to be fed with what we believed to be the moſt wholeſome diet, but to be turned adrift amongſt a medley of all ſorts of food and all ſorts of poiſon, and left to chooſe for himſelf, then indeed have we ſtill to learn our duty, and to begin at that point where we have hitherto fancied education ought to end. But the wretched abſurdity of this doctrine is too manifeſt to bear a queſtion. It muſt ſeem like trifling to attempt its refutation. I will therefore proceed to notice

one topic more, on which I have heard the complaints of friends as well as enemies.

Much wonder has been ſometimes expreſſed, that, in ſo important a ſcience as Moral Philoſophy, no more diſtinct proviſion ſhould have been made in the Engliſh Univerſities, and that ſo much reſpect ſhould ſtill continue to be paid, more eſpecially in Oxford, to the ancient heathen ſyſtems of Ethics, after ſo many corrections and improvements, with the light and authority of the Goſpel to guide us.

To this objection the firſt anſwer which occurs is, that, in a Chriſtian community, Ethics is much more included within the province of Religion than that of Philoſophy. Without the ſanction of Religion, the pureſt ſyſtem of Ethics would be comparatively lifeleſs and unfruitful: and without ethical inſtruction, Religion itſelf is vapid, and even dangerous. They may be conſidered as inſeparable ingredients of one compound; and the care of teaching both in the moſt effectual manner may well be intruſted to the ſame hands. It is then from the pulpit that we are to look for the fulleſt performance of this branch of education; and it is in this ſervice that we ſee called forth amongſt us the greateſt efforts of moral and metaphyſical reaſoning.

The name of Sermon has with ſome people become ſynonymous with a trite ſuperficial ſtatement

ment of truths which no one combats. A volume of Sermons is too often regarded by the world in that light: and it is well known to be a moſt unpromiſing title to a work. Call the ſame compoſition, Lectures in Moral Philoſophy, Diſſertations on certain theorems in Ethics or Metaphyſics, and they are immediately ſuppoſed to contain ſomething profound—ſome diſplay of acute and original reaſoning—ſome new illuſtration or powerful vindication of eſtabliſhed truths. And the ſame injuſtice is equally obſervable with regard to the unpubliſhed arguments which are continually framed, and delivered from the pulpit. The inſtruction, however, thus conveyed is, for all practical purpoſes, and in a great degree alſo for intellectual exerciſe and improvement, the moſt ſolid and impreſſive.

Religion adapts itſelf to all conditions, to all occupations, whether of mind or body; and that form, in which its truths are beſt repreſented to a congregation of ſtudents and of educated men, is one which calls for a power of abſtract reaſoning, and for a knowledge of the beſt Ethical works, the matter of which, according to its worth, may be incorporated with religious diſcourſe. Hardly any man but the Enthuſiaſt contends that the Goſpel was deſigned to ſuperſede moral reaſoning. It adds a ſanction to Ethics, which the ſublimeſt philoſophy could never give: it corrects ſome

errors, into which the pureſt philoſophy, without that guide, had fallen. But it diſplays no entire and ſyſtematic code, which renders the employment of our natural faculties in ſuch an enquiry leſs needful: on the contrary, it affords a ſtrong additional ſtimulus to exert them in this ſervice. If therefore the whole of what we learnt in Morals were to be derived from one work, no Chriſtian could heſitate between the ſyſtem of Ariſtotle and the ſyſtem of Paley. The latter work is well known here, and never mentioned without reſpect. But whether as an exerciſe of the reaſoning faculty, or as exhibiting moral theorems in a more captivating and convincing ſhape, I cannot think it entitled to a decided preference. It may lead to a notion alſo, that it contains *all* we think well eſtabliſhed in Chriſtian Ethics: whereas the Greek Philoſophy is always ſtudied with a reſerve in favour of Chriſtianity, and an habitual reference is made to a more unerring ſtandard, by which its ſoundneſs is to be tried. When we conſider too how frequently, from the very nature of the caſe, a popular modern work in Engliſh will be read without much ſpecific encouragement, while a foreign ſtimulus is almoſt always wanted to make an ancient treatiſe of any depth generally ſtudied, the prudence of fixing on the latter as the object of reward and honour, ſuppoſing them nearly equal in value, cannot be queſtioned.

queſtioned. My own conviction, after much conſideration of the matter, decidedly ſettled in that way: but I admit it to be a point, on which different opinions may well be entertained, even by people acquainted with the works of both claſſes.

In the view which has thus been given, and the defence which has been attempted, of Oxford Education, although I have not been able, nor indeed have I been willing, to ſuppreſs the ſtrong affection which I feel for the place and for its peculiar ſtudies; yet nothing has been farther from my mind than to act the part of a profeſſed advocate—to hide its defects—to exaggerate its merits—and to give a falſe complexion to the whole caſe. It is one of the marks either of extreme weakneſs, or of artful malignity, to draw an ideal picture of what a ſeminary of learning might be, or ought to be. A kind of intellectual paradiſe is delineated, from which human paſſions, prejudices, and intereſts are altogether excluded. Nothing is to occupy the mind but a never-failing and laborious attention to peculiar duties. No allowance is to be made for difference of bodily or mental conſtitution—none for occaſional languor, or fluctuation of ſpirits—none for the avocations of buſineſs—for multiplied and entangled connections—for purſuits of private intereſt

intereſt and advancement; purſuits which are thought not only allowable, but laudable in every other department of life. And when this viſionary ſcene has been exhibited to the fancy, what wonder if the reality ſhall be found homely and diſappointing! Where human beings are, human follies and intereſts will ever be found. The compariſon ought not in candour to be made with a perfect ſtandard; but with that which ſeems fairly practicable, and reaſonably to be expected in the preſent ſtate of things. If there be any inſtitution ſo pure, any body of individuals ſo devoted to the public good, that no other motive finds place in their minds, and no other view or inclination, from day to day, is harboured there, but the ſervice of God and man, let *them*, (with ſolemn reverence and ſincerity of heart I ſpeak it,) let them caſt the firſt ſtone at us. But theſe are not the men, from whom the language of inſult and invective is heard. It is that many-tongued ſpirit of jealous diſcontent or political diſcord, which utters theſe jarring ſounds; which ever and anon flits acroſs our path, and, occupying ſome ſheltered nook or over-hanging eminence, derides us with fiendlike mockery, and points with a reproachful hand at each faultering ſtep or accidental failure: while nothing ſeems to delight it more than to ſee its elfiſh tricks imitated by an idle throng of ſpectators, or to hear an echo

of

of laughter raiſed at the expence of ſilent and unpretending worth.

There are, moreover, ſome points in the conſtitution of this place, which are carefully kept out of ſight by our revilers, but which ought to be known and well conſidered, before any compariſon is made between what we are, and what we ought to be. *The Univerſity of Oxford is not a national foundation.* It is a congeries of foundations, originating ſome in royal munificence, but more in private piety and bounty. They are moulded indeed into one corporation; but each one of our twenty Colleges is a corporation by itſelf, and has its own peculiar ſtatutes, not only regulating its internal affairs, but confining its benefits by a great variety of limitations. In this particular, I believe, we are much more reſtrained than the foundations in Cambridge, although in many caſes the limitations bear a cloſe reſemblance. In moſt Colleges the fellowſhips are appropriated to certain Schools, Dioceſes, Counties, and in ſome caſes even to Pariſhes, with a preference given to the Founder's kindred for ever. Many qualifications, quite foreign to intellectual talents and learning, are thus enjoined by the Founders; and in very few inſtances is a free choice of candidates allowed to the Fellows of a College, upon any vacancy in their number. Merit therefore has not ſuch proviſion made as the extent

tent of the endowments might ſeem to promiſe. Now it is certain, that each of theſe various conſtitutions cannot be the beſt. The beſt of them perhaps are thoſe where an unreſtrained choice is left among all candidates who have taken one degree. The worſt are thoſe which are appropriated to ſchools, from which boys of ſixteen or ſeventeen are forwarded to a fixed ſtation and emolument, which nothing can forfeit but flagrant miſconduct, and which no exertion can render more valuable.

But what can be ſaid to all this? Are the wills of private benefactors to be ſet aſide, not becauſe they contain proviſions *injurious* to the public, (for in that caſe no one could queſtion the propriety of interference in the Legiſlature,) but ſimply becauſe theſe proviſions are *not the beſt that might have been?* If the country were about to allot anew any portion of its wealth for the purpoſe of education, of courſe the plan would be uniform, and the regulations ſuch as might ſeem beſt adapted, in every reſpect, to promote the deſired end. But an Engliſh Legiſlature has always evinced, and I truſt ever will evince, a tender regard for the authority of Wills, and the ſacredneſs of private property. Whatever innovations may be made, no one can apprehend from ſuch a Legiſlature, that any perſonal loſs ſhould be ſuſtained by the preſent individuals. And whether even the

maintenance

maintenance of a ſacred principle be not a greater good than the mere *amelioration* of a ſyſtem, ought to be, and would be, I am confident, well conſidered, before any change is made[a].

[a] Mr. Cockburn, late Chriſtian Advocate at Cambridge, has propoſed a plan for limiting the duration of all fellowſhips to ten or twelve years, ſecuring of courſe the preſent poſſeſſors from any loſs or injury. Although I admire and applaud the zeal of this writer, and have no doubt of the purity and rectitude of his intentions, yet I cannot think his plan deſirable, on ſeveral accounts. The hardſhip, which many individuals would *certainly* ſuffer, outweighs in my mind the value of any *incidental good* which might ariſe from this ſyſtem. Beſides, the great object propoſed is, to ſend Fellows of Colleges into active employment. Now this purpoſe is already effected by the permiſſion, univerſally granted, of non-reſidence. Not more than one ſixth part, I believe, of the Fellows of Colleges in Oxford are reſident; very few more than are engaged in the buſineſs of education. The reſt are employed in the world in different ways. The ſyſtem of non-reſidence is carried ſo far, as to have affected materially the aſpect of the place, perhaps farther than in prudence it ought to be. Very few are there who are poſſeſſed of leiſure to carry on learned works. And the conſequence is, that the buſineſs of Authorſhip is often aſſumed by moſt incompetent hands; while abler men are occupied in the more uſeful but leſs ſhewy taſk of tuition. On this ſubject I believe the public are much miſinformed. The life of a College is far from being the life of a Cloyſter. The character of a Fellow of a College, ſo often made the theme of ſatirical humour, like that of the Squire in country life, has nearly diſappeared. The evil, if any, is now reverſed. So far from a College being a drain upon the world, the world drains Colleges of their moſt efficient members; and, although the Univerſity thus becomes a more effectual engine of education, it loſes much of that characteriſtic feature

In the mean time I never wish to see the University placed above responsibility to public opinion. I never wish to see her shielded from the fear of public censure, reposing securely on her endowments, and disregarding the clamours of the world around her. It is the terror of the public voice which keeps in awe our very Government, and all our public institutions: and when once that salutary check is removed, we know how soon every ill weed springs up and ripens in every quarter of the estate, and how indolent all its stewards and labourers become. To the voice of the public we ought always to answer with respect, and to render an account, if called upon, of our proceedings. And when that account is fairly given in, I do not fear that a judgment will be passed, upon the vain and ungenerous expectation of perfect virtue. If indeed the great purpose of national education were defeated or lightly regarded by us, if the life-blood of England, instead

it once had, as a residence of learned leisure, and an emporium of literature.

Having mentioned this pamphlet of Mr. Cockburn's, I cannot avoid repeating, that I admire the sincerity and benevolence of the Author, and that I enter warmly into his views of the danger to which the Church is exposed, not by the fear of Catholic Emancipation, as it is absurdly called, but by the subtle activity of its adversaries, and the supineness and indifference of those who ought to be its most energetic defenders.

of

of being invigorated by healthy food, and quickened by pure patriotiſm, were ſent back tainted and diſeaſed, to circulate through her veins diſloyalty, irreligion, or fanaticiſm, then indeed might we hang down our heads in ſhame, and ſhrink from that ſtorm of obloquy which is gathering ſo thick around us. But if no ſuch deadly miſchief is ſuffered to lurk here; if, with the allowances candour will ever make for human frailty, we be found upon the whole to diſcharge our duty with diſcretion and fidelity; we need never ſcruple to meet our accuſers with a clear and unabaſhed countenance; confident, as we well may be, that we ſhall continue to enjoy the protection of the government we live under, and the favour of that nation, whoſe beſt intereſts we ſerve,

POSTSCRIPT.

I WISHED, when it was too late, to introduce a note, or to make ſome alteration in one or two paſſages. E. g.

P. 60. l. 14. QUOD *always has more or leſs the force of* BECAUSE. This is not ſtrictly true. It has the force alſo of AS TO; but this uſe of it was not the point in queſtion: it may ſafely be ſaid, that it *never* has the force of UT.

P. 67. Note. A further reaſon might be aſſigned for the doctrine reſpecting *ſcio quod*, notwithſtanding the line in Plautus. A long parentheſis is often the cauſe of a little grammatical incongruity in the oldeſt writers: it is a kind of *diſturbing force*, which affects the courſe of the ſentence, although it does not extinguiſh its original character: ſuch a ſentence therefore is not a good authority for any unuſual conſtruction.

P. 90. l. 11. This ſtatement may ſeem hardly reconcileable with the example from Livy, xxxi. 9. in the ſame page. It is certainly a general rule, that, to mark the *ſame relation* in Latin, *the ſame caſe*

caſe is required. But this rule is, like other grammatical rules, liable to variation, through the idioms and anomalies of language: of which variation the paſſage from Livy xxxi. 9. is one example.

ERRATA.

P. 8. l. 9. for *light* read *lit*.
P. 57. l. 6. for *ut* read *at*.

W. P.
1810

A

SECOND REPLY

TO THE

EDINBURGH REVIEW.

BY

THE AUTHOR OF A REPLY

TO

THE CALUMNIES

OF THAT REVIEW AGAINST OXFORD.

"We cannot review the pamphlet before us, without either re-
"futing the argument contained in it, or acknowledging the juſt-
"neſs of its remarks." *Edin. Rev. No.* 31. *p.* 158.

"Beſides, leaving out the conſiderations of morality and religion,
"I am aſtoniſhed, my good brethren, that you do not eſtabliſh a
"character for telling truth, for your own advantage." *Sermons by the Reverend Sydney Smith,* vol. ii. p. 117.

OXFORD,

Printed for the Author; and ſold by J. Cooke, and J. Parker; and J. Mackinlay, London.

1810.

Collingwood and Co. Printers, Oxford.

REMARKS

UPON

Article VII. in Number XXXI.

OF THE

EDINBURGH REVIEW.

BY treating this Article as the production of three different writers, each defending himself againſt the ſame adverſary, and vindicating his former writings from the cenſures paſſed upon them, I am certainly putting the moſt candid conſtruction upon it, which the nature of the caſe will bear.

It is poſſible indeed for great agitation of mind to betray an individual into language not only offenſive and indecent, but hardly reconcileable with truth, becauſe not conſiſtent with itſelf; but in the inſtance before us the violation of conſiſtency is ſo frequent and direct, and occurs in parts which give ſo little occaſion for paſſion to operate, that I cannot refer it to any other cauſe than to that diviſion of labour, which I doubt not is found

beneficial, upon the long run, in reviewing, as well as in the other uſeful arts. The particular examples of this failing will be noticed as we proceed. In the mean time, I cannot but contend, that, if well eſtabliſhed, they muſt at leaſt be allowed to diveſt the Review of all the authority which it is ſuppoſed to derive from numbers—from that impoſing *plural* ſtyle which overawes the ſolitary reader, and gives to the dictates of a ſingle writer the weight and efficacy of a legal ſentence. Wherever this diſcrepancy can be diſcovered, not only is the authority of many reduced to that of one, but we can oppoſe to this one an authority of equal rank with his own; and all the claims to deference, which belong to him as one of a diſtinguiſhed fraternity, are nullified by counteracting authority, which he muſt himſelf admit to be equally ſtrong.

Some blame is perhaps in ſuch caſes due to the Conductor of a work of this nature, whoſe peculiar office ſeems to be, to make the parts of his machinery play well and ſmoothly into one another. He does not indeed ſeem to have been altogether indifferent to this object; for the introduction, as well as one or two connecting clauſes, are evidently the work of his pen: but though they ſerve to give the whole piece a more finiſhed appearance, they do in fact looſen and encumber what was ricketty enough before. For one ſen-

tence however of this introduction, which is manly and candid, I am ready to make my ſincere acknowledgments. He is pleaſed to ſay, "We cannot review the pamphlet before us, without *either refuting the argument* contained in it, *or acknowledging the juſtneſs of its remarks.*" Now to this pledge I wiſh ſtrictly to confine him. I have no other deſire than that the queſtion between us may fairly be brought to that iſſue. And I entreat thoſe who have felt any intereſt in this diſpute to examine the ſtatement I am about to make with cloſe attention; to compare it ſtrictly with the Article in the Review, and to form their judgment, not from the tone of confidence which either party may aſſume, and the looſe unſupported aſſertions which they may advance, but from the intrinſic force of the arguments and authorities reſpectively adduced. If, after making this impartial compariſon, it ſhall appear that the writers have refuted any one of the leading propoſitions I maintained; if I am obliged to abandon any one of the critical opinions ventured in the Reply, or if I fail of demonſtrating that, where my arguments could not be overthrown, they have been repreſented to be what they really were not, I will then patiently ſubmit to the moſt inſulting and abuſive of thoſe epithets which that Review has thought fit to beſtow upon me. But if the reſult ſhall be the reverſe of all

this, as I doubt not upon an accurate inveſtigation it will be found to be, few of my readers will deny, that the diſgrace of that language is reflected entirely upon the authors of it; and not only that the charges are made good in their original force, which were at firſt laid againſt them, but that their guilt has been greatly aggravated by the manner in which they have conducted their defence.

I proceed now to make the propoſed examination, only ſtopping for a few moments to remove an obſtruction which lies at the very threſhold.

In the firſt place then an exception is taken to the Title of the work reviewed, "A Reply to the "*Calumnies* of the Edinburgh Review;" and we are told that a Calumny is "a fictitious recital "made for the purpoſe of hurting the *moral* cha- "racter of an individual, or a body of indivi- "duals:" from whence the Reviewer infers, that as no immorality was imputed to Oxford, the term *Calumny* is not applicable to their accuſations, even ſuppoſing the *falſehood* of them to be proved.

This ſurely is at beſt but a piece of verbal criticiſm: and verbal criticiſm is in the ſame Article, p. 185. denominated "a ſilly art:" for it in no degree affects the caſe between us. All I con-

tend for is, that their charges againſt Oxford are *falſe:* and this point being once eſtabliſhed, whatever ſatisfaction they can derive from reflecting that their *falſehoods* inferred no immorality, I am very ready to allow them. At the ſame time I muſt wait for authority very different from that of the Edinburgh Review before I confine the uſe of an Engliſh word to a narrower ſenſe than I find it bear in the converſation and daily uſe of well educated men. "Any falſehood circulated injurious to the reputation of another," is, according to my apprehenſion, a calumny; and although the Reviewer ſays, according to *our* apprehenſion it is neceſſarily an attack on the *moral* character, I wiſh he would inform us under what ſyſtem of ethics the writing of barbarous Latin is deemed a *moral* offence. For be it obſerved, that in p. 176. of the ſame Article, the word *calumniator* is uſed in this very ſenſe. The writer calls me a *libeller* of Oxford for expoſing its bad Latin—'he wiſhes 'he could ſay *calumniator*;' adding, in ſubſtance, that falſehood is the only ingredient wanting to make this libel of mine a *calumny*. But it is uſeleſs to dwell longer upon ſuch a quibble. Not only the Edinburgh Reviewer, but the beſt writers of the language, uſe the word in the ſenſe in which I have above explained it[a]. And till

[a] Mr. Burke, I know, when correcting the error, that the adminiſtration of affairs in Hanover was arbitrary, calls the

we have ſomething better than a dogma from Edinburgh to guide us, we may continue to reſpect the authority of Dr. Johnſon, who, without a hint of its being appropriated to offences of a *moral* nature, explains it to be "Slander; falſe "charge; groundleſs accuſation;" and one of the examples produced by him is from Sir W. Temple, which ſpeaks of a *calumny* againſt our ſoil [b].

It is at the ſame time worthy of notice, that the very Review in queſtion accuſes the Graduates of Oxford of not "poſſeſſing any knowledge or "ſkill whatſoever in that art which they profeſs, "and which they were choſen and appointed to "practice for the benefit and inſtruction of the "community." No. 28. p. 431. It declares that the Univerſity "acts with the minds of young "men, as the Dutch did with their exuberant "ſpices—that an infinite quantity of talent is an-"nually deſtroyed by the miſerable jealouſy and "littleneſs of its inſtructors." No. 29. p. 50. And in the ſame Number a *genuine Oxford Tutor* is

ſtatement a *calumny*: but I cannot at this moment turn to the paſſage. The word is uſed every day in and out of Parliament for *falſe accuſations of a political nature.*

[b] The authority quoted for the uſe of the word *calumniate* is ſtill more to the point.

One trade or art, *even thoſe that ſhould be the moſt liberal,* ſhall make it their buſineſs to diſdain and *calumniate* another. SPRAT.

deſcribed as a *holy poltroon*, " who vilifies God " and Kings, by carefully averting from them the " ſearching eye of reaſon, and who knows no bet- " ter method of teaching the higheſt duties, than " by extirpating the fineſt qualities and habits of " the mind." Ibid.

All this the world are now told (I believe for the firſt time) that, even if *falſe*, it is not *calumnious*: and that the accuſation involves no moral delinquency or defect whatever.

PART I.

Provok'd, the Juggler cried, 'tis done:
In Science I ſubmit to none.
Thus ſaid, the cups and balls he play'd;
By turns, this here, that there, convey'd;
The cards, obedient to his words,
Are by a fillip turn'd to birds;
His little boxes change the grain,
Trick after trick deludes the train.
He ſhakes his bag, he ſhews all fair,
His fingers ſpread, *and nothing there.*

GAY.

THE ground being thus broken, the taſk of completing the firſt parallel is left to the Reviewer of La Place, a writer of whoſe ability and ſcientific attainments very reſpectful mention had been made. The paſſage extracted from his Review, as containing falſe and injurious aſſertions concerning Oxford, I think it beſt to print entire, not only becauſe the reader will thus beſt be able to follow up the argument, but becauſe the Reviewer has been ſo unfortunate, when defending himſelf, as to exhibit this paſſage, on which the whole queſtion hinges, with a material change of expreſſion. In No. 22. of the Edinburgh Review it ſtands thus;

" We believe, however, that it is chiefly in the pub-
" lic inſtitutions of England that we are to ſeek for
" the cauſe of the deficiency here referred to, and par-
" ticularly in the two great centres from which know-
" ledge is ſuppoſed to radiate over all the reſt of the
" iſland. In one of theſe, where the dictates of Ariſ-
" totle are ſtill liſtened to as infallible decrees, AND
" where the infancy of ſcience is miſtaken for its ma-
" turity, the mathematical ſciences have never flou-
" riſhed; and the ſcholar has no means of advancing
" beyond the mere elements of geometry." Edin.
Rev. No. 22. p. 283.

Of this paſſage he obſerves, " To the propoſi-
" tion, *which is the main ſcope of the ſentence*, that
" the mathematical ſciences *have never flouriſhed*
" at Oxford," I have been prudent enough not to make any reply. To this obſervation therefore, before I touch upon the three other propoſitions, which will be treated in exact order, I will now firſt direct my attention: and if the reader will examine what I ſay with patience, I have little doubt to which of us the compliment of prudence will appear to be moſt due; to me for having omitted to make any reply then, or to the Reviewer for having provoked one now.

It will be remembered then that the Reviewer is attempting to account for the *decline* of mathematical learning in England " for almoſt a cen-
" tury paſt;" he is ſeeking " to what cauſe we
" muſt aſcribe the *dereliction* of a ſcience, by what

" may be regarded as its native country;" and the principal cauſe ſuggeſted by himſelf is the ſyſtem of education purſued in the two Engliſh Univerſities. Now if it be true that " the mathe-" matical ſciences *never flouriſhed* at Oxford;" if this be not only his meaning, but "the main ſcope " of the whole ſentence;" and if by this he means to account for the *decay* of mathematical ſcience among us in modern times; I own I am at a loſs to gueſs according to what ſyſtem of dialectics his argument is framed. Let us but try the ſame proceſs of reaſoning in another caſe.

A great mortality has taken place *of late years* among our troops, and many cauſes may be aſſigned for this *increaſe:* but the principal cauſe is the unwholeſomeneſs of our two chief military ſtations. One of theſe has *always been an unhealthy place.* And although the greateſt objections to it have been long ago removed, yet there *ſtill remains* much which is injurious to the health, &c. What ſhould we think of a medical board whoſe report ſhould commence with a reaſon of this kind? To that profeſſion indeed we are indebted for the Galenic figure, a very ſuperfluous addition to the ſcheme of Ariſtotle; but it was reſerved for a later age, and a more enlightened philoſopher, to enrich the art of reaſoning with ſo ingenious a method of ſupporting falſehood as that juſt exhibited.

But, what is ſtill more ſurpriſing, after having given me credit for *prudence* in not attempting any reply to the propoſition, "that the mathema-"tical ſciences have never flouriſhed at Oxford," within a few pages this *prudent* writer proceeds as follows:

"The author ſeems, in his outſet, to have choſen "very unſkilfully the ground on which his ſtand was "to be made. In the warfare of the pen, no leſs than "of the ſword, it is a great error to attempt defend-"ing a place which is untenable; and from which, in "ſpite of every effort, you muſt be forced to retire "with loſs. *To defend the mathematics and the ſciences "of Oxford*, was preciſely an undertaking of this "kind:—it was to defend the weakeſt point in the "whole country, and that which a prudent com-"mander would have immediately reſolved to aban-"don. Our adverſary, *by making choice of this diſad-"vantageous poſition*, has committed an error that we "ſhould not have expected from one who had learnt "his tactics in the ſchool of Ariſtotle: he has taken "poſt in a hollow way, where he is overlooked in all "directions, and commanded by higher ground on "every ſide to which he can poſſibly turn." Edinb. Rev. No. 22. p. 168.

What other ſolution can be offered of this ſingular phænomenon than that before ſuggeſted? Surely never was man yet ſo blinded with paſſion or prejudice, as to be the author of both theſe ſentences, and to utter them almoſt in the ſame

breath. But if this be indeed a touch from the maſter's pencil, one has only to lament that he ſhould have thrown in his colours ſo careleſsly, and have ſpoilt the effect of his compoſition, by aiming injudiciouſly at ſome partial beauties. As a general, indeed, he ſeems to have been guilty of a moſt ſignal miſtake; for, if I may be allowed to borrow the metaphor which his own rich fancy has created, 'in the warfare of the pen, no leſs 'than of the ſword, it is a great error' ſo to diſpoſe our troops, that, when we think they are haraſſing the enemy, they are in fact keeping up a croſs fire againſt themſelves. Into this error the Editor of the Review ſeems to have been repeatedly betrayed: and he not only allows his ſeveral diviſions to attack and impede each other, but he calls out his *corps de reſerve* when matters come to extremity, and employs them in charging and routing his own army.

It may be as well however to ſtate in plain language the reaſons why ſo little notice was taken of the propoſition above quoted. In the firſt place it is looſely expreſſed, and capable of ſo many interpretations, that, unleſs it was material to the caſe, it would have been merely a tedious incumbrance on the argument to diſcuſs it at all. It was not the *hiſtorical fame*, but the *preſent character* of the Univerſity, which I undertook to vindicate: it was that character which the Re-

viewer attacked; and he repreſented it as one principal cauſe of the decline of mathematical ſcience in this country, although he ſcruples not now to declare, that the "main ſcope of the ſen-"tence" in queſtion was to ſtate that our cha-racter in that reſpect has been always the ſame. To ſuch miſerable ſhifts is a man driven, who has perhaps the ſenſe to ſee that he has advanced a falſe accuſation, but not manlineſs or candour enough to retract it.

I ſhall now proceed to notice, in their order, the three following propoſitions, which conſtitute the whole of the original charge, which I thought it concerned me to notice.

I. That at Oxford the dictates of Ariſtotle are ſtill liſtened to as infallible decrees.

II. That the infancy of Science is miſtaken for its maturity.

III. That the ſcholar has no means of advanc-ing beyond the mere elements of Geometry.

In ſupport of the firſt article he ſays, that he never intended to charge us with teaching the Phyſics of Ariſtotle; "that what was ſaid about "the dictates of Ariſtotle was not meant of his "Phyſics, but of his Logic and Metaphyſics." And, before he advances to the diſcuſſion of this topic, he gives us a ſpecimen of his own logic in

a paſſage too remarkable to be omitted. Having produced an extract from the Reply reſpecting the progreſs of natural philoſophy in the ſeventeenth century, he adds,

"We will not at preſent diſpute the correctneſs of "this ſhort account here given of the revolutions in "Phyſics; although we muſt remark, that if the ar- "tillery which diſlodged the Ariſtotelian Phyſics had "come from the arſenal of Bacon, the Carteſian never "would have ſucceeded to them; as no two plans of "philoſophiſing were ever more oppoſite than thoſe of "Bacon and Deſcartes." Rev. p. 160.

Thus, if it was A that drove B out of his houſe, C could never have got in, becauſe no people were ever more at variance than A and C. If it was the Preſbyterian ſect which ſhook the power of the crown in the reign of Charles I. the Independents would never have acquired the aſcendancy, becauſe their tenets were fundamentally different. If the Jacobins in France deſtroyed the monarchy, Buonaparte would never have ſucceeded to them, as no two plans of polity were ever more oppoſite than thoſe of Buonaparte and the Jacobins. Admirable reaſoner! Is this then the 'inductive method,' to which the logic of Ariſtotle is ſo hoſtile? In order to overthrow a poſition relating to a matter of fact, he produces a theoretical principle of morals, by which he would have our belief reſpecting this

fact determined. A compendious road truly, which Ariſtotle never dreamt of; a road, which not only makes hiſtorical evidence ſuperfluous, but which forbids us even to liſten to it, when it militates againſt an abſtract probability. Little did Lord Bacon imagine, when he wrote his 127th Aphoriſm, that, after the lapſe of two centuries, a writer, who profeſſes to be one of his greateſt admirers, would evince ſo wanton a diſregard of his leading principle.

The paſſage itſelf has little indeed, or rather nothing to do with the main argument: but it is a curious commentary upon the opinions of this aſſailant of Ariſtotle, and gives us ſome foretaſte of the bleſſings which will be derived from a complete overthrow of the works of that miſtaken philoſopher. We ſhall ſoon have abundant proof of the inconvenience of other rules, by which he had the temerity to fetter down the human underſtanding; but from which, through the influence of the Edinburgh Review, eſpecially if ſupported by the credit of the preſent writer, we may hope ſpeedily to ſee mankind ſet at liberty.

Let us now reſume the conſideration of thoſe dictates of Ariſtotle, which the Reviewer ſays are ſtill held to be infallible at Oxford; contained, as he himſelf explains it, in his Logic and his Metaphyſics. Now, whatever terrors may have haunted him with reſpect to the latter of theſe works, I

am happy in being able to releaſe him at once from them all. The work forms no part of the ſyſtem of education in this Univerſity. Whatever its merits may be, I can aſſure him the ſtudent is neither required, nor expected, nor adviſed to read it. The whole of the queſtion then reſolves itſelf into the Logic of Ariſtotle. And here, if it were not preſumptuous to expect that an Edinburgh Reviewer ſhould condeſcend to look at the book he is reviewing, I would venture to refer him to p. 22. of the 'Reply,' for a ſtatement of the manner in which the Logic of Ariſtotle is now ſtudied here. He will find, that the ſhorteſt Compendium extant, which contains all the eſſential principles of the art, is the text-book uſually employed. If he conſults that Compendium, he will find, that the method of induction is there accurately explained; and that the vulgar error, (*about which more will be ſaid preſently,*) by which people are led *to oppoſe* the Organon of Bacon to the Organon of Ariſtotle, is diſtinctly pointed out and refuted[c]. But of this I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more at large preſently.

The Reviewer ſays,

"The Logic of Ariſtotle is particularly hoſtile to inductive ſcience. By turning the mind to the ſyllogiſtic

[c] Longe alia Verulamio mens; cujus *Organon* cum Ariſtotelico nihil habet commune præter unum nomen. Ald. Art. Log. Comp. in Concluſ. §. 6.

"method, it becomes a very powerful obſtruction to "that knowledge, which is derived, by induction, from "experience and obſervation. It is on this foundation "that the charge reſts, which the author of the Reply "calls impudent and unfounded, that of miſtaking the "infancy for the maturity of ſcience." Rev. p. 161.

He then produces the well known remark of Bacon, that the later times are in fact the *ſenium mundi*, as having the benefit of all former experience; and thence infers moſt ſagaciouſly, that "we muſt not go back to the remote ages of an-"tiquity *for our knowledge concerning nature and* "*its laws.*" What the force or meaning of this remark is I cannot even gueſs, unleſs he would ſtill inſinuate, that the ancient *phyſics* are taught by us inſtead of the modern. But this meaning he himſelf diſclaims. I muſt therefore leave the paſſage in all its obſcurity, and proceed to his quotation from Dr. Reid, which immediately follows.

"After men, ſays Dr. Reid, had laboured in the "ſearch of truth near two thouſand years, *by the help* "*of ſyllogiſms*, Lord Bacon propoſed the method of "induction as a more effectual engine for that purpoſe. "His *Novum Organum* gave a new turn to the thoughts "and labours of the inquiſitive, more remarkable and "more uſeful than that which the Organum of Ariſto-"tle had given before: and may be conſidered as a ſe-"cond grand æra in the progreſs of human reaſon."

"*It is plain from this,*" that is, becauſe Dr. Reid ſays ſo, obſerves the Reviewer; the ſame Reviewer who talks of the dictates of Ariſtotle being liſtened to as infallible decrees: "it is plain "from this, that where the Organum of Ariſtotle "is appealed to once, the Organum of Bacon "ſhould be conſulted a hundred times." Rev. p. 162.

Now all this, and a great deal more of the ſame irrelevant matter, might have been ſaved, if the writer had only taken the precaution of refreſhing his memory, or perhaps of reading for the firſt time a work, for which he profeſſes an entire admiration. As he ſeems to have omitted this uſeful preliminary, he will, I truſt, excuſe me, if I attempt to clear the queſtion of ſome difficulties, with which it is uſually embarraſſed in the hands of modern writers; and although it may ſeem to occupy ſome time in the outſet, it will, I am ſure, be found to be true economy in the end.

Firſt then, it is a miſtake widely ſpread, that the Organon of Bacon was deſigned by the author himſelf to ſuperſede the Organon of Ariſtotle. The author himſelf profeſſes no ſuch deſign, nor can I diſcover the ſlighteſt intimation of it throughout the whole work. He complains indeed, and very juſtly, that the dogmas of the ſchools checked all free enquiry into the laws and

conſtitution of nature. He recommends earneſtly and repeatedly, that we ſhould throw off theſe ſlaviſh chains; that we ſhould take nothing for granted, but what obſervation confirms; and that we ſhould obſerve and enquire for ourſelves, inſtead of blindly adopting opinions already received. His firſt book is occupied with a conſideration of the cauſes which have retarded the progreſs of *natural philoſophy*; and his ſecond book contains a ſpecimen of the new method of inveſtigation which he propoſes, in order to farther diſcoveries in that department. To this province of natural philoſophy is the whole treatiſe excluſively confined. With this province the Logic of Ariſtotle has no neceſſary or natural connection.

Among the cauſes which have hindered the improvement of ſcience, Bacon frequently notices the injurious effects of Ariſtotle's works. But his complaint is confined to two points: firſt, the corruption of phyſical ſcience, by intermixing with it the doctrines and rules of Logic; and, ſecondly, the haſty aſſumption of phyſical principles, the truth of which was not afterwards allowed to be queſtioned.

The firſt of theſe complaints is made particularly in Aph. 62 and 63. Having divided falſe philoſophy into three kinds, *ſophiſtica*, *empirica*, and *ſuperſtitioſa*, he refers Ariſtotle's errors to the

firſt kind, "Primi generis exemplum in Ariſto-"tele maxime conſpicuum est, qui *philoſophiam* "*naturalem* dialectica ſua corrupit &c." The ſame charge is repeated nearly in the ſame words, Aph. 96.

The ſubſtance of the ſecond charge, *viz.* a precipitate aſſumption of firſt principles without ſufficient inveſtigation, and a dogmatical adherence to them, notwithſtanding the diſcovery of new phænomena, is contained principally in Aph. 67 and 125. The whole of this latter aphoriſm is well worthy of attention, if any one would convince himſelf how entirely falſe the current notion is, that Bacon invented the method of Induction for arriving at thoſe truths which Ariſtotle ſought by means of Syllogiſm. In this Aphoriſm it is diſtinctly declared, that the *method* of acquiring firſt principles adopted by each is *in kind* the ſame. The defect however of the ancients was an impatient, ſcanty, and ſuperficial obſervation of particulars, from which they mounted prematurely to the higheſt principles; whereas the advice of the modern philoſopher is, to be cautious, ſlow, laborious, and perſevering in experiment, before we venture to elicit *propoſitions*, out of which other truths are to be ſyllogiſtically inferred.

Having in the firſt book of the Novum Organum enumerated the ſeveral cauſes which ſeem to have obſtructed the advancement of natural

ſcience, (among which the ſyllogiſtic method of reaſoning is not once mentioned,) he proceeds in the ſecond book to give a ſpecimen of that patient and methodical examination of particulars, out of which alone he juſtly obſerves that all further diſcoveries of the nature of things muſt ariſe. It is needleſs to give any fuller account of this book, which is ſtrictly confined to the ſubject of natural philoſophy; but I muſt be permitted to expreſs a doubt, whether the writers, who are for ever ſounding in our ears the praiſes of this work, are really acquainted with its nature and principal contents. From the trite invectives they are continually pronouncing againſt the jargon of the ſchools, one would little expect to find in this favourite ſubſtitute of theirs, a technical vocabulary infinitely more unwieldy, fanciful, and uncouth, than any which accompanies the ſyſtems of Logic as they are now taught. Witneſs the ſeveral claſſes of experiments, into which the examination of natural bodies is divided; *inſtantiæ migrantes, liberatæ, prædominantes, conſtitutivæ ſive manipulares, proportionatæ, monodicæ, limitaneæ, deciſoriæ, lampadis, evocantes, itinerantes, perſecantes,* &c. &c. to the number of twenty-ſeven. If this Reviewer, or if any modern philoſopher will affirm, that he has himſelf ſtudied nature according to this example, or if he would ſeriouſly recommend a ſtudent to conduct and ſort his experiments after

this manner, I am ready to acknowledge, that the method of teaching natural philoſophy adopted by us is materially different from his. But even then the queſtion will be, whether *we* have not got the ſtart of *him?* whether he be not guilty of miſtaking the infancy of ſcience for its maturity, and of employing an engine in its rude primitive ſtructure, after it has been ſimplified and improved by many ſucceeding artiſts?

There is in fact ſo much trick and juggle in the uſe which is made of Bacon's name, that I ſhall riſk the imputation of prolixity, in order to expoſe, once for all, the ſhallow ſophiſtry, to which writers of this deſcription are for ever reſorting. The Organon of Bacon has been already ſhewn to be confined to the department of phyſical ſcience. It is indeed truly ſaid to conſtitute a grand æra in the hiſtory of philoſophy: but to propoſe it as a manual of inſtruction, or a guide for philoſophical enquiries in the preſent age, is to miſtake its real nature and deſign. The great author of that work had to explode inveterate prejudices; to awaken men from a ſtupid lethargy; to rouſe them to action; to convince them that as yet they knew little of nature; and to ſet them an example, after which they might be enabled to learn more. Theſe great purpoſes have been long ago anſwered: there is not one, I believe, of the *idola* which is now defended or cheriſhed in any ſeat of learning, or

by any perſon of liberal education. The proceſs of experiment has been unceaſingly purſued, and is ſtill hourly purſued, by perſons who never read a line of Bacon, with more ſkill, ſagacity, and ſucceſs, than if they had learnt by heart all his twenty-ſeven *inſtantiæ*, and practiſed his *vindemiatio* upon them. Thus even the object which alone he had in view himſelf, that of promoting diſcovery, is better attained by this revolution which has taken place in the opinions and practice of philoſophical enquirers, than it was by his own moſt ſedulous endeavours: for it is ſomewhat remarkable, that the concluſion, to which he is led in the firſt exemplification of his method of enquiry, is found by later experiments to have been directly falſe; nearly one fourth of the ſecond book being occupied with an inveſtigation of the nature of heat, which is determined at length to be "*Motus* expanſivus, cohibitus, et nitens per "partes minores." Lib. ii. Aph. 20.

Let me not be underſtood to ſpeak diſreſpectfully of the greateſt of modern philoſophers, when I ſay this. My ſole object is to ſhew, that an improper uſe is made of his authority. There is a ſpirit of party, as Profeſſor Playfair informs us[b], even among geometers; and this ſpirit has, I fear,

[b] Notes to Elements of Geometry, p. 427.

had more ſhare, even than ignorance, in miſrepreſenting the queſtion reſpecting ancient and modern philoſophy. The Reviewer, who is perpetually exalting the latter above the former, ſeems to have derived all his knowledge of the works of Ariſtotle from Dr. Reid's Analyſis of the Organon, a work which, whatever its merits may be, is certainly very defective, not only becauſe the author, by his own confeſſion, never read the treatiſe entirely through, of which he propoſes to give a ſummary; but ſtill more becauſe he had hardly any acquaintance with the other writings of that Philoſopher. This acquaintance is not only uſeful, but even indiſpenſable in a writer, who would preſent a juſt expoſition of any of his ſpeculative works; and as the world have for ſome years been poſſeſſed of an accurate and clear analyſis of theſe, to which eaſy acceſs was open, I cannot acquit the Reviewer of moſt culpable negligence in venturing upon a condemnation of this philoſophy, without availing himſelf of the means of information at hand.

If the paſſages above referred to in Bacon are not ſufficient to prove that Syllogiſm and Induction are employed for different purpoſes, and that neither of them was unknown or diſregarded by Ariſtotle, a few extracts from the learned and faithful Analyſis of Dr. Gillies will, I hope, put

the matter beyond diſpute, and will not be unacceptable perhaps even to thoſe who never entertained any doubts concerning it.

"The patient examination of objects, and the accu-
"rate definition of terms, are continually employed by
"our philoſopher, as the beſt means for arranging per-
"ceptions into ſcience. Theſe, and not ſyllogiſms, are
"the ſole inſtruments uſed by himſelf in the deepeſt and
"moſt various reſearches that ever exerciſed the inge-
"nuity of man. Yet his art of ſyllogiſm (an art igno-
"rantly depreciated in the preſent age, and more ab-
"ſurdly magnified in preceding times beyond its real
"worth) is not therefore uſeleſs, although its real uſes,
"as will preſently appear, are altogether different from
"the purpoſes to which it was long moſt injudiciouſly
"applied." New Analyſis of Ariſtotle's Works, p. 68.

After giving a juſt and truly philoſophical view of the nature of ſyllogiſm, ſuch as no man can collect from the Analyſis of Dr. Reid, Dr. Gillies returns to the perverſions and miſrepreſentations, with which the world is filled reſpecting the Organon. "Our acquaintance with the properties of
"things, Ariſtotle perpetually inculcates, muſt be
"acquired by patient obſervation, generaliſed by
"compariſon and induction," &c. p. 79. And in p. 81. is an admirable refutation of the cavil, ſo frequently repeated, that the treatiſe is converſant about *words* inſtead of *things*.

The moſt deciſive authority, however, for it is one which this Anti-Ariſtotelian ſchool cannot ob-

ject to themſelves, is to be drawn from the works of Bacon. If the Reviewer ever glanced his eye over the Advancement of Learning, he probably met with the part which treats of the Art of Logic—its preſent condition, its uſe, its abuſe, its imperfections, and its capacity of improvement. He obſerves, that Logic does not help towards the invention of arts and ſciences, but only of arguments; that the induction, which logicians ſpeak of, leads to the diſcovery of very few principles and axioms: but he admits, "that in ſci-"ences popular, as moralities, laws, and the like, "yea, and divinity, that form [the form of ſyllo-"giſm] may have uſe, and in natural philoſophy "likewiſe, by way of argument, or ſatisfactory "reaſon, *Quæ aſſenſum parit, operis effœta eſt:* "but the ſubtilty of nature and operations will "not be inchained in thoſe bonds." Vol. I. p. 63. fol. ed.

The reaſoning here is much the ſame with that of the Novum Organon, and the main tendency of all is to ſhew, that *diſcoveries* in natural philoſophy are not likely to be promoted by this engine;—a propoſition, which no one of the preſent day diſputes; and which, when alledged by our adverſaries as their chief objection to the ſtudy of logic, only proves, that they are ignorant of the ſubject about which they are ſpeaking, and of the manner in which it is now taught.

Throughout this part the author of the Advancement of Learning, ſo far from holding the Ariſtotelian Logic uſeleſs, ſpeaks of the additions and improvements, which he would wiſh to ſee grafted upon it. The abuſes, of which he complains, have been long ſince remedied. The art is now confined within its proper limits, and is never ſuffered to impede the progreſs of free enquiry. The deficiencies, indeed, which he notes, are not yet ſupplied, although much has been done by different modern writers towards attaining that object; and perhaps out of theſe various materials a more complete ſyſtem might now be moulded, and nearer to Bacon's own idea, than any which has yet appeared. But, whenever that is done, the ſtudy of it will certainly engage more time than is at preſent uſually given to that branch of inſtruction, even where it is beſt underſtood, and moſt aſſiduouſly cultivated.

Having thus, I truſt, made it appear, that the Reviewer, when he fancied that he was writing againſt Ariſtotle, was really writing againſt Bacon, I ſhall be content, for the preſent, to refer my readers to thoſe parts of the works of Bacon already cited, for fuller proof of this point: at the ſame time profeſſing, that if he ſhould complain of partial or incorrect repreſentations having been given, I ſhall be perfectly ready to meet him in a ſeparate diſcuſſion, and have no doubt of being

able to vindicate all the poſitions, in ſtill greater latitude than has been here maintained.

II. It is time now to notice the Second of thoſe charges, which, inſtead of qualifying or retracting, he has thought fit to repeat againſt Oxford; viz. "That the infancy of ſcience is miſtaken for its "maturity."

His ſupport, indeed, of this charge is identified with his reaſoning upon the former: and, according to his own ſtatement, it is not a diſtinct article of accuſation, but a kind of corollary upon the preceding. We are accuſed, [Rev. p. 161.] of teaching the Logic of Ariſtotle; and then he adds, "It is *upon this foundation* that the charge "reſts of miſtaking the infancy of ſcience for its "maturity." This charge he twice ſays I have called "impudent and *unfounded*." When a writer thinks it worth while to notice the language of another, it is a convenient practice to look at the paſſage he profeſſes to tranſcribe. Had he taken this obvious precaution, he would have found the word "unſupported" inſtead of "un-"founded." The propoſition was evidently *unſupported*; nor do I imagine, that the propriety of this epithet can be queſtioned even by himſelf. He has ſince, indeed, attempted to *ſupport* it; but the attempt, I truſt, has only proved the impoſſibility of the thing; and I may now be allowed to

employ a term, which, before the aſſertion was refuted, I never did employ, and call what was then termed only *unſupported*, incapable of ſupport, or *unfounded*.

In order, however, to make ſome amends for the contemptuous mention of Oxford, "where "the mathematical ſciences never flouriſhed, and "where the infancy of ſcience is miſtaken for its "maturity," a note is inſerted, p. 166. containing the names of three illuſtrious profeſſors, who are exceptions from this general reproach; Wallis, Gregory, and Halley. Of theſe men he ſays, "Their writings inſtructed, and will for ever in-"ſtruct, the ſcientific world." But the impartial fit is ſoon over: in the ſame note he denies that Halley belonged originally to Oxford, although he obtained a Profeſſor's chair there. Now the truth is, that Halley entered, about the age of ſeventeen, at Queen's College, Oxford; that he is reported by his biographer to have applied himſelf, while there, to practical and geometrical aſtronomy; and that he never ſtudied at any other Univerſity. Of Wallis it is remarkable, that he wrote a complete and accurate treatiſe on Logic, ſtrictly according to the Ariſtotelian method, which has been uſed very generally as the lecture-book in that department, and is ſtill uſed by many in preference to Aldrich, which is more conciſe. This treatiſe was publiſhed, in the latter part of his life,

but half a century before the period began, to which the Reviewer aſſigns the decay of mathematical learning in England; and indeed he, as well as every one elſe, knows, that if the Ariſtotelian Logic were an hindrance to ſcience, it had to contend with that obſtacle during the ſeventeenth century, in a degree far beyond what could ever have been felt in the eighteenth. Thus then did this illuſtrious Profeſſor not only himſelf *miſtake the infancy of ſcience for its maturity*, but he contributed to propagate that miſtake, to the utmoſt of his power, in the Univerſity where he reſided!

Perhaps while the Reviewer was apparently performing an act of candour to Oxford, by enumerating ſome of its diſtinguiſhed profeſſors, he might have found room for the inſertion of the name of Bradley. Or is it poſſible that the fame of a man who diſcovered the Aberration of Light and the Nutation of the Earth's Axis, ſhould not yet have reached the Univerſity of Edinburgh:—that Univerſity which he ſuppoſes 'Oxford can no 'more rival in ſcience and philoſophy, than Edin-'burgh can rival Oxford in the antiquity, wealth, 'and ſplendour of its eſtabliſhments?'

There is however a ſingular feature in this affair, which muſt not paſs without notice, although I am not well able to conjecture from what cauſe it ſprung.

The original charge [No. 22. of the Edinburgh Review] was expreſſed in the following words.

"In one of theſe, where the dictates of Ariſtotle are "ſtill liſtened to as infallible decrees, *and* where the "infancy of ſcience is miſtaken for its maturity," &c.

This latter propoſition I had called *unſupported*. When the writer undertakes to ſupport it, he prints the paſſage thus.

"In one of theſe, where the dictates of Ariſtotle are "ſtill liſtened to as infallible decrees, *or*, where the in-"fancy of ſcience" &c. Edin. Rev. No. 31. p. 159.

The change of *and* into *or* may on many occaſions be immaterial: on the preſent, the *whole of his reaſoning depends upon that change*. For he treats the latter propoſition as an off-ſhoot merely of the former, and, when defending it, ſays, that it reſts upon the former as its ſole foundation. Why then did he not blame me for treating it as a ſeparate propoſition? The defence too is ſo futile, that it was hardly worth the expedient which was adopted, in order to bring it in. *Becauſe the Logic of Ariſtotle is ſtudied, therefore ſcience is not ſtudied.* Becauſe Greek is ſtudied, therefore Latin is neglected! Becauſe the poets are read, therefore the hiſtorians and orators are deſpiſed! Such is the reaſoning of this learned cenſor of Engliſh education.

If he contends that he has alledged other reaſons, as that "the Oxonian ſyſtem has done an "injury to ſcience by not teaching any thing *at* "*all* concerning Phyſics, and by turning its at-"tention *entirely* to other objects," [vid. Edin. Rev. No. 31. p. 160.] I anſwer, that he has ſhifted the ground of his defence, and that the charge does not reſt, as he ſaid it did reſt, upon the foundation, of teaching the logic of Ariſtotle. He ought therefore to have been prepared to make good this accuſation. He has failed of doing this; as every one muſt fail who combats the plain truth. There never has been a time within the memory of perſons now living, when Oxford was open to this charge. The Examinations formerly were inſignificant, but not leſs ſo in logic than in geometry; and few people will queſtion the aſſertion I now make, that much leſs of logic was underſtood and taught twenty or thirty years ago in this place, than of geometry and natural philoſophy. Rather therefore than relinquiſh an untenable poſt by honourable capitulation, he has ſuffered himſelf to be driven from it, after practiſing every ſtratagem, lawful and unlawful, without effect.

I muſt not diſmiſs the ſubject, without exhibiting what he ſeems to think his moſt triumphant argument, in his own words. The paſſage follows

immediately after that notable quotation from Dr. Reid, p. 162.

"It is plain from this, that where the Organum of "Ariſtotle is appealed to once, the Organum of Bacon "ſhould be conſulted a hundred times. If therefore "there be any ſyſtem of *literary* inſtruction in which "the former work is much ſtudied, and the latter en- "tirely neglected, it is a ſyſtem moſt undoubtedly "liable to the charge of miſtaking the infancy of *ſcience* "for its maturity. It is as much liable to that charge, "as the engineer would be, who, inſtead of erecting a "ſteam-engine according to the conſtruction of Watt "and Bolton, ſhould prefer one on the more ancient "plan of Savary or Beighton: or as much as a ma- "thematician, who, in order to inſtruct his pupil in the "higher geometry, would rather put into his hands "the Indiviſibles of Cavalleri, than the Differential "Calculus of Euler. *We can perceive no difference* in "the three caſes; and *we are perſuaded*, that there is "no competent judge of the matter, that is to ſay, no "man verſed, both in the principles and the hiſtory of "ſcience, who would not pronounce the demerit to be "the ſame in them all." Edin. Rev. No. 31. p. 162.

Fortunately for our credit, the preſent is a queſtion to be determined not by the *perceptions* or the *perſuaſions* of this learned writer, but by authority of a more impartial kind. If indeed the end propoſed in each of theſe works entitled *Organum* were the ſame, ſome ground might exiſt for his objection, and the compariſon adduced might be thought a fair illuſtration of our error. But

by this time, I truſt, it is become needleſs for me to ſay more on that ſubject. The nature and deſign of each treatiſe being *wholly different**, there is no incongruity in adopting both, according to their ſeveral meaſures of utility: and thus the analogy, which he ſuggeſts to illuſtrate his reaſoning, falls at once to the ground. The ridicule, indeed, properly belongs to him, who would have us neglect the one becauſe we are in poſſeſſion of the other: a folly not unlike to that of a man who would diſcard the windmill, becauſe the ſteam-engine has been invented, or who laughs at the uſe made of the mariner's compaſs, ſince the introduction of gunpowder.

III. The third and laſt article of the charge, which remains to be conſidered, was expreſſed in theſe words: "The ſcholar has no means of ad-"vancing beyond the *mere* elements of geometry."

Under the influence of the ſame fatality which preſided over his former quotations, when he enters upon his vindication, he prints it thus:

"The ſtudent has no means of going beyond the "elements of geometry;" Rev. p. 163.

omitting the word *mere*, which is far from being without its force; ſince whatever variety of opi-

* *Sit denique alia ſcientias colendi, alia inveniendi ratio,* are Bacon's own words in his Preface to the Novum Organum.

nions may be entertained of the meaning of the word *elements*, the epithet *mere* muſt be underſtood as reſtraining that term to its narroweſt ſignification.

The author of the Reply, knowing that different ſenſes are affixed to this term, inſtead of aſſerting poſitively that our ſyſtem of inſtruction did advance beyond the elements, preferred the interrogatory form; and, by the queſtions he has put, the Reviewer obſerves that he has furniſhed a very unexpected *confirmation* of the charge.

The queſtions put were theſe: "Are Plane "and Spherical Trigonometry, are the properties "of Conic Sections, of Conchoids, Cycloids, the "Quadratrix, Spirals, &c. &c. the mere elements "of geometry? Is the method of Fluxions included "under the ſame appellation? On all theſe ſub-"jects, lectures both public and private are given." Reply, p. 18.

Now if any *one* of theſe ſubjects exceeded the mere elements of geometry, the falſehood of the Reviewer's aſſertion was certainly eſtabliſhed. It was perfectly immaterial whether one or ſeveral were *within* the elements, if any of them went *beyond*. The Reviewer, however, having thrown off the uneaſy trammels of Logic, very complacently argues, that, becauſe the two firſt are included under the head of elements, therefore his original aſſertion is *confirmed*. Thus if A reproaches B

with having read *none but* elementary ſchool books, and B replies, I have read Phædrus, Salluſt, Livy, Thucydides, and Plato, he *confirms* the aſſertion of A, provided Phædrus and Salluſt are held to be elementary. Such is the proceſs of reaſoning which this formidable enemy of Ariſtotle purſues.

Let us now conſider the ſoundneſs of his aſſertion, "that Plane and Spherical Trigonometry *moſt* "*certainly are* the mere elements of geometry, "more eſpecially Plane Trigonometry."

If they are both *moſt certainly* the mere elements, how can one of them be *more eſpecially* ſo? Does not this very diſtinction imply ſome doubt reſpecting the other? But the reaſon immediately aſſigned muſt of courſe remove all doubt upon the ſubject.

Plane Trigonometry, he obſerves, "ariſes from "the *union* of ſome of the ſimpleſt rules of *arith-* "*metic*, with ſome of the ſimpleſt propoſitions of "*geometry*, and is the very firſt point in which "the ſciences of number and extenſion come in "contact with one another." This may be all very true: but it ſeems to me rather a novel way of proving a thing to be a *mere element* of one ſcience, to ſay that it is an union of that ſcience with ſome other.

The uſes of the word *elements* are, I am aware, various; and as the proper uſe of it in geometry

is beſt ſettled by the authority of eminent mathematicians, to that ſtandard I propoſe to refer the preſent queſtion: and although I ſhould be inclined, in any queſtion of mathematical ſcience, to pay great deference to the Reviewer of La Place, yet, if I can produce known and eſtabliſhed authority of the moſt reſpectable kind againſt him, I truſt it will not be deemed preſumptuous in me to diſpute a doctrine which he peremptorily maintains. In the firſt place, then, I find that Plane Trigonometry is expreſsly diſtinguiſhed by PROFESSOR PLAYFAIR from the elements of geometry. The title of his work, well known in this Univerſity, is, ELEMENTS OF GEOMETRY, *containing the firſt ſix books of Euclid, with a Supplement on the Quadrature of the Circle, and the Geometry of Solids*; TO WHICH ARE ADDED, *Elements of Plane and Spherical Trigonometry.* Leſt any doubt ſhould be entertained of the Profeſſor's meaning, as ſet forth in the title-page, it may be obſerved, that the running title, "Elements of Geometry," extends through about two thirds of the volume, covering the whole of the ſix books of Euclid, and the books of Solids; and, when he paſſes on to the remainder of the work, a new title-page and a new running title are aſſumed, "Elements of Plane "and Spherical Trigonometry." If an objector ſhould ſtill ſuggeſt, that the latter part is only a member of the former, although it bears a new title, a thing which can hardly be ſuſpected of ſo

accurate a writer as Profeſſor Playfair, I would ſtill farther refer him to the Preface of the work, in which ſome account is given of the component parts of the volume. Having ſpoken of the manner in which he has treated the firſt ſix books of Euclid, the Author proceeds to ſay ſomething of the Supplement, containing three books on Solids; and of the twenty-firſt propoſition of the third book he ſays, "The compariſon of this laſt ſolid "with the cylinder concludes the laſt book of the "Supplement, *and is a propoſition that may not* "*improperly be conſidered as terminating the ele-*"*mentary part of Geometry.*" Pref. p. 12. edit. 2.

Now whatever may be the ſcientific merits of this Reviewer, he cannot expect me to rate his authority ſo high as that of the eminent mathematician juſt quoted. *He* may, perhaps, conſider himſelf entitled to an *equal* eſtimation; but it would be indecorous in the higheſt degree in me not to prefer this learned Profeſſor to a nameleſs writer: and when we reflect moreover on the exalted ſtation he fills in the Univerſity of Edinburgh, I can hardly think it decent in the Editor of the Review, to inſert an article ſo diſreſpectful to one of their brighteſt ornaments. How diſreſpectful and even inſulting to him the paragraph is, may be collected from the following ſentence:

"It is hard to conceive in what ſchool the author of "the Reply has ſtudied mathematics, ſo as to be unac-"quainted with the place which Plane Trigonometry

"occupies in the arrangement of geometrical ſcience." Rev. p. 164.

Whatever diſgrace, therefore, is intended for the author of the Reply, muſt evidently attach in an equal, if not a ſuperior degree, to the Profeſſor, whoſe arrangement he has adopted. And, if the ſingle miſtake of that author reflects diſcredit even on the Univerſity in which he has ſtudied, if it indicate ſuch ignorance as the Reviewer himſelf would hardly have credited on the teſtimony of a third perſon, [Vid. Rev. p. 164.] how much deeper muſt that Univerſity be implicated in the diſgrace, over whoſe ſtudies a Profeſſor, guilty of the ſame miſtake, continues to preſide?

The Reviewer then proceeds to expreſs a doubt whether the author of the Reply "has *any pre-* "*ciſe idea* of the boundary, which ſeparates the "parts of geometrical ſcience that are elementary, "from thoſe that are not:" and very kindly offers him a criterion, in the following modeſt and humble phraſeology.

"We would therefore, if it were not an act of un- "pardonable preſumption for Northern Critics like us "to propoſe inſtructing a perſon who lives four degrees "further to the South, take the liberty of ſuggeſting "*a criterion, by which the queſtion may always be re-* "*ſolved.* Every property of lines of the firſt and ſe- "cond order, and of the figures compoſed from them, "which, when tranſlated into the language of Alge-

" bra, involves *nothing higher than a quadratic equa-*
" *tion*, providing, at the ſame time, that it be a propo-
" ſition *of very general application*, is to be accounted
" elementary."

According to this criterion he determines, that the properties of Conic Sections *are* elementary, but that Conchoids, Cycloids, &c. *are not* elementary. I think it right to notice the latter phraſe, becauſe the ſentence containing this criterion is ſo worded, as to raiſe a doubt whether the writer intended it for a ſtrict *definition*: that is, whether he meant it not only to declare what *is* elementary, but to exclude alſo what *is not*. Of this, however, we can now entertain no doubt, after the application he has himſelf made of his own language.

Now, if it were not an act of unpardonable preſumption in a Southern critic to propoſe inſtructing a perſon who lives four degrees farther to the North in the firſt rudiments of logic, I would venture to ſuggeſt, that this criterion fails in every point, which is eſſential to a definition.

1ſt. It includes what does not belong to the thing defined.

2dly. It excludes what does belong to the thing defined.

3dly. It contains expreſſions more looſe and indefinite than that which it propoſes to limit and explain.

Upon the firſt point I ſhould ſpeak with much diffidence, if I did not find myſelf ſupported by authority, which, in matters of ſcience, I never heard any one but this critic ſet at nought. The work, to which I am about to appeal, was certainly written nearly three degrees further to the South, even than Oxford; but that circumſtance will not, I venture to hope, materially affect its credit. Thus, then, writes the author of the article *Géométrie*, in the Encyclopédie des Sciences:

"On peut diviſer la Géométrie de différentes manières. 1°. En *élémentaire* et en *tranſcendante*. La Géométrie *élémentaire* ne conſidère que les propriétés des lignes droites, des lignes circulaires, et des ſolides terminés par ces figures. *Le cercle eſt la ſeule figure curviligne dont on parle dans les élémens de Géométrie,*" &c.

"La Géométrie *tranſcendante* eſt proprement celle qui a pour objet toutes les courbes différentes du cercle, comme *les ſections coniques* et les courbes d'un genre plus élevé." Ibid.

To theſe two parts a third is added, by the ſame writer, under the title "Géométrie *ſublime:*" and the whole diviſion is ſummed up in theſe words:

"Par-là on auroit trois diviſions de la Géométrie: "*Géométrie élémentaire, ou des lignes droites et du cercle;* Géométrie tranſcendante, ou des courbes; et Géométrie ſublime, ou des nouveaux calculs."

The ſame article is repeated in the Encyclopédie

Méthodique; and, if any additional circumſtance is wanting to give weight to the authority, it may be obſerved, that this article proceeded from the pen of D'Alembert, and is quoted as his by Profeſſor Playfair, Elem. Geom. p. 418. Edit. 2. It is indeed fortunate for me, that in the preſent caſe I can call in northern as well as ſouthern auxiliaries on my ſide. The work of Profeſſor Playfair, before cited, adopts the ſame rule with the French academician, and declares the elementary part of Geometry to end with the doctrine of ſolids, whoſe boundaries are either circular curves, or ſtraight lines. So that the ſarcaſtic remark, with which the Reviewer's friendly offer of inſtruction is introduced, applies, in the firſt inſtance, to this Profeſſor, who is, I am ſure, too well able to defend himſelf, to require any aid from me.

Let us examine the definition then, with reference to the *ſecond point*, and ſee whether it does not *exclude* ſomething which properly belongs to the Elements.

By the terms of this definition all properties of figures are excluded, which, when tranſlated into the language of Algebra, involve any thing *higher than a quadratic equation*. Now many of the propoſitions relating to ſolid figures, arranged by Profeſſor Playfair under the head "Elements of "Geometry," thoſe, I mean, which ſpeak of the contents of ſimilar ſolids, when reſolved, according

to the moſt natural and obvious method, into algebraic expreſſion, involve *cubic equations:* ſome of them are capable, perhaps, of more circuitous ſolutions, by which cubic equations may be avoided; but I believe I may ſafely challenge the Reviewer to reduce the 11th propoſition, for inſtance, of the third book of the Supplement, to a quadratic; in which it is ſtated, that "ſimilar Solid "Parallelepipeds are to one another in the tripli-"cate ratio of their homologous ſides."

If, therefore, the Reviewer's definition be correct, the Profeſſor has erred in placing theſe propoſitions in a department of the ſcience to which they do not belong: but, rather than adopt this concluſion, I would prefer the Profeſſor's authority to that of his anonymous adverſary; and muſt therefore conſider the definition as defective in a ſecond point eſſential to all definition.

Thirdly, If the object of definition be to render that preciſe and evident, which before was indiſtinct and obſcure, I cannot think we have gained much by being told, that that only is an *elementary* propoſition, which is of *very general* application. If I were not afraid of offending the ears of modern philoſophy with the jargon of the ſchools, I ſhould not ſcruple to exclaim here, "*Ignotum per ignotias.*" Among all the phraſes which the ſtorehouſe of language ſupplies, there is hardly one to be found more vague, more

floating, more looſe, more directly oppoſed to every thing that is meant by *definition*, than this phraſe " very general;" and the adoption of it on this occaſion furniſhes a happy ſpecimen of the advantage to be derived from diſcarding all attention to logic in the courſe of ſcientific ſtudies.

Having ſupplied us with this memorable criterion for determining the elementary part of Geometry, the critic endeavours to reply to my ſtatement, 'that lectures on the doctrine of Fluxions 'are read here, and that candidates for the degree 'of B.A. are examined twice every year in New-'ton's Principia.' If theſe things have been taught for more than four or five years, he admits that he has been in an error, and is ready to acknowledge it.

" But," he adds, " if the date alluded to is actually " as late as we ſuppoſe, we muſt conſider our aſſer-" tions as *perfectly juſt*, and as accurately deſcribing " the *only* ſtate of things, by which our argument, " concerning the decline of mathematical learning for " the laſt ſeventy or eighty years, could poſſibly be af-" fected." Rev. p. 165.

And in the next page he ſays,

" The change, that had recently taken place in the " Oxford examinations, was nothing to our argument. " *On that account* we took no notice of it. It did not " concern the ſubject in hand." P. 166.

Now let me remind the reader, that the Re-

viewer's own words are, when ſpeaking of Oxford, "Where the dictates of Ariſtotle *are ſtill* liſtened "to as infallible decrees, and where the infancy of "ſcience *is miſtaken* for the maturity, the mathe- "matical ſciences have never flouriſhed, and the "ſcholar *has no means* of advancing beyond the "mere elements of Geometry." In the paſſage then, juſt extracted from p. 166. of the Review, he admits that *he knew* his words were inapplicable to the *preſent* ſtate of things, although he repeatedly uſes the *preſent* tenſe; and yet *his aſſertions are perfectly juſt!* But he took no notice, it ſeems, of this recent change, becauſe the ſubject in hand related to the *decline* of mathematical learning for the laſt ſeventy or eighty years. Strange forgetfulneſs! a few pages ago he told us, that "the mathematical ſciences had *never* flouriſhed "at Oxford," and that this propoſition was "the "main ſcope of his argument."

Quo teneam vultus mutantem Protea nodo?

How ſhall I unravel ſophiſtry ſo intricate? how fix the flittings of this ſubtle antagoniſt, who baffles all our vigilance, and eludes our graſp, juſt when we fancy him encloſed beyond the poſſibility of eſcape? I will endeavour, however, to collect under one view the ſeveral ſhapes which his reaſoning has aſſumed, in order that we may form ſome judgment of its ſtrength and ſolidity.

Firſt then, he complains that mathematics have *declined* greatly within the laſt century in England, of which one principal cauſe is, that they *never* flouriſhed at Oxford.

2dly. At Oxford the infancy of ſcience is ſtill miſtaken for its maturity, becauſe the Logic of Ariſtotle is ſtill taught. Yet the principal exception to this reproach, the perſon of whom Oxford has an undoubted right to boaſt as an illuſtrious mathematician, as one "whoſe writings inſtructed, and "will for ever inſtruct, the *ſcientific* world," is one, who not only carefully ſtudied the Logic of Ariſtotle, and thus miſtook the infancy for the maturity of ſcience; but who is famous for having recommended and written a treatiſe of that Logic, more copious and minute than the Compendium now uſually employed.

3dly. An important change has of late years taken place in the ſtudies of the Univerſity, and therefore it is *perfectly juſt* to ſay, that they *ſtill* remain the ſame.

4thly. The properties of Conic Sections, and of the higher curves, together with the doctrine of Fluxions, and Newton's Principia, are regularly taught, and therefore it is *perfectly juſt* to ſay, that the ſtudent has no means of advancing beyond the mere elements of Geometry.

5thly. A writer, who combats this aſſertion,

really *confirms* it; becauſe, when he ſays theſe things are taught, he places certain parts of mathematical ſcience beyond the Elements, which M. D'Alembert and Profeſſor Playfair have directed him to arrange in that manner.

Such, I conceive, to be a tolerable ſummary of the argument which this learned adverſary of Oxford maintains. Now although it is quite immaterial to that argument how long ago the preſent ſyſtem of ſtudies was introduced, ſince he acknowledges himſelf that he knew it *was* introduced, but ſays, p. 165. he was ſilent about it becauſe it did not concern his reaſoning, yet in anſwer to his queſtion, which is put with ſuch a tone of confidence, I will tell him, that I *know* the ſubjects have been uniformly taught here for twenty years paſt, and, I *believe*, for more than double that period, which he affirms are not taught here; and that during the laſt ten years they have not only been taught, but have been made the ſubject matter of examinations for degrees.

It was far from my intention to induce any thing like a compariſon between the merits or the fame of the univerſities of Oxford and Edinburgh. My object was to refute, not to recriminate: to vindicate this Univerſity, not to attack any other. I cannot conceive, therefore, what ground the Reviewer had for introducing the following ſentence, unleſs it was with the view

of indulging a feeling which he profeſſes not to entertain.

"We reſpect exceedingly the claſſical learning of "Oxford; and wiſh it to excite the emulation, not the "envy, of our countrymen: but, as to ſcience and phi-"loſophy, we do no more ſuppoſe that Oxford can "rival Edinburgh, than that Edinburgh can rival Ox-"ford in the antiquity, the wealth, or the ſplendour of "its eſtabliſhments." p. 167.

In order fully to underſtand the value of this compliment to our claſſical learning, it is only neceſſary to read a few pages of the ſame article, which will furniſh a pretty intelligible commentary upon it. If the author of this compliment really wiſhed us to think him ſincere in his profeſſions, he might at leaſt have ſtipulated, that they ſhould not be cloſely linked, and, as it were, identified, with ſuch company: nay, the Editor himſelf, perhaps, owed a little more reſpect to the public, as well as to the character of his own publication, than to preſent them with a compound, one half of which ſerves to neutralize the other [e]. Of the reſt, I can only repeat, that the compariſon between ourſelves and Edinburgh formed no part of my purpoſe; and, as I am poſſeſſed of no

[e] "Oxonian barbariſms," "Oxonian Latinity," &c. are among the moſt ordinary phraſes of a writer permitted to inſert his criticiſms, not only in the ſame Review, but in the ſame article.

knowledge whatever of the *Examinations* required for the Honours of that Univerſity, I am as much deſtitute of the means as I am of the inclination to leſſen the value of its degrees.

But when he talks in ſuch unmeaſured terms of the ſcience and philoſophy of Edinburgh, I ſhould really eſteem it a favour if he would point out upon what foundation their claims to pre-eminence in the former of theſe branches reſt. Undoubtedly, if he means only that they poſſeſs able profeſſors, who perform their duty in demonſtrating to younger minds the truths they have learned themſelves, and who are contented with that degree of reputation which belongs to ſuch a ſervice, no queſtion can be made of the ſoundneſs of their pretenſions; although I muſt be allowed to remind him, that this is by no means an excluſive, or a very remarkable diſtinction. But if any thing more than this is meant, if he would imply that mathematical ſcience has been enriched by their diſcoveries, or its boundaries enlarged, I confeſs I have yet to learn to what members of that learned body within the laſt half century the world is ſo much indebted. Certainly it is not to the author of a work examined by the Eclectic Review, in the number for March 1810.

In page 167. is an extract from the Reply, which the Reviewer thinks proper to commend.

It is ſucceeded by ſome remarks upon the evils reſulting from the conſtitution of this Univerſity, which are apparently ſuggeſted and ſupported by the extract which he has made. Upon this paſſage I ſhould now be diſpoſed to ſay a few words; but I reſerve the conſideration of it till the third Part of this Pamphlet; and that for reaſons which I hope the reader will think, when he comes to the paſſage, quite ſufficient.

At preſent then, I ſee nothing to detain me from entering upon the ſecond part of my deſign, except it be to make a few obſervations on the ſtyle and temper with which I am accuſed of having defended my cauſe.

The Reviewer of La Place in particular blames the "heat and aſperity" betrayed in every part of the chapter directed againſt him. He complains of "a ſtrain of illiberality that does but ill become "the champion of a learned body:" and in another place, he talks of the "inſulting and ungentlemanlike language in which he has been addreſſed." In anſwer to all this I have to remark, that an anonymous writer, more eſpecially a writer in a Review, is the laſt perſon entitled to exact a ceremonious and reſpectful addreſs. He lies perfectly concealed from public view; and even his private friends, unleſs it be his own choice to acquaint them, are ignorant of the perſon who is the object

of attack. The language employed againſt him may, it is true, be ſo coarſe and vulgar as to diſgrace the author who employs it: and in that caſe a retort is eaſy, by merely pointing out to public notice, and extracting the offenſive paſſages. Again, the language, though not vulgar and indecent, yet may perhaps exceed in ſeverity the juſt meaſure of the offence; and then an appeal is open to the juſtice and good ſenſe of unprejudiced readers, and the writer will moſt probably incur the blame which he deſerves. But in no caſe has the anonymous critic any right to remonſtrate, as if a perſonal injury had been done to himſelf; to complain that *he* has been treated unfairly, that *his* feelings have been wounded, *his* dignity inſulted, or *his* character traduced. Neither is the community, of which he boaſts himſelf a member, entitled to any deference in its corporate capacity. As a body, it has no ſubſtantive form; no ofteniible exiſtence; it is *vox et præterea nihil.* It is ſeen by nobody, holds itſelf reſponſible to nobody, and in ſome caſes, I am compelled to add, reſpects nobody. It cannot therefore, in its collective capacity, any more than in the perſons of its ſeveral members, demand that civility and courteſy, which is impoſed by cuſtom upon the open intercourſe between man and man.

If theſe poſitions be indiſputable, even when the attack may be conſidered as unjuſt and unpro-

voked, they ſurely loſe none of their force in a caſe where the Reviewer is the *aggreſſor*, and the aſperity of language proceeds from the party who conſiders himſelf aggrieved. In the preſent inſtance it is needleſs for me to ſtate, that the animadverſions on this Univerſity were wholly irrelevant to the ſubject of the work under review. The opportunity was apparently ſought after, or rather created: for, in truth, it requires much leſs ability than this writer is poſſeſſed of, to connect the merits of a ſeat of education with the conſideration of any ſcientific or literary performance whatever. In the next place, the charges were expreſſed, not indeed with heat and aſperity, (for how could that find place when there was no provocation?) but with a cool, ſneering, ſarcaſtic countenance, infinitely more inſulting than the language and tone of paſſion. They were directed, not againſt an individual, but againſt a body of individuals, which is ſeldom addreſſed without ſome epithet of reſpect, and which is certainly entitled to reſpect in a degree far exceeding the claims of any ſingle perſon compoſing that or any other learned ſociety. They were beſides injurious to its reputation in the higheſt degree, affecting particularly the very deſign and character of its inſtitution. Laſtly, and above all, they were, I do not ſay exaggerated and diſtorted, but directly and fundamentally *falſe*.

Under ſuch circumſtances is it to be expected that the injured party ſhall come forward with a humble remonſtrance?—that he ſhall condeſcend to exculpate himſelf, and prove his innocence, to the ſatisfaction of his accuſer, in order that he may, if it ſuit his good pleaſure, let the world know that he had been *miſinformed?* I confeſs, the perſon who ſtoops to that method of clearing himſelf, appears to me unworthy of enjoying the reputation, which he would make ſuch ſacrifices to preſerve. Let the appeal be made to that authority before whom the accuſation is brought; and, if any language is employed by either party unſuitable to the occaſion, let the court, whoſe dignity is inſulted, interfere. The Reviewer glories indeed in the epithet NORTHERN, as being ſynonymous with FREE; and prefers that diſtinction to "the riches, the dignities, or even the climate "of the South." But, like ſome paſſionate admirers of *freedom* of the modern ſchool, he is jealous of any rivals in his affection, and ſeems diſpoſed to have it all on his own ſide. He cannot bear to liſten to home truths in plain language; and, after accuſing us of the groſſeſt ignorance and neglect of duty, is quite indignant at being told, that the aſſertion is "impudent and "unſupported," and that he has aſſerted as a thing known, what he really knew not. If to hear theſe truths is ſo very unpleſant to his feel-

ings, I can put him in a ſure way of avoiding that inconvenience for the future. He need but abſtain from cauſeleſs inſult and detraction himſelf, and he may reſt aſſured that no language will reach him from this quarter, but ſuch as is due to his talents, and to the ſituation which he fills in ſociety, however reſpectable it may be. For his talents I have always felt, and ſtill feel, much reverence; although the ſingularly weak defence he has lately made compels me to reduce conſiderably the eſtimate I had once formed. But the perſon who has offered them the keeneſt inſult is he, who has not ſcrupled to call them in to the furtherance of contumely and ſlander; and has even contaminated them by an aſſociation with a writer, who is faſt filling up the meaſure of infamy, which he pretty well knows will ſooner or later be his only ſhare.

PART II.

Quam terſa omnia! quam Latina! quam Græca! Athenis vivere hominem, non in villa putes. PLIN.

THE author of the Reply is in the ſecond place accuſed of laying aſide "the ſcanty portion of ci-"vility and moderation with which he had co-"vered his rancour in the preceding part," and of charging the Reviewer of the Oxford edition of Strabo with "deliberate falſehood," "miſrepre-"ſentation," and (what can hardly be credited of ſo profound a ſcholar) with "ignorance and pre-"ſumption." Accordingly this Gentleman now advances to the combat in vindication of his injured honour, and is pleaſed to inform his readers, that he ſhall confine himſelf, in a great degree, to what has been ſaid againſt his "veracity and his "knowledge."

To the world at large it is at leaſt a novel ſpectacle to ſee an Edinburgh Reviewer appear as plaintiff in a cauſe of this nature. Long have we been accuſtomed to the complaints of men, whoſe feelings have been wounded by the wanton ſeverity of that publication, whoſe literary pretenſions

have been treated with the moſt contemptuous ridicule, whoſe names have been ſtudiouſly connected with every phraſe expreſſive of ſcorn, whoſe veracity has been impeached without ſcruple, and who have been ſingled out and expoſed, with malicious pleaſure, as the object of indecent and ſcurrilous buffoonery. It cannot therefore be expected that much ſympathy will be awakened by this appeal, in the breaſts of thoſe to whom the ordinary tone and temper of that Review is already known. Some people indeed may derive a little ſatisfaction from perceiving that this cruelty on their part did not proceed from utter apathy; and a hope may ariſe, that, as their ſenſibility has been awakened to their own ſufferings, a little regard may hereafter be ſhewn, if not from a ſenſe of pity, yet from a motive of prudence, to thoſe of others.

Since, however, the writer of this article has judged it expedient to mitigate the ſtrain of invective which diſgraced his former pages, there will not be much occaſion for reverting to that topic now; and I ſhall confine myſelf chiefly to the conſideration of thoſe points, which he very juſtly conſiders as affecting "his veracity and his "knowledge." A ſteady and careful examination of the ſeveral points in queſtion is indeed neceſſary, before any judgment can be ſafely pronounced; and if I am favoured with this during

the philological minutiæ which it is impoſſible to omit, I have no doubt of being able to prove *demonſtratively*, that his claim to theſe attributes is ſmall indeed.

But though I wiſh to give him all fair play, there is one ſcreen, from the benefit of which I truſt he will be deprived in the outſet of the buſineſs. To impeach the veracity of another in private life is thought to be an infraction on the rules of ſociety. But why is it ſo conſidered? Is it not becauſe, if the accuſed party be guilty, he is unworthy of a place in that ſociety? And the peace and comfort of the reſt muſt be diſturbed before any ſufficient proof can be obtained of the matter. In the preſent caſe no ſuch evil is to be apprehended, and no obſtacle preſents itſelf in the way of free enquiry. Again, however others may complain of the inconvenience and noiſe uſually attending ſuch diſputes, the culprit himſelf cannot ſurely be allowed to make uſe of that plea, or *avail himſelf of his own wrong*. The accuſation may indeed be preferred in language unneceſſarily violent; and for this the accuſer may be juſtly blamed; though not even then by the offending party, provided he makes good his charge. But if the offence has really been committed, permiſſion ought ſurely to be given ſomewhere, to ſtate it in terms which cannot be miſtaken, and which, though not coarſe or vulgar, are yet ex-

preſſive of that indignation and abhorrence, which is naturally excited by ſuch a practice.

The paſſages which juſtify the imputation againſt the *veracity* and the *knowledge* of the Reviewer are ſo intermixed, that it is not eaſy to ſeparate them altogether; but as far as that is practicable it ſhall be done, beginning with thoſe of the firſt kind. And as the charge is one of a ſerious nature, it will be the ſafeſt way to make entire extracts, whenever they materially affect the queſtion. Thus then the Reviewer opens:

"In the firſt place we are ſtated to have '*intimated*, "that the late Mr. Tyrwhitt took no degree at Oxford, "and was not even a member of the Univerſity.' In "anſwer to which we beg merely to refer the reader to "our words, which are, that Mr. Tyrwhitt reſided in "London, in buſineſs and in ſociety, and that his name "ſtands in the title-page plain Thomas Tyrwhitt, with-"out any decorative adjunct, or title of degree. (p. 431.) "This is all we ſay on the ſubject; and as all this is "correctly and confeſſedly true, we profeſs not to un-"derſtand the grounds upon which this profound writer "aſſures his readers, 'that there is not *any truth*' in "our *intimation* with reſpect to Mr. Tyrwhitt." Rev. No. 31. p. 169.

Although the Reviewer tells his readers this is *all* he ſaid on the ſubject, I will preſent them with the following extract from what he *did ſay*, and will leave them to determine under what claſs of miſdemeanors this offence is to be arranged.

"Certain it is, that no ſuch attempt has been made "ſince, except in the ſingle and minute, but very ſuc- "ceſsful inſtance, of Ariſtotle's Poetics; which was "produced by an *auxiliary volunteer*, reſiding in the "metropolis, engaged in buſineſs, and never ſecluded "from the avocations of ſociety. By not enjoying the "leiſure, perhaps he never contracted the indolence, of "a monk; but preſerved the activity, even by the diſ- "traction of his faculties. His name ſtands in the title- "page plain Thomas Tyrwhitt—*without any decorative* "*adjunct or title of degree—though it would have done* "*honour to the proudeſt* which the moſt exalted ſeat of "learning could beſtow." Rev. No. 28. p. 431.

Was I wrong in interpreting this paſſage as intended to inform the world that Tyrwhitt *took no degree at Oxford, and was not even a member of the Univerſity?* Are the words capable of any other ſignification? I replied, therefore, that he *was* a member of Oxford—that he was educated there—that he took his degrees there regularly—that he was for ſeven years a Fellow of a College; and that, after an interval of ſix years' public employment, as Clerk to the Houſe of Commons, he paſſed the remainder of his life (*eighteen years*) in the enjoyment of literary leiſure. Yet the Reviewer, who read this anſwer of mine, when deſirous of eſtabliſhing his veracity, ventures to declare, that he does not underſtand the grounds upon which his intimation concerning Mr. Tyrwhitt was treated as untrue.

In that anſwer I told him, that Tyrwhitt's edition of Ariſtotle's Poetics was a poſthumous publication from unfiniſhed papers, and that the title-page was of courſe arranged by another hand; and yet, when ſpeaking again of this ſubject, he ſays, "an univerſity title, *which he did not think* "*worth* affixing to his name:" that is, did not think worth after he was dead. He then adds, "but as we *aſſerted* nothing on this important "ſubject, we think we might have eſcaped the "charge of *miſrepreſentation.*" The only anſwer I make to this is, to deſire the reader once more to peruſe the extract, "Certain it is," &c.

The next charge againſt his veracity reſpected what he ſaid of Mr. Falconer, the editor of Strabo; whom he had deſcribed as "a diſtinguiſhed "Graduate, ſelected from the whole body, at an "advanced period of life, to conduct the greateſt "work that it had undertaken for more than a "century preceding." Rev. p. 437.

To this it was replied,

"That the editor never was a Graduate;—that he "was not a member of the Univerſity when he under-"took the work;—that he was not then at an advanced "period of life;—that he was not ſelected therefore "from the whole body;—and that he was not ſelected "by the Univerſity at all." Reply, p. 40.

The Reviewer now defends himſelf by ſaying, that in the title-page Mr. Falconer had announced

himſelf of a particular College. The deſcription runs thus, "*Olim* e Coll. Æn. Naſ." Upon this foundation reſts the whole of what is extracted above from page 437 of the Review: and if he can convince any human being that he believed what he was there aſſerting, in conſequence of having read this deſcription in the title-page, I muſt congratulate him on poſſeſſing powers of perſuaſion of no ordinary kind. He ſays, indeed, it is nothing "but ludicrous to repreſent ſo natu-"ral and almoſt unavoidable an error as either "calumnious or diſgraceful:" but if this fact was ſo unimportant, why did he dwell with ſuch earneſtneſs upon it? Why did he colour and adorn it, and hold it up ſo anxiouſly to the notice of the public? Was it not evidently to point the diſgrace more directly againſt the Univerſity, and for this purpoſe was not the circumſtance of the degree *eſſential* to his argument? When that object was in view, it was material to ſhew that Tyrwhitt had no degree, and that Falconer had; but now that both of theſe aſſertions are proved to be falſe, he would fain pretend that the facts are unimportant, and not worth waſting a word about.

The next ſentence relates to the text of the Oxford Homer and of the Oxford Strabo, and is as follows:

"When we mentioned the Oxford Homer as retain-

" ing *all* the errors of Clarke's edition, and the Strabo " *all* thoſe of the Amſterdam edition, we diſtinctly " ſtated, at the ſame time, that *we had not collated ei-* " *ther*, and indeed *that we had examined only a few* " *pages of the firſt*; an *intimation* which muſt have " conveyed, to every candid mind, a ſufficient qualifi- " cation of the word *all*, to ſhew that it was applied " *generally* with reference to the parts which we had " collated, taken as a ſcale for the reſt; and from " thoſe, we did certainly produce *examples ſufficient to* " *warrant ſuch general inference.*" Rev. No. 31. p. 170.

Here again are aſſertions which I am unable to reconcile with the *veracity* of this anonymous critic: and, in order to ſhew that he did not " diſ- " tinctly ſtate that he had not collated the Oxford " Homer, and indeed that he had examined only " a few pages of it," I will give *the whole* of what he ſaid on that ſubject in the Article alluded to.

" Of the Homer, publiſhed under the patronage, and " partly, we believe, at the expenſe of a noble and il- " luſtrious family, the editors appear to be, at leaſt, " half a century behind the reſt of the world in cri- " tical knowledge; *they having religiouſly retained all* " *the errors of Clarke's edition*, even thoſe introduced " on the authority of mere conjecture, and in inſtances " where the true reading had been twice before pub- " liſhed on the authority of the Venetian manuſcript. " One of theſe ſo appalled us in the twentieth line of " the firſt Iliad, as to deter us from all further *critical* " examination: for, when a groſs violation of idiom in

"the uſe of the moods and voices, introduced arbitra-
"rily to ſupply a defect in the metre, neither excited
"ſuſpicion nor ſuggeſted inquiry, no one who values
"his time can think it worth while to go farther."
Rev. No. 28. p. 431.

Where is it diſtinctly ſtated that he had *not collated the edition?* Where, that he had *examined only a few pages?* Does he mean that this is implied in the ſentence reſpecting the twentieth line of the Iliad? If ſo, the defence of his *veracity* conſiſts in this: that having examined only the firſt TWENTY LINES of a work containing above TWENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND, and having obſerved *one* error, he poſitively aſſerted and proclaimed to the world, that *all* the errors of Clarke's edition were *religiouſly* retained in it! If this be rightly termed *veracity*, it is a virtue againſt which the inexperienced part of mankind ought to be well upon their guard. Or is this given as a ſpecimen of that new *Induction*, to which the Syllogiſtic method is ſo hoſtile? For it will be recollected, that in his defence he ſays, "he produced *examples* "*ſufficient to warrant* ſuch general inference." Where, let me aſk, are his examples? Not one is *produced*. There is ſimply a reference to a ſingle line of the Iliad, which is ſaid to contain one, although the reader is left to find out for himſelf in what word it conſiſts.

If on the other hand he rejects this interpretation of the ſentence reſpecting the twentieth

line of the Iliad, and bids us remark that he only ſays he was deterred from all further *critical* examination, what becomes of his aſſertion above quoted, that he "diſtinctly ſtated he had not collated the Homer, and indeed that he had examined only a few pages of it?" For I affirm that there is not a ſyllable ſaid of the Homer throughout the whole article, except in the paſſage above extracted.

Let us now ſee how far his declaration concerning the Strabo is ſupported. It is true that of this book he had ſaid, "We have not indeed, "thought it a part of our duty to collate 1305 "folio pages, in which nothing new was promiſed:" but he goes on to ſay, "We have nevertheleſs *peruſed the whole attentively*, and can "again aſſert, that the printers have done their "duty in rendering very accurately that which "was put before them." And ſoon after, "*Every* "*error* of the preſs, and uſual inaccuracy of ſpelling, that had crept into the Amſterdam text, "is *religiouſly retained.*" Again, ſpeaking of Caſaubon's text, he remarks, "Errors have accumulated upon errors, which are *all carefully em*"*balmed and preſerved* in the ſplendid edition before us:" and this declaration he certainly follows up with a liſt of *nine* examples, occurring within the ſpace of *One hundred and fifty* folio pages.

In his defence we are told, that the parts collated are to be taken as a *ſcale for the reſt*, and this too after he had read a ſtatement of a different kind, with all the examples ſpecified, by which it appears, that no leſs than *fifty errors* of the Amſterdam edition had been corrected within the ſpace of *one hundred pages* in this Oxford edition, without taking into the account a much more numerous liſt of accentual errors, in like manner corrected. He does not retract or alter a ſyllable of his ſtatement, and yet he ventures to appeal to the deciſion of "every candid mind." This, to be ſure, is *modeſty* as well as *veracity*.

The next topic in the Reviewer's defence regards the reading adopted by the Oxford editors in the 20th line of the firſt Iliad, viz. λύσαιτε. Upon this ſingle reading, according to his own defence, he had founded the charge of their having copied *all* Clarke's errors. When arguing the point of his veracity, therefore, I allowed him the advantage of conſidering this an error: it is now time to examine the queſtion whether it be an *error*;— a queſtion, which belongs to the ſecond head of charges, or thoſe which concern his "knowledge;" although I can aſſure him the firſt head is by no means yet exhauſted.

Let us hear his own words:

"The direct charge of untruth, which follows, we "directly retort; and assert, that λυσαιτε, taken and ac- "cented as the *second plural of the imperative, in the* "*middle voice*, and followed by δεχεσθε, is an arbitrary "innovation, sanctioned by no authority." Rev. No. 31. p. 170.

Λύσαιτε taken and accented as *the second plural of the imperative, in the middle voice!* It is necessary to pause a little here, and recollect somewhat of our boyish studies. Λύσαιτε in the *imperative middle!* I certainly never met with the word in that voice, nor do I conceive how it can be formed there. There is λυσαιτε in the *optative of the active voice*, a mood very frequently employed to express a wish or prayer, such as that which Chryses is here addressing to Agamemnon. But, "taken and accented as the second plural of "the imperative, in the middle voice," I do believe it *is* an innovation, and that it never entered the head of any man, but of a writer in the Edinburgh Review. Perhaps it would become me to speak with more respect of the whole fraternity, were I not countenanced by the authority of an eminent Greek scholar, who expresses his contempt of the Edinburgh Reviewers in the following terms:

"That such critics should know any thing of the dis- "tinct use of the articles in Homeric, Pindaric, and "Attic composition, it would be absurd to expect."

Analyſis of Taſte, by Richard Payne Knight, Eſq. p. 258. 4th Edit.

Can it be neceſſary to dwell any longer upon this Gentleman's Greek criticiſms? Inſtead of conſidering, as I did in the Reply, his language as affected, when he ſaid that "he was appalled at "the 20th line of the Iliad, and could go no far-"ther:" I am now inclined to give him full credit for the aſſertion, and have only to expreſs my ſurpriſe that he ever got ſo far. I will however repeat, that the Venetian MS. reads,

Παῖδα δ' ἐμοὶ λύσαιτε φίλην, τὰ δ' ἄποινα δέχεσθαι.

Upon which the Scholiaſt remarks, τὸ δὲ ΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ ἀντὶ προστακτικοῦ ἀπαρεμφάτου, [qu. ἀπαρέμφατον], ſaying nothing of λύσαιτε, and therefore clearly implying that it was not to be read ſeparately, λῦσαί τε. Now when δέχεσθε (for which the Scholiaſt ſays δέχεσθαι is uſed) is found to be the reading of many good MSS. does not the union of it with λύσαιτε, which Clarke has adopted, form, as Heyné himſelf ſays, *lectio expeditiſſima?*

But however meanly we may think of his qualifications as a Greek critic, his intimate acquaintance with the Latin language is, I doubt not, generally allowed and dreaded. Perilous as the taſk may be, I venture upon it without much trem-

bling, and propoſe to examine *ſeriatim* every criticiſm he has advanced. This part of the Review, we are told, has been provoked by a "back-load "of dictionary learning" in the Reply, and by a diſplay of "*very ordinary ſcholarſhip* through fifty "pages" of that work. Rev. p. 169. In the firſt place, then, let me remark, that the Reviewer contends that this "dictionary learning" is neither to be found in dictionaries, nor to be ſupported by them: and ſecondly, that the opinions of the author of the Reply are treated as *novel* and *dogmatical*; and therefore, if they contain a diſplay of ſcholarſhip at all, I cannot conceive how that ſcholarſhip can be reckoned of the *ordinary* kind. All this however is between ourſelves. The public are no otherwiſe concerned than as the critical opinions ſhall appear to be well founded or not.

He obſerves of the author of the Reply,

"In ſlowly and reluctantly admitting the validity of "our objections to expreſſions, which *even he* does not "venture to defend, he directs his attack to the princi- "ples on which they are founded, in two prolix di- "greſſions on 'neſcio quis' and 'quod." Rev. p. 170.

This ſlow and reluctant admiſſion was expreſſed in the words, "I do not defend the phraſe:" and the digreſſion on 'neſcio quis' was cauſed by a diſplay of ignorance on his part, when he was deſirous to ſhew his learning. All that I have ſaid

on that ſubject remains unſhaken; and yet the Reviewer is ſo injudicious as to bring it again before the public, without acknowledging that he was wrong. The two paſſages which he now produces, p. 171. from Cicero de Inventione, and the three from his Epiſtles, have nothing whatever to do with that queſtion. He is pleaſed indeed to ſay of me,

"On the principle laid down by this dogmatical au-
"thor, what would he make of ſuch a paſſage as the
"following?—Loci autem, qui ad quaſque quæſtiones
"accommodati ſunt, deinceps videndum? Cic. de Inv.
"l. 23."

As I am unable to find this paſſage by his reference, it is impoſſible for me to ſay what may be made of it. How unſafe it is to truſt to his quotation, the other paſſage, which I *can* find, informs me.

"Quæritur et quibuſcum vivat." Cic. de Inv. ii. 9.

Of this he obſerves, that if *technical accuracy*, and not *colloquial brevity*, were intended, it would have been written by Cicero, "Quæritur et *qui* "*ſint*, quibuſcum vivat." Now the whole ſentence, in which theſe words occur, is as follows:

'Et ex victu multæ trahuntur ſuſpiciones, cum,
'quemadmodum, et apud quos, et a quibus educatus
'et eruditus ſit, quæritur, et quibuſcum vivat, qua ra-
'tione vitæ, quo more domeſtico vivat.'

Cicero is engaged in a *technical enumeration* of

the materials from which a pleader may impeach the credibility of a witneſs. For what purpoſe indeed theſe quotations are made, I cannot diſcover; nor in what way they militate againſt any poſition of mine. According to the principle laid down in the Reply, all the words in this paſſage which he ſeems to conſider as Relatives, I take to be Indefinites; *quem, quos, quibus, quibuſcum, qua, quo*; and the ſubjunctive mood is uſed with them, according to the ſame principle. That there may be, and often are, *ellipſes* of *ſit quod*, as well as of other phraſes, I never denied, or even doubted: but to have recourſe to an ellipſis, adapted arbitrarily to the caſe, *viz. qui ſint, ſit quod*, juſt as it may be wanted, ſeems to me an ignorant and awkward expedient, when a ſimple and ſatisfactory key of another kind is at hand. His own reſolution, in fact, only ſuppoſes thoſe indefinites to be *underſtood*, which I conſider as really *expreſſed*.

Of the quotations from the Epiſtles to Atticus, the firſt I cannot find; the ſecond is more eaſily accounted for as a colloquial anomaly, than by an ellipſis of *ſit quod*.

Let me, however, be permitted to obſerve, that the principle laid down by the "dogmatical Au-"thor of the Reply," of diſtinguiſhing between the Indefinite and the Relative, in order to determine the uſe of the ſubjunctive mood, is offered by him, not as one which will remove every diffi-

culty, but which will "ſerve greatly to ſimplify "the matter." That the Reviewer, after having this pointed out to him, ſhould ſtill cling to his *ellipſes*, I can only attribute to a moral conſtitution, celebrated even in the time of the Poet Heſiod:

Ὃς δέ κε μήτ' αὐτὸς νοέῃ, μήτ' ἄλλου ἀκούων
Ἐν θυμῷ βάλληται, ὃδ' αὖτ' ἀχρήϊος ἀνήρ.

I requeſt the reader's particular attention to the next paragraph, in which the Reviewer profeſſes to clear himſelf from the charge of *falſehood*, for having ſaid that Mr. Falconer *ſyſtematically* uſed UT with the indicative mood, when it ought to have the ſubjunctive. I accuſed him of having produced only *two* examples of this error out of two folio volumes, which was not ſufficient to warrant the epithet *ſyſtematic*, in a word of ſuch continual occurrence; and I expreſſed a belief that he was not able to produce another. How does he reply to this charge? He does not produce one more example; but he tells his readers that he had already produced *three*: thus, according to approved uſage, defending one falſe ſtatement by advancing another. He *has not* produced *three* examples: and of thoſe *two* which he has produced, *one* is very capable of another meaning. Upon this foundation ſtill reſts his charge of *ſyſtematic*, after having had three months interval to ſubſtantiate his accuſation.

The paſſage in which UT is ſaid to be *omitted* by Mr. Falconer is this:

" Paullo infra Caunum ex Idubeda emiſſus Oroſpeda
" mollibus initio jugis vix aſſurgere videatur; ſenſim
" tamen ſeſe efferens Molinæ primum montes erigit
" &c." Strabo, p. 220.

Of this paſſage I ſaid that *ut* was not omitted. " To place it where he propoſes would make non-
" ſenſe. The meaning of *videatur* is, *may ſeem.*" Reply, p. 69. And I proceeded to paraphraſe the ſentence in order to ſhew that it could bear no other. " *To the eye* it may ſeem at firſt not to
" riſe, but, *in reality*, by degrees it ſwells into the
" mountains of Molina, &c." The phraſes, *to the eye*, and *in reality*, were introduced as paraphraſtic; and the Latin was given at the bottom of the page to prevent, as I thought, all poſſibility of cavil. He laughs indeed at this tranſlation of *videatur*, calling it " a ſubjunctive ſubjoined to no-
" thing.' Why then is it a ſubjunctive? Why is it not a potential, like this of Cicero?

" Poſtremo, vix veriſimile fortaſſe videatur, oderam
" multo pejus hunc quam illum ipſum Clodium." Ep. Fam. vii. 2.

If it were poſſible to ſuppreſs indignation at ſuch practices as have been detected, nothing would be more amuſing than the awkward attempts which this critic makes at merriment.

Let the following paſſage ſerve as a ſpecimen, with which he points his cenſure of the expreſſions *according as, claſſified,* and *claſſification:*

"We call them Oxonian barbariſms, becauſe we "know no other title deſcriptive of them. In milli- "ners' and barbers' ſhops, indeed, they may poſſi- "bly paſs for Galliciſms; but if the revolution have "tainted the French tongue with any ſuch redun- "dancies of anomalous jargon, it has not yet raiſed "them into any more reſpectable circle of ſociety." Rev. p. 172.

The firſt of theſe phraſes, *according as,* he is alſo pleaſed to ſtyle an "ungrammatical vul- "gariſm," which the author of the Reply "meant "to be Engliſh." It ſo happens that ſome other obſcure writers *meant it to be Engliſh*; Dean Swift, for inſtance, Dr. Johnſon, Mr. Dugald Stewart, and a few others, deceived, perhaps, by an ungrammatical book on Engliſh particles, written by one Wm. Walker, a man whoſe ignorance was privileged by his degree of B. D.

This miſtaken Grammarian produces four ſentences containing the phraſe *according as,* and gives four different ways of turning it into Latin. What Dean Swift and Dr. Johnſon[f] thought of it

[f] "A man may with prudence and a good conſcience ap- "prove of the profeſſed principles of one party more than the "other, *according as* he thinks they beſt promote the good of

may be ſeen by conſulting the latter writer's Dictionary: and, when ſearching for the word *claſſification*, although not in the places where alone he thinks it is to be found, I luckily dipped upon this very vulgariſm:

"*According as* theſe words are comprehenſive or limited in their ſignification, the concluſions we form will be more or leſs general." Elements of the Philoſophy of the Human Mind, p. 209. 4to.

Whether the other words objected to belong to any reſpectable circle of ſociety, ſome doubts may be entertained, ſince we find one of them, "*claſſification*," employed in this very article, p. 165. But the queſtion, I truſt, will be conſidered as tolerably ſettled when it is ſtated, that in one chapter [chap. 4.] of Mr. Stewart's Elements of the Philoſophy of the Human Mind, I have met with the word, upon a curſory glance, not leſs than *ten times*.

The next paragraph relates to the alteration of *conſtat* and *ſequitur* into *conſtaret* and *ſequebatur*, which the Reviewer had deemed neceſſary in order to make Mr. Falconer's Latin Roman Latin. His criticiſm was introduced in the following manner:

"Church and State." Swift, Sentiments of a Church of England Man.

"The *tenſes*, in this Anglo-Latin dialect, are as li-
"centiouſly and incongruouſly uſed as the *moods*:
"whence we have 'Neque hoc memoriæ lapſu Strabo
"ſcripſit; ſed cum de Cyri rebus geſtis vix aliquid
"certè conſtat, eam famam ſequitur &c." Rev. No.
28. p. 436.

His former paragraph had related to what he called a wrong uſe of *moods*; and I naturally ſuppoſed, by his altering *conſtat*, not into *conſtet*, but *conſtaret*, and *ſequitur* into *ſequebatur*, that he meant to reconcile them with *ſcripſit*. Examples therefore were produced of ſimilar tranſitions from the paſt to the preſent tenſe. He now pretends that all this was irrelevant, and aſks,

"Can a cauſal, which influenced Strabo in writing,
"be now expreſſed by an *indicative preſent* ſubjoined
"to the cauſal 'cum?' If it can, let its defender boldly
"ſay ſo, and produce a ſingle caſe in point." Rev.
No. 31. p. 172.

The *Indicative* preſent may be uſed no leſs than the *Subjunctive* preſent, if the preſent tenſe may be uſed at all. It is not very common, as I had remarked, and "writers of Latin ſhould be cau-
"tioned againſt it;" but it has, although very rarely, the ſanction of Cicero. Among the few inſtances in which an *Indicative preſent* is uſed after the cauſal *cum*, not one perhaps is a caſe in point with this; i. e. where the *cauſe* is ſaid to have influenced an author in writing. And he

might as well go on to aſk for examples of a verb of the firſt conjugation, or of a compound of *ſto* ſo employed, conditions equally eſſential to the point in diſpute with that which he has demanded. But that we *may* uſe the *preſent tenſe*, both when ſpeaking of the *opinions* of a writer long ſince dead, and of the *cauſe* of thoſe opinions, I think the following authority will prove:

"Cum igitur aliorum animantium ortus in terra *fit*, "aliorum in aqua, in aëre aliorum: abſurdum eſſe Ari- "ſtoteli *videtur* in ea parte, quæ ſit ad gignenda ani- "malia aptiſſima, animal gigni nullum putare." Cic. de Nat. Deor. ii. 15.

For anſwers to the two next paragraphs in p. 172. I refer to the Reply, p. 73—79. They do not in the ſlighteſt degree invalidate, or attempt to invalidate, any thing contained in thoſe pages. He repeats however his old cavil, again and again refuted, that the Univerſity are reſponſible for the correctneſs of every phraſe printed at the Clarendon preſs.

It is idle to think of teaching a ſcholar that will not learn,

Occidit miſeros crambe repetita magiſtros.

Let him read again what is ſaid on this ſubject in pp. 31, 32, and 43, of the Reply; for it is really unfair to me and to my readers to require that the caſe be explained anew.

Entering now upon the defence of his own Latinity, he begins with his alteration of Mr. Falconer's ſentence, "Tigranes poſt reges ſubditos "rex regum appellatur," into "Tigranes poſt-"quam reges ſupradictos imperio ſubjecerat, rex "regum appellatus eſt." He ſays, that the whole ſentence was condemned by him as being "nei-"ther ſenſe nor Latin;" becauſe he *conceived* the writer meant to ſignify, "*That Tigranes had him-"ſelf ſubdued thoſe kings, and then aſſumed the "title of king of kings.*" Obſerve now the candour of this critic. When he meets with a violation of Latin idiom in the notes of the editor, although the meaning is perfectly clear, eſpecially to an Engliſh reader, he affects not to underſtand it: but when it ſuits his purpoſe, he *aſſumes* that the writer meant to expreſs what his words do not convey according to *any* idiom, and what we have no reaſon to think he intended them to convey. The whole note is badly written; but the editor moſt probably meant, as the words quoted from him expreſs, "that Tigranes, *after* the period when "he ſubdued the kings, [and *not till then,*] is "called in hiſtory king of kings." Thus on ſome of his coins the title of βασιλεὺς alone is found: on others βασιλεὺς βασιλέων g. And how eſtabliſhed it was at one time we learn from Plutarch,

g Eckhel. Doct. Num. Vet. vol. iii. p. 247.

who describes Lucullus as speaking of him in his absence by that title. Plut. in Lucull. c. 14. If this was the editor's meaning, nothing is more common than his use of the word *appellatur*[h].

But the Reviewer fancies he has discovered another rule of Latinity. "*Post reges subactos*," says he, "would not have signified *that Tigranes* "*had himself subdued those kings.*" On this, as upon other occasions, I must beg to differ from him: for not only is this form of speaking used by good writers when *referring to an epoch*, but when describing *continued action*. E. g.

Qui post factam injuriam se expurget, parum mihi profit. Ter. Hec. v. 1. 15.

Post acceptam proximam pugnæ cladem Veientes abstinuêre acie. Liv. ii. 51.

He proceeds to assert, that his use of the tense "*competisset*," which I had altered to *competeret* in the following passage, is strictly proper;—"Pla-"tæenses ad paludem olim habitâsse, noster affir-"mat: in locum autem meliorem translatos novæ "urbi nomen priscum continuâsse, *situi* licet, ab "aquis remoto, *haud diutius competisset*." [Quoted in p. 83. of the Reply.]—giving as a reason this remarkable rule:

[h] Ex iis conclusionibus quas supra scripsi, prior quartus, posterior quintus a dialecticis modus *appellatur*. Cic. Topic. c. 14.

" In an oblique narration, or ſtatement in the perſon " of one who had long ceaſed to exiſt, events coexiſtent " with him are to be expreſſed in the *imperfect*: and " thoſe preceding him, in the *pluperfect* tenſe ſubjunc- " tive." Rev. p. 173.

Thus the *perfect* ſubjunctive is altogether excluded from a ſentence of this kind! and we muſt alter ſome hundred ſentences of Livy to make them Latin! But this is not the only novelty. He ſeems to have forgotten that there are *two* reaſons for the uſe of the *imperfect ſubjunctive*: one, *when the clauſe is ſubordinate to a verb in the paſt time*; the other, *when the idea denoted by it requires continued time.* In the example he has produced from Livy xxv. 16. *redirent* depends on the firſt of theſe principles; *fieret* and *feneſceret* on the ſecond. On the latter account I had held *competeret* to be the right tenſe, as being equivalent to the following, and a hundred other examples of the ſame conſtruction:

Atque illum, cum differendo par eſſe non *poſſet*, ad' auctores confugiſſe, et id quod *diceret* . . . . ſcriptum protuliſſe. Cic. De Orat. i. 56.

Metum continuiſſe ad eam diem Hiſpanorum animos, quia procul Romani *abeſſent*. Liv. xxii. 22.

Conſulem in Lucanos oſtendiſſe iter, quum Picenum et Galliam *peteret*: caſtra relinquentem nulla alia re tutiora, quam errore hoſtis, qui ducem inde atque exercitus partem abiſſe *ignoraret*. Liv. xxvii. 44.

Quum ſigna portis prope inferri *cernerent*, neminem ſe moviſſe. Liv. xxxiv. 33.

In all theſe examples the obliquity of the ſtructure correſponds with the ſentence in which I would introduce *competeret*. The idea does not *precede* "continuâſſe," but is *concurrent* with it.

But the rule he lays down was perhaps chiefly intended to vindicate his uſe of *habuiſſet* and *occidiſſet* in this ſentence:

"Nonne vult Pauſanias Melanthum Andropompi filium e Nelei progenie *primum* fuiſſe, *qui* in Attica "ſedem *habuiſſet*; atque ideo *eundem qui* Xanthum oc"*cidiſſet*." [Quoted Reply, p. 84.]

Of this I had ſaid, "*Haberet* might do, as re"lating to continued time, but *habuerit* is the "more uſual form. Inſtead of *occidiſſet*, he ſhould "have ſaid *occiderit*." Reply, p. 91. A parallel was then produced from Cicero. "Publium etiam "Scipionem Naſicam . . . . habitum eloquentem "*aiunt*, illius qui ſacra *acceperit*, filium." Clar. Orat. 20. He objects to this parallel, becauſe, as he ſays, *occidiſſet* refers to the time of an intermediate perſon, between the writer and the event ſtated, whereas *acceperit* refers to the writer's own time. To this it may be anſwered, that the perſons meant by *aiunt* are probably intermediate between Cicero and the event ſtated, and in that caſe the parallel holds exactly. "*Aiunt*" in the one example ſeems to me perfectly equivalent to "Pauſanias *vult*" in the other.

But the true principle, which governs the uſe of this tenſe in ſuch caſes, ſeems to have been quite overlooked or never known by this critic. If the leading word of the ſentence be in the preſent tenſe, the *perfect* ſubjunctive is commonly uſed after it; if it be in a tenſe denoting paſt time, the *pluperfect* ſubjunctive, thus:

Nec *putant* ei nummos deeſſe poſſe, qui ex obſidione fœneratores *exemerit*. Cic. Ep. Fam. v. 6. *Velim* recordere, quæ ego de te in ſenatu *egerim*. Ibid. v. 2. Nec tamen *dubito* quin magnam vim ſemper *habuerit* oratio. Clar. Orat. 10. Etiam in ſcriptis *obliviſcebatur*, quid paulo ante *poſuiſſet*. Clar. Orat. 60. Tamen quod memoria *tenebam*, cujuſmodi ad me literas antea *miſiſſes*. Cic. Ep. Fam. v. 6. *Maluit*, longe omnium, non modo ejuſdem ætatis, ſed eorum etiam qui *fuiſſent*; in jure civili eſſe princeps. Clar. Orat. 41.

In one chapter of Livy the rule is remarkably exemplified. When the leading word is in the *preſent* tenſe, "ceperint" is employed; when in the *imperfect*, "cepiſſent."

"Tribuni militum ..... *jubent* &c. ſicut *ceperint* "[caſtra] poſſe capi."

Soon after,

"L. Atilius tribunus primus ſecundæ legionis, non "*hortabatur* modo milites, ſed *docebat* etiam, Si victores "Iſtri, quibus armis *cepiſſent* caſtra, iiſdem capta reti-"nere in animo haberent &c." Liv. xli. 3.

If theſe examples are not ſufficient, others, illuſ-

trative of the ſame principle, will be found Cic. Ep. Fam. v. 12. v. 8. Clar. Orat. 7. 14. 36. 42. 51. 53. 69. 78. Liv. xxxii. c. 33, 34.

To the criticiſm reſpecting *primus qui* more than a page of the Review is devoted; nearly all of which turns againſt himſelf, and ſupports the objection I had made to the phraſe. He produces five paſſages from Cicero, in every one of which the antecedent to *qui* is not *primus*, but ſome pronoun either expreſſed or underſtood[1]. He evidently miſtakes the whole queſtion. *Primum qui* was not condemned becauſe *primum* went before *qui*, or becauſe *qui* referred to the ſame ſubject of which *primum* was an epithet; but becauſe

[1] Ex quo poteſt probabiliter confici, *eum* recte primum eſſe judicio ſuo, *qui* omnium cæterorum judicio ſit ſecundus. Cic. Acad. fragm. Eſt enim [*illud*] primum, *quod* cernitur in univerſi generis humani ſocietate. Id. de Off. i. 16. In quibus *hoc* primum eſt, in *quo* miror &c. Id. de Fin. i. Polemoni—*ea* prima viſa ſunt, *quæ* paulo ante dixi. Ib. ii. 11. Si illud vere connectitur . . . . . *primumque quod* eſt in connexo . . . . . neceſſarium eſt &c. "*If that which is firſt* in the hypothe-" tical propoſition be neceſſary, the other part is neceſſary alſo." That ſuch is Cicero's meaning is not only evident from the rules of Logic, according to which he is conducting the argument, but he proceeds, after a parentheſis, to *reſtate* the reaſoning in that very form: "Si igitur quod primum in connexo " eſt, neceſſarium eſt; fit etiam quod conſequitur neceſſarium." Cic. de Fato, c. 7.

the *priority* denoted by *primum* was made the *antecedent* to *qui*. Thus it is not againſt the idiom to ſay, *Primus* Regum Romanorum, *quem* Rhea natum et lupa nutritum ferunt, bella quamplurima cum finitimis urbibus geſſit. But to ſay, "Ancus Martius *Primus* Regum Romanorum fuit "*qui* civitatem Latinis dedit," is againſt it: becauſe *qui*, in this caſe, does not refer to the ſubſtantive implied in *primus*, but to the *priority* which that word denotes.

The next paragraph recriminates on me with great aſperity. I had ſaid, in reference to "*pri*-"*mus qui*," that Cicero invariably avoids the phraſe, although he has a hundred occaſions for uſing it, if it were Latin. "In the treatiſe de Claris Ora-"toribus, *this idea occurs continually*; and the "phraſe employed is either 'primus' alone, or 'qui "primus,' or the adverb 'primo.'" Reply, p. 85.

The Reviewer, ſpeaking of the ſame idea, writes thus:

"Our anſwerer, indeed, ſays there are *more than* "*twenty* [occaſions for it] in Cicero's book de Claris "Oratoribus, in all which he avoids it, and employs 'primus,' 'qui primus,' or the adverb 'primo.' This "aſſertion is of a character—Cui non invenit ipſa no-"men, et a nullo poſuit natura metallo. *There is only* "*one occaſion for it* in the whole book; and there he "does employ it." Rev. p. 174.

It is ſomewhat ſtrange, that, in order to con-

vict me of this offence without a name, he ſhould condeſcend to be guilty of it himſelf—that he ſhould invent a phraſe which I never uſed, and coolly pronounce it mine. Or will he tell us in the next Review, that "*more than twenty*" is an error of the preſs for "*continually?*" In page 85. of the Reply I produced *four* examples from the firſt fourteen chapters of the book De Claris Oratoribus, in ſupport of my aſſertion that the idea occurred *continually*; to which I can now add *eight* more[1], all within the compaſs of the firſt thirty chapters, that is, within leſs than one third of the book. In all theſe paſſages the idea conveyed is that which in Engliſh might naturally be expreſſed by the phraſe, "The firſt who:" and many of them would loſe ſomething of their force

[1] Quoniam longo intervallo modo *primum* animadverti paulo te hilariorem. c. 5. Qua in urbe *primum* ſe orator extulit. c. 7. Hæc igitur ætas *prima* Athenis oratorem prope perfectum tulit. c. 12. Atque hic Livius, *qui primus* fabulam docuit, &c. c. 18. And again, Cui ſi æqualis fuerit Livius, minor fuit aliquanto is *qui primus* fabulam dedit. Ibid. Et nimirum is *princeps* ex Latinis illa oratorum propria et quaſi legitima opera tractavit. c. 21. Hoc in oratore Latino *primum* mihi videtur et lenitas apparuiſſe illa Græcorum &c. c. 25. Nam et quæſtiones perpetuæ hoc adoleſcente conſtitutæ ſunt, quæ antea nullæ fuerunt, (L. enim Piſo, tribunus plebis legem *primus* de pecuniis repetundis, Cenſorino et Manilio conſulibus, tulit, &c.) c. 27. See alſo Academ. i. 9. Nat. Deor. i. 20. Liv. vi. 37. vii. 22. and four times Quintil. iii. 1.

or exactneſs, if expreſſed in any other manner. They would, I am confident, be ſo rendered by any one who was anxious to give the *preciſe* meaning; eſpecially in the four examples already quoted from chap. 8, 9, 11, 14. and not leſs ſo in thoſe from chap. 12, 21, 25, 27. in the note below.

As to the ſingle authority which he produces on his ſide, "Quem vero exſtet, et de *quo* ſit memoriæ proditum, eloquentem fuiſſe, et ita eſſe habitum, *primus* eſt M. C. Cethegus;" if it is, as I really believe it to be, the only paſſage in that author of the ſame kind, it cannot ſurely be allowed to contradict an uniform ſtream of examples in a phraſe of ſuch continual occurrence. The inverted collocation of the ſentence may well account for the anomaly. Many inſtances occur in the ſame author of grammatical incongruities ariſing from the ſame cauſe: a ſentence is begun, perhaps, with the accuſative caſe, and the conſtruction ſuddenly changes, eſpecially if ſeveral clauſes have intervened, to the nominative: and if it were allowable to produce theſe as authorities, there would be an end not only of Latin idiom, but of Latin ſyntax. Some examples of equal inaccuracy are given in a note, where the conſtruction appears to have been inadvertently changed *currente calamo*; from no one of which, as I apprehend, would a perſon be allowed to reaſon concerning a diſputed point in

the Latin language. They are what the grammarians call ἀναπόλουθα [m].

The reaſon for introducing the examples which follow, I profeſs not to underſtand. *Digniſſimus qui*, or *dignus qui*, is good Latin; and no one, I believe, ever doubted of it [n].

The other phraſe which I had treated as a barbariſm, is *eundem qui*. And here, as the Reviewer

[m] *Prætor* interea, ne pulchrum ſe ac beatum putaret, atque aliquid ipſe ſua ſponte loqueretur, *ei* quoque carmen compoſitum eſt. Cic. pro Muren. c. 12. Nam *quoniam*, quidquid eſt quod in controverſia aut in contentione verſetur, in eo, aut ſitne, aut quid ſit, aut quale ſit, quæritur: ſitne, ſignis: quid ſit, definitionibus: quale ſit, recti pravique partibus: *quibus* ut uti poſſit orator, non ille vulgaris, ſed hic excellens, a propriis perſonis et temporibus ſemper, ſi poteſt, avocat controverſiam. Orat. c. 14. So, Etenim virtus omnis &c. De Off. ii. 5. Etenim ſi orationes quas nos &c. Tuſc. ii. 1. An dubitas, quin præſtans &c. Tuſc v. 15. Ex eodem hoc vetus illud &c. De Orat. ii. 64. Of the ſame kind are theſe: Nam *nos omnes*, quibus eſt alicunde aliquis objectus labos, Omne quod eſt interea tempus, prius quam id reſcitum eſt, *lucro eſt*. Ter. Hec. iii. 1. 6. *Hunc adoleſcentem* quem vides, malo aſtro *natus eſt*. Petron. Quas credis eſſe *bas*, non ſunt veræ nuptiæ. Ter. And. i. 1. 20.

[n] If I underſtand him rightly in p. 174. "Where the predi-"cate, &c." the ſingle authority which he produces from Cic. de Clar. Orat. in ſupport of his uſe of *primum qui*, is a violation of his own rule.

ſeems to triumph moſt, I muſt beg leave to repeat the words I uſed concerning it:

" Is it credible, that if this mode of ſpeaking were " correct, it ſhould not be met with ten times in all " the pureſt writers? The idea is ſo common, and en- " ters inadvertently into ſo many ſentences, that we " muſt purſue a very different rule of criticiſm, when " examining this, from what is uſually adopted when " the genuineneſs of a ſingle word is ſuſpected. In the " preſent caſe I ſhould not admit *three or four in-* " *ſtances*, out of the whole body of Latin authors, to " juſtify the uſe of it: but the fact, I believe, is, that " *in the way here employed* it does not occur *once*." Reply, p. 86.

It is neceſſary therefore to obſerve attentively in what way *it is employed* by the Reviewer, for upon this point the whole queſtion between us turns.

The caſe is briefly this. Strabo relates, that Melanthus, a baniſhed king from the Peloponneſus, and deſcendant of Neleus, ſettled in Attica; and, having ſlain Xanthus king of Bœotia in ſingle combat, was choſen by the Athenians to be their king. Caſaubon in his note obſerves, that this account differs from Pauſanias, who ſays that Xanthus was ſlain by Andropompus, the father of Melanthus. Upon this Mr. Falconer remarks, that Pauſanias is hardly conſiſtent with himſelf; for that in another part of his work he had men-

tioned Melanthus as having obtained the kingdom of Athens, after dethroning the laſt of the race of Theſeus. Did not Pauſanias therefore mean that Melanthus was the firſt of his family that ſettled in Attica? and if ſo, HE, and not Andropompus, was certainly the perſon who ſlew Xanthus.

Such is the argument purſued by Mr. Falconer: which argument the Reviewer would expreſs by, "Nonne vult Pauſanias Melanthum Andropompi "filium e Nelei progenie primum fuiſſe, qui in "Attica ſedem habuiſſet; atque ideo *eundem qui* "Xanthum occidiſſet." As a better mode I had propoſed, "Nonne vult Pauſanias, primum ex "Nelei nepotibus Melanthum in Attica ſedem "habuiſſe, ac proinde *eum eſſe qui* Xanthum occi-"derit?"

That *eundem qui* is a legitimate phraſe when abſolute *ſameneſs* is predicated, I was ſo far from denying, that I even declared and proved it by examples. But I contended, and ſtill contend, that to uſe it where *ſameneſs* is not the leading idea meant to be conveyed, is againſt the genius of the Latin language. All the authorities now produced by the Reviewer are of this kind.

"Quid enim eſt tam repugnans, quam *eundem dicere*, "quod honeſtum ſit, ſolum id bonum eſſe, *qui dicat*, "appetitionem rerum ad vivendum accommodatarum a "natura profectam?" Cic. de Fin. iv. 28. "*Neglige*, "inquit, *dolorem*. Quis hoc dicit? *Idem, qui* dolorem

" ſummum malum." Id. Tuſc. ii. 19. " Opus ipſa " ſuum *eadem, quæ* coagmentavit, natura diſſolvit. Ut " navem, ut ædificium *idem* deſtruit facillime, *qui* con- " ſtruxit; ſic hominem *eadem* optime, *quæ* conglutina- " vit, natura diſſolvit." Id. De Senect. c. 20. " Quæ- " ritur etiam nunc *quis* eum nuntium miſerit? Nonne " perſpicuum eſt, *eundem, qui* Ameriam?" Id. pro Roſc. Amer. c. 37.

The news of the murder of Sex. Roſcius had been carried both to Ameria and Volaterræ with wonderful ſpeed: and Cicero is arguing, that *the ſame* perſon muſt have diſpatched both meſſengers: no one elſe had any motive for ſuch expedition. The other example from Cornelius Nepos relates to a *party* in Thaſus, whoſe firm attachment to Athens Lyſander feared, becauſe of their former reſolute hoſtility to it[n]. " Proinde ac ſi *iidem* fir- " miſſimi ſolerent eſſe amici, *qui* conſtantes fu- " iſſent inimici." Corn. Nep. in Lyſ. In this way *idem* is uſed as an epithet even to the name of an individual, if the writer wiſhes to draw attention to the *identity* of the perſon; as, *idem Cæſar*, [De Clar. Orat. c. 60.] where the whole ſtreſs of the ſentence conſiſts in his being *the ſame* man.

Having called my remark on this phraſe " a " blunder, ſurpaſſing all that pride, engrafted on

[n] Such muſt be the meaning of the paſſage if this reading is kept. Vid. Var. Lect. Edit. Oxon. 1697.

" ignorance, has hitherto committed," he proceeds to vindicate his Latinity in " Luna *ſub* deæ *perſona* " ab iis culta." This I had termed " bald Latin;" adding, that I doubted its purity. " For the ſtrict " meaning of the phraſe is, *under the aſſumed ap-* " *pearance, or character, of a goddeſs.*" Reply, p. 92. In order to defend it from this attack, he refers to a paſſage in Paterculus, where it is uſed *juſt as I have explained it.* The hiſtorian obſerves, that many writers call Theſſaly by that name at a time when it did not belong to the diſtrict. " Quod cum alii faciant, Tragici frequentiſſime " faciunt: quibus minime id concedendum eſt: " nihil enim *ex* perſona poetæ, ſed omnia *ſub* eo- " rum, qui illo tempore vixerunt, dixerunt." Pater. i. 3. Of the uſe of the word *perſona* in the other paſſages referred to, I had never expreſſed or entertained any doubt.

" *Straboni* is an error of the preſs for *a Stra-* " *bone!*" Be it ſo. The preſſmen at Oxford, though ignorant of the DEUS LUNUS, would hardly have made ſuch a ſlip. 'BUT,' we are told, *potuerit* in the following ſentence is an ELEGANCE:

" Romanis enim Græciſque juxta ignorantibus quiſ- " nam deorum eſſet iſte Menes, pro alio quam Luna, " ſub deæ perſona ab iis culta, a Strabone vix haberi " *potuerit.*"

The meaning certainly is *potuit*, and I had re-

commended that word. Since however he calls it an elegance to uſe *potuerit*, it may not be amiſs to examine the point a little more cloſely. It is then the ſubſtitution of the *perfect potential* for the *perfect indicative*. Where, let me aſk, is this ever done when the aſſertion is abſolute? The two examples he gives are quite irrelevant. *Hypothetical* caſes are in them propoſed, and it is merely ſtated what *would follow* from ſuch a ſuppoſition. *Vix crediderim, vix dixerim* &c. are often indeed uſed abſolutely, but never for *credidi, dixi*; they repreſent *credam, dicam*, or *crederem, dicerem*. See Liv. vi. 14. vii. 10. x. 9. Tac. Vit. Agric. 12. Cic. de Clar. Orat. 47. Even of this form, we have the opinion of a man generally ſuppoſed to know ſomething of the Latin idiom, that it is *not more elegant* than the other. Scheller, vol. i, p. 178.

Competo was not rejected as a bad word; but *convenio* was propoſed as a better. "*Haud diutius*" for *non amplius*, or *jam non*, is not indeed recommended by the Reviewer as an *elegance*, but as one of thoſe phraſes "which diſtinguiſh a learned man of *parts, taſte, and diſcernment*, from the mechanic drudge of memory." Rev. p. 176. Being claſſed myſelf under the latter deſcription, I can only tell him that I never *remember* to have ſeen 'diutius' joined with a verb, except when that verb denoted ſome

duration or continued action. It may be otherwiſe; but the examples he has brought leave the thing juſt where it was.

Of the groſs fabrication pointed out, p. 82. of the Reply, he had better have ſaid nothing than what he has ſaid. I leave the matter to be decided by any one who will turn to the paſſage, or to page 590. of the Strabo, and read the note of Palmerius, together with that of Mr. Falconer.

I come now to the laſt article of his defence—an article which I hope will be attentively examined, becauſe it affords a ſtriking ſpecimen of the manner in which this Gentleman vindicates his character for veracity. He ſays,

"Laſtly, this acute detector is pleaſed to accuſe us "of one blunder, and three falſe propoſitions, in our "remarks on the central map of Greece. The blunder "is an *a* for the ſecond *o* in Oropiæ.—The firſt falſe "propoſition is, that Hiſtiæa, the only name under "which that place ever exiſted as a ſtate or free city, is "not in the map; *and it is not.* The other two are, "that Erythræ in Bœotia, and Ægæ in Eubœa, are "diſtinguiſhed by coins ſtill exiſtant." Rev. p. 177.

Let the reader peruſe this paſſage carefully, and then compare it with the paſſage of which it profeſſes to be a repetition. In p. 97. of the Reply, having extracted his paragraph reſpecting the maps, I added,

" In this ſingle paragraph there are three falſe pro-
" poſitions, *one miſrepreſentation*, and one blunder. The
" blunder is Orabiæ for Orobiæ. *The miſrepreſentation*
" *is, that Hiſtiæa is not in the map.* Oreus, which in
" Strabo's time was the name of Iſtiæa, is in the map;
" and it is difficult to conceive that he did not know
" it, becauſe in D'Anville's map it is called 'Oreus,
" prius Iſtiæa.' As for the *three falſe propoſitions*;
" Erythræ in Bœotia had no coinage of its own: Ægæ
" in Eubœa had none of its own: *and the maps are not*
" *ſaid in the Preface to have been formed on the beſt au-*
" *thorities.* All that is ſaid of them is, that care was
" taken to adapt the laſt fourteen to the text of Strabo
" as cloſely as the three firſt. The adoption of the name
" of Oreus inſtead of Hiſtiæa is one proof of this."

The laſt of the three falſe propoſitions he leaves unnoticed; but, to cover the artifice, he treats *that* as the firſt of them, which I had called a *miſrepreſentation:* and which every one, I am ſure, will call a moſt diſgraceful one, after this deliberate repetition of it.

The only thing remaining for me is, to defend what was ſaid about the coins. And here I beg it will be recollected that I ſtated this, not as from myſelf, but on the authority of Mr. Falconer's letter, Gent. Mag. Oct. 1809. The words of that letter are;

" If the exiſtence of coins is to determine the meaſure
" of this error, the omiſſion of Erythræ in Bœotia, this
" place may be reſerved for inſertion till its mint be
" diſcovered. For the ſame reaſon, we may poſtpone

" the addition of Ægæ in Eubœa. The Reviewer places " ancient mints at pleaſure; and he is equally indif- " ferent, whether at Erythræ in Bœotia, or Erythræ in " Ionia; at Ægæ in Eubœa, or Ægæ in Æolia." And again, " He has aſſigned to one place in Eubœa, and to " another in Bœotia, the dignity of a ſpecific coinage, " unknown when they exiſted."

Upon this authority, which I diſtinctly ſtated, the aſſertions reſpecting the coins were made; for which he is pleaſed to call *me* " a bold-faced aſ- " ſertor of negatives;" adding, that he is " ready to " produce *undoubted coins* of both cities from col- " lections in London." Notwithſtanding this declaration, ſubſequent enquiry has led me to conclude that Mr. Falconer was perfectly juſtified in making that ſtatement. No coins of Ægæ in Eubœa have ever been publiſhed; and thoſe few [two or three only] which have been attributed to Erythræ in Bœotia, are now generally admitted not to belong to that city, and are expreſsly aſſigned by Seſtini to Pheræ in Theſſaly. [Geograph. Numiſmat. part ii. p. 31.] Eckhel, indeed, who mentions them, ſays, that the only reaſon for aſſigning them to Erythræ in Bœotia is the difference of their fabric and impreſs from thoſe of Erythræ in Ionia. Eckhel, vol. ii. p. 199. The inſcription however which he read EPΥΘ, is declared by Seſtini to be ΦΕΡΑ. Thoſe which bear EPΥ with the head of Hercules, are referred by the ſame writer to Erythræ in Ionia. Geog. Numiſm. part i. p. 39.

What the Reviewer ſays about coins of Erythræ in private collections, may be true; and if they bear the Bœotian ſhield, there can be no doubt to which Erythræ they belong: but it is quite ludicrous to expect that becauſe they are "undoubted" by him, therefore they are to be undoubted by the world; or that his anonymous unſupported aſſertion ſhall have any weight in a diſputed point. According to the evidence hitherto produced, Mr. Falconer's aſſertion is ſtrictly proper. No coins of thoſe cities have been publiſhed; and therefore we have no grounds for ſaying that there ever were any.

Before we diſmiſs the ſubject, it may be as well to notice the ſtratagem by which he endeavours to perſuade the world, that only *one* error had been proved in all his criticiſms: *viz.* his cenſure of "majorem" as an epithet to "fidem." This trick has been ſo long uſed in controverſy, as to be almoſt worn out. It will not be forgotten then, that, beſides the errors repeated in the laſt Review, and now again expoſed, his ignorance of the uſe of *quod* was betrayed in condemning *quod ſubiere* &c; he had confounded *relatives* with *indefinites* when ſpeaking of the ſubjunctive mood; he had miſrepreſented the paſſage containing *citius*, which he abſurdly altered into *crebrius*; he conſtrued *verſus Labicanam*, "*to* the Labican "*gate*;" he declared that no language on the con-

tinent had an idiom correſponding in expreſſion with "give credit;" he enriched the Latin language with the word *fitui*, not inadvertently, but when correcting the Latin of another; he complained that Tyrwhitt's emendations had not been publiſhed ſeparately; he ſelected *fix* out of near two hundred, and blundered in ſpeaking about *five* of them; he declared that Philip, the ſon of Demetrius, is *repeatedly* called Philip the Second by Mr. Falconer, whereas he is only ſo called *once*. Upon this ſingle fact he founded a charge againſt the edition, of inaccuracy in hiſtory equal to its inaccuracy in grammar: and, to crown the whole, he informed us that there was a DEUS LUNUS at Rome.

All this however is nothing, either in kind or degree, when compared with the liſt which has been exhibited in the preceding pages; and I ſhould not have thought the topics worth a ſecond mention, had he not uſed an unfair expedient in order to conceal them from public notice. The vindication of his ſtyle from the charge of *virulence* and *ſcurrility* perhaps did not proceed from *his* pen. It is a ſort of curioſity in its way: and I hope its beauties will not be overlooked. "We "have carefully looked over the article, ſays this "defender, to which ſo much *malice*, virulence, "and ſcurrility is imputed, and cannot find a "ſingle epithet or expreſſion that implies any

" thing like *anger* or *violence*." Of this it will be ſufficient to ſay, that *no malice* was imputed to the writer, *no anger*, *no violence:* and, for a defendant to quit the real accuſation, and prove himſelf innocent of things which were never laid againſt him, is uſually interpreted into a confeſſion of guilt. He was charged with *unprovoked inſult*, with *deliberate miſrepreſentation*, and with *vulgar abuſe*. If the reader ſhould be of opinion that theſe charges have been proved, he will not condemn me for having replied with warmth and ſeverity: for, unleſs the feeling of indignation is to be ſuppreſſed altogether, I know of no occaſion on which it can be better juſtified, than when all theſe qualities are combined in a groundleſs attack, made in a work of high credit and popularity, with a view to degrade the character of a place of liberal education.

PART III.

Never was dash'd out, at one lucky hit,
A fool, so just a copy of a wit:
So like, that critics said, and courtiers swore,
A wit it was, and called the phantom More[a].
DUNCIAD.

THE third Part opens with a display of the Logic, adopted in the modern school. Speaking of the chapter in the Reply which falls to this Gentleman's share, he observes, "AS this part of the "work is more remarkable than the rest for its "ostentatious dulness, and its gross departure from "the language and manners of a gentleman, we "must be excused for bestowing on it a little more "of our time than we are in the habit of wasting "on such men, and such things."

That is, if I understand him rightly, *because* it possesses qualities which render a composition unworthy of notice, *therefore* I shall bestow more time upon it. He then charges me with two in-

[a] James More Smith was the real name, as the notes to the Dunciad inform us. Of this Mr. Smith it is said in the same place, that his whole misfortune "was too inordinate a passion "to be thought a wit."

ſtances of deceit, of which it becomes me in the firſt place to clear myſelf.

One is, that when anſwering his firſt article of accuſation, which I had expreſſed in theſe words, "That claſſical learning forms the ſole buſineſs of "Engliſh education," I omitted the exception in favour of Cambridge. This he calls a "low ar- "tifice." For what purpoſe I could be induced to practiſe this low artifice, is to me unintelligible. It does not aſſiſt the argument I maintained, nor does it affect it in the ſlighteſt manner. The exception was expreſſed in the form of a note. [Edin. Rev. No. 29. p. 45.] I quoted the paſſage of the text to which this note was appended; and proceeded to argue upon it ſtrictly in the ſenſe in which the author meant it, as a cenſure of Oxford education. Having made ſome remarks on the phraſe "learning Latin and Greek," for a particular refutation of the charge itſelf, I referred to the chapter on The Courſe of Studies *purſued at Oxford*. Reply, p. 119. That pamphlet muſt have been worded with an accuracy more fortunate than common, if he is able to diſcover only two paſſages he can call deceitful, and this is one of them.

The other charge requires more illuſtration: becauſe he has contrived to give it a greater air of plauſibility. I hope therefore I ſhall be excuſed for ſtating the whole caſe in the fulleſt manner.

He produces a quotation of mine from the Edinburgh Review, ending with theſe words; "If "our religion be a fable, the ſooner it is exploded "the better. If our government is bad, it ſhould "be amended." Upon this he obſerves,

"Here he ſtops his quotation; and the reader, who is "obliged to ſtop along with him, is left of courſe to "ſuppoſe, that the Reviewer was himſelf in a ſtate of "*extreme doubt and uncertainty*, whether the Chriſtian "religion was true or falſe, or the Engliſh government "good or bad. In the Review, however, the following "words come immediately after thoſe which have juſt "been cited; *but we have no doubt of the truth of the "one, or of the excellence of the other: and are convinced "that both will be placed on a firmer baſis, in proportion "as the minds of men are more trained to the inveſtiga-"tion of truth.* On the meanneſs and malice of this "ſuppreſſion we ſhall make no comment." Rev. No. 31. p. 178.

Who that reads this would not imagine, that I had been impeaching or inſinuating ſomething againſt the *religious and political opinions* of the Reviewer—that I had produced this paſſage in ſupport of my argument, to ſhew their dangerous tendency—and that I had omitted *part of a ſentence* in order to give to the reſt a force which did not belong to it? Such, I think, muſt be the impreſſion made on a perſon unacquainted with the caſe; and whoever has been led to form that opinion, I entreat him to read p. 163. of the Reply.

He will find that the argument was not in the ſlighteſt degree connected either with political or religious tenets, but that it concerned merely the particular charges preferred againſt this Univerſity: namely,—"that our inſtruction was confined "to the grammatical niceties of a dead language—"that we repreſs all attempts at reaſoning upon "moral and political queſtions—that by our mi-"ſerable jealouſy and littleneſs an infinite quan-"tity of talent is deſtroyed—that all the great "topics, in which the mind of a public man "ſhould be well informed, are not only neglected, "but diſcouraged or deſpiſed." Having given this ſummary, I proceeded to ſay, "The words of this "*acrimonious invective* I have not thought it al-"ways neceſſary to tranſcribe; but the ſubſtance "of it will not be found, I truſt, unfairly ſtated, *if* "*compared with the extracts below.*" Theſe extracts were given in *a note*, as authorities for the ſtatement made in the text; which ſtatement was immediately followed by a diſcuſſion of the term *Utility*.

It is impoſſible to conceive a caſe where ingenuity would be more tortured, in order to faſten a charge of diſhonourable quotation. The clauſes which finiſh the extract were almoſt neceſſary to ſhew the full extent of the phraſes '*moral* and 'political truth,' as well as the preciſe meaning of the preceding ſentence, "And yet, who vilifies

"of both, &c." They were introduced ſolely with that view. To have continued the extract would have been not only irrelevant, but *contrary* to the *profeſſed* deſign of the note. We were condemned for ſuppreſſing all free diſcuſſion of thoſe important topics, as if afraid that the truth might be againſt us. The Reviewer argues that the fear is unmanly, and that truth ſhould be the object of our purſuit, to whatever concluſions it might lead. He thought proper to accompany this ſentiment with a declaration of *his own* opinions on thoſe ſubjects; and if thoſe opinions had been at all the object of animadverſion or diſpute, it would have been unfair and indeed abſurd in me to have kept the paſſage out of ſight. But, *being totally foreign to the ſubject in hand,* it would have been equally trifling to inſert it, in a note which profeſſed only to give *abridged* extracts of the parts moſt intimately connected with the argument. However important his opinions in religion and politics may be to himſelf, or however important he may think them to the world, *upon this argument they had not the moſt diſtant bearing.* To have mentioned them would have been to digreſs and amplify, inſtead of to abridge[b].

[b] Perhaps it may be the beſt way to produce the entire paragraph from which extracts were given in the Reply, as *ſpecimens of acrimonious invective* againſt Oxford. The paſſages *not extracted* are printed in Italics. From this I truſt it will ap-

To illuſtrate my *own caſe* more clearly, I would remind the reader of a topic mentioned in p. 49.

pear, that *compreſſion* was the chief object; and that the laſt clauſes extracted were introduced as *explanatory* of the foregoing paſſage about *moral* and political truth.

'The Engliſh clergy, in whoſe hands education entirely 'reſts, bring up the firſt young men of the country, as if they 'were all to keep grammar ſchools in little country towns; 'and a nobleman, upon whoſe knowledge and liberality the 'honour and welfare of his country may depend, is diligently 'worried, for half his life, with the ſmall pedantry of longs 'and ſhorts. *There is a timid and abſurd apprehenſion, on the 'part of eccleſiaſtical tutors, of letting out the minds of youth upon 'difficult and important ſubjects. They fancy that mental exertion 'muſt end in religious ſcepticiſm; and, to preſerve the principles of 'their pupils, they confine them to the ſafe and elegant imbecility of 'claſſical learning.* A genuine Oxford tutor would ſhudder to 'hear his young men diſputing upon moral and political truth, '*forming, and pulling down theories, and indulging in all the bold-'neſs of youthful diſcuſſion.* He would augur nothing from it, 'but impiety to God, and treaſon to kings. And yet, who villi-'fies both more than the holy poltroon, who carefully averts from 'them the ſearching eye of reaſon, and who knows no better 'method of teaching the higheſt duties, than by extirpating 'the fineſt qualities and habits of the mind? If our religion is 'a fable, the ſooner it is exploded the better. If our govern-'ment is bad, it ſhould be amended. *But we have no doubt of 'the truth of the one, or of the excellence of the other; and are con-'vinced that both will be placed on a firmer baſis, in proportion as 'the minds of men are more trained to the inveſtigation of truth. 'At preſent we act with the minds of our young men, as the Dutch 'did with their exuberant ſpices. An infinite quantity of talent is 'annually deſtroyed by the miſerable jealouſy and littleneſs of eccle-

of this Pamphlet, and reſerved for this purpoſe. The Reviewer produced [Rev. No. 31. p. 167.] the following extract from the Reply:

"The Ariſtotelian Phyſics were interwoven with the "whole courſe of our ſtudies and exerciſes; and it was "not eaſy to reconcile the abandonment of them with "the language of the Statutes, which public officers "were bound to enforce. And thus, as in courts of "judicature, and other bodies of ancient ſtanding, "many forms and practices continued to ſubſiſt, which "had loſt their original force and meaning." p. 16.

Here he ſtops his quotation; and the reader, who is obliged to ſtop along with him, is not *left*, but *led* to conclude, by the remarks which follow, that this ſufficiently accounts for the ſtate of natural philoſophy in Oxford during the laſt ſeventy or eighty years, which had been the object of his cenſure; and that the ſame cauſe ſtill operates againſt the admiſſion of new truths. In the Reply, however, the following words come im-

'ſiaſtical inſtructors. It is in vain to ſay we have produced great 'men under this ſyſtem. We have produced great men under all 'ſyſtems. Every Engliſhman muſt paſs half his life in learning La-'tin and Greek; and claſſical learning is ſuppoſed to have produced 'the talents which it has not been able to extinguiſh. It is ſcarcely 'poſſible to prevent great men from riſing up under any ſyſtem of 'education, however bad. Teach men dæmonology or aſtrology, 'and you will ſtill have a certain portion of original genius, in 'ſpite of theſe or any other branches of ignorance and folly.' Edin. Rev. No. 29. p. 50.

mediately after thoſe which have juſt been cited:

"Even after the new doctrines were received and "taught, formal exerciſes continued to be performed "according to the ancient regimen. How long this "anomalous ſtate of things laſted, I cannot exactly ſay; "but it may ſafely be aſſerted, that, *for more than a* "*century*, the phyſics of Ariſtotle have been ſet aſide, "&c."

In this caſe the part omitted is *eſſential* to the main argument. In the other caſe, it only ſerved to exculpate the Reviewer from a charge which was never brought againſt him [c].

And here too it cannot but excite ſurpriſe, that all this quick ſenſibility ſhould be betrayed by an unknown writer, at the fancied imputation of ſcepticiſm. When a divine of the Church of England is openly charged with having uſed language inconſiſtent with the creed of his church, it may be prudent and neceſſary to avow his belief in every *iota* of the articles to which he has ſubſcribed: and ſuch a declaration muſt for ever put to ſilence his accuſers, and convince the moſt

[c] I cannot avoid noticing an honeſt expedient employed by this writer, who accuſes me of 'low artifice.' In order to perſuade his readers that I had quoted *part of a ſentence* inſtead of the whole, he begins the paſſage omitted with a ſmall letter—"*but we have no doubt*, &c." For an anſwer to this I refer to the Edin. Rev. No. 29. p. 50. quoted in the laſt note.

incredulous that there was no ground for the cruel ſuſpicion entertained againſt him. But even if this inſinuation were intended in the caſe complained of, in what way was it to operate? How could the credit of a nameleſs member of a nameleſs community be at all affected by it? How could *his* feelings be wounded, or his reputation injured by any implied doubts concerning the purity of his faith? This over-anxious jealouſy may indeed be conſtrued into a conſciouſneſs of ſomething not altogether right; and will be far from conveying to the world that entire ſatisfaction, which the pious profeſſion above mentioned has univerſally produced. Nor can I conceive a more lively contraſt than the ſerenity of mind from which alone that profeſſion could take its riſe, and the angry feveriſh inquietude which this querulous Reviewer indicates.

Of the argument maintained by him little can be ſaid, becauſe it is difficult to ſee where it lies. His images always run before his reaſoning, and crowd ſo faſt upon him, that he is at a loſs how to find places for them all. To provide for this, ſeems to be the whole art of his compoſition. He invents a fable, and then ſeeks for a moral. If he can wind the argument round ſo as to bring it in, well: if not, rather than loſe the metaphor, he makes a place to fix it in, and heſitates not to

purchaſe the laughter of a few careleſs readers, by incurring the ſerious reprobation of every man who will take the pains to examine the truth of what he reads.

In this Review he declares that his objection lay not to the ſtudy of Greek and Latin, but that, in reading the former language, "the attention "which ſhould be given to things, is inevitably "diſtracted by words"—"that there is of courſe "leſs leiſure for reflecting upon the opinions and "facts of an author, when the difficulty of the ex-"preſſion is firſt to be overcome." Rev. No. 31. p. 179. Admitting that he ſaid this, what is the inference? It is then a waſte of time to ſtudy that language *thoroughly*. But, if this be true, much greater muſt the waſte be to ſtudy it *partially*—to leave off juſt when the difficulty is conquered; when, according to his own metaphor, the huſk and ſhell have been broken through, and the kernel is to be extracted. Yet "up to a certain "point he would educate every young man in "Latin and Greek; but to a point far ſhort of "that to which this ſpecies of education is now "carried." Rev. No. 29. p. 49. Thus he would have the language learnt, but not learnt ſo as for the ſtudent to become familiar with it; which, as he himſelf tells us, is the only way of making it at all uſeful.

He denies having ſaid, that poetry only was

read in claſſical education. This he may ſafely deny, for it was never alledged againſt him. But he held an argument which reſted ſolely on that ſuppoſition. Vid. Reply, p. 116. and 119. Of the loves of the heathen gods he now ſays, that "they "are the principal ſubjects by which the attention "of young men is engaged in *the firſt years* of "education." And this he would paſs upon his readers as merely a repetition of what he had ſaid before. "Theſe facts the Engliſh youth get by "heart the moment they quit the nurſery; and "are moſt ſedulouſly and induſtriouſly inſtructed "in them *till the beſt and moſt active part of life "is paſſed away.*" Rev. No. 29. p. 46. The ſame paragraph explains this to be *till the age of twenty-four.*

The only remaining point of argument relates to the meaning of the word *Utility*. Of this word I had ſaid, that a ſophiſtical uſe is made. When writers of this deſcription ſpeak of the *uſeleſſneſs* of claſſical learning, they confine the term to the popular ſenſe; and regard thoſe purſuits only as *uſeful* which miniſter to the bodily wants of man: whereas intellectual pleaſure and improvement are objects not only of equal, but of greater utility, provided they do not interfere with or impede the other. The Reviewer, who complains of "baſe "and diſhonourable quotation," repreſents me thus: "The *objections* which he makes to the

"ſcience of chemiſtry, are really curious—that "it raiſes and multiplies the means of ſubſiſtence, "and terminates merely in the bodily wants of "man:" and on this account, he ſays, "I have "conſidered it as *undignified and degrading*." P. 185. He then proceeds to give, as deciſive of the queſtion, the following criterion: "*Every "branch of human knowledge is eſtimated in the "mixt ratio of its utility and its difficulty*." Thus, where the ſole diſpute was concerning the word *utility*, he propoſes to determine it by a criterion which makes uſe of that word without explaining it. How utterly void of truth the whole ſtatement of my reaſoning is, will be ſeen immediately by a reference to page 167. of the Reply.

Having endeavoured to perſuade us that all he meant by his long article in No. 29. was merely to ſhew that claſſical education was "*not the only "good*," p. 180; and having in conſequence enjoyed a very juſt triumph over writers who deal in 'truiſms,' he ſtill perſecutes the ſyſtem of ſchool exerciſes with unrelenting rigour; and ſpeaks of "*the horrible abſurdity of verſe-making*" with an averſion almoſt unaccountable. If a writer had ſuffered under that engine of ſatirical torture, one could eaſily underſtand his diſlike of a thing from which others derive the moſt lively pleaſure. The ingenious gentleman, for inſtance, of verſatile ta-

lents, pourtrayed by Pope in a few lines of the Dunciad, might be indulged in that antipathy:

> Oh! great reſtorer of the good old ſtage,
> Preacher at once, and zany of thy age!
> Oh! worthy thou of Egypt's wiſe abodes,
> A decent prieſt, where monkeys were the gods!

But what motive the preſent critic can have for proſcribing ſo elegant an exerciſe of one of our native faculties, I cannot conjecture, as he has not thought fit to accompany his prohibition with any reaſons. And in this department, as I apprehend, it is not merely the exceſs which he would retrench, but he would explode the whole practice as being altogether a waſte of time.

The reſt, which is made up of mere abuſe, will in general furniſh the beſt anſwer to itſelf. He affects indeed to have been provoked to the employment of this language by what he calls "Billingſgate clamour," "vulgar and ignominious "traſh," and a "rage for perſonality and impertinence," in the pamphlet he is reviewing; all of which, he ſays, are moſt remarkable in the part concerning Claſſical Education. He exclaims, "Why this hailſtorm? this frigid violence? why "this pelting with all the mud and filth he can "get up in his hands?"

" Exit et obducto late tenet omnia limo ?"
Rev. p. 184.

The reading of this paſſage brought to my recollection a ſtory ſo well told by Addiſon, out of Tacitus, and ſo illuſtrative of the caſe, that I cannot forbear extracting it, although it is rather longer than I could wiſh. 'When a great part of the 'Roman legions were in a diſpoſition to mutiny, 'an impudent varlet, who was a private centinel, '*being mounted upon the ſhoulders of his fellow-*'*ſoldiers*, and reſolved to try the power of his 'eloquence, addreſſed himſelf to the army in all 'the poſtures of an orator, after the following 'manner: "You have given liberty to theſe mi-"ſerable men," (pointing to ſome criminals whom they had reſcued,) "but which of you can reſtore "life to my brother? He was murdered no longer "ago than laſt night, by the hands of thoſe ruf-"fians, who are entertained by the General to "butcher the poor ſoldiery. Tell me, Blæſus," (addreſſing himſelf to the General,) "tell me, "where haſt thou caſt his dead body? an enemy "does not grudge the rites of burial. When I "have tired myſelf with kiſſing his cold corpſe, "and weeping over it, order me to be ſlain upon "it. All I aſk of my fellow-ſoldiers, ſince we "both die in their cauſe, is, that they would lay "me in the ſame grave with my brother." 'The 'whole army was in an uproar at this moving

'ſpeech, and reſolved to do the ſpeaker juſtice; 'when, upon enquiry, they found that he never 'had a brother in his life, and that he had ſtirred 'up the ſedition only to ſhew his parts.' Freeholder, No. 17.

In like manner, I entreat thoſe who have been moved by this impaſſioned appeal, to make diligent enquiry into the charge, and I will cheerfully abide their deciſion. It will be neceſſary to conſult the book itſelf, for not a ſingle phraſe is extracted to ſupport the accuſation, nor is even a reference given to the page where any offenſive language, too bad perhaps to be extracted, lies: ſo that one might be tempted to think that the Reviewer had never read the part himſelf; that having been told of it by ſome gentleman or lady, he ſat down to ſhew how undeſerving he was of ſuch treatment, and at the ſame time to ſet an example of writing "modeſtly and like a gentleman."

In the proſecution of this plan, he has not been able to repreſs that indignation which an accurate believer naturally feels at being ſuſpected of a leaning towards ſcepticiſm. So far from being inclined that way, he would have "young men be "diſputing upon moral and political truth, form-"ing and pulling down theories, and indulging "in all the boldneſs of youthful diſcuſſion." This, according to him, is the true way to baniſh doubt and error from young minds. There are, it can-

not be denied, weak and narrow-minded writers, who have thought it beſt for us to learn ſomething, before we diſpute about every thing. But theſe are men of a "trumpery *local underſtanding*;[c]" they are mere depoſitaries of obſolete opinions, which are worn out every where elſe; they will never inſtruct a young man going into public life "to contemn the reputation of a great "ſcholar;[d]" to "*burſt through the cant* of indiſcriminate loyalty, and to know his ſovereign "*only* as he diſcharged thoſe duties, and diſplayed "thoſe qualities, for which the blood and the "treaſure of his people are confided to his "hands[d]." Some of them even have gone ſo far, as to apprehend the moſt dreadful conſequences to ſociety, if ever the ſpirit of free diſcuſſion in religion ſhould gain the aſcendant: conſequences which, though ſomewhat exaggerated, are even in proſpect ſufficiently alarming. "The "danger is, (ſays a grave writer,) that, having eſ"caped from one age of darkneſs, where nothing "was called in queſtion, we ſhall fall into an"other, where every thing is diſcuſſed; that the "fires of perſecution may be lighted up to ſupport "an orthodox pyrrhoniſm, and to check the he"reſy of piety." Sermons by the Reverend Sydney Smith, vol. i. p. 68.

[c] Edin. Rev. No. 31. p. 164. [d] Ibid. No. 29. p. 52.

The ſame intrepid advocate declares, that "to "neglect thoſe floating imputations and popular "*calumnies*, which are in circulation againſt any "ſyſtem either moral, religious, or political, is ra-"ther magnanimous than wiſe." He feels himſelf "called upon by common ſenſe, and by com-"mon ſpirit, to reſiſt and to extinguiſh this dynaſty "of fools;" men who are poſſeſſed with "a madneſs "of incredulity and luſt of doubt." Ibid. The whole ſermon is an admirable ſpecimen of ardent zeal, metaphyſical acuteneſs, and fine writing.

To ſuch a mind, how afflicting muſt it be to obſerve, year after year, anonymous writers of the proſcribed dynaſty, aſſuming his ſtyle and manner for the better concealment of their inſidious deſigns, and induſtriouſly ſapping the very principles which it has been the labour of his life to inculcate; addreſſing themſelves more particularly to the young and thoughtleſs; amuſing their fancy by unexpected combinations of things ſacred with things ludicrous; weakening the natural and habitual reverence of men for the ſervice of religion; and, though never venturing to diſavow religion, yet painfully toiling to looſen all the ſecret filaments by which it winds round the heart, and can alone become inſtrumental to the attainment of any practical good. With theſe men it is common, after ten pages of ſatirical invective againſt *holy poltroons*, to inſert a kind of *ſaving clauſe* of three

lines, profeſſing their belief in revelation. They declaim in favour of public virtue, and have ſome ſwelling periods to convince the world of their moral principle. But the whole evaporates in theſe empty generalities. Whenever they come down to poſitive and particular duties, it is merely for the purpoſe of diſplaying ſome petulant or indecent wit. The more private and familiar the relations of life, out of which theſe duties ſpring, the better fitted they ſeem for materials of ridicule. They are dragged forth from the ſhelter and retirement, in which alone they appear graceful, and are expoſed with a kind of heartleſs gaiety to the gaze of the multitude. And when, by a ſtrain of ludicrous comparifons, a feeling of contempt has at length become aſſociated with the mention of thoſe ſubjects, the inſult is pointed by a pretended eſteem for ſome general quality, which never can have real exiſtence, except in the ſhape of one or other of thoſe duties which are thus derided.

Nothing, according to my own judgment, is more pernicious than ſuch preachers of morality. Nothing is more likely to corrupt, not merely the taſte, but the principles and affections, of thoſe who hear them. And to the writer whoſe ſentiments have juſt been quoted, what can be more painful than to behold this artful adverſary counteracting all his ſerious endeavours? It is a mortification which good men alone are fit to meet; and which

muſt call for all that *piety* to withſtand it, which, though now his chief ſolace, may, as he ſeems to fear, one day become the object of ſtill keener perſecution.

That it has been my lot to provoke the malice of ſuch an adverſary, cannot excite wonder, when the nature of the cauſe, in defence of which I wrote, is recollected. In that cauſe is included what an enemy to virtue and religion would moſt ſeek to depreciate: and ſince it is now too late to think of gaining that point by open violence, no method ſeems to promiſe better, than the ſubtle inſidious approaches, which this writer ſo well knows how to practiſe. If once he can ſucceed in making people aſhamed of partial affections, and of the obſcurer claſs of relative duties; if he can ſubſtitute high ſounding declamation for active and diligent performance; his purpoſe is in a great meaſure effected. This is the way in which the great maſters of the ſame ſchool have trod before him. Demoliſh the outworks, and the citadel will ſoon fall. Teach men to talk of virtue in lofty phraſes when it is an abſtract name, and to laugh at it when exemplified in ſpecific conduct. Let them profeſs to love and revere their country in theory, but deſpiſe every ſeparate part of which the aggregate is compoſed. It was in reference to ſome tenets of this nature Mr. Burke obſerved, that "to be attached to the ſubdiviſion—to love the

" little platoon we belong to in ſociety, is the firſt
" principle, the germ, as it were, of public affec-
" tion: it is the firſt link in the ſeries, by which
" we aſcend afterwards to a love of our country
" and of mankind." But, among the diſciples of this ſchool, we are taught to believe that the fruit has ripened to perfection, although the firſt germ was always wanting. With them, *patria eſt ubicunque bene eſt.* Their patriotiſm is ſo capacious as to have ſwallowed up every local and limited attachment. Affection to ſcenes endeared by friendſhip, by learning, by religion, by the image of antiquity, and the memory of great names, is not merely an agreeable illuſion, but, according to their own phraſeology, "a trumpery feeling," a degrading prejudice. If it does not awaken their invectives, it is uſually choſen as the provocative of wit; as a thing to be ſpurned and ridiculed, if not ſeriouſly deteſted.

The writer, who has moſt diſtinguiſhed himſelf by railing at all we value and cheriſh in this place, ſeems to have once belonged to it himſelf, and to be nettled at ſome reflections, which he ſuppoſes on that account to be directed againſt him. Safe however in his anonymous diſguiſe, he tells us, that what other people think of him 'he nei-
'ther knows nor cares; but ſays what he has to
'ſay after his own manner.' At the ſame time he recommends to his adverſary a ſimilar conceal-

ment of his name. I have to thank him for the advice, but to aſſure him, that that name will be forthcoming whenever he thinks proper to require it, or whenever it may be neceſſary to ſubſtantiate any aſſertions relating to matters of fact. If I am not greatly miſtaken, the publication of *his* would have ſaved me ſome trouble. It would have been the beſt refutation of all his calumnies againſt the Univerſity; and for myſelf, I ſhould have felt ſatisfied that his keeneſt reproaches, provided that name were coupled with them, would only tend to raiſe me in the eſtimation of all men, whoſe good opinion is worth preſerving.

THE END.

CORRIGENDA.

P. 16. l. 18. Dele *about which more will be ſaid preſently*

43. l. 27. for *ignotias* read *ignotius*

67. l. 12. The Greek line ſhould have been printed without the accents.

APPENDIX.

Sit denique alia scientias colendi, alia inveniendi ratio.
Præf. Nov. Org.

AFTER these pages were printed, Mr. Drummond's *Observations on the Strictures of the Edinburgh Review upon Oxford, and on the Two Replies*, came to my hands: and as a considerable part of that pamphlet is directed against some positions of mine respecting Aristotle's Logic and the Novum Organum, I will not omit this opportunity of defending them, and of explaining more particularly than before what I conceive to be the cause of a very general misapprehension upon both those subjects. Many of these objections I had anticipated as probable, and declared myself ready to meet my antagonist upon this ground in a separate discussion. Others again are of such a nature, that it would never have occurred to me to expect them, or to guard against them. They are however all conveyed in a tone so much more friendly than that to which we have been of late accustomed, that the task of answering them is much lightened: and I trust, that whatever freedom may be shewn in examining Mr. Drummond's statements, will not be interpreted into any resentment at the manner in which he has thought fit to convey his censure, although the censure itself I feel to be without any solid foundation.

The first error into which Mr. Drummond supposes me to have fallen is one, which, if it be an error, can-

not at all affect the question concerning the relative utility of Aristotle and Bacon; namely, that the Novum Organum is confined to the province of the *material world.* Such must be his interpretation of my phrase, 'physical science,' when he blames me for narrowing the scope of Bacon's philosophy to that department. Now to shorten the dispute I will at once admit, that the science of mind, as well as the science of matter, ought to be understood under that appellation. I shall forbear entering at length into a subject which has been of late thoroughly * discussed, and content myself with subscribing to Mr. Stewart's doctrine in its fullest extent, wishing at the same time that the term Metaphysics, which is now commonly employed to denote the science of mind, were recalled to its primitive acceptation. There is, however, quite enough, both in the language and in the subject-matter of Bacon's works, to justify the opinion, that the knowledge of the material world was his main object, and enough perhaps to excuse the error, that it was his only object; but it is sufficient for the Author of the Reply to shew, that upon his argument this point had no bearing. His purpose was to explain, that the Organon, as it has been called in the Schools, of Aristotle, if rightly understood, has an object totally different from the Organon of Bacon; and that it is absurd to set up the one against the other, or to regard the latter as a substitute for the former.

Mr. Drummond therefore has fallen into an error more material to the argument, when he represents me as 'not having spoken the whole truth,' and as implying, that Lord Bacon allows discoveries of any sort may be made by syllogisms. I never thought or said or implied any such thing. The proper extent of the term *physical science,* or *natural philosophy,* was not then present

* See Stewart's Essays, chap. 2.

to my mind; and whether my reasoning was right or wrong, it could not be affected by that circumstance.

The title of Lord Bacon's treatise, as every one knows, is "Novum Organum sive indicia vera de Interpretatione Naturæ;" and this phrase, *interpretatio naturæ*, occurs continually as descriptive of its great and only employment. That its purpose was essentially different from that of Aristotle's Logic (which Lord Bacon always speaks of by the name Logica Vulgaris) is so plainly set forth by himself, that one can only attribute to the unfortunate use of the same name for different things the confusion now so widely prevalent.

"Atque est ea, quam adducimus ars (quam *Interpretationem Naturæ* appellare consuevimus) ex genere Logicæ: "licet plurimum atque adeo immensum quiddam intersit. "Nam et ipsa illa Logica vulgaris auxilia et præsidia in"tellectui moliri ac parare profitetur: et in hoc uno con"sentiunt. Differt autem plane a vulgari, rebus præci"pue tribus: viz. *ipso fine*, ordine demonstrandi, et in"quirendi initiis."

My admiration of the profound and original views of this philosopher cannot be exceeded by Mr. Drummond's; and yet I am tempted to suspect that our notion of their nature and ultimate design does not exactly coincide. However that may be, my own shall be stated very briefly, as it may tend to account for the opinions which I have already published, and am now about to repeat, of the utility of that treatise as a branch of Academical study.

The first part of the *Instauratio magna* consists of a survey of the state of the arts and sciences as they were in the author's time. The defects and errors of the several systems are demonstrated, and hints are given for the supply of what is wanting, as well as for the remedy of what is wrong in each. The point, however,

which he labours to establish, and which draws forth all the power of his comprehensive mind, is, that all these arts and sciences are branches of one parent stock; and that if severed from this stock, they wither and become comparatively unproductive. In the NATURE OF THINGS, he reminds us, they are all founded. They may be practised with success by those who have no knowledge or thought of this connection; but they cannot be improved, nor can their fundamental defects be remedied, except by reverting to that *nature of things* out of which they are formed, and by enlarging our acquaintance with its laws. The *method of inquiry* into this nature, which alone can extend and correct our knowledge of principles, is declared to be not that of *syllogism*, but of *induction*. And this method is most accurately and elaborately explained in the second part of the Instauratio magna, called the Novum Organum.

This celebrated work first enumerates the several causes which have heretofore checked the progress of knowledge, among which Aristotle's works are often mentioned; and the charge against that philosopher is, that he corrupted and fettered *natural philosophy*, or the enquiry into the nature of things, by the rules of his Logic. This Logic (or Dialectic, as I should wish to have it called) he allows to be useful in the invention of arguments, in the communication of thoughts and reasonings, in exhibiting truth clearly to the understanding, and in procuring its assent: but it is barren of that invention which he has in view, the invention of arts and sciences; and this can be effected only by means of discovering new facts and principles, which have hitherto been hid from the eyes of men. The superior dignity of such a pursuit cannot bear a question. In the vastness of its aim, and in its ultimate utility, which extends through all ages, and to the whole human race, it far

surpasses the cultivation of any single art, however necessary or useful to the society in which we are placed.

When I use the term *ultimate* utility, my wish is to mark out the true character and drift of this philosophy, which seems to me to be greatly misunderstood. The additional knowledge thus acquired, Lord Bacon often speaks of as so much acquired *power*. It furnishes man with the means of extending his dominion over the world which he inhabits; that is, of making it subservient to his own wants and pleasures, whether of mind or body. But it is not the *immediate* effect of that knowledge thus to extend his dominion. It is through the medium of the several arts and sciences, by giving rise to the improvement of some, and to the original invention of others, that the truths thus acquired are brought down to use, and applied to the various purposes of life. Those ARTS are, as it were, the instruments by which the sovereign and supreme philosophy exercises her sway, and subjects all the powers of nature to our will; and it is honour enough for most men to wield any one of these instruments skilfully in her service. They are represented again as the channels through which the fountain of knowledge is widely distributed. It is within the compass of very moderate powers to manage, or even to improve these in their interior structure and contrivance: but the streams which flow through them must all be derived from a higher origin; and it is only by opening new and undiscovered springs that we can expect to improve them, or to increase their quantity.

That the discovery of truth will sooner or later be of practical utility, Lord Bacon uniformly maintains. And although he contends for the value and importance of these discoveries, even in their unproductive state, as mere *pignora veritatis*, yet it is by their adoption into some art or system that they become subservient to hu-

man purposes, and are means of *power*. The task of applying them to such purposes is totally distinct from that of making the first discovery; it is not unfrequently the result of accident or conjecture; whereas the discovery itself is the fruit of long, earnest, and methodical enquiry: and although the application may not be soon obvious, he bids us by no means be disheartened or discouraged on that account. The world is in possession of a new truth, and some good we may rest assured will in time arise, from the action of many minds upon it. Indeed he frequently reproves that premature anxiety to apply practically what we have discovered, by a beautiful allusion to the fable of Atalanta, as likely to stop us in the course we are running, and draw us aside after a prize of much inferior value.

Having thus endeavoured to give an exposition of this great author's views, which I hope, however imperfect, will not be thought irrelevant, for a further confirmation of the argument in the Second Reply, I will appeal to the very Aphorism which Mr. Drummond produces as most at variance with my doctrine.

"Etiam dubitabit quispiam potius quam objiciet; "utrum nos de Naturali tantum Philosophia, an etiam "*de Scientiis reliquis, Logicis, Ethicis, Politicis, secundum*" "*viam nostram perficiendis* loquamur. At nos certe de "universis hæc, quæ dicta sunt, intelligimus: atque "quemadmodum vulgaris Logica, quæ regit res per Syl"logismum, non tantum ad Naturales sed ad omnes sci"entias pertinet; ita et nostra, quæ procedit per Indu"ctionem, omnia complectitur." Aph. 127.

If Mr. Drummond, who seems to think that this Aphorism had escaped my notice, will take the trouble of turning to page 15 of the Second Reply, he will find express reference there made to it, for the purpose of marking my surprise, that a professed admirer of Lord

Bacon should have adopted a *new process of reasoning* directly at variance with his leading principle. At the same time it affords a pointed refutation of the error, that the Novum Organum is meant as a substitute for the Logic now in use, or that it has any closer connection with that Logic, than it has with *every* other art and science; to all of which some benefit may be derived from pursuing steadily this new method of enquiry. It must indeed be obvious to every reader, that the Novum Organum may, for any thing contained in this Aphorism, just as well be called a system of *ethics* or of *politics*, as of *logic*; because it equally holds out the prospect of affording materials for improving each one of those sciences.

The Aphorism is produced indeed by Mr. Drummond in order to contrast it with an assertion of mine, that Lord Bacon's treatise is strictly confined to the province of natural philosophy. This is simply an *argumentum ad hominem*, not *ad rem*. At the utmost it only convicts me of an inaccurate use of words, and leaves my reasoning just where it was. Lord Bacon himself, as we have seen, continually calls his work "Interpretatio Na-"turæ," including mind as well as matter; and although in this Aphorism he evidently uses the phrase *naturalis philosophia* in its popular acceptation, as confined to matter, yet in the same passage the phrase *rerum natura* is twice used so as to include the province of mind. If it would afford him any satisfaction, I could produce various passages from the same author's writings, in which *philosophia* is used in different senses; but this species of verbal criticism I am sure Mr. Drummond would despise as well as myself, when it tends to throw no light upon the argument. I may be permitted however to remark upon one sentence containing this word, because I am apprehensive, from the manner in which he has himself

quoted the passage, that its force was not exactly understood.

"Illud vero monendum, nos in hoc nostro Organo (in "opposition, says Mr. Drummond, to that of Aristotle) "tractare logicam non philosophiam *." I see no ground for supposing that this is Lord Bacon's meaning, or that any emphasis resides in the word *nostro*. This indeed would imply, that Aristotle had called *his* Organon philosophy, and not logic, a charge which I never heard alleged against him. The stress, as I apprehend, lies in the word *organo*. "In this second part of the *Instauratio magna*, "my *logic*, or *method of enquiry*, is explained; being *in-* "*strumental* only to that philosophy, which is the object "of the whole work." Let me observe too, as we are now on the subject of the use of words, that the term *Logica* itself is used by Lord Bacon in different senses—one where it stands, as here, for *his method of enquiry*; another, as in Aphorism 127, where it means Dialectica, or the art of Logic then in use, derived from Aristotle, and which he commonly calls *Logica vulgaris*.

That this art is very capable of improvement, and that we have in the present age the fairest prospect of such improvement from the success with which the inductive science of mind has been cultivated, no one is more ready than myself to allow. But I must think it a most unreasonable and unphilosophical perversion of Lord Bacon's labours to teach, that till that improvement is obtained, the art is to *stand still*, and be neglected. And I think too, that every attentive observer of mankind must perceive it to be one of the most efficient of those agents, by which the *power* that knowledge gives is exercised; for, if rightly understood as an art of language, it regulates the universal machinery by means

* Nov. Org. Lib. II. Aph. 52.

of which the understanding of one man acts upon that of another. As such I have always looked upon it to be an essential, and even indispensable part of liberal education. As such it is adopted into our system of studies, not as the road to fame or distinction, but as the *grammar* of reasoning by means of words, the humble but necessary foundation on which every solid intellectual fabric must be raised.

Mr. Drummond has expressed a doubt whether my attention was ever given to this subject before the present controversy. I can assure him it is one of the earliest which ever much exercised my mind: and when more than ten years ago, upon the projected reform of our Examinations, I heard sensible men talk of substituting the Novum Organum for the Logic of Aristotle, an opinion so strange induced me to examine that work again with peculiar attention. The result of my enquiry was a conviction, which every year's experience has since confirmed, that the recommendation proceeded from an ignorance of the true nature of each treatise. And as often as I hear the students of this University reproached with preferring one to the other, my endeavours shall not be wanting to point out to them this fundamental error; an error upon which our revilers not only ground their favourite accusation of us, but, with a blindness truly disgraceful, place their own claims to superiority.

At the time when Lord Bacon wrote, the abuses of Scholastic Logic were so many, its pretensions so extravagant, the use made of it so pedantic and futile, that some asperity might be justified in those who were conscious they had valuable truth to communicate, but who felt this art operate as an hindrance to its reception. But since these abuses have been remedied, and the art has been confined within its proper limits, I can see no excuse for the contemptuous and angry language in which

some people are at present apt to express their hostility, except in a radical misapprehension of its real object *. It professes only to give us a command over our own knowledge, and to enable us to convey our reasoning in the clearest and most correct manner; and while performing this office it exercises and improves the mental faculties so employed, gives them a facility of action, and guards them against sophistry and imposture.

The next of Mr. Drummond's strictures regards what I said of Induction, and of the mistaken opinion, that Lord Bacon was the sole inventor of this mode of enquiry. I was indeed startled at the first passage which I read on this subject, not only by the extensive acquaintance which it implied with Aristotle's works, an acquaintance far exceeding that which I have any right to boast, but by the assertion itself, which I thought even my own limited reading would enable me to disprove. The assertion was this: "Now whatever be the merit of "Aristotle, it must be admitted, that of *Induction* there "is nothing to be found in his writings." p. 38. It immediately occurred to me, that Lord Kames had long ago stripped the philosopher of every 'attempt to apply his 'syllogistic mode of reasoning to any subject handled by 'himself;' and I was at a loss to conceive what postion or what kind of reasoning it was intended, after these successive defalcations, to leave in his possession: for it

* The complaints we hear of the barrenness of Logic, and of the expectation which it raises and disappoints, bear a strong analogy to a story which Bishop Warburton somewhere tells in his Divine Legation, in order to expose a ludicrous mistake of his adversary. A person entered the shop of a toyman at Bath, and asked for a reading-glass, which was one among the many articles in which he dealt. Having tried several without finding them answer his purpose, and at length growing out of humour, the toyman was induced to ask him, "Sir, have you ever learnt to read?" To which the other angrily replied, "Sir, if I had, why should I come here for a reading-glass?"

seemed to me, that if both these positions were true, his works must consist of a series of disjointed propositions; a light in which, however interesting and instructive, I confess I had never been accustomed to view them.

A few pages after, indeed, my perplexity was somewhat relieved, by an explanation of the foregoing passage. "When I said above, that in Aristotle's writings "there is nothing of Induction, I only meant to con- "tend, that he no where treats of it, or recommends its "adoption, and that he was as ignorant of it as the un- "lettered savage is of the law of gravitation." p. 50.

Before I came to this passage, it was my intention to have pointed out whole chapters both of his Ethics and his Rhetoric, which had always struck me as beautiful illustrations of the method of Induction; in particular those relating to the moral habits, to friendship, to justice, and above all to the passions. In all of these the principal object of investigation seemed to be attained by that *abscissio infiniti*, those successive limitations and distinctions, which at length disclosed and *enucleated*, as it were, its genuine form and essence. But the explanation given in page 50 restrains me to another mode of proceeding.

There are then several passages, which I have had the good fortune to meet with, in which Induction is treated of and its adoption recommended, although they are such as, in that wider survey of his whole works, may well have escaped a reader's recollection.

In the Ethics, b. vi. c. 3. I find it expressly said, with a reference to his Analytics, that Induction is the method by which first principles are to be acquired. And in the second book of the Posterior Analytics the doctrine of Induction is handled at some length, both as it relates to the acquisition of principles, and the definition of terms. Mr. Drummond will recollect, that it is

for both these purposes, not only for the discovery of *axiomata*, but also *ad notiones terminandas*, that Lord Bacon urges its adoption. In the latter use I admit it is much more frequently employed by Aristotle, and under that view it is largely considered in this book of the Analytics: but as a form of demonstration also, as *inverting* the accustomed order, and eliciting general truths out of particular examples, it is accurately explained in his Prior Analytics, b. ii. c. 23. and again in the first book of the Topics. The fault of the ancients however was, as I have elsewhere observed, a scanty imperfect examination of particulars, and an eagerness to mount prematurely to the highest principles, impatient of that gradual but sure ascent, which Lord Bacon has so admirably taught and illustrated.

It is needless I trust to remind my readers, that the professed design of what is called Aristotle's Organon being the art of effecting conviction, not of acquiring knowledge, the process of Induction there described is adapted to its appropriate end, and of course, in point of accuracy, fulness, and variety, falls far short of that which is requisite for the investigation of nature; yet even of this the 14th chapter of the second book of the Posterior Analytics will afford no unfavourable specimen.

But, after all, Mr. Drummond will say, 'he is by no 'means convinced that this ἐπαγωγὴ has much resemblance 'to the Baconian Induction.' For he informs us, "The "word is derived from ἐπάγω, *infero*." Thus far we are perfectly agreed. But when he proceeds to say, "and "it would be much more correctly rendered *inference*, or "deduction," not only my logical prejudices, but my regard for the *Latin* * as well as the Greek language,

* In the passage quoted by Mr. Drummond from Quintilian, *inferebat* means only *brought in*: its union with *novissime* proves, that the other

forbid me to follow him. The word, both according to its etymology and its use, signifies *bringing in*. A general proposition may be proved either by shewing its dependence upon some other acknowledged proposition, or by *bringing in several particulars* sufficient to warrant that proposition, that is, to make it probable, or even morally certain.. In like manner, when the true nature of any thing is to be defined, we are directed to *bring in* particulars one after the other, and carefully compare them with the thing in question, especially those which most resemble it; and to proceed in this comparison till we have distinguished that thing from all other things, and ascertained its exact character and dimensions.

Although I am by no means desirous of repeating my opinion concerning Lord Kames's works in general, especially as it seems to have given great offence, yet I cannot consent to retract or modify it in the slightest degree with regard to the passage in question; and I will even venture to exhibit that passage again, without any comment, as a full justification of my remark. "Aristotle "never attempts to apply his syllogistic mode of rea-

things had been *brought in* as well as this: and every one who has read Plato's Dialogues is aware of the manner of Socrates, not to deduce conclusions himself, but, after having obtained concessions upon several analogous points, to *bring in* at last [novissime] the point he had in view, and draw a similar concession from his opponent upon that. But the use which Rhetoricians made of the term is not now the question. It is by them borrowed from Logic; and, although extended in its application, it still bears an obvious affinity to its original meaning. The ἐπαγωγὴ of the Topics comes very near to that of Rhetoric. And I have little doubt but the subsequent extension of the term *infero* to the sense of '*draw a conclusion*,' is to be assigned to this favourite rhetorical practice. The genuine sense of *infero*, its affinity with *induco*, and the first symptoms of its subsequent extension to the meaning of *infer*, may be seen in Cic. de Inventione; particularly in chapters 34, 40, 45, 47. *Inductio* is clearly explained in chapter 31. of the same work.

" soning to any subject handled by himself: on ethics, on " rhetoric, and on poetry, he *argues* like a rational be- " ing, without once putting in practice any of his own " rules."

Mr. Drummond indeed says, that the exercise of reducing the *truths* which his treatises contain to the syllogistic form, " if there be any justice in *the definition*, " *that every sentence must contain a proposition*, is not " more appropriate to the writings of the Greek philo- " sopher than to any other work which may exhibit a " due proportion of *self-evident truths*." p. 53. Does he then suppose that I meant to reduce self-evident truths to a syllogistic form? Either he or I have been guilty of a strange mistake. My meaning and I believe my words were, that Aristotle's *arguments* in those treatises are easily reduced to the syllogistic form, and are striking examples of the force and accuracy of his logical system.

In adverting to some minor topics of accusation, it gives me no little concern to notice what I must call a degree of unfairness, and want of candour, in a person for whom I entertain much respect, and to whom I am indebted for many handsome and even flattering expressions.

The first instance is, his stating that I have applied the epithet '*flippancy*' to Lord Bacon, which 'most in- 'appropriate appellation' he ascribes to the 'influence 'of inveterate prejudice;' and he proceeds to say, " The " charge of '*flippancy*' against Bacon is founded upon " the comparison of the ancient philosopher's ambition " to that of his royal pupil, the justness of which has " rendered it almost proverbial." p. 55. This interpretation of my language is, I must be allowed to say, in every sense of the word, a specimen of *mala inductio*: and in order to refute it I will produce the single passage

upon which the unfair representation rests. "It has "been a current charge against Aristotle, that he medi- "tated the same thraldom over the minds of men, which "his pupil Alexander endeavoured to effect over their "bodies and fortunes. A charge which, from its flippancy, "one might suspect to be of a very different growth, but "which had its origin with no less name than Bacon." *First Reply*, p. 20. If this passage can be construed into any disrespect of that philosopher, if it indicate any prejudice against him, or if the tenor of my language, whenever I have occasion to mention him, does not always bespeak admiration and esteem, I will submit without a murmur to Mr. Drummond's reproof. That the charge against Aristotle is altogether groundless, notwithstanding the high authority by which it has very recently been sanctioned, I am firmly convinced: and I feel that indignation at hearing it, which is always allowable when the character of an illustrious person, the fruits of whose labours mankind still enjoy, is unjustly aspersed.

Mr. Drummond, however, thinks himself entitled to affirm; 'It is in vain to dispute the justice of Dr. Reid's 'remarks upon Aristotle's want of candour, either as 'to the bounds of his own knowledge, or the merits of 'his predecessors. Of the former the Author of the Re- 'plies himself affords the strongest confirmation, when 'he admires his "entire systems moulded into a full and "*perfect* shape; buildings planned and raised from their "foundation by the same hand, and carefully *finished in* "*all their parts*;" a praise,' Mr. Drummond continues, 'which no panegyrist would have offered, and which no 'philosopher would have claimed, who entertained just 'views of the human mind.' p. 55. I must here beg my readers to bear in mind the occasion of my panegyric, which will be the best commentary on the candour of this interpretation. I was contrasting the labours of

Aristotle with those *detached essays and dissertations*, which, however useful or ingenious, demand neither the effort nor the talent requisite for framing *an entire system*. Aristotle engaged in this more arduous office: and the more I become acquainted with his works, the greater astonishment do I feel at the intellectual powers which they display. The epithets *perfect*, and *finished*, which I had applied to the nature of the composition, and had used in opposition to *partial*, and *unfinished*, Mr. Drummond most unaccountably represents as proofs *that I thought the systems incapable of improvement*: a representation to which no other answer is necessary than the reference above made to the context.

I come now to the position which, though not the most important, strikes me as by far the most extraordinary in the whole pamphlet. 'When the Author of the 'Reply observes, that "the syllogistic method of reason-"ing is not once mentioned, in the first book of the No-"vum Organum, among the causes which seem to have "obstructed the advancement of natural science," he can 'only be understood to mean, *that no mention whatever of* 'syllogism occurs in that part of the work.' p. 56. He then informs his readers, that the very second page contains four consecutive aphorisms, in which syllogism is mentioned, as *useless* in the discovery of every species of knowledge; and this he would advance as completely contradicting my assertion. Mr Drummond elsewhere talks of the 'wretched outlines of Logic,' which are found sufficient to qualify a candidate for Examination. What these outlines are I cannot even guess; but of this I am sure, that if a candidate were to give the proposition above quoted from his pamphlet as *contradictory* to my assertion, he would be required to produce other evidence of his skill in Logic, before he would be allowed to

assume even the humble appendage of B. A. to his name.

This wrong interpretation of my words *against* me is the more remarkable, when compared with his *favourable* interpretation of my adversary's words, about the dictates of Aristotle being received at Oxford as infallible decrees. These dictates my adversary had himself explained to be 'The Logic and Metaphysics' of that philosopher. But when he is informed that the *Metaphysics* are not read here, how does the 'impartial hearer of both 'sides' determine the question? Not by declaring that the charge has been refuted, but that my adversary must '*be understood to mean such metaphysical doctrines as are 'contained in the Ethics and Rhetoric.*' p. 36. Why *he* must be understood to mean this, or why *I* must be understood to mean that a thing is not mentioned *at all*, because I say it is not mentioned as an *obstruction*, is to me quite unintelligible: and I cannot but suspect that Mr. Drummond, while he wrote these passages, had forgotten for a moment the office which his motto implies, and that we must look a little higher in his title-page for the character which alone can justify such a mode of proceeding.

It is not my design to enter into the examination of Mr. Drummond's strictures on the late proceedings in this University, or of the further reforms which he proposes; although I cannot withhold my tribute of respect for the candour and ability which he has displayed in discussing those subjects. He will, however, permit me to observe, that some of his information is altogether of a novel kind, even to myself, who have been no inattentive observer of all the recent changes. In particular, when he remarks, with reference to Oxford, "that any system of University "education must be deemed faulty and incomplete, in

" which the inductive method of intellectual philosophy " *is utterly proscribed,*" [p. 58.] it seems not improper to guard his readers against a most egregious mistake. As well might it be said, that the study of Oriental literature, of political economy, of the English Classics, of Antiquities, of the Saxon or the modern languages, in short, of one half of the things which are studied here, is *proscribed,* as the philosophy which he mentions. The grounds for each of these assertions are in this respect precisely equal, that they are not required of a candidate for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts. Mr. Drummond has himself given the history of the abolition of the Examination for the Degree of Master of Arts; a measure upon which different opinions were strongly entertained at the time; but I believe it never occurred either to the friends or to the opposers of that measure to suspect, that a single individual in the whole University would therefore imagine the studies formerly directed for that Degree to be *proscribed.*

If he would recommend the addition of that study to the other branches required for the first Degree, I must beg leave to dissent entirely from his opinion. If any alteration is made, I would rather indeed see the field contracted than enlarged. The prevailing fault even of diligent students is to pass over the ground of their studies too rapidly; and the business of the instructor, which requires most skill and effort, is, to *detain* the mind upon the several principles he is teaching till they are thoroughly worn in, to present these principles in a variety of lights, and to check that ambitious pursuit of higher objects, till it can be indulged without prejudice to more solid and necessary attainments. It is this disposition to slight the ordinary track of study, aided by what Lord Bacon emphatically calls " the canker of epitomes," which, instead of increasing real knowledge, and forming

accurate thinkers, fills the world with so many empty talkers. *Ista advolatio ad generalissima*, to use the great philosopher's own words, *perdidit omnia*. Nor can I imagine a more crude and preposterous misconception of the nature of his labours, than to fancy that a young man's mind is to be employed in the cultivation of the *prima philosophia*, that is in quest of discoveries by which new ARTS may be invented and old ones improved, before he has yet learnt any one of those ARTS in its present form and condition.

But upon this subject I will now say no more. What I have said has occupied more space than I had intended; although the magnitude and wide prevalence of the error which I have endeavoured to correct might well excuse a much longer discussion. The view thus given of Lord Bacon's philosophy is either altogether wrong, or it must be useful. And on that account I solicit the close attention of younger students to it, in order that they may be proof against those groundless imputations which our enemies have lately circulated, if any attempt should ever again be made to repeat them.

To the Edinburgh Reviewers indeed Mr. Drummond thinks 'that every impartial person must feel considerably indebted,' for having brought these subjects into notice. On their motives he does not venture to form any decision; although I am glad to see that of one of those writers his opinion does not appear to differ widely from mine. My own, expressed as it was without reserve in the Second Reply, is founded solely upon a consideration of that Reviewer's writings; which appear to me to indicate an absence not only of generous and manly feeling, but of moral principle: and as I find this to be a very general persuasion, I have good reason to think, that, whatever opinions or scurrilities he might think proper to publish, they would soon be perfectly harmless, if they

were not anonymous. But (leaving this writer to the benefit of his own reflections) of the rest I must say, that, whatever good may have arisen from the discussion, I should have thought the praise belonged least of all to the authors of the evil out of which it sprung. That it is beneficial to the public to have the truth vindicated, and to repel calumny, cannot be doubted; but I confess, that, till now, I was not aware of the merit of those who give occasion for this duty, nor of the gratitude which is due to false accusers.

POSTSCRIPT.

SOME variation in the use of the phrase *Naturalis philosophia* occurs even in the Novum Organum; but it is not such as to cause any embarrasment to the reader, or even to excite any notice, had not the full extent of Lord Bacon's design been called in question. In Aph. 127, it is clearly used, as we use the phrase *natural philosophy*, for one of those sciences which are to be enriched and improved by his method of investigation. "Utrum nos "de naturali tantum philosophia, an etiam de *scientiis* "*reliquis*, logicis, ethicis, politicis &c." In this sense it resembles what he elsewhere calls *historia naturalis*, as in Aph. 98. "Alia enim est ratio naturalis historiæ, "quæ propter se confecta est; alia ejus, quæ collecta "est ad informandum intellectum in ordine ad conden- "dam philosophiam." That Lord Bacon thought but little of the philosophy of mind throughout the Novum Organum, and the succeeding parts of his Instauratio magna, every candid reader must allow. It is only here and there that we are reminded *obiter*, of the application of his method of enquiry to this purpose. In the beginning of the 80th Aphorism the term *naturalis philosophia* will be found used in its limited sense, as is evident from the degrading service in which he complains that it is employed. But as he proceeds, the larger and more comprehensive meaning opens upon us. I cannot perhaps do better than extract the remainder of this Aphorism entire; because it is not only decisive of the question, whether his work embraces the science of mind, but it likewise concentrates almost every thing

I have endeavoured to demonstrate of the real scope of his philosophy.

" Interim nemo expectet magnum progressum in sci-
" entiis (præsertim in parte earum operativa) nisi philo-
" sophia naturalis ad scientias particulares producta fue-
" rit, et scientiæ particulares rursus ad naturalem philo-
" sophiam reductæ. Hinc enim fit, ut astronomia,
" optica, musica, plurimæ artes mechanicæ, atque ipsa
" medicina, atque (*quod quis magis miretur*) *philosophia*
" *moralis et civilis, et scientiæ logicæ* nil fere habeant
" altitudinis in profundo; sed per superficiem et varie-
" tatem rerum tantum labantur: quia postquam particu-
" lares istæ scientiæ dispertitæ et constitutæ fuerint, *a*
" *philosophia naturali non amplius aluntur*; quæ ex fon-
" tibus et veris contemplationibus motuum, radiorum,
" sonorum, texturæ et schematismi corporum, *affectuum,*
" *et prehensionum intellectualium,* novas vires et augmenta
" illis impertiri potuerit. Itaque minime mirum est, si
" scientiæ *non crescant,* cum a radicibus suis sint sepa-
" ratæ."

THE END.

A

THIRD REPLY

TO THE

EDINBURGH REVIEW.

A

THIRD REPLY

TO THE

EDINBURGH REVIEW,

BY

THE AUTHOR OF A REPLY

TO

THE CALUMNIES

OF THAT REVIEW AGAINST OXFORD.

OXFORD,

Printed for the Author; and sold by J. Cooke, and J. Parker;
J. Mackinlay, J. Murray, and F. C. & J. Rivington,
London.

1811.

Collingwood and Co. Printers, Oxford.

Rides? Quid mea cum pugnat ſententia ſecum?
Quod petiit, *ſpernit*; repetit quod nuper omiſit;
Diruit, ædificat, *mutat quadrata rotundis?* Hor.

HAVING been led to entertain the hope that a controverſy excited by the Calumnies of the Edinburgh Review againſt Oxford was now cloſed, and that each party might be allowed to return to that temper of mind and to thoſe peaceful occupations which had been for ſome time interrupted, I was much concerned to ſee a diſpoſition manifeſted in the laſt number of that Review to reſume the ſubject. The recurrence to it was a needleſs digreſſion from the writer's argument: and it was accompanied with language ſo contemptuous, and, as I conceive, ſo unjuſt, that I cannot abſtain from offering a vindication of myſelf; and from pointing out the fallacy, by which the writer endeavours to defend his former error. For this purpoſe it will be neceſſary to preſent my readers with a brief ſummary of the whole queſtion.

It will be remembered then, that the Edinburgh Reviewer propoſed the following rule, *as a criterion by which it might always be determined what parts of Geometrical ſcience are elementary*

and what not. " Every property of lines of the " firſt and ſecond order, and of the figures com- " poſed from them, which, when tranſlated into " the language of Algebra, involves nothing " higher than a quadratic equation, providing, at " the ſame time, that it be a propoſition of very " general application, is to be accounted elemen- " tary."

To this rule, or definition, it was objected by the Author of a Reply to the Calumnies of the Edinburgh Review, that it was defective in three eſſential points.

1ſt, That it *includes* what is not elementary.

2dly, That it *excludes* what is elementary.

3dly, That it is looſely and indefinitely worded.

In the Review of Woodhouſe's Trigonometry, No. 33. p. 125, the critic adverts to theſe objections, and, leaving the firſt and third unanſwered, proceeds to defend the definition againſt the ſecond. In ſupport of this ſecond objection it had been obſerved, that many of the propoſitions arranged by Profeſſor Playfair under the head of Elements, if reſolved algebraically, would involve *cubic equations:* and one was ſingled out as an example, viz: the 11th of the 3d Book of his Supplement, which is the ſame as the 33d of the 11th Book of Euclid. " Similar Solid Parallele- " pipeds are to one another in the triplicate ratio " of their homologous ſides."

The Reviewer in defence of his definition ſays, "Let us take the propoſition here given, and "tranſlate it directly into the language of Alge-"bra. Becauſe the object of the theorem is to "expreſs the ratio of two ſolids by means of the "ſides of the ſolids, we muſt conſider the ſolids "as the *unknown*, and their ſides as the *known* "quantities. Call the ſolids therefore x and y, "and their homologous ſides a and b; then the "propoſition *affirms*, that x is to y as a^3 to b^3: "therefore $\frac{x}{y} = \frac{a^3}{b^3}$. But this is ſtrictly and li-"terally a Simple Equation." Edin. Rev. No. 33. p. 126.

He then proceeds to remark, that the error of his opponent is ſo groſs, that it is unaccountable on any ſuppoſition, except that of extreme ignorance of the principles both of geometry and algebra.

This reproach might perhaps have come with a better grace from one who had proved himſelf free from error in that department of ſcience. My readers however will bear in mind, that expreſſions of exactly the ſame import were lately uſed by him, becauſe I conſidered certain parts of Geometrical ſcience to be more than Elementary, which M. D'Alembert and Profeſſor Playfair had taught me to arrange in that manner. He could not conceive in what ſchool I had learnt Mathe-

matics, in order to be capable of ſuch a miſtake: and he produced it as a proof, that the whole Univerſity in which I had ſtudied were as ignorant as he had before pronounced them to be. If an indifferent perſon had told him that ſuch an opinion prevailed at Oxford, he would hardly have believed it—and he aſſured his readers, that he never ſaid any thing half ſo ſevere againſt Oxford, as what was implied in that opinion.

Yet after I had made it appear that this opinion was ſanctioned by the moſt eminent Mathematicians—that M. D'Alembert and Profeſſor Playfair had expreſsly held the ſame doctrine—I might have expected ſome little conceſſion on his part, if ever he ſhould again be led to mention the ſame ſubject. In particular I think I had a right to draw from him an acknowledgment, not only that D'Alembert, but that a celebrated writer and countryman of his own, had held the very ſame language, which he repreſented as a proof of conſummate ignorance in me. Nay, after having admitted that this definition was at variance with D'Alembert's doctrine, he inſinuates that it is nevertheleſs defenſible, and that he ſtill adheres to it; but adds, "It is *needleſs to give in this place our* "*reaſons* for extending our definition farther than "the geometer above named had choſen to do." Why only the *geometer above named?* Was there not another *geometer* alſo named, who in 1804

declared the ſame opinion? And would he inſinuate that this geometer has changed his opinion? Or that his authority is inconſiderable? Or that he is at this moment* one of his opponents, though he does not think him worth naming? Or, in ſhort, that what was elementary then, has, in conſequence of the rapid advancement of Science in the laſt ſix years, ceaſed to be elementary now? Of all theſe hypotheſes indeed the laſt is by far the moſt improbable; eſpecially when we recollect that the writer is himſelf one who laments the decline of Mathematical ſcience in this country during the laſt 80 years.

Whatever the caſe may be, it certainly is neither decent nor diſcreet in the Reviewer thus to ſlide over the ſubject without any notice of that Profeſſor, whoſe authority had been quoted by name againſt him. It may be harmleſs, as I doubt not it is highly amuſing, to him and to his friends to attack my credit, or that of any nameleſs writer; and ſome indulgence perhaps is due to a propenſity at once ſo amiable and entertaining. But when he ſhews ſo little regard for well known and diſtinguiſhed characters, I confeſs I cannot ſo eaſily forgive him. To me at leaſt it ſeems to be no light affair: and however contemptuouſly he may think himſelf entitled to treat that moſt reſpect-

* See the motto

able writer, I truſt that I, for one, ſhall never be found wanting in due reſpect for his authority, and in tenderneſs for his well-earned reputation.

It is in vindication of that writer's method that I now again venture to oppoſe this anonymous critic, and undertake to prove that his criterion would exclude from the Elements ſome propoſitions which Profeſſor Playfair has placed among them. But I muſt in the firſt place complain that an attempt is made to withdraw the reader's mind from the true ſtate of the queſtion: and on that account I requeſt him to read over the Reviewer's words once more, and to take particular notice of the clauſe, 'providing it be a propoſition of very 'general *application*.'

"Every property of lines of the firſt and ſecond "order, and of the figures compoſed from them, "which, when tranſlated into the language of "Algebra, involves nothing higher than a qua- "dratic equation, providing, at the ſame time, *that* "*it be a propoſition of very general application*, "is to be accounted elementary." "The ſimpli- "city that muſt always be reckoned eſſential to "elementary ſcience, is ſecured by the firſt of the "two conditions juſt mentioned, *and the uſeful-* "*neſs* by the ſecond."

It is my own belief that, when framing this criterion, he was thinking only of *curves*, and that the properties of ſolids were not at that time

within his contemplation. This however, if true, it would have been too humiliating to confeſs. He proceeds therefore to prove that the 33d of the 11th of Euclid falls within his definition, becauſe, truly, what the Propoſition *affirms* may be expreſſed algebraically without involving a Cubic Equation. But can it always be ſo *applied?* And is it not the *application* of the propoſition which, according to his own rule, is to determine whether it be elementary or not? If one of the ſides of thoſe ſolids ſhould be an unknown quantity, will he deny that we muſt proceed, in the algebraical inveſtigation of it, by means of a cubic equation?

There is however a confuſion in the whole ſtatement, into which I cannot conceive it poſſible that ſo profound a Mathematician would have fallen, if he had not been concerned to vindicate a former error. He ſeems to conſider the demonſtration of a Geometrical *theorem* and the ſolution of an algebraical problem as the ſame thing. He talks of the ſolids, in prop. 33d of the 11th of Euclid, as being *unknown* quantities, and the ſides of thoſe ſolids as being *known*. In comparing the language of Geometry with that of Algebra, I have always been accuſtomed to conſider the term *given* as equivalent to *known*, and *undetermined* as equivalent to *unknown*. If we adopt this phraſeology, the Sides in that propoſition are not more

known than the Solids are known. All the terms are equally known: and the object of the theorem is to demonſtrate the mutual relation which ſubſiſts between them. This relation being once eſtabliſhed as an univerſal truth, whenever a problem comes before us, to which that truth is *applicable*, we proceed to inveſtigate the *unknown quantity of that problem* by means of the relation which, as Geometry has taught us, ſubſiſts between it and the known quantities. If, in order to *apply* that Geometrical truth, we muſt make uſe of a cubic equation, the Geometrical truth lies beyond the limits which, as I conceive, the Edinburgh Reviewer had preſcribed for the Elements of that Science.

That a problem may be given, the ſolution of which depends upon the 33d of the 11th of Euclid, but in which, when tranſlated into the language of Algebra, a cubic equation is neceſſary, I preſume he will not deny. Indeed when I recollect the profeſſions of eſteem for claſſical literature which fell from this learned writer, I make no doubt but he is familiar with a celebrated problem of antiquity, ſaid to have been delivered as a reſponſe from the oracle of Delphi, and to have acquired the name of the Delian problem, becauſe it directed the Athenians to double the altar of Apollo at Delos, the ſhape of which was a cube. After having condeſcended to notice one *defiance* of ſo

ignorant a writer as myſelf, he will not perhaps diſdain to accept a ſecond—which is, to ſolve this problem algebraically without a cubic equation.

Till this is done, my objection to his rule, "that "it excludes from the Elements what properly "belongs to them," will, I truſt, be allowed to ſtand. For he will not, I hope, carry his contempt of Logic ſo far as to ſhelter himſelf under the defence, that this propoſition *may* be applied in ſome caſes where cubic equations are not involved, ſince that would be allowing the ſame propoſition to be both elementary, and not elementary—and would carry with it ſuch defiance not only of Logic but of common ſenſe, as was not practiſed by all the Scoffers and Sophiſts of antiquity.

As this is probably the laſt opportunity I ſhall have of addreſſing my opponent, he will, it is hoped, allow me to add a few words in reply to the concluding ſentence of his digreſſion. Not content with the reproach already noticed, he cloſes with an inſinuation, which, if juſt, (however incredible or inconceivable the feeling may be to him,) would be, I can aſſure him, in my own eſtimation more diſgraceful than that 'extreme ig-'norance' ſo courteouſly alledged againſt me. "We have done more," he ſays, "than we were "challenged to do; but it may not, for all that,

"s be out of the power of quibble and conceit to "s diſpute the victory."

Where, let me aſk, does he diſcover thoſe ſymptoms of 'quibble and conceit,' which, as he thinks proper to imply, are the only weapons now left to his antagoniſt? Is there one among the many arguments maintained againſt him, which is conducted in ſuch a manner as to deſerve that character? If ſo, he might have referred or alluded to it at leaſt, inſtead of dealing out a general ſarcaſm, for which there exiſts no real foundation. When I challenged him to reduce the propoſition in queſtion to a *quadratic*, I adopted his own term, and meant no more than to expreſs the extreme limit of the definition which he had drawn. And if any impartial reader of the argument I have juſt ſtated ſhall determine that the propoſition has been reduced by him within that limit, whether it be to a quadratic or a ſimple equation, I will make no attempt to diſpute the victory. But this, I am confident, can never be ſo determined, except by means of that perverſion of language, which alone deſerves the name of *quibbling*. It cannot be, without giving to words a different ſenſe from that which they were deſigned to bear. The whole of my language ſhewed that I was ſpeaking of ſomething to be *ſolved*—not ſomething to be *affirmed*: and the whole of the Reviewer's language ſhews that he had the ſame

meaning, till the vindication of one error tempted him incautiouſly to commit a greater.

If however the term *quibbling* was introduced merely to expreſs his contempt of that logical method in which my reaſoning was conveyed, I have only to lament that a writer of ſuch ability ſhould ſtill countenance the popular, but miſtaken notion, which in a former publication I endeavoured to correct. If he will deign to devote ſome portion of his time to that much neglected art, he will, I am perſuaded, diſcover that one of its greateſt advantages is, the quick perception which it breeds of unſound reaſoning under all its diſguiſes; and, inſtead of confounding the uſe with the abuſe of it, he may learn hereafter to transfer his contempt to thoſe artifices, which it is the buſineſs of Logic to detect and to render of no avail.

Note. Since the publication of the Second Reply, I diſcovered that the life of Dr. Matthew Stewart, whom I by no means intended to exclude from the number of perſons to whom Mathematical Science is greatly indebted, came within the period ſpecified in page 49, as unproductive of ſuch characters.

Ibid. Page 70. "That there may be, and often are, "ellipſes of *fit quod*, as well as of other phraſes, I never "denied, nor even doubted." This is not conſiſtent

with the opinion given, p. 57. of the First Reply; which opinion I ſtill retain, although it was out of my recollection at the time this paſſage was written.

Ibid. Page 73. In the latter editions of Johnſon's Dictionary a doubt is expreſſed about the propriety of the phraſe *according as:* it is however ſanctioned not only by the authors named in this page, but by Locke, Saunderſon, Prieſtley, and by the Author of the Wealth of Nations almoſt in every page.

THE END.

OBSERVATIONS,

SUGGESTED BY THE STRICTURES

OF

THE EDINBURGH REVIEW

UPON OXFORD;

AND BY THE TWO REPLIES,

CONTAINING

SOME ACCOUNT OF THE LATE CHANGES IN THAT UNIVERSITY.

By HENRY HOME DRUMMOND,

B. C. L. ADVOCATE.

Βελτιον αναγκη εχειν προς το κριναι, τον ὡσωερ ανιδικων και των αμφισβητουντων λογων ακηκοοτα ωαντων.

ARISTOT. METAPHYS.

EDINBURGH:

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1810.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE Account of "The Course of Studies pursued in Oxford," which has been given by the Author of Two able Replies to the Edinburgh Review, and the important confession which he has extorted from his opponents, that their animadversions are inapplicable to the present state of that University, may, perhaps, require some apology for any farther discussion of the subject. On one point, however, I have the misfortune to differ from that Author, with regard to the views which he entertains of Lord Bacon's Writings, and the importance which he has attached to Aristotle's Logic in the system of Academical discipline; and something still appears to be wanting as to the *History* of those

improvements of which the Reviewers have shewn themselves so unaccountably ignorant. On the Constitution of the University, and some other points, I have not found it easy to speak with certainty; and if I shall any where appear to have delivered my sentiments with too much freedom or confidence, my intention at least is less to inculcate any particular views, than to encourage, as far as I am able, the agitation of questions, from the fair discussion of which the public may derive the most important benefits; having always before me the recommendation of the Stagirite, μελειν της αληθειας, μαλλον η της δοξης.

OBSERVATIONS, &c.

IN this age of reformation, it was not to be expected that the University of Oxford should escape her share of the obloquy which is lavished from so many quarters on all ancient institutions. Her noble buildings and rich endowments excite the envy and jealousy of her rivals, and her haughty tone of independence provokes them to indiscriminate abuse. The best friends of learning may not, indeed, wish to see her "clothed in purple and fine linen, and faring sumptuously every day," but the important benefits ought not to be overlooked, of removing the instructors of youth far above the necessity of flattering prevailing prejudice, and of fashioning their doctrines according to the ever-varying temper of the times. Oxford

is not, perhaps, precisely in the happy medium between the fear of want, and the indifference of ease; but while so much is said about her bigoted attachment to exploded systems and opinions, some notice might be taken of the accurate and patient habits of study which her ancient discipline encourages, and of the premature exertions, unsettled notions, and superficial, though general knowledge of more liberal and enlightened Academies. No one contends that Oxford stands in need of no reformation. She herself, in the very preamble of her recent statute, proclaims its necessity.

"Cum vero, variis de causis, antiquus examinandi mos, per magistros necessario regentes, hisce temporibus minime accommodatus sit, decrevit haud ita pridem Academia, examinatores publicos designandos esse, et novam formam Examinationis instituendam; in quâ cum nonnulla jam agnoscimus in melius mutari posse, (usus enim fere semper aliquid apportat novi, ita ut quæ optima putaveris ea in experiundo repudies,) visum est Academiæ rem ab integro refingere."

The candour of those writers cannot be commended, who will scarcely allow Oxford any merit at all; who continue the unmeaning echo of the old reproaches, when their cause is in a great measure removed; and who persist in total ignorance of all the recent improvements; deriving their information concerning the actual state of the University from books that were written many years ago. There has, indeed, been a good deal of port and prejudice at Oxford, and in the common rooms and cloisters vestiges of both may still be occasionally traced; though no one is any longer forced to imbibe either the one or the other. But it has been doubted whether some of the current reproaches are not a little indebted to their sound for their perpetuity, or even to certain ignoble feelings, which are occasionally confounded with laudable emulation, and disinterested love of science. Amidst the proud pretensions to every species of orthodoxy, certain observances, venerable only by the stamp of antiquity, may sometimes darken the light of knowledge; and the place of acquirements more directly advantage-

ous may, in some few instances, be usurped by studies, which a great writer compared to "crops raised, not for the sake of the harvest, but to be ploughed in as a dressing for the land." But, on the other hand, is it impossible to satiate the appetite for knowledge, by prematurely gratifying the curiosity by a varied, but superficial mode of instruction, which affords materials for conversation rather than for thought? and are there no dangers to be feared from plunging the untutored mind at once into the depths of metaphysics and political economy, when totally unprepared for their reception by any previous discipline; and hurrying through the whole circle of the sciences ere the maturity of reason shall be enabled to separate the wheat from the chaff, and to withhold from novelty and ingenuity the honour which is only due to useful knowledge? Is there no instance of an ingenuous mind, caught by a glittering paradox, or blinded by the benevolent professions of a favourite system, "seeking to be wise above what is written," and falling into unphilosophical errors, or bewildered in a maze of uncertain opinions?—Is the acquisi-

tion of every species of knowledge invariably safe at all times, and under all circumstances? Or is it not rather desirable to exercise the memory, to fix the attention, to form the taste, and, above all, to acquire habits of accurate investigation, and of industrious research, previous to the cultivation of nobler faculties of the mind?

I am not prepared to deny that wealth is one of the many causes of indolence; but as little should I be inclined, even if I were more sanguine of success, to attempt convincing the Oxford Fellows of the heterodox position, that the piety and munificence of their founders and benefactors has been misplaced. I leave to others, who may have more confidence in their rhetoric, the glory of procuring a general resignation of fellowships; and without pretending to combat the truly philosophical maxim, "*ingeni largitor venter*," I shall take the liberty, once for all, to allude to a trite, but interesting topic to all who form systems for the education of youth. —A young man entering an English university is precisely at that period of life when a few

accidental impressions bestow a bias upon all his future conduct. Emancipated from the bondage of a school, his vanity is easily flattered, and a conscious pride attends the developement of his faculties. If, at this most important period, mean and unpleasing ideas should once be associated with the acquisition of knowledge, it is vain for reason to demonstrate its utility. And, on the other hand, the same relative pleasure is associated with the first exertions in drinking, coachmanship, fox-hunting, and the various *physical* energies, in the minds of those whose lives are afterwards devoted to such pursuits, as attends the recollection of the scenes where genius first discovered its latent powers, or ambition first warmed the breast of the patriot. It is at this period that we form predilections that attend us to the last hour of our existence, and that we experience the luxury of those disinterested attachments which the selfish pursuits of our maturer years will not suffer to return. " Cette amitié parfaite, dont on n'est capable que dans la jeunesse, avant qu'on ait connu le sentiment de la rivalité, avant

que les carrières irrevocablément tracées sillonnent et partagent le champ de l'avenir."—It is at the same period that we form those deep-rooted antipathies that attend us through all the business of life. But why should I enlarge upon so obvious a topic, as the importance of associating in the tender mind whatever is pleasing, and dignified, and honourable, not only with proficiency in literature and science, but even with the scenes where such pursuits are wont to occupy the thoughts? Human nature itself proclaims the ignorance of those who would separate the pomp of learning from its power.

On no occasion, perhaps, do the generality of men form an opinion altogether unbiassed by some passion or prejudice, or which is not more or less influenced by some external and adventitious circumstance. This may, and ought to mortify the pride of human understanding; but such is the law of our nature; and a wise man will not attempt to set our instincts and our speculations at variance. The most enlightened minds should feel the operation of the

same principle which arrested the savage Gauls in the career of conquest, when they gazed with silent admiration on the majestic appearance of the Roman senators: For our desires and affections are as much a part of our constitution as our reason; nor would this alone teach us to preserve our life, and far less to provide for our future happiness. "Et fulmina ipsa non tam nos confunderent, si vis eorum tantum, non etiam ipse fulgor timeretur."* With these truths before our eyes, the application of which to the present purpose, it would lead into too wide a field to illustrate, we may safely leave to the "shallow, petulant, and short-sighted coxcombs of philosophy," their old employment of holding up to ridicule every established custom and ancient institution, of which they cannot calculate the direct utility; and while we are satisfied with this conviction, that the feelings, and even the prejudices of the human heart may accomplish noble and useful purposes, rather endeavour to see both the errors and merits of

* Quinct. Inst. VIII. 3.

contending systems and opinions, than to venture upon any positive decision.

Previous to the year 1800, a stranger could discover no vestige of public education in the University of Oxford, except some antiquated and useless ceremonies. The exercises of polemical divinity and scholastic logic, which had engrossed the attention of preceding ages, had, by their universally acknowledged inutility, dwindled into forms; and even their names were no longer understood by those who performed them. The business of education was entirely carried on within the walls of the different colleges, in various modes, and with various degrees of success. Those who had no leisure or opportunity to investigate the proceedings of these societies, or who found a difficulty in reconciling such a system to their ideas of a university, were apt hastily to conclude that there was nothing but total idleness at Oxford. They heard the names of professors who never lectured; and they saw before them the ruins of a great system of public discipline, which, ages before, had rendered the

name of Oxford famous over all the literary world. But they did not perceive that every college was now become a university, and every college tutor a professor. They inveighed against the public professors for converting their offices into sinecures, without considering that under-graduates could not learn from them what they were obliged to learn from the tutors of their respective colleges, and what, even if they had their choice, they could not learn so well: For, however splendid a spectacle it may be, to see hundreds of young men crowded together in a lecture-room, catching every word that is uttered from the chair, as if it were an oracle, and carrying off volumes of notes, far exceeding in size the manuscripts of the professor, I have always doubted whether the instruction that is thus collected be not more specious than solid. The utility of this mode of instruction several centuries ago was manifest, when there were scarcely any books, and knowledge was confined to a few; but I should be glad to know, wherever the practice prevails at the present day, how many of those volumes

of notes already alluded to are ever studied after they are written; and if they were, how great a proportion of what they contain might not be found much better told in a hundred books; and how much of what is new is mis-stated and unintelligible. "People," says Dr Johnson, "have now-a-days got a strange idea that every thing is to be taught by lectures; now I cannot see that lectures can do so much good as reading the books from which the lectures are taken. I know nothing that can be best taught by lectures, except where experiments are to be shewn. You may teach chemistry by lectures;—you may teach making of shoes by lectures." Now, although this opinion is not to be understood as denying all advantages to oral over written instruction, yet, upon the whole, there is much sound sense in the learned Doctor's remark. Knowledge is now too generally diffused in books, to leave much to be learned at a university, which may not be learned elsewhere. The great advantage of an academical education arises chiefly from the love of learning which is inspired by the genius of the place,—from the

collision of many minds,—from the ardour which hope of distinction kindles,—and from the advice and assistance in the use of books which young men derive from those of more experience than themselves. The knowledge that is actually gained is less to be considered, than the foundation that is laid for future improvement. The habits that are acquired, the associations that are formed, the bias and turn of mind, are of infinitely more importance than a superficial smattering of the various arts and sciences. The latter may sometimes be more directly and immediately useful in the business of life, but it is from the former only that any real and solid advantage can ever be derived. The one is the seed scattered on the surface of the earth, which quickly springs up and ripens, but is withered and gone before the harvest; the other is the slow, though certain produce, which rewards the labour of the husbandman. "Hi sunt, qui parva facile faciunt: et audacia "provecti, quidquid illic possunt, statim osten-"dunt. Possunt autem id demum, quod in "proximo est: verba continuant; hæc vultu

" interrito *nullâ tardâti verecundiâ*, proferunt:
" non multum præstant, sed cito: non subest
" vera vis, nec penitus immissis radicibus niti-
" tur: *ut quæ summo solo sparsa sunt semina,*
" *celerius se effundunt: et imitatæ spicas herbu-*
" *læ inanibus aristis ante messem flavescunt.*"*
As to discoveries in science, they are quite foreign from the instruction of youth. If they are not completely ascertained, they tend only to mislead; and as it is at best but the elements of knowledge that can be taught, it is of importance to teach, in the first place, those old and established principles that are beyond the reach of controversy; and, with regard to more modern improvements, rather to be satisfied with pointing out the best mode of study, than to attempt, in the short period of academical residence, to convey a few slight and superficial outlines of the whole mass of useful knowledge which learning and genius have accumulated in the revolution of ages. Thus it is that the most ingenious man is frequently the worst

* Quinct. Instit. Lib. I.

tutor or professor. Besides, it is obvious that a lecture, delivered to a popular assembly of several hundred persons, cannot be adapted to the capacities of the whole. The professor cannot, like the tutor of a college, know the previous habits and various acquirements of his pupils, and separate them into small classes accordingly, where he can stop to explain every difficulty as it occurs. In a public lecture, the instruction conveyed may be of great service to those who have made some progress in their studies; but if the subject be new to them, and, still more, if they either trust to it altogether for information, or at best content themselves with hastily referring to the books of which they learn the names and characters from the professor, their knowledge may be extensive, but it must be superficial, their principles ill founded, their deductions rash, and all their habits of thinking unsound. The desultory acquisition of general knowledge may suit some great geniuses, who catch the truth, as it were, by intuition, and can snatch, at one glance, all that is useful and important in the accumulated wis-

dom of past ages; but the evils that arise to the ordinary herd of men from a precocious system of education are serious and alarming. —These hints were written before the appearance of the First Reply to the Edinburgh Review; and what the author of that pamphlet has thrown out on this subject seems to preclude the necessity of their enlargement, and of any farther illustration of the advantages which the System of College Lectures possesses over the more ancient and imposing solemnity of a Professor speaking in public to a whole University. On the whole, it is natural that each mode of instruction should have its admirers, where each may be defended on such excellent grounds; nor is it of much importance to settle the preference, while impartial men must admit the conclusion, that "the best method would be that "which should unite both more completely "than is the case with any modern universi-"ty." * I shall only observe farther, that in what has been said concerning public lectures,

* Page 146.

their advantage to the chosen few is not denied, especially when united with the adventitious circumstances of an exhibition of experiments, or display of eloquence; but the inclination of the pupils to learn is taken for granted, since it is obvious that in this mode of instruction neither authority nor emulation can operate. *

* In the College of King James the Sixth, which alone constitutes the University of Edinburgh, boys matriculate so young, that at the end of the two first years, which are devoted to Greek and Latin, they in general know very little of the former, and a great deal less of the latter, than when they left school. This system undoubtedly tends to destroy the patient and industrious habits previously acquired, and to encourage a superficial and inaccurate mode of study, which is very observable in their future progress. I allude to the system only, and not to those whose duty it is to enforce it; for the very exertions I have witnessed serve but to strengthen my conviction of the incalculable advantage of continuing the discipline of a school for two years longer. In consequence of the comparatively small number who attend the Mathematical lectures, and the necessity of teaching this branch by examining the students, the mode of proceeding in this instance very much resembles a College lecture, and shews the prevailing sentiment, that mathematics cannot be well taught to a crowd, since those young men who do not attend the mathematical lectures in the Universi-

Even Mr Knox himself, a member of the University, has contributed much to mislead the public, by writing pages after pages to expose the folly of the obsolete institutions, on

ty are instructed by other persons, in different parts of the town, who teach precisely in the same manner. The other professors have no mode of being acquainted with the proficiency of their pupils, or even (in consequence of their numbers) with the regularity of their attendance; nor do the lectures differ at all from any other public exhibition, excepting that the rule of not disturbing the audience is in general enforced by the professor.

In this University there is nothing corresponding to the Oxford idea of a College. The public professors and their lectures are every thing. None of the young men lodge in the College, or are subject to any discipline, or wear any distinctive dress, or enjoy any emolument, with the exception of a few trifling exhibitions, or bursaries, as they are called, none of them exceeding L.15 a-year, chiefly payable to students attending the Lectures on Divinity. As to University honours, the degrees of Bachelor of Arts and of Law are unknown. For that of Master of Arts there used formerly to be an annual examination, but the rules drawn up for that solemnity by the late Principal now serve no other purpose than to adorn the walls of the Library; and the degree itself is seldom claimed, and never refused to any one who has attended the lectures. The degree of Doctor in Divinity is usually conferred on the most respectable and dis-

which it was not worth while to have written a single sentence, as no one attempted to defend them; and by expressing himself so carelessly and ambiguously about what the Colleges had substituted in their room; and allowing repeated editions of his popular but superficial works to meet the public eye, without adding a syllable concerning the successive improvements of Academical discipline. His narrow and illiberal views of education are sufficiently developed in

tinguished clergymen of the Presbyterian Church; and that of Doctor of *Laws*, as it is still termed, is a literary honour reserved for laymen;—both of them purely honorary. The degree of Doctor of Medicine is the reward of success in a strict private examination by the Medical professors, and of three years attendance on their lectures, or rather of the payment of three years fees; the only mode, in a numerous class, of ascertaining the fact; and is an honour for the purity of which the University deserve the highest praise. No corporate privileges attach to any of these degrees; nor is it necessary even to matriculate in order to obtain them. The *Senatus Academicus*, consisting of all the Professors, to the number of twenty-eight, and a Principal, is the only Academical Meeting.—Upon the celebrity of a University which forms so complete a contrast to the wealthy foundations of Oxford, without funds, or patronage, or discipline, it is unnecessary to enlarge.

the plan for reforming the University, suggested in the Letter to Lord North. Upon the scheme of improvement which that Letter contains, I have only one remark to offer,—that Mr Knox's scheme of improvement is strongly marked by the prejudices of his professional habits; and that its adoption would make the University a school. Now, if I were to hazard an opinion, it would be, that it is in some instances too much of a school already; that young men will never be driven to literary eminence by the fear of punishment, or deterred from idleness by sumptuary laws; and that it is of no avail for the legislators of the University to multiply prohibitions, and nominate proctors to enforce them, if they do not succeed in inspiring the youth committed to their charge with such an interest in the business of education as may render these restraints unnecessary. "Let them be encouraged," says Dr Tatham, "by kind and benevolent assistance; "let them be led on by honest emulation, "which is a way to learning a thousand times

" more successful than the rod of awe." Boys may be forced to exert their memory, but can men ever be forced to think? Or will an oppressive inquisition into the minutest parts of a student's conduct call into exertion any of his mental powers? Young men will learn nothing to purpose, which they do not learn with good will, and from a conviction of its utility.

Nothing can be spoken with too much contempt of the absurd and ludicrous remains of the ancient discipline, which would not have so long disgraced the schools of Oxford, if the nature and constitution of the University had not been adverse to every change. But while the troublesome forms of the scholastic disputations provoked the indignation of a liberal age, the meritorious exertions of those individuals were too apt to be forgotten, who laboured so successfully in their own societies to supply the place of a system common to the whole. I do not mean that it was possible, by all that single colleges, acting without concert, could effect, to have produced so many of the advantages of

public education as might have proceeded from the united efforts of the whole. I am only at variance with those who will not allow that there was any thing done in any of the Colleges, because there was nothing done by the University, or by some one College with which they happened to be best acquainted.—The following observations relate to what is done by the University at large, over and above the various important branches of instruction carried on by individual Colleges.

In the year 1800 a statute was passed in Convocation *De Examinandis Graduum Candidatis*, by which every candidate for the lowest Academical degrees was subjected to a public examination in the rudiments of religion, in at least three classical authors, of which two might be Greek, or two Latin, and in the Elements of Mathematics and Physics, Logic, Ethicks, and Rhetoric. The candidate was also obliged to shew "quâ polleat facultate animi sui sensa "linguâ Latinâ explicandi." The Examiners had the power of dispensing with certain of

these branches, (the classical authors, and the rudiments of religion, however, always excepted;) but when this power was exercised, the examination was more severe in the rest. Of six Examiners, three made a quorum, and three annually went out of office. They examined six candidates in a day; and the examinations generally lasted about five hours.—I am not merely quoting the words, but stating the operation of the law; and I can confidently assert, that the officers appointed by the University to carry it into effect, most anxiously and conscientiously discharged their duty, during the six years that it remained in force. It frequently happened, so strictly was their duty interpreted, that several of the candidates were refused a certificate; and even instances were not unusual where a second attempt proved unsuccessful.

In this statute a provision was made for two classes of candidates, the first of which was limited to twelve in a year, who should be particularly distinguished in the examinations. But, instead of allowing the Examiners to select

these classes from the whole number examined, the statute appointed the candidates for *honours*, as they were usually termed, to come forward in a particular manner, not unlike challenging the whole University to a trial of strength, and subjecting themselves, in case of failure, to signal disgrace. This, joined to the singular error of admitting none into the second class till the first class was filled, was soon found to operate as a great discouragement to emulation.

Obvious as these defects in the statute were, it was not till the year 1806 that any attempt was made to rectify them. The statutes are enacted by the House of Convocation, or body corporate at large, consisting of all the Doctors and Masters of Arts. The heads of Colleges and Halls form also a separate body, possessed of peculiar and important powers and privileges, which the other members of convocation do not enjoy; and their opinions and interests are sometimes at variance: but, like the Peers and Commons in the ancient parliament of Scotland, in their legislative capacity they delibe-

rate and vote together. Fortunate would it be for Oxford if this were the whole of the resemblance, and if the Lords of the Articles were not forcibly recalled to our recollection, by the encroachments of the Heads of Houses upon the powers of this venerable Assembly, which have reduced their functions to a simple negative upon the questions proposed by the Vice-Chancellor from the chair. Their power must have been originally derived from the Convocation, and they were probably intended as a committee to transact such business as did not require its immediate superintendence. How it has come to pass, it may not be easy to trace, but it seems now established in practice, that no statute can be proposed that does not originate with the Heads of Houses, and receive their previous sanction; and every attempt to make the smallest alteration or amendment on their measures is invariably resisted with success. Thus it is, that instead of every member of the legislative body having the means of proposing what he thinks best calculated to promote the

honour and interest of the University, and of obtaining a free discussion for every grievance and for every improvement, the only power reserved to them is that of preventing rash and pernicious innovations; an office which all who are acquainted with the prudent caution with which the Heads of Houses are accustomed to oppose the current of popular opinion, will readily believe requires no very arduous exertions. The statute, as previously prepared, is proposed from the Chair, and must be passed or rejected *in toto*. From this it follows, that a good measure may be lost for some trifling objection, or a bad one may be carried into effect, because it is better than none.

To this defect in the constitution of the University the delay in amending the obvious errors of the statute of 1800 was in a great measure owing. Greater alterations were called for than the Heads of Houses were willing to concede; and an expected opposition, powerful both in numbers and in eloquence, which they could neither satisfy nor resist, confined their delibe-

rations for six years within the walls of that mysterious conclave, known to the younger members of the University by the profane appellation of *Golgotha*. In the end of the year 1806, the public attention was at length directed to a new statute, amending that passed in 1800. At this time appeared the first of a series of addresses to the Members of Convocation from the Rector of Lincoln College, which, along with some bad taste and extravagance, contained many important truths. Dr Tatham is a strenuous advocate for the freedom and independence of Convocation, and labours to animate that body to a sense of their own importance; calling loudly for "one grand Academical Act," to abolish all that is useless in the ancient system, and substitute in its room the improvements of a liberal and enlightened age. In truth, there must be admitted to be some justice in the remark, that there is a tendency in all corporations to a species of "corporate pride and vanity," * which is sometimes hostile to a spirit of improvement. The possession of great corpo-

* Edin. Rev. of Barry's Works.

rate privileges is, perhaps, of more advantage in protecting the infancy of learning, and preserving alive its spirit in dark ages, than when it is generally diffused. Thus it was that the Heads of Houses resisted every alteration of the existing law, till the general dissatisfaction with some parts of it became so strong, that they were obliged to expose themselves to the disgrace of a failure, in the proposal of something new. The amended statute was proposed and rejected, the first time in 1806, and a second time, though again amended, in February, 1807. In order the better to ascertain the objectionable passages, the third time the statute was proposed, it was agreed that it should be divided into portions, and that a vote should pass upon every one of these, notwithstanding the rule, that the whole is lost by the rejection of a part. One only was negatived, that, viz. which contained a provision for publishing the names of the lowest class of candidates. This was accordingly altered, and the statute again proposed and passed, in Convocation, on the 17th June, 1807.

In this statute, as finally passed, the objectionable system of *Honours*, already alluded to, was removed, and in its stead the simple and natural mode of classing the whole candidates according to merit, and publishing the names of the two first classes, both in literature and in mathematics, at the end of each half-yearly examination, was introduced. The number of Examiners was reduced from six to four; two annually going out of office, and being declared incapable of re-election without the interval of one year; and their emoluments were increased from L. 50 to L. 80 a-year; a trifling recompence, after all, for the most laborious and important office in the University. In the subjects of examination there is little alteration. "Instituatur igitur examen in Rudimentis Re-" ligionis, in Literis Humanioribus, et in Ma-" thematicarum Scientiarum, et Physices Ele-" mentis." "Literæ Humaniores" are explained to mean, not only the Greek and Latin languages, but also Rhetoric and Moral Philosophy, "quatenus a scriptoribus veteribus deri-" vandæ sint." "Dialecticam itidem," says

the statute, " hisce literis adnumeramus." Now, as to the *Dialectica*, it may be allowed to exhibit the singular example of an art brought to perfection in the same age in which it was invented; for however it may have been reformed by omissions, its fondest admirers do not boast of the additions it has received since the days of Aristotle; but I cannot conceal my great regret and astonishment, that this learned University should discard every modern acquisition in moral philosophy. The works of Aristotle and Cicero on this subject were wonderful productions for the age in which they wrote, and are still highly interesting and instructive; nor can any thing be less desirable than their exclusion from this examination. But Dr Tatham's accusation, of a bigoted attachment to antiquity in the framers of the statute, seems in this instance well founded, and the question highly deserving of attention, to which that reverend gentleman has so often in vain required an answer, Whether, in their opinion, there has been no improvement in Moral Philosophy since the days of Aristotle? Every

scholar must be anxious to see the invaluable remains of ancient genius and learning assiduously cultivated, not only as models of taste, but for the important matter they contain. It is only against the *exclusive* study of the ancient moralists that any objection occurs; nor can a satisfactory apology be conceived for thus rejecting with scorn all that the efforts of human reason, assisted by divine revelation, have produced upon this most important of all the sciences, during the lapse of nearly two thousand years. The narrow policy of attempting to conceal from the eyes of under-graduates the arguments for any system of opinions, is now, I trust, utterly extinct; and the orthodoxy of an Oxford scholar no longer thought the less secure, that he can give *a reason of the faith that is in him*. The University will not surely reply with the Caliph, that if the books be conformable to the Koran, they are useless, and if they be contrary to it, they are detestable.

Equally well founded is the Rector of Lincoln's attack upon that *Dialectica*, on which, and its admirers, he bestows so many singular

epithets. I cannot, however, apprehend the same unfortunate consequences which he forebodes from the melancholy clause, "Modo ut "dialecticæ *semper* ratio habeatur," which restrains the dispensing power of the Examinators in the only other instance beside that of the Christian religion; being firmly convinced that not all the statutes, nor all the Doctors, and both the Proctors, will ever revive the fame of this antiquated discipline. A law positively absurd is generally eluded. It is the negative absurdity, the defects of the statute, of which I am most afraid. Let them but enact that the modern authors on Moral Philosophy *may* be a subject of examination, and I shall not object if they add, that the Dialectica *must*. They must be themselves aware, that even at present, recent as the enactment is, the few days which the candidates find it necessary to devote to the consideration of some wretched outlines of the once stupendous fabric of Scholastic Logic, do not exceed the gratification of a laudable curiosity concerning a tale of other times.

This I apprehend to be the best defence

against the charge, that " at Oxford the dictates " of Aristotle are still listened to as infallible de- " crees," * though I am aware that it is not likely to be popular. This charge is now explained as particularly alluding to the Logic and Metaphysics; but as far as the books called *The Metaphysics* are concerned, it must be admitted to be quite unfounded, that work being unknown in the schools. This must, however, have been discovered, from the circumstance, that no notice was taken of it among the subjects of examination enumerated in the First Reply, already referred to; and indeed it is not likely that any person at all acquainted with *the Books that come after the Physics*, which are in a great measure but a continuation of the latter, should suppose them to be much attended to where the Physics are obsolete. The author must, therefore, be understood to mean such metaphysical doctrines as are contained in the Ethics and Rhetoric; and though the positive evil here does not seem to deserve so serious a

* Edinburgh Review, No. 22.

charge, as far as the exclusion of all other metaphysics from the schools is implied, I have no defence to offer. The most irresistible reasons may indeed be given, why the ancient treatises on Rhetoric and Ethics should continue, as at present, to occupy a great portion of the candidate's attention.* Their unrivalled excellence in cultivating habits of accurate and patient investigation would alone induce me to view any alteration in the present practice with the greatest regret. But why should not such candidates as chuse to do so be allowed to shew their knowledge of modern authors also? In Ethics and Rhetoric, Aristotle will not easily be superseded with advantage, as the foundation of every future acquirement; but there is this error, I fear, in the Oxford system, that it points to no mode of raising the superstructure. Every one must invent and discover for himself; but at the close of an academical course he should find himself on the right road, else the provisions which he has with so much

* First Reply, pages 26, 140, and 180.

pains stored up for the journey will gradually moulder away, while he continues, in the expressive language of Bacon, to gaze at Philosophy and the Sciences, as if they were statues.* Now, whatever be the merit of Aristotle, it must be admitted, that of Induction there is nothing to be found in his writings; and if this be indeed the only road to useful discovery, until Bacon and his commentators shall share with the Stagirite the honours of the *Schola Metaphysices*, the melancholy reflection must present itself, that the valuable habits acquired at Oxford are in a great measure lost to their possessors, from ignorance of the important ends to which they are destined.

Upon this head I am called upon, in consistence with the principle which I had before me when I selected the motto prefixed to these remarks, to take some notice of the errors into which the author of the Two Replies has fallen with respect to the nature of the *Novum Organum*. Notwithstanding my high respect for

* Instaur. Mag. Præfat.

that author's talents, and my approbation of his sentiments on other subjects, I must take leave to express my humble apprehension that he has misconceived the scope of that philosophy, to which, in the opinion of the ablest judges, the world is not less indebted in intellectual than in physical science. The strongest confutation of his assertion, that "the *Novum Organum* is confined "to the department of Physical Science," will probably appear, to those who are best acquainted with Bacon's writings, to consist in that general tendency of the whole work, which is so easily collected, for one's own satisfaction, from a careful study and comparison of all its bearings, but of which every one must find it so difficult to convey to others any adequate notion, who feels his own powers unequal to the task of entering, in some measure, into the mind of that wonderful man. Invaluable as his labours must ever be esteemed in the history of science, he seems, after all, to have but very partially developed the magnitude and importance of his general views. His principal object appears to have been, to point out the road of useful

inquiry, in opposition to the vain jargon of the schools, and to substitute the Inductive method of reasoning for the Logic of Aristotle. He does not go so far as to pronounce the *Dialectica* absolutely useless. He admits that it may be of advantage in strengthening the mind, as wrestling in strengthening the body, and may, on various occasions, especially in what he terms "artes populares et opinabiles," be a convenient instrument in the use of knowledge previously acquired; but he distinctly denies that it can ever be of the smallest service in the discovery of useful knowledge; and as the best mode of investigating truth is his object, he totally discards it, as foreign from his purpose.—This view of the subject is clearly established in the *Distributio Operis*, and the preface to the *Novum Organum*; and the conclusion is this: "Quod si cui mortalium cordi et curæ sit, non "tantum inventis hærere, atque iis uti, sed ad "ulteriora penetrare; atque non disputando "adversarium, sed opere naturam vincere; de-"nique non belle et probaliter opinari, sed certo "et ostensive scire; tales, tanquam veri scien-

" tiarum filii, nobis (si videbitur) se adjungant; " ut omissis naturæ atriis quæ infiniti contri- " verunt, aditus aliquando ad interiora pate- " fiat."

The author of the Replies quotes a passage from the second Book of the Advancement of Learning,* in which Lord Bacon admits, that " in the sciences popular the form of syllogism " may have use;" but when he draws the conclusion, that the object of Bacon's reasoning here and elsewhere, is to show, " that *dis-* " *coveries* in " *Natural* Philosophy are not like- " ly to be promoted by this engine," this conclusion is indeed the truth, but not the whole truth: for there is not, as far as I can recollect, a passage in Bacon's writings to sanction the implication, that a *discovery of any sort* was ever made by syllogisms. In the passage to which he more particularly refers, he himself quotes the limitation, " Quæ assensum pa- " rit, operis effæta est." Lord Bacon, he says, " observes that Logic does not help towards the " invention of Arts and Sciences, but only of

* Second Reply, p. 26.

" Arguments." With regard to the latter, I beg leave to quote farther, from the same passage, the following words, which so strongly show Lord Bacon's anxiety to obviate the idea that *any discovery* could be made by the Logic of the Schools. " The invention of speech or ar-
" gument is not properly an invention; for to
" invent is to discover that we know not, and
" not to recover or resummon that which wee
" alreadie knowe; and the use of this invention
" is no other; but out of the knowledge where-
" of our minde is alreadie possest, to drawe
" foorth, or call before us, that which may bee
" pertinent to the purpose, which wee take into
" our consideration. So as to speake truly, it
" is no invention; but a remembrance or sug-
" gestion, with an application: which is the
" cause why the schooles doe place it after
" judgement, as subsequent, and not precedent.
" Neverthelesse, because wee doe account it a
" chase, as well of deere in an inclosed parke,
" as in a forrest at large; and that it hath al-
" readie obtayned the name: Let it be called
" Invention; so as it be perceyved and dis-

"cerned that the scope and end of this inven-
"tion, is readynesse and present use of our
"knowledge, and not addition or amplification
"thereof."

As to this strange assertion, that the *Novum Organum* has nothing to do with the science of mind, instead of attempting a general exposition of Bacon's views, or of referring to the opinions of his ablest commentators, I shall content myself with contrasting a single extract with the first statement of this extraordinary position.

"His first Book (of the
"*Novum Organum*) is oc-
"cupied with a considera-
"tion of the causes which
"have retarded the progress
"of Natural Philosophy; and
"his second Book contains a
"specimen of the new me-
"thod of investigation which
"he proposes, in order to far-
"ther discoveries in that de-
"partment.—*To this pro-*
"vince of Natural Philosophy
"is the whole Treatise exclu-

"Etiam dubitabit quispiam
"potius quam objiciet; utrum
"nos de Naturali tantum Phi-
"losophiâ, an etiam de Sci-
"entiis reliquis, Logicis, E-
"thicis, Politicis, secundum
"viam nostram perficiendis
"loquamur. At nos certe
"de universis hùc, quæ dic-
"ta sunt, intelligimus: At-
"que quemadmodum vulga-
"ris Logica, quæ regit res
"per Syllogismum, *non tan-*
"tum ad Naturales, sed ad

" *sively confined.*"—Second Reply, p. 19.

" *omnes scientias pertinet ;*
" *ita et nostra, quæ procedit*
" *per Inductionem, omnia com-*
" *plectitur,*" &c.—Aph. 127., lib. I.

The second book, " which," he repeats, " *is strictly confined to the subject of Natural Philosophy,*" * is indeed, in great part, occupied with physical illustrations. But, in the very midst of these, examples of a purely intellectual sort occur, as the long aphorism concerning memory ; and the reference which the former bear to the human mind, together with their introduction merely as forming a part of the new Logic, is continually inculcated. In the concluding aphorism Bacon gives this reason for the number of physical examples, which, if the incomplete nature of the work be taken into view, must appear completely satisfactory : " Illud vero monendum, nos in hoc nostro Or-
" gano," (in opposition to that of Aristotle) " tractare Logicam, non Philosophiam. Sed

* Page 21.

" cum Logica nostra, doceat intellectum et eru-
" diat ad hoc, ut non tenuibus mentis quasi
" claviculis, rerum abstracta captet et prenset,
" (ut Logicà vulgaris;) sed naturam reverâ
" persecet, et corporum virtutes et actus, eo-
" rumque leges in materiâ determinatas inveni-
" at; ita ut non solum ex naturâ mentis, sed
" ex naturâ rerum quoque hæc scientia ema-
" net; mirum non est, si ubique naturalibus
" contemplationibus et experimentis, ad exem-
" pla artis nostræ conspersa fuerit et illustrata."

The author then proceeds to enumerate " the " hasty assumption of *Physical* principles," as one of the injurious effects which Bacon notices of Aristotle's works. But upon a reference to Aphorisms 67 and 125, his authorities for this position, they will be found to be expressed in such general terms, as to be utterly irreconcileable to this imputed restriction to Physics. Philosophia, Philosophiæ, meditationum principia, veritas, &c., absolutely taken, can never signify Physics; and if considered with reference to Bacon's explanation of his meaning, when generally expressed, (as already quoted from the

next aphorism but one, and in various other places,) and still more, with reference to the scope of the whole work, this limitation of Bacon's charge against the old Logic to *Physical principles* must appear at least as "hasty an assumption" as any that was ever charged against its master Aristotle.

"The whole of this latter aphorism," the author continues, "is well worthy of attention; "if any one would convince himself how en- "tirely false the current notion is, that Bacon "invented the method of Induction for arri- "ving at those truths which Aristotle sought by "means of Syllogism. In this aphorism it "is distinctly declared, that the method of ac- "quiring first principles adopted by each is in "kind the same." * Now, if any one thing be more certain than another, it is this, that Bacon did intend to substitute the mode of Induction for that of Syllogism, in the discovery of *every* species of truth; and, fortunately for science, his intentions have been well understood by his

* Page 20.

successors. Accordingly I must confess myself unable to detect in this aphorism any thing inconsistent with the uniform tenour of his writings. It is intended to anticipate the objection, that he is only doing over again what the ancients did before him; which objection he thinks it unnecessary, after what he has already said, to answer at length; and after alluding to those passages where he has more fully explained his meaning, he observes, that the ancients rushed at once from certain examples and particulars to the most general conclusions, and thus were obliged to reduce to their rules, by subtle distinctions and explanations, the new facts which occurred, or to remove them in a slovenly manner by exceptions; and even when the facts themselves did not disagree with those conclusions, their causes, at least, were not to be accommodated without much labour and pertinacity. He concludes, "Verum nec Historia "Naturalis et Experientia illa erat, quam fuisse "oportebat; (longe certe abest) et ista advola-"tio ad generalissima, omnia perdidit."

If it did not occupy too much space to follow Bacon's own advice, and, going back upon his work, use one part of it as a commentary upon another, such a mode of proceeding would exhibit in the strongest light the unity and consistence of the great plan which he meditated; and the constant impression of the same general views upon his mind. But, in truth, I despair of success, if the references already made be insufficient to show that he intended the method of Induction for the discovery of every species of truth, and that, as he conceived Syllogism to be unfit for discoveries of any sort, wherever the application of the latter to such a purpose had been attempted, the former should take its place. "Itaque," says he in the preface, "Ars illa Dialecticæ, sero (ut diximus) ca-
"vens, neque rem ullo modo restituens, ad er-
"rores potius figendos, quam ad veritatem ape-
"riendam valuit. Restat unica salus, ac sani-
"tas, ut opus mentis universum de integro re-
"sumatur," &c. Such, among innumerable other passages, is the tenour of that part of the

Distributio Operis where he assigns his reasons for rejecting Syllogism, but which is too long for insertion here. It is followed by an excellent commentary on the aphorism now under consideration,* which commences with the observation, that, according to his mode, the order of demonstration is *completely inverted.* Bacon undoubtedly admits, in this aphorism, that the ancients were in possession of useful knowledge; and as Induction is the only mode of discovering truth, it must have been obtained in this manner. But they soon stopped short, and imitating the example of the architect, (the illustration is admirably correct,) who removes the scaffolding out of sight by which the building was raised, they deprived themselves of the means of adding the smallest improvement. No one ever asserted that no example of Induction occurs in the writings of Aristotle, or claimed to Bacon the merit of its invention. It is impossible to advance a single step without it, even in the intercourse of life. Accordingly,

* Aph. 125.

when I said above, that in Aristotle's writings there is nothing of Induction, I only meant to contend, that he no where treats of it, or recommends its adoption, and that he was as ignorant of its philosophical application as the unlettered savage is of the law of gravitation, who nevertheless makes that law subservient to his daily wants, by the very same process which afterwards led to its discovery. On the other hand, the merit of Bacon's philosophy consists in the systematical application of the only mode of useful investigation, from which the attention of his predecessors had been distracted by the prevailing influence of the Syllogistic form of reasoning.

It is observed in the Second Reply, that "Induction was neither unknown nor disregarded by Aristotle;" * and Doctor Gillies is quoted in confirmation of this remark. But, omitting all notice of the circumstance, that Aristotle only mentions the επαγωγη in a very cursory manner in one or two passages, not-

* Page 24.

withstanding Dr Gillies's "learning and fidelity," I am not convinced that this επαγωγη has much resemblance to the Baconian Induction. The word is derived from επαγω, *infero*, and, as far as I understand it, would be much more correctly rendered *Inference* or *Deduction*. Constantine defines it, "Argumentatio, quæ ex "concessis sensim laqueos texit ad irretiendum "eum qui semel se interrogandum præbuit;" which certainly is not very promising for the discovery of truth. Quinctilian says, "Est ar- "gumentorum locus ex similibus; si continen- "tia virtus, utique et abstinentia: Si fidem de- "bet tutor, et procurator. Hoc est ex eo ge- "nere quod επαγωγην Græci vocant, Cicero *in-* "*ductionem*." * And in the next chapter, "Illa "argumentatio qua plurimum Socrates est usus, "hanc habuit viam; cum plura interrogasset, "quæ fateri adversario necesse esset, novissime "id, de quo quærebatur, *inferebat*, cui simile "concessisset. Id est *inductio*." One of the authorities produced by Suidas seems anxious

* Lib. V. c. 10.

to make a difference of opinion upon the meaning of this word, but I suspect, upon investigation, the distinction would not appear of much importance. The author of the Replies may himself determine, whether, upon the most favourable construction, it resembles more the process of reasoning which discovered the law of gravitation, or that "*mala inductio*" which Bacon frequently contrasts to the "inductio vera," in the following and similar terms: "Quæ "procedit per enumerationem simplicem, res "puerilis est, et precario concludit, et periculo "exponitur ab instantia contradictoria, et ple-"rumque secundum pauciora quam par est, et "ex his tantummodo quæ præsto sunt pronun-"ciat."*

As to the inutility of Syllogism for every species of discovery, and the necessity of adopting Induction in its room, or, in other words, as to the truth of Lord Bacon's philosophy, any thing that I can offer must appear altogether unimportant and superfluous. At the present day it will therefore be a sufficient defence of that

* Aph 105. *et alibi.*

position of Lord Kames, which has drawn forth a *general* charge of "*flippancy* and *falsehood*,"* to observe, that his opinions are identically the same with those contained in that very aphorism to which our attention is so erroneously directed for a quite opposite view of the subject. The passage from Lord Kames is this, † "That Aristotle never attempts to apply his "syllogistic mode of reasoning to any subject "handled by himself: That on ethics, on rhe-"toric, and on poetry, he argues like a rational "being, without once putting in practice any of "his own rules." In this passage he certainly did not mean to maintain the impossibility of reducing to the syllogistic form whatever truths the treatises referred to might contain; and it was quite unnecessary to inform us of the exercise formerly in such repute, of converting the propositions which occur in a page of Aristotle into syllogisms; an exercise which, if there be any justice in the definition, that every sentence must contain a proposition, is not more appro-

* First Reply.
† Sketches, Vol. III.

priate to the writings of the Greek philosopher than to any other work which may exhibit a due proportion of self-evident truths. Lord Kames, as well as Lord Bacon, admitted that the ancients were in possession of useful information, but he challenged the admirers of the Scholastic Logic to trace its origin in any instance to this unfertile source. The continuation of the passage completely corresponds with the ideas of Lord Bacon. "It is not supposable "that a man of his capacity should be ignorant "*how insufficient a syllogism is for discovering* "*any latent truth.* He certainly intended his "System of Logic chiefly, if not solely, *for dis-* "*putation:* And if such was his purpose, he "has been wonderfully successful; for nothing "can be better contrived for wrangling and "disputing without end. He, indeed, in a man-"ner professes this to be his aim in his book, "De Sophisticis Elenchis." Thus, in Bacon's language, "*Ad garriendum prompta, ad generan-* "*dum invalida,*" &c.

I shall leave this charge of "*flippancy* and *falsehood*" against Lord Kames, as far as it is

general, to receive its refutation from a less partial quarter; but when I find the former epithet applied even to Lord Bacon, I may be allowed to lament, in the strongest terms, the influence of inveterate prejudice, which could dictate to a mind so highly cultivated this most unappropriate of all appellations. The charge of "*flippancy*" against Bacon is founded upon the comparison of the ancient philosopher's ambition to that of his royal pupil, the justness of which has rendered it almost proverbial. Whether it was his zeal in the cause of truth that gave rise to the reproach of the Platonists, *that he trampled on the mother which produced him*, will not now be easily discovered; but whatever exertions he might have made "to "establish the empire of common sense and "reason," when they served at the same time to establish his own reputation, it is vain to dispute the justice of Dr Reid's remarks upon his want of candour, either as to the bounds of his own knowledge, or the merits of his predecessors. Of the former the author of the Replies himself affords the strongest confirmation, when

he admires his * "entire systems moulded into "a full and *perfect* shape; buildings planned and "raised from their foundation by the same "hand, and carefully *finished in all their* "*parts*;" a praise which no panegyrist would have offered, and which no philosopher would have claimed, who entertained just views of the human mind.

After having "*shewn the Organum of Bacon* "*to be confined to the department of Physical* "*Science*," when the author observes that "the "syllogistic method of reasoning is not once "mentioned, in the first book, among the cau- "ses which seem to have obstructed the ad- "vancement of natural science,"† he can only be understood to mean, that no mention whatever of Syllogism occurs in that part of the work; and it might be fairly questioned upon this ground, whether he had ever paid much attention to it previous to this controversy. But I am not anxious to press this conclusion, and shall content myself with observing, that (to pass over the preface) the

* First Reply, p. 26.

† Second Reply, *ut supra*.

very second page contains four consecutive aphorisms in which Syllogism is mentioned as useless in the discovery of every species of knowledge; from which the usual conclusion is drawn, "Spes est una in Inductione vera." I trust I may now be permitted to observe, that there are some *modern* "Treatises" for the study of which "*a foreign stimulus*" * is occasionally wanted, and upon this ground to plead for the tolerance of Bacon in the schools. Let but a fair opportunity be offered for comparing Syllogism and Induction: Where they do not interfere, no harm is done; where they do, let them contend fairly for the preference, and Truth will be in this, as in other instances, the infallible result. In recommending this alteration, I am well aware that, independent on the technical phraseology, and the physical illustrations already mentioned, a great part of Bacon's

* This is one of the reasons given in the first Reply for the exclusive study of the ancient moralists, "That a popu-
"lar modern work in English will be read without much spe-
"cific encouragement, while a foreign stimulus is almost al-
"ways wanted to make an ancient treatise of any depth ge-
"nerally studied."

philosophical works is ill calculated for the subject of the public examinations; but without presuming to offer any remarks upon the mode of carrying the reformation into effect, this, at least, I should hope few unbiassed persons will dispute, that any system of University education must be deemed faulty and incomplete, in which the Inductive method of intellectual philosophy is utterly proscribed.

To return to the statute: There seems little force in the objection, that the duties of the Examiners and Examinees are not defined with sufficient accuracy, and that it confers too much power upon the former. On the contrary, the latitude of interpretation of which it is susceptible, and the consequent facility with which it may be accommodated to the changes of manners and opinions, seem to open a way for the best of all innovations,—those which time imperceptibly, but irresistibly, operates in an age of increasing light and liberality. One of the greatest errors of the ancient system was the officious anxiety with which it regulated every minute particular that was to be spoken or to

be heard in the whole course of Academical discipline; as if it had been possible so to simplify and controul every object of intellectual attainment, that, in the infinite diversity of human understanding, no two persons should draw from the same premisses a different conclusion. It was this unaccommodating nature of the old exercises that excluded every partial improvement; and it was owing to the corrupted constitution of the University that they were suffered to continue so long after they were reduced to cumbersome and ludicrous ceremonies. Why should a vestige of any one of them remain, to afford a handle of abuse and misrepresentation to the enemies of all ancient institutions?

> "Verre pavimentum, nitidas ostende columnas,
> "Arida cum totâ descendat *aranea* telâ."

A second statute, distinct from the former, was passed on the 22d June, 1808, which substituted, in place of certain parts of the old forms, a kind of minor examination in the classics, chiefly grammatical, one Greek and

one Latin book being the minimum, together with Logic, and Euclid's Elements, and translation from English into Latin, to be gone through a year previous to the other. The Examiners may dispense with either Logic or Euclid, and are not restricted to Aristotle's Logic. In practice, however, Euclid only is ever omitted; and I need hardly add, that Aristotle's is the only Logic known. But an opportunity is thus left for the Examiners to break through the practice. I know not why the appellation of *Responsiones in Parvis* has been retained to denote this exercise, unless, perhaps, for the purpose of including the members of New College, whom the vanity and great influence of their founder had exempted from all *examinations*. With the view of destroying so foolish a regulation, why might not the title of *General* or *Jurament* be bestowed on the other, or any name of an obsolete exercise to which these exemptionaries were amenable? The usual reply to this question, that the principal examination was not substituted in place of any statutable exercise, as the minor examination was,

only removes the difficulty a single step; for the old examination and the old school exercises being equally useless, or, if possible, the latter being the more useless of the two, why not introduce the new examination, where it would be attended with the additional advantage of abolishing a senseless privilege? At the same time four weeks in a year have very properly been added to the minimum of Academical residence, which is thus extended to eighteen weeks; and the practice of most of the Colleges requires a good deal more. Last of all, the most oppressive of all the ancient ceremonies, viz. the Determination of Bachelors in Lent, has been abolished, and, in its room, the reading of two Latin discourses, or, in place of one of them, the recitation of some Latin verses of their own composition, has been substituted. Of the efficiency of this last exercise I have no means of knowledge, but its susceptibility of degenerating into a useless form must be sufficiently obvious to every one acquainted with the unintelligible ceremony of a College declamation. Might it not prove a

proper encouragement, to allow no exercise to be publicly read without having been previously perused and sanctioned by one of the Masters of the Schools, who might also be empowered to select the best, to be read on some particular day? Indeed the propriety of reading all these compositions is by no means apparent, a great proportion of which are in all probability not of a very interesting nature. This Lectio now constitutes the only exercise for the degree of Master of Arts, and is not only a great relaxation of the ancient discipline, but a wide departure from the views of those who thought a second examination necessary for this degree. The impropriety of a second public examination for young men of this standing is generally admitted, but a private examination in Natural and Moral Philosophy might produce the greatest advantages. The examination for the inferior degree might, perhaps, remain as at present, without detriment to the progress of useful knowledge, were the Logic of Bacon introduced even here, with his best commentators, as well in Morals as in Phy-

sics. At all events, it must appear sufficiently singular, that while the statutes of so many Colleges require the residence of their dependent members of this standing, no exercise should be required of them, except the discourses already mentioned; *not even a certificate of attendance upon any of the public lectures.* It is but a sorry apology for the omission of one important branch of University education, that there is no professor of Moral Philosophy.—English essays might be best adapted for a college-exercise for Bachelors of Arts.

At the same time with this last statute in 1808, a new edition of the former of 1807 appeared; in which, however, there seems no other variation than a clause prohibiting any candidate from being admitted without a certificate of his having performed the *responsiones in parviso*, and a line subdividing the second class, which, in fact, makes three classes, and is a very considerable improvement.

It was said above, that the examination was required of the candidates for the lowest Acade-

nical *degrees*, viz. Bachelors of Arts and of Civil Law. The latter honour, however, corresponds to that of Masters of Arts, and requires a similar standing of seven years in the University. The Lent Determination, already mentioned, being peculiar to Bachelors of Arts, the students in Civil Law are not liable to the Lectio substituted in its place. No mention occurs in the late statutes of the abolition of a hereditary discussion upon *contracts*, and some other subjects, in the syllogistic form, transmitted from the dark ages in "academical entail," through the hands of many successive disputants; a notable example of those "*perfect* buildings" for which the world is indebted to the Logic of Aristotle. The professor of Civil Law reads no lectures, notwithstanding every thing connected with Roman antiquities is so congenial to the spirit of the place. But since this inexhaustible field presents no topic of general interest, and since, even if the students in Civil Law were required to attend, they are not sufficiently numerous to constitute a class, why may not the

professor examine privately the different candidates, in Heineccius, or Sigonius, or Taylor, or even in Dr Adam's Roman Antiquities? These are works of which no scholar should be ignorant: and many others, not only in Civil Law, but in antiquities, and the law of nature and nations, might, with a proper liberality of interpretation, be admitted to the choice of the candidate. Even "Propria quæ maribus" would be a respectable substitute for the Syllogisms upon *contracts*, already alluded to.

Such is the public part of the system of education pursued at Oxford, as it has been *re-cast* within the last ten years; and such it will, in all probability, remain for a long period to come. Public lectures, indeed, are read, but they hardly form part of the regular system, the whole efficiency of which depends upon the operation of the new statutes as now detailed. And here I cannot omit to express a hope, that Dr Tatham has not forgotten the promise to continue his labours, with which he concludes the second edition of his last Address. He probably waits

for an opportunity of examining the practical effect of the statute, when he will doubtless redeem his pledge, "to make whatever comment "upon it before the public he may think will "serve the interests of truth, and tend to pro-"mote the advancement of science and sound "learning."

The author of the Replies has clearly explained the subject matter of the examinations, and the manner in which they are carried on; but this *Historical* account of the late changes will not, I trust, appear unnecessary, when it is considered that the derision and contempt which has of late been levelled against the University, is said to have been done in ignorance of the new statutes, and to have been applicable only to the state of things previous to the recent improvements. We have already seen, that the period which, in different places, the Reviewers term "a few years," "a very few years," "four or five years," "three or four years," and, in one place, admit to be eight years, is in fact *ten*, the statute having been passed in the year 1800:—and consequently these four assertions

as to the period when the new system commenced, are alike unfounded in fact, and inconsistent with each other, and with the singular defence of ignorance.

In the review of the first Reply, three different authors are supposed to have concentrated their powers. Whether all of them have judged wisely in this particular is not for me to determine; but the union of their grounds of defence, in one article, is necessarily attended with the effect of identifying, in some measure, their responsibility, and leaving a general impression of the whole on the mind of the reader. For this reason, I am anxious to state, lest there should be any thing in these remarks of ambiguous application, that they relate chiefly to the concluding part of the article. The author of the first part is certainly entitled to this defence, that his argument related to the deficiency of great mathematical talents during the last century, and that a system of education established only ten years had scarcely time to operate. I could have wished that he had dropped a single hint concerning the prospect of future improve-

ment; but as it is, since he does happen to have connected himself with this discussion, I cannot withhold my humble tribute of admiration, superfluous as it may well appear, from the able criticism, a part of which he here comes forward to defend, and that might have done honour even to a name with which I have been accustomed, from my earliest years, to associate every sentiment of respect and esteem.

The last of the three authors asks, "How "long has this system been established? Has "it existed four years? And how long did "that which preceded it exist? Four years "*also.*"* The improvements, above detailed, in 1807, are probably what are here alluded to as two distinct and different systems; but the foregoing remarks are sufficient to show, that they are the same system somewhat altered and amended; and that his strictures are no more applicable to the statute of 1800 than to that of 1807. Much praise, therefore, is not due to the "*candour*" of the tardy "admission,"

* Edinburgh Review, No. 31, p. 183.

that he was " not *perfectly* aware of the new " system of education;"—an apology which might have been entitled to more attention prior to the invention of posts by Cyrus of Persia. I had almost said, prior to the publication of the First Number of the Edinburgh Review, where distinct and honourable mention is made of the new system of examinations in the following terms: " The University of Oxford—have " completely abolished their very ludicrous and " disgraceful exercises for Degrees, and have " substituted in their place, a system of exer- " tion, and a scale of Academical honours, cal- " culated (we are willing to hope) to produce " the happiest effects." But it would be too much to expect this gentleman to pore over pages of such dull morality and religion, as he might expect in the review of a sermon; yet, if he had looked into the review of Dr Parr's Spital Sermon, he might have found some effusions to relieve the natural heaviness of such subjects, not unlike the exuberance of his own fancy in its better days. The new system is, however, admitted to have been *somewhat*

known; though no hint escaped him *previous to the publication of the Reply*, of this dark and doubtful rumour which had shot across the vast abyss between Oxford and Edinburgh. How is it that no means occurred of investigating the strange report, that something was doing at Oxford, during the whole ten years of its subsistence? Have none of our southern neighbours, who annually migrate to the north, been able to answer his eager enquiries concerning a subject which interested him so much? The Sons of Oxford, who have of late been induced to compare the advantages of the most opposite systems of education, have not *all* been driven from the alma mater of their ancestors, by the awkward circumstance of a public examination, to take shelter in the promiscuous crowd of a northern lecture-room. They have not all been attracted by the well-earned fame of the Scottish professors, to desert those seats of learning, and, I must still venture to add, of science, which have been envied and admired by all Europe for centuries, and which occasionally

draw forth the *respect* even of those who are least disposed to bestow it, before they have had an opportunity of witnessing the operation and effects of the new system of Academical discipline. It is strange, that while these authors can set at defiance the anti-commercial decrees of Buonaparte, and present their readers with such ingenious and interesting pictures of foreign literature; that while Paris, and Petersburgh, and Turkey, the East and West Indies, and the whole continent of America, are open to their researches, their supplies of information from the west of England should be so miserably scanty, that ten long years shall elapse before they are "*perfectly aware*" that a new System of Education is established at Oxford. Accordingly when we are reminded of "the astonishment of the waiter, that the passenger, "who complained of the roughness and darkness of the town, should not know that a bill "had just passed for paving and lighting it," * however witty the anecdote, (for I speak with

* Page 184.

much deference to the acknowledged talents of the writer in his own peculiar department), the application at least is difficult. Had the streets of this anonymous town been actually paved and lighted for ten years, without attracting the notice of the traveller, the case would have been parallel; but would not have suited a writer for whom plain matters of fact possess no attractions. For these and other reasons, until I shall be entertained by more than one "periodical evacuation" of this author's jest-book, and this, too, a little more to the purpose than that to which I have just alluded, I intend to substitute for "*not perfectly aware*," "*nescire paratus*." And, in the mean time, I will venture to assert, that a more whimsical view of any subject was never taken by any author than this, to write page after page upon the present state of Oxford, in the present tense, and not only to expect the reader to apply it all to the past, without any previous warning of so strange a departure from the common use of speech, but to treat, as an absolute absurdity, any other interpretation of his words.

As to the epithet *northern*, which has given rise to so much offence, it really appears to me a very harmless appellation. It may possibly include, in the conception of some persons, that portion of ridicule which men ignorant of the world are apt to attach to those of different countries, or of different habits and professions; but I can assure these authors, that, in the pure Oxonian acceptation of the word, no small respect is generally included for the intellectual attainments of a people, to whom, through the united influence of poverty, local institutions, and hereditary qualities of mind, their southern neighbours are so well accustomed to yield the prize in the great contest for riches and fame.

The minute points of criticism to which this controversy has given rise, do not fall within my plan; nor do I feel the smallest inclination to comment on the "Babel of savage sounds" with which the λεπτοτατων ληρων ΙΕΡΕΥΣ,* who concludes the last attack has endeavoured to compensate for his deficiency in argument.—

* Aristoph. Nub.

When this author still continues to assert, that classical erudition is the *sole occupation* at Oxford, and to declaim upon the importance of cultivating other branches of knowledge, and this while reviewing the very work which gives an account of the mathematical and other studies pursued in that University,* it is obvious that he writes only for those whose leisure or inclination may not lead them to investigate the other side of the question, and whose previous knowledge of the subject may not enable them to detect the spirit of misrepresentation which

* I own I cannot attach much importance to the controversy concerning the acceptation of the comparative term, *Elements* of Mathematics. As there are no public examinations at Edinburgh, I have nothing to state as to the only point of any consequence, the challenged comparison in mathematical attainments, except my own belief that it is a very rash defiance on the part of the Reviewers.—I omitted to observe above, that it is most erroneous to boast of the numbers attending the lectures at Edinburgh as greatly exceeding those of the students at Oxford; since, if the comparison were fairly made, the former would not be found equal to one half of the latter. The Edinburgh classes of the two first years ought not to be calculated, as at that age boys are at school in England, and far less the students in Medicine and Scotch Law.

pervades all he has written. And who would wish to deprive him of any applause which he may derive from such a quarter?—On one point, however, he must be admitted to be sincere; where he states, that "he neither knows "nor cares whether he is or is not considered "as a superficial person *by competent judges*:"* —a manly avowal, which deserves approbation from its consistency with his usual contempt for whatever the world are accustomed to regard with respect and veneration. Yet even this avowal, to deal frankly with him, I feel it difficult to reconcile with the vexation which his ill-timed mirth is so awkwardly officious to conceal, at the chastisement inflicted by the author of the Replies, with so just a forgetfulness of mercy.

He has revived, not without considerable pretensions to novelty, Rousseau's declamations about the study of Latin and Greek; withdrawing the attention "from things to words." "If," says he, "a man reads a book in a dif-

* Page 186.

" ficult language, copious in its words, and " licentious in its variations, it is not possible " he should attend as much to the meaning of " what he reads, as if that meaning were con- " veyed to him in his own native tongue."— First of all, it may be observed, that the best examples of the very opposite to every thing that is copious and licentious are to be found among the ancient writers. Aristotle's style, in particular, is altogether unrivalled for conciseness and accuracy of expression. But I deny the general position, that what is most easily read is best remembered. On the contrary, the most susceptible memory is generally the least tenacious; for this very reason, that a smaller exertion of attention being necessary, the impression is originally slighter, and is more easily effaced. If a difficulty occurs about the meaning of a passage, is not this, of all others, what we recollect the best? Thus it is that an ancient writer remarks, with perfect justice, " Quæ " legentem fefellissent, transferentem fugere non " possunt." * But the fact, that what is care-

* Plin. Ep. VII. 9.

lessly hurried over in English cannot be remembered half so well as what we must read with painful attention in Greek, seems a principle too plain to admit of illustration. In truth, the general diffusion of knowledge, and the ease with which it is acquired, is, amidst many advantages, attended with this evil, that books are referred to rather than read, or at best read in such a hasty and careless manner, that their contents leave but a general and confused impression on the memory. Books are every day most unnecessarily multiplied, either from motives of vanity or profit, or simply because the authors have not read, or do not understand, the writings of those who have gone before them; and even, by the number of useful books which the facility of printing occasions, the heads of every art and science are to be found so concentrated and compressed, that the curiosity is prematurely satisfied, and the interest with which they are studied much diminished. For the ardour which attends any pursuit is most unquestionably damped by destroying the ne-

cessity of exertion; and most of all, those pursuits, the principal inducement to which is the gratification of the desire of knowledge. Now, the difficulties of a dead language are precisely that drag-chain on the wheels of learning, which this great and increasing evil of modern education seems to require. If it were possible to separate altogether the actual possession of knowledge from the labour of acquiring it, the value would be inconceivably diminished, from the absence of the habits necessary for its useful application. Those who are already in possession of the end, cannot be expected to exert the means for obtaining it; nor are those likely to enlarge the bounds of science, who are content to grasp the fruits of other men's labours, and seize their discoveries, without learning the arts by which they were matured. If philosophy be made to shine suddenly on the tender mind with too bright a lustre, the faculties will at first be dazzled rather than enlightened, and there will be a danger of a similar indifference succeeding to that with which ignorant

nd barbarous men are accustomed to behold the beauties of the material world. Young men, who are really desirous to be wiser and better for what they read, and to learn to think rightly and sensibly upon the most important subjects, must subdue every unreasonable desire of novelty, and, relinquishing the vain applause of all that is witty and superficial, assiduously labour to trace the steps by which their predecessors advanced on the road of useful discovery, while their affections are stedfastly fixed on the ultimate object of all education, χαιρειν και λυπεισθαι εις δει.

It has been shewn above, that, with one exception, the study of the ancient writers, as pursued at Oxford, is not exclusive of other branches of knowledge; and there is no force in the objection, that it forms the principal pursuit. On the contrary, there are many great and important advantages in preserving, to the different seats of learning, the peculiar genius and distinctive character of each. The number of persons is probably very limited upon whom

nature bestows a bias for any particular object of science; but wherever such an instance may occur, it is highly proper that an opening should be left for it. Yet, as it is plain that no man deserves the name of a scholar who does not know something of Greek and Latin, even he whom the impulse of genius, real or imagined, prompts to other objects, has no reason to complain that he cannot obtain an Academical degree without some knowledge of the ancient languages. Now, although these languages cannot be effectually acquired without the devotion of a long period of time to this object, it still remains to be shewn what exercise is more salutary to the youthful mind. Leaving to its fate the absurdity of the statement, that an ancient language can be studied without studying the substance of the works in which it is contained, and that the meaning of ancient authors may be correctly explained without being understood,—is there no advantage in the accurate habits of attention and memory and judgment, which such an occupation requires? Or rather, I would ask, is

there any better mode of uniting the cultivation of all these powers with the formation of the taste and fancy, on the purest models of excellence? Or any better discipline, by which the faculties may be matured for the more important researches of philosophy?

We are told of the time that is mis-spent in studying the structure of Greek verse, and getting the poets by heart; while the orators, historians, and philosophers, are overlooked and forgotten: but wherever such things occur it is not at Oxford. The structure of Greek verse is undoubtedly one of the most intricate subjects which can engage the attention of a scholar; and for this reason those who have devoted their time to classical studies, have naturally been most anxious to unravel and explain what was least understood by those who went before them: But no attempt was ever made to introduce such a subject in the schools. The composition of Latin verse is, indeed, encouraged by an annual prize; but, as no one is compelled to write for it, such a practice cannot be considered as very dangerous or alarming. Upon

the whole, the prose authors have, at least, their share of honour; nor is it likely that any one, who has taken the trouble to attend the public examinations, will accuse the present race of under-graduates of any very preposterous and unnatural abhorrence of false quantities. There are some persons who can discover no other advantage in prosody than a little additional pleasure in reading poetry; and, in truth, the genius of the French and English languages is in this respect so different from those of ancient Greece and Rome, that it is not easy to explain to one, who possesses but a slight acquaintance with the latter, why the meanest of the ignorant and beastly mob of Athens would have hissed an actor for mispronouncing a word, while in his own country he has been accustomed to consider an accurate attention to pronunciation and prosody, as among the refinements of the higher and more learned orders, the mere offspring of arbitrary custom, which is daily changed without the smallest inconvenience. At all events, it seems an experiment of very doubtful advantage, which learned men

have of late been so imperiously called upon to make, in the devotion of that time which is now occupied even with the less important parts of classical learning, to the translation of the Greek and Latin philosophers. Some of the best of such attempts which have hitherto been made, the fruits of much labour and learning, serve but to propagate imperfect and erroneous views of the author's meaning, and prevent many persons from having recourse to the original; and thus, while they are of little benefit to the scholar, are worse than useless to the ignorant. It is melancholy to see the heads of Aristotle's Lectures converted into a "plena ac numerosa oratio," and to hear that accurate, concise, and energetic philosopher made to deliver, in vague and flowing periods, sentiments not always consistent with an earlier age than the restoration of learning.*

With those who deny all merit to classical studies, I do not presume to argue. It is not easy to explain colours to the blind. To de-

* On the subject of translation some excellent remarks occur in the first Reply, p. 113.

termine also the relative utility of different objects of knowledge, is extremely difficult, if not impossible: but it is generally admitted, that the ancient languages ought to form a distinguished branch of liberal education.—Now, why should there not be one place in the world particularly famous for Classical studies?—And why should not that same *genius loci*, or *esprit de corps*, from which so many important effects are often found to follow, be allowed to operate at Oxford, in favour of classical learning, with the same impunity with which it has been permitted to perpetuate the fame of Cambridge for Mathematics, and of Edinburgh for Medical Science?

The author of the Replies has ably argued the superior excellence of Classical studies to every other preparatory discipline, which, without teaching a man the peculiar business of any one office or calling, enriches and ennobles all his future employments, and bestows a better grace and more elevated carriage on every occupation to which his talents may chance to be directed. He exposes the absurdity of contin-

ally asking of what direct utility each particular branch of knowledge is to the individual; and thinks it sufficient to reply, that any study forms a part, however small, of that complete circle of generous education, which imparts a dignity to every profession in life. He contends, with the eloquence and enthusiasm of a scholar, that the precious remains of Grecian and Roman genius will be held more and more sacred, while genius, and taste, and learning, shall be valued among men; and that, as the human mind is the same in every age, nothing can make eloquence "less powerful, poetry less "charming, historical example less forcible, or "moral and political reflections less instruc-"tive."

I cannot deny myself the satisfaction of concluding these remarks by quoting, at length, the following passage:—*

"Never, while the world lasts, will it be "wholly disabused of that specious error, that "the more there is crammed into a young

* First Reply, p. 175.

" man's mind, whether it stays there or not,
" whether it is digested or not,—still the wiser he
" is. And writings, such as those which I have
" been examining, smart, witty, and confident,
" tend to confirm this diseased habit of think-
" ing, and to spread the contagion. A half-
" educated father hears that lectures are read in
" Chemistry, Botany, Mineralogy, &c. &c. at
" one place, and his son is learning nothing of
" this sort at school. Incapable of judging how
" mental powers are improved by continual ex-
" ercise, and how the moral character is, in a
" great measure, formed by the study of good
" authors, he fancies that when the grammar
" of a language is learnt, all farther attention to
" that language is lost time ;—that there is no-
" thing more gained, because there is no new
" name. If the boy is captivated by the no-
" velty and variety of the studies which are pre-
" sented to him, he seldom returns with any
" relish to philological pursuits. He may be-
" come a skilful agriculturist, an improver of
" manufactures, a useful inspector of roads,
" mines, and canals : but all that distinguishing

" grace which a liberal education imparts, he " foregoes for ever. It cannot be acquired in a " later period of life, if the morning of his days " have been occupied with other cares, and the " intellectual habits already settled in different " forms and postures. If, as too often happens, " these matters are received into the ears, but " take no possession of the mind, there is not " only a moral blank, but an intellectual barren- " ness,—a poverty of fancy and invention,—a " dearth of historical and poetical illustration,— " a want of all those ideas which decorate and " enliven truth, which enable us to live over " again the times that are past, and to combine " the produce of widely-distant ages."

The peculiar importance of classical learning to the English clergy, to whose profession in general the Reviewer has extended his charge against college tutors, of hostility to every liberal and useful acquirement, would of itself justify any preference it might obtain, not altogether exclusive of other branches of knowledge, in a system of education of which they are to derive the chief advantage. If it be

at all desirable, that the ministers of religion should be respected, and should respect themselves, for the learning peculiar to their profession, this must be admitted as a strong argument against a radical change in the favourite pursuits of Oxford. This ground of defence, indeed, is obvious, and has been frequently urged with much ability. I shall not therefore attempt, by any thing which I might add on this subject, to silence the unprincipled clamour for the total subversion of a system venerable for its tried utility.—On some occasions it may, perhaps, be rash to attribute to the writer, to whom I have just alluded, any meaning at all; but if his abhorrence of the University of Oxford, and his contempt for the character and pursuits of the English clergy, have any foundation in consistency or truth, it will be difficult for persons of different views to reconcile his revolutionary dogmas on these subjects, with his attachment to certain principles of the British constitution, which they have been accustomed to consider as deriving from this quarter a valuable support. To such persons it may

not appear the less important to preserve the sacred union of the Universities and the Church with the Monarchy and Aristocracy of England; that those who, on some points, give vent to open calumny and undistinguishing abuse, should on other occasions show some small deference to public feeling, in a formal profession of faith, or vague avowal of abstract attachment and metaphysical loyalty.

On the whole, every impartial person, who reads both sides of the question, must feel considerably indebted to the Edinburgh Reviewers, for having contributed, by the agitation of the subject, to bring into more general notice the Oxford "system of exertion, and scale of Aca-"demical honours, calculated (as they them-"selves observed, when it suited their argu-"ment), to produce the happiest effects;" and for establishing, on a more permanent basis than ever, the reputation of that University as a place of general education. Whether their motives have been always praiseworthy, and whether they have, in any instance, rolled a stone which has recoiled on their own heads, is of more im-

portance to themselves than to the public. The good effects of their exertions will continue to be felt, long after the causes that produced them shall have ceased to operate.

FINIS.

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CORRIGENDA.

Page 22. note l. 13. for *twenty-eight* read *twenty-seven*.

23. l. 4. *et seq.* read—*that it is strongly marked by the prejudices of the author's professional habits.*

73. l. 20. for λειοτατων λαμων ΊΕΡΕΥΣ. read, λειοτοτατων λαμων ΊΕΡΕΥΣ.

79. l. 13. for εις read ὁις.